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Abstract 
 
This study evaluated the extent to which changes in UK sport policy have impacted 
on three selected small to mid-sized national governing bodies (SMNGBs) of 
Olympic sports in England, considered to be competitive-community-grassroots 
sports rather than elite (by virtue of their loss of elite funding), and the strategies 
utilised by them to adapt to changing policy and operational environments, to 
determine their position as primarily ‘policy shapers’ or ‘policy takers.’ The analysis 
was informed by the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). 
The extent to which sport policy has impacted on SMNGBs, the strategies used to 
adapt to changes in policy, the changing nature of their relationship with government 
and governmental agencies, and their role in sport policy, have seldom been 
addressed directly in academic literature. While community sport policy has received 
some interest from scholars, there has been far less analysis on the significance of 
SMNGBs at the community level.  
The research adopted a qualitative approach within a multiple case-study design. 
The cases selected were England Handball, Volleyball England, and Table Tennis 
England. Primary data collection methods were document analysis and semi-
structured interviews with key actors.  
A thematic analysis of the data revealed a sport policy subsystem constructed or 
substantially shaped by government and agency-led coalitions, engineered on the 
basis of shared-beliefs (which are partly common to SMNGBs and Sport England 
[SE] and partly imposed by SE), and a culture of contract-compliance, shared-
interests, financial inducements/sanctions and organisational interdependencies, to 
deliver on the shifting priorities of government’s pro-social agenda. The research 
identified SMNGBs as primarily ‘policy takers’, based on: i) a largely unopposed 
acceptance of policy change by SMNGBs; ii) a willingness to adapt to change and 
comply with contractual obligations; and iii) the utilisation of various opportunistic and 
pragmatic strategies to align with the ‘core beliefs’ of government and SE, achieve 
policy outcomes, and maintain membership of the SE-led coalition. The impact of 
which has significantly shaped SMNGBs, both organisationally and operationally, 
heightened levels of resource-dependency and tensions within SMNGBs, 
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predominantly attributable to a compliance versus autonomy dichotomy, and 
exposed their weakness and vulnerability to policy change, as well as a lack of 
understanding of the policy environment.   
Application of the ACF illuminated a number of key points relevant to the 
fundamental assumptions of the framework, particularly in relation to the formation, 
composition, and boundaries of advocacy coalitions and policy subsystems, the 
ACF’s hierarchical belief system, and the ACF’s capacity to explain both policy 
change and stability, which contribute to debates on the utility of the ACF as an 
analytical framework. The evaluation of the ACF highlighted its usefulness as an 
analytical framework, but also potential weaknesses, particularly in regard to the 
limited insight given to government-constructed agency-led coalitions.   
Key words: Sport England, small to mid-sized NGBs, community, sport, policy, 
advocacy coalition framework (ACF).    
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1) Introduction 
This study has evaluated the extent to which changes in UK sport policy have 
impacted on three selected small to mid-sized national governing bodies (SMNGBs) 
of Olympic sports in England, and the strategies utilised by them to adapt to 
changing policy and operational environments, to determine their position as 
primarily ‘policy shapers’ or ‘policy takers.’ More specifically, the three SMNGBs are 
considered competitive-community-grassroots sports rather than elite, by virtue of 
their loss of elite funding from UK Sport (UKS). They have also received lower levels 
of community sport funding from Sport England (SE) relative to the average funding 
awarded to national governing bodies (NGBs) of Olympic sports. 
The extent to which sport policy has impacted on SMNGBs, the strategies used to 
adapt to changes in policy, the changing nature of their relationship with government 
and governmental agencies, and their role in sport policy, have seldom been 
addressed directly in academic literature. While community sport policy has received 
some interest from scholars, there has been far less analysis on the significance of 
SMNGBs at the community level. Previous contributions to research have mainly 
focused on elite sport policy and sporting excellence (e.g. Houlihan, 2000a; Oakley 
and Green, 2001; Green, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Green and Houlihan, 2004, 2005; 
Grix and Carmichael, 2012; Houlihan and Zheng, 2013), and school sport (e.g. 
Houlihan, 2000a; Grix and Phillpots, 2014; Mackintosh and Liddle, 2015).  
The analysis of sport policy and the three case studies was informed by the 
advocacy coalition framework (ACF), particularly as Green and Houlihan (2004, 
p.400) suggested the potential for a less prominent advocacy coalition consisting of 
a ‘cluster of competitive, but not high performance sports’, to actively engage in 
shaping sport policy, thus signposting the application of the ACF towards SMNGBs. 
Payán et al. (2017) also highlighted the limited attention given by the ACF to state 
agency-led advocacy coalitions within policy subsystems, as well as the lack of 
academic interest. Additionally, the increasing governmental interest in sport as an 
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important cross-departmental policy area, and an ‘extremely malleable resource’ to 
achieve ‘a wide variety of domestic and international [policy] goals’ (Houlihan and 
Green, 2008, p.3), has not been matched by similar levels of academic interest in the 
analysis of UK sport policy (Houlihan, 2005, p.164), and less so in the context of 
SMNGBs. The intention of this research has been to contribute to knowledge 
surrounding the impact of changing sport policy and governmental relationships on 
SMNGBs, the mechanisms adopted to adapt to change, and their capacity to 
influence or at least shape sport policy. Similarly, this study aimed to contribute 
further towards debates on the analysis of UK sport policy and the utility of the ACF 
as an analytical framework. 
The following sections within this introductory chapter provide details of the research 
aims and objectives that have underpinned this study, a rationale for investigating 
sport policy and NGBs, and the structure of this thesis. 
 
1.2) Research aims and objectives 
The aims that underpin this research are twofold: 
1) To evaluate the extent to which changes in sport policy have impacted on 
small to mid-sized NGBs, and the strategies utilised to adapt to changing 
policy and operational environments; and 
2) To determine whether small to mid-sized NGBs are primarily ‘policy shapers’ 
or ‘policy takers.’  
In order to achieve the aims, the research objectives are to:  
(a) Understand the historical context of contemporary sport policy within which 
SMNGBs operate;  
(b) Examine the development of governmental relationships with SMNGBs; 
(c) Investigate the impact of changing sport policy on SMNGBs, by means of a 
thematic analysis of operational activities; 
(d) Ascertain the strategies utilised by SMNGBs to adapt to, and operate within, a 
changing policy and operational environment; and 
(e) Evaluate the utility of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). 
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1.3) Investigating sport policy and NGBs: a rationale 
Historically, NGBs have been characterised as ‘traditionally voluntarist’ 
organisations, involved in and responsible for harmonising and enforcing the rules, 
administration, stimulating the sport's development, selecting international teams, 
organising events, and representing the interests of the domestic sport in the 
international federation (Houlihan, 1991, pp.115-116). Prior to the 1980s, NGBs 
operated within a sport policy context best characterised as 'traditional pluralism', 
where ‘market and voluntary sectors represented the major providers of sporting 
opportunity’, with the state only playing a supplementary role (Bramham and Henry, 
1991, p.140). This was followed by a ‘neo-liberal’ phase of political thinking and the 
‘rejection of state-led provision’ (Bramham and Henry, 1991, p.141), there being ‘no 
strong impulse or desire’ for a hands-on approach to sport (Jefferys, 2012, p.11). Of 
course, it would be misleading to suggest that government had no interest in sport or 
disregarded the attributes or impact of sport, particularly when it was in the national 
interest to do so. For example, the utility of sport at times of national and economic 
crisis (Horne, 1986; Horne et al., 1999), and sports’ promotion of tourism and national 
pride, such as government’s backing of the 1948 London Olympic Games (Jefferys, 
2012). Thus, reflecting Sugden and Bairner’s (1993, p.10) claim that irrespective of 
the idealistic rhetoric that ‘sport is and should be free from politics, historic evidence 
reveals that this is rarely the case.’   
From the late 1980s, governmental interest and involvement in sport became more 
regular and consistent, prompted by the belief that sport was a legitimate aspect of 
welfare provision, although government intervention and motives varied significantly 
(Houlihan, 1997; Houlihan and White, 2002). Houlihan and White (2002) noted 
further that sport policy, unlike other policy areas (e.g. education), had a more 
blurred focus and unclear legislative boundary, attributable to inter alia: i) sport’s 
emergence as a legitimate focus for welfare provision only in the last [50] years; ii) 
instability of objectives and variability in outputs and outcomes, highlighted by 
government's tendency to utilise sport to achieve a range of non-sport political 
objectives; and iii) a lack of continuity in sport policy attributed to varying salience to 
government.  
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According to Houlihan and White (2002; Pickup, 1996), increased government 
attention toward sport created a sense of unease among many NGBs, concerned 
with the imposition of uniformity from increasing government interference, and the 
undermining of NGBs’ capacity to determine their own role. Furthermore, the pattern 
of change within the operational environment of NGBs prompted increased levels of 
bureaucratisation (Houlihan, 1991), professionalisation (Coalter et al., 1988; Thibault 
et al., 1991; Henry, 1993, 2001), and resource-dependence (Borrett, 1991).  
It is generally accepted that sport was increasingly acknowledged as falling within 
the remit of government during the period between the 1960s and 1990s. However, 
sport’s elevation to a higher degree of salience, arguably gained momentum from the 
mid-1990s following the introduction of the National Lottery (Lottery), particularly in 
relation to elite sport and youth/school sport. Equally, the relationship between 
government and NGBs has changed dramatically from one of deference and 
entitlement, to one of contractual complexity and greater resource-dependency. 
Table 1.1 illustrates the dimensions of change in the political status of sport policy 
and its significance to NGBs since 1960.    
It is clear that the increasingly dynamic policy and operational environment of NGBs, 
identifiable within Table 1.1, has placed a premium on the ability of NGBs, 
particularly SMNGBs and those that have suffered a loss of elite funding, to 
anticipate and adapt to change, and acquire new entrepreneurial and political 
qualities to engage with government and governmental agencies at a policy level. It 
is these set of challenges which are of interest to this study. The significance of 
community sport policy, although not neglected completely, has been overlooked 
(Thurston, 2017), as have those sports considered to be emerging, developing or 
declining within the UK, where previous studies have been weighted towards 
traditional British sports (e.g. football, rugby union, cricket, and athletics). 
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Table 1.1: Dimensions of sport policy change and significance to NGBs 
Dimension 1960-1990 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Salience to 
government 
Low. Increasing following John 
Major’s appointment as 
Prime Minister (PM). 
Notable level of continuity 
following Labour’s return 
to government. 
  
Consistently and 
significantly higher than 
1960–1990; increasing 
use of sport to meet 
government‘s pro-social 
agenda. 
 
Public Policy 
objectives for 
Sport (direct 
and indirect) 
Vague, except in 
response to specific 
problems (e.g. football 
hooliganism).  
Emerging strong focus 
on elite/school sport. 
Vague aspirations; dual 
prioritisation elite/school 
sport; hosting major 
events (e.g. successful 
bid to host the 2012 
Olympics in London. 
 
Shifting focus from 
‘sports for sports sake’ to 
‘sport for social good.’ 
Machinery of 
government 
concerned 
with sport 
Neglected with limited 
resources; confused 
overlapping remits. 
Reduction in overlapping 
remits, due to the 
establishment of UKS, 
and appointment of a 
Minister for Sport, within 
a ministry responsible for 
sport. 
 
Still very complex. 
 
Performance 
management culture; 
reform and 
modernisation; continued 
complexity. 
Still complex – greater 
intent for joined-up 
government; changing 
remits of governmental 
agencies; continued 
modernisation and 
reform. 
Distribution 
of power in 
the policy 
sub-sector 
Lobbying capacity weak 
in both the not-for-profit 
and commercial sectors. 
Increasing lobbying 
activity by Central 
Council for Physical 
Recreation (CCPR) and 
NGBs. 
 
Aggressive lobbying from 
NGBs, especially from 
the ‘big 5.’ 
More vigorous policy 
network with more 
effectively organised 
interests, especially elite 
sport, but also in relation 
youth/school sport and 
social sport, though less 
intensified. 
 
Sport Policy 
Outcomes 
Limited connection 
between public policy 
inputs, outputs and 
outcomes. 
Significant increases in 
resources available from 
central government (via 
National Lottery funding). 
Increased funding and 
new role for UKS/SE – 
narrower focus on ‘sport 
for sport’s sake’; shift 
from mass participation 
to a nationally-defined 
strategy to increase 
participation and elite 
success.  
 
Tighter integration 
between public and not-
for-profit sectors; 
substantial success at 
elite-level (increasing 
Olympic/Paralympic 
podium success); 
gradual decline in mass 
participation; shifting 
emphasis towards 
social/health benefits of 
sport. 
  
Significance 
for NGBs 
Increased government 
attention and funding; 
role uncertainty and 
confusion; increased 
intervention and 
bureaucracy.   
Fundamental change in 
cultural, policy and 
operational environments 
of NGBs; major shift from 
entitlement to evidence-
based monitoring and 
resource distribution. 
  
Greater government 
intervention; reduced 
autonomy; complexity 
and confusion; resource- 
dependency; changed 
remit to ‘deliverers’ of 
sport to meet policy 
objectives. 
  
Significant government 
intervention; changed 
remit for NGBs from 
deliverers of sport back 
to ‘core’ market; shift 
away from ‘one size fits 
all’ agenda; continued 
compliance and 
resource-dependency; 
reduced funding. 
    
Source adapted from: Houlihan and Lindsay (2013) 
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The community-social sport policy and operational environment of NGBs has also 
been subjected to a further significant change following the publishing of 
government’s policy document, Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation 
(2015)1, which has strengthened the relevance of this research. In particular, the 
sport policy pendulum has again swung away from ‘sports for sport’s sake’ back to 
‘sport for social good’, reversing the role of NGB/SMNGBs within the sport policy 
environment from a key mechanism for achieving government’s overall outcomes for 
sport, back to ‘core’ market delivery (i.e. those who maintain a strong and resilient 
relationship with sport and activity) within a more intense mixed economy model for 
community-social and grassroots sport. 
 
1.4) Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of three theoretical chapters and four empirical chapters, 
followed by a final discussion and conclusions chapter. 
Chapter Two, Sport Policy and NGBs, focuses on the historical context of UK sport 
policy. The chapter provides a chronological review and analysis of the development 
of sport policy within which NGB/SMNGBs have operated, and examines how 
changing policy since the early 1960s has altered governments’ expectations of and 
relationships with NGBs, and affected the functional and operational environments 
within which they work. Apart from highlighting the lack of academic research 
focused on NGBs, especially SMNGBs, the review of sport policy identified the 
themes that informed and guided this research. 
Chapter Three, Theorising Policy at the Meso-level, reviews the theoretical literature 
that underpins this study, in particular, an understanding and assessment of three 
analytical frameworks, namely, new institutionalism, the multiple streams framework 
(MSF), and the ACF, since the principal level of analysis in this research is at the 
meso-level. The evaluation of macro-level assumptions and the nature of power 
relations have served to sensitise the researcher to particular relationships and 
different aspects of the policy process. The chapter concludes by identifying the 
                                                          
1
 Referred to as, Sporting Future, throughout this thesis. 
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framework found to be of greatest potential value for analysing sport policy in relation 
to NGB/SMNGBs. 
Chapter Four, Methodology and Research Design, outlines the research strategy for 
this study utilising the structure advocated by Grix (2002), beginning with the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin this research, followed by 
a more detailed discussion on the critical realist research paradigm adopted for this 
study. The chapter continues with a discussion on the research strategy and 
methods considered to be the most logical and appropriate in achieving the research 
aims and objectives, including rationales and justifications for: the use of a multiple 
case-study research design, and case selection; the qualitative approach to this 
study and use of document analysis and semi-structured interviews as the primary 
methods of data collection; and the use of a thematic analysis of the data. This is 
followed by a discussion of periodisation, and justifications and explanations for the 
particular time periods that have been adopted for the purposes of this study. The 
chapter closes with a discussion on validity and reliability.   
Chapter Five, The UK Sport Policy Subsystem, is the first of the empirical chapters, 
focused on the conceptualisation of the sport policy subsystem within the UK, 
utilising the ACF as the theoretical framework for analysing sport policy. The purpose 
of this chapter is to identify and define the UK sport policy subsystem and policy 
actors; the existence of advocacy coalitions; the factors that have influenced policy 
change over a decade or more; and the key impacts of policy change on NGBs. 
Operational aspects of power are also embedded within discussions. The chapter 
closes with concluding remarks on the key findings of the research.   
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, present evidence within a common structure on the 
three selected SMNGBs. Each chapter starts with an introductory profile of the 
SMNGB, followed by a discussion on governmental relationships and the thematic 
analysis on operational activities, as guided by the research objectives, literature 
review and further findings within Chapter 5. Threaded throughout the chapters are 
relevant links and discussions that reflect the nature of power and the utility of the 
ACF. The concluding section summarises the key findings of each case study in 
relation to the aims and objectives of this research.  
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Chapter Nine, Theoretical and Empirical Evaluations and Research Implications, 
presents the key findings and conclusions drawn from the empirical chapters that 
directly address the aims and objectives of this study, drawing particular attention to 
the similarities and differences between the selected SMNGBs, and the utility of the 
ACF as a theoretical framework for analysing UK sport policy. Included within this 
chapter are the implications of this study for UK sport policy, SMNGBs and the ACF. 
A concluding section completes this chapter.   
Chapter 10, Conclusions, is the final chapter of this thesis and presents a summary 
of the key findings and conclusions drawn from each chapter that directly address 
the aims and objectives of this study. This is followed by a review of the limitations of 
this research and directions towards future academic enquiry. This final chapter 
concludes with a reflection on the research process.  
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Chapter Two 
Sport Policy and NGBs 
 
2.1) Introduction 
An understanding of the historical context of contemporary sport policy within which 
SMNGBs operate, and an analysis of the impact of policy change on SMNGBs, are 
an integral part of this study. This chapter provides a review of literature appertaining 
to the development of UK sport policy since the 1960s, with an emphasis on 
community sport policy and its implications for NGBs. The inclusion of policy 
development between 1960 and 1995 is considered important contextually to set the 
scene for the more in-depth review of policy documents from Sport: Raising the 
Game (1995), through to the current published policy document Sporting Future: A 
New Strategy for an Active Nation (2015), illustrating the extent to which 
governments’ expectations of and relationships with NGBs have altered, and 
affected the functional and operational environments within which they work. The 
review also highlights the lack of academic research focused on NGBs, especially 
SMNGBs, and the impact of sport policy post-2008, as well as supporting the 
identification of initial analytical themes that were considered relevant to inform and 
guide the case study research, as seen in the concluding section of this chapter.  
 
2.2) Wolfenden and the Sports Council 1960 to 1995: setting the 
scene 
The Wolfenden Report, commissioned by the CCPR and published in 1960, was a 
response to the challenges faced by sport in post-war Britain (Holt and Mason, 2000; 
Jeffreys, 2012). According to Coghlan and Webb (1990, pp.8-12), Wolfenden 
provided the public at large with ‘formal recognition’ of society’s responsibilities in the 
field of sport, and challenged government to provide for sport as never before. Thus, 
providing NGBs with potential opportunities to develop and expand, while still 
preserving their autonomy. Government intervention in sport was premised on three 
key assumptions: i) sport had a role in alleviating the problem of (adolescent) urban 
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disorder (Hargreaves, 1986; Holt and Mason, 2000); ii) a need to respond to 
increasing electoral pressure to improve sport and recreation opportunities; and iii) a 
realisation that state-funded sport could help to improve Britain’s ailing international 
sporting achievements (Houlihan, 1991; Holt and Mason, 2000).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
In line with Wolfenden’s recommendations, and despite political infighting between 
government departments and Whitehall inertia (Jefferys, 2012), the Advisory Sports 
Council (ASC) was established in 1965, signposting the recognition of sport as a 
legitimate interest of government (Coghlan and Webb, 1990; Binfield and Stevenson, 
1993; Houlihan and White, 2002). According to Coghlan and Webb (1990, p.21), the 
ASC’s remit was to advise government ‘on matters relating to the development of 
amateur sport and recreation’, focused on the provision of community sports 
facilities, planned and coordinated distribution of community resources, and sport 
development. Yet, Coalter et al. (1988; Coghlan and Webb, 1990) noted that the 
ASC had initially directed a large proportion of funding into elite sport, particularly to 
strengthen the administrative and coaching structure of NGBs; albeit dependent 
upon their ability to meet funding criteria and close scrutiny of proposals that 
demonstrated the need for funding. Arguably, this identifies the first signs of 
extended state influence over NGBs, where the ASC’s ‘use of economic power’ can 
be viewed as directly ‘rationalising and modernising the elite sector' (Coalter et al., 
1988, p.58). That said, the relationship between sport/NGBs and government/ASC 
remained one of deference and uncertainty, in part due to restrictions on funding and 
political reluctance to fully priortise sport, as seen by the ‘lack of a comprehensive 
and intelligent approach to sport and recreation’ (Polley, 1998, p.24). 
However, the reconstitution of the Sports Council in 1972, by Royal Charter, 
signalled a significant change in the relationship between sport and government. The 
stated aim of SC was to ‘raise standards of performance in sport and physical 
recreation' (Coghlan and Webb, 1990, p.67), primarily focused on encouraging 
participation, improving the provision of new sports facilities for the wider community, 
and improving Britain’s international performance (Holt and Mason, 2000), although 
Houlihan and White (2002) claimed that the allocation of funding remained skewed 
towards elite sport, as opposed to mass participation. Notwithstanding the above, the 
Sports Council launched its Sport for All (1972) campaign, in a concerted effort to 
increase mass participation in sport. However, while Coghlan and Webb (1990, p.69) 
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suggested that Sport for All was influential in shifting policy beliefs towards the ‘value 
of sport in society, increasing participation in sport and physical recreation and 
promoting sport as a desirable social concept’, other authors argued that Sport for All 
was merely a slogan, since resources were targeted to a greater extent towards 
ameliorating government’s wider social policy concerns (Coalter et al., 1988; Henry, 
1993, 2001; Green, 2003).  
According to McIntosh and Charlton’s (1985) Sport for All was well supported by 
NGBs, although in varying degrees, although a review of Sports Council-led political 
strategies for sport, including Sport for All (1972), Sport in the Community – The 
Next Ten Years (1982), and Sport in the Community – Into the 90s. A strategy for 
sport 1988-1993 (1988), has shown the lack of a clearly defined role for NGBs in the 
development and implementation of sport policy (see Appendix I). Coghlan and 
Webb (1990) also noted a minimal response from NGBs to the Sports Council’s 
1982 strategy, which signified a lack of understanding of the social or welfare role of 
sport, rather than a lack of interest, although Keech (2011, p.218) argued that the 
above strategy had been ‘ill-defined, resulting in ineffectual organisations responding 
to ineffectual policy goals.’ This echoed Houlihan and Green’s (2009, p.678) earlier 
observations of the ‘fragmentation, fractiousness and perceived ineffectiveness of 
organisations within the sport policy area.’ The lack of a clear definable role for 
NGBs, arguably a reflection of the persistent entanglements between the Sports 
Council, the CCPR (acting in the interests of NGBs), and the British Olympic 
Association ([BOA] – who also believed they acted in the interests of NGBs) 
(Coghlan and Webb, 1990; Roche, 1993; Pickup, 1996; Horne et al., 1999).   
Furthermore, the Sports Council’s 1988 strategy (Sports Council, 1988) 
acknowledged the constant disharmony and discord within England’s sport system, 
and that participation in many traditional sports had become static, particularly due to 
decreased participation among young adults aged 16-24, also signposting a decline 
in NGBs’ own memberships (Pickup, 1996). Moreover, the ‘New Right’ Conservative 
government’s social and economic policies under Thatcher, encapsulated 
decreasing public expenditure, competitive tendering (privatisation and contracting-
out), efficiency maximisation, and the reshaping of school curriculums, which created 
new challenges for sport (Sports Council, 1988) and those NGBs in receipt of 
considerable financial support. The latter having raised concerns over how much 
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was sport doing for itself to help improve its revenue base, and alleviate its 
dependence on Sports Council grant-aid (Coghlan and Webb, 1990; Pickup, 1996). 
NGB involvement in raising participation levels also continued to be marginal, 
consistent with the divided opinions on their ability to meet participation objectives, 
partly due to their ‘lack of supporting structures and the absence of clear objectives’ 
(Sports Council, 1988, p.45). Houlihan and White (2002, p.61) also noted that the 
Sports Council had demonstrated a desire to 'redefine its relationship with its [NGB] 
partners on a more contractual basis', arguably to establish greater uniformity and 
central direction among NGBs (Sports Council, 1988), and the improvement of their 
financial and governance controls (Coghlan and Webb, 1990). Conversely though, it 
was also the Sports Council’s belief that ‘total rationalisation’ of NGBs was an 
‘impossible dream’, and interestingly, a ‘mixed economy was inevitable’ (Sports 
Council, 1988, p.47).  
 
2.3) Major’s Raising the Game and the Lottery    
According to Houlihan and White (2002, p.2; Holt and Mason, 2000; Jefferys, 2012; 
Houlihan and Lindsey, 2013), the election of John Major as leader of the 
Conservative Party in November 1990, ‘brought sport … closer to the centre of the 
political stage’, signposting an improved position for sport/NGBs as a strategic 
priority for government policy. For Major, sport was not a peripheral concern, but a 
‘central part of Britain’s National Heritage’ (Department of National Heritage [DNH], 
1995, p.2) and ‘part of the fabric of society’ (Major, 1999, pp.402-405). Furthermore, 
during his time at the Treasury, Major (2006)2 concluded that:  
‘[L]eisure pursuits could never expect to receive sufficient money or encouragement 
from public funds; in any race for resources, the demands of health, education, 
pensions and defence would … always come first.’  
Major’s solution to the funding problem was the introduction of the Lottery to provide 
resources for sport (as one of the five good causes), which would benefit from 20% 
of the funds generated (Oakley and Green, 2001) and an estimated annual allocation 
of £300m, thus providing sport organisations, in particular NGBs, with much needed 
                                                          
2
 Direct quotations not displaying a page number refer to online sources. 
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financial support to ease some of the financial pressures that had developed over 
the previous decade, although the demands of funding criteria often left some poorer 
sports unable to raise the required 35% match-funding for their project (Houlihan and 
White, 2002). More importantly, the Lottery gave government considerable leverage 
over the direction of policy, and the ability to keep a tight rein on central government 
funding/expenditure (Jefferys, 2012).  
While the Major government’s published sport policy document, Sport: Raising the 
Game (1995)3, was viewed as a concerted effort to bring the focus of sport to the 
attention of Parliament (DNH, 1995, pp.1-2), it is likely that tabloid assertions 
suggesting sport was ‘under-funded … [and] … second-rate’ and ‘the reason why 
sport was in such a dire state was a direct responsibility of the Government’ 
(Jefferys, 2012, p.210), were also explicit enough motives for Major to reassert 
greater government control over sport, particularly now that sport/NGBs would have 
access to previously unimaginable financial resources. The key priorities of Raising 
the Game were threefold (DNH, 1995, pp.1-2): i) to bring about a sea change in the 
prospects of sport from pupil to podium; ii) rebuild the strength of every level of 
British sport; and iii) re-establish sport as one of the great a pillars of education, 
predominantly based on the belief that sport in schools was ‘the single most 
important element in the sporting continuum’ (DNH, 1995, p.6). This signalled a shift 
in government priorities from mass participation to a twin track of elite performance 
and school sport (Houlihan, 1997). 
For NGBs, there was an indication of a more defined role, albeit a vague focus on 
forging links with schools and filling in the gaps where possible, through the provision 
of resources and coaching, encouragement of youth inclusion within affiliated clubs, 
and the development of inter-school competitions (DNH 1995). In support of 
government’s aspirations for school sport, the Youth Sports Trust (YST) was 
established in 1994 as a non-governmental organisation, to manage the 
development of youth sport and develop better communication between schools and 
NGBs (DNH, 1995). More importantly for NGBs, Raising the Game conveyed the 
message that future funding allocations to NGBs would be conditional on the explicit 
support of government objectives (Houlihan, 1997, p.95).   
                                                          
3
 Referred to as, Raising the Game, within this thesis. 
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Despite a change in political administration to a New Labour government following 
the 1997 General Election, a high degree of continuity was observed within UK sport 
policy, especially the emphasis placed upon school/elite sport development to 
facilitate British international success (Houlihan and White, 2002), although Houlihan 
(2000, p.175) claimed that while New Labour had ‘begun to make good its policy 
commitments in the area of sport’, notably, there had been ‘far greater progress in 
addressing the issues associated with the elite end of the sports continuum.’  
According to Keech (2011), the election of 1997 coincided with the emergence of 
significant tension within sport policy and sport objectives, particularly in the debate 
between investment in community sport and investment to meet the specialist needs 
of elite sport, although arguably this represents a central dichotomy in most, if not all 
domestic sport policies (Bailey and Talbot, 2015). Partly in response to this tension, 
government opted to restructure the Sports Council by dividing its responsibilities 
between UKS and SE (and other Home Nation Sports Councils). Accordingly, SE’s 
remit was the advancement of sport across the development continuum and to work 
alongside UKS, now solely responsible for the progression of elite athletes and 
related policy objectives (e.g. sport event hosting) (Houlihan and White, 2002). 
However, the restructuring of the Sports Council received a negative response from 
those sports organisations who perceived the bifurcation between British and Home 
Nation sport, as an increase in jurisdictional complexity. As noted by Houlihan and 
White (2002), NGBs were frustrated by the changing governmental expectations that 
required them to deal with an additional body, and cope with increasingly complex 
procedures to secure funding.  
Moreover, an emergent strategy from New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ political ideology, 
the Best Value scheme, was utilised to drive the modernisation and reform of a 
broad range of public services, including sport, in order to improve levels of 
efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery (Robinson, 2004; Green and 
Houlihan, 2005). The impact of the Best Value policy on NGBs can be seen through 
SE’s incorporation of the policy as part of its 'priority sports' criteria, whereby only 
prioritised sport/NGBs received financial support, and only upon addressing welfare 
related goals (e.g. improved social inclusion). The scale of change facing NGBs was 
clearly signalled by SE (Sport England [SE], 1999, p.34):  
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'[W]hereas previously, a [NGB] was often a small concern, run by committed 
volunteers; it can now be a multi-million pound business. This brings far greater 
responsibility for efficient management and financial propriety.'  
 
 2.4) Sporting Future for All, Game Plan, Playing to Win: the ‘Third 
Way’ 
Under Tony Blair’s New Labour government, the Department for Culture Media and 
Sport (DCMS – formerly DNH) published Sporting Future for All: The Government’s 
Plan for Sport (2000), and Game Plan: A strategy for delivering Government sport 
and physical activity objectives (2002)4. Both policy documents reiterated John 
Major’s claim that ‘[s]port matters’ (Department for Culture Media and Sport [DCMS], 
2000, p.2), and was an under-used, yet powerful political tool (DCMS, 2002a, p.5). 
Indeed, Blair (2000) raised the political profile of sport across government 
departments by proclaiming that Sporting Future for All was ‘not only a sports policy, 
it is a health policy, an education policy, a crime policy, and an anti-drugs policy.’  
As alluded to previously, a notable level of continuity existed between New Labour’s 
policies for sport and the Conservative’s Raising the Game, especially the dual 
prioritisation of school sport and elite sport development (DCMS, 2002a, p.11; Green 
and Houlihan, 2005, 2006). Observable differences between the policy strategies 
were a renewed focus on sport and physical activity in schools to increase 
grassroots participation (particularly for health benefits), and a move towards 
‘identifying and nurturing sporting talent to facilitate sustainable improvements at an 
international sporting level’ (DCMS, 2002a, p.7). Arguably though, Game Plan did 
not change the policies established in Sporting Future for All, but provided a more 
comprehensive statement of policy objectives and delivery mechanisms, in part due 
to the Cunningham Report5 (2001, p.5; UKS, 2002a), which concluded that ‘radical 
steps’ were required to ‘create a world class system capable of producing consistent 
success in the international arena.’ 
                                                          
4 
Respectively referred to as, Sporting Future for All and Game Plan, throughout this thesis. 
  
5
 The Cunningham report laid out a constructive set of proposals aimed at the continued evolution of UKS’s elite funding 
system, and an increased focus on the ever-changing needs of top athletes and coaches.  
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Government had branded Sporting Future for All as a new way of thinking about 
sport (DCMS, 2000), although not in terms of what sport could do for government, 
but rather how this could be achieved through a ‘radical rethink of the way sport 
[was] funded and organised’ (DCMS, 2000, p.19), and a ‘radical change in the 
relationship between government and NGBs’ (DCMS, 2000, p.20). More specifically, 
the government’s intention was to realise its vision for sport through a reform agenda 
and a ‘modernisation partnership with [NGBs]’ (DCMS, 2000, p.19), which was a key 
recommendation within Game Plan. The organisation and management of sport was 
still regarded as ‘fragmented and too often unprofessional’, and criticised for being 
‘inefficient, lacking vision, and failing to develop common goals’, especially in high 
public profile sports (DCMS, 2000, pp.5-7; Deloitte and Touche, 2003; Green, 2009). 
A common claim was that British sport was plagued by ‘infighting and turf-wars 
generated by overlapping organisational responsibilities’ (DCMS, 2000, p.163; 
Foster, 2004). Foster (2004, p.11) explicitly cited the existence of ‘backbiting, 
prejudice, blindness to the facts and a disturbing resistance to change’ in athletics, 
which could equally apply to other sports (see Dutton, 2006). According to Deloitte 
and Touche (2003, pp. 1-2), change was clearly necessary within some NGBs, 
where evidence suggested a ‘lack of basic administrative and professional support 
which is essential for any organisation’, and that if NGBs were to realise their full 
potential in meeting the challenges of sport in the 21st Century, ‘many will need to 
reform.’  
Sporting Future for All asserted that NGBs should develop 'a clear strategy for 
participation and excellence’ to receive public funds (DCMS, 2000, p.20), whereby 
greater emphasis was placed on the importance of target-setting, with the caveat 
that ‘success or failure in achieving milestone targets in performance plans [would] 
be an important factor in deciding future levels of funding’ (DCMS, 2000, p.14). 
According to Green and Houlihan (2006, p.58), Game Plan set priorities for ‘a wide 
range of sporting activity including participation rates, elite sport development, the 
hosting of major events, and, notably, the overly bureaucratic nature of sports 
administration in the UK.’ A clear example of the impact of Game Plan is the 
modernisation of SE and its radical transformation from a sports development 
agency concerned with mass participation, to a strategic-lead agency responsible for 
community sport and the co-ordination of government policy through other 
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organisations (Keech, 2011). Despite government critique of the inadequacies of 
NGBs, both UKS and SE had received sustained levels of criticism by major political 
parties and NGBs, for example, Houlihan and Green (2009, p.678) noted that both 
agencies were accused of being: 
‘unresponsive to the needs of their clients, overly bureaucratic and complex, 
especially in relation to accessing funds; and incoherent due to overlapping 
responsibilities, the lack of strategic clarity and the generation of an excess of what 
are often termed short-term initiatives.’  
While SE acknowledged some of the criticism and the need for reform and 
modernisation, the momentum for change was largely government-driven, resulting 
from government’s acceptance of the salience of sport and physical activity 
programmes as solutions to various policy issues, such as health and education 
(Houlihan and Green, 2009, p.687).  
As noted in Game Plan (DCMS, 2002a, p.18), SE’s new, rationalised role recognised 
the governmental agency as ‘investors in sport rather than deliverers.’ The 
alternations of which prompted a greater focus on customer-based funding and 
revised Lottery criteria for mass participation/community sport funding, within a 
performance regime of ‘constant measuring, monitoring and evaluation’, to ensure 
valued delivery from limited resources (SE, 2003, p.2). The latter included the 
introduction of two major surveys, SE’s Active People Survey (APS) conducted on 
an annual basis, and DCMS’s Taking Part, both contributing to the evidence base in 
sport (Robinson, 2004). According to Houlihan and Green (2009, p.689), the 
increasing use of contractual arrangements from DCMS to SE/UKS, down through 
the ‘spine of accountability’, not only captured the ‘new expectations from 
government’ of its agencies and those in receipt of public funding (e.g. NGBs) further 
down the ‘sporting-food-chain’, but ensured compliance with government policy.  
The above critique of SE also prompted the publishing of the new ‘Framework for 
Sport in England’ (SE, 2004b), which identified seven generic key performance 
indicators (KPIs) for NGBs to work towards, as part of an effective policy monitoring 
process. The KPIs related to mass participation, club accreditation, membership 
numbers, coaching qualifications, volunteer loyalty, international success, and British 
representation (SE, 2004b, p.7). Furthermore, NGBs were required to develop a 
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thorough and robust Whole Sport Plan (WSP) in order to receive funding, which 
articulated long-term goals, agreed outcomes and delivery plans for individual sports, 
while also outlining the level of investment required (over the four-year funding 
cycle), and how funding was to be spent, monitored and evaluated (SE, 2004b, 
p.17). It is clear that the level of reform had daunting implications for many of the 
more traditional NGBs within British sport, which had not previously considered 
adopting the principles and practices of strategic management. For example, 
Robinson (2004) highlighted four main challenges experienced by sport 
organisations in relation to the modernisation agenda: i) the limited understanding or 
appreciation of performance management processes; ii) the use of poorly specified 
KPIs; iii) the inadequacy of existing organisational structures; and iv) the defensive 
attitudes of sport organisation management who were threatened by the prospect of 
change. It is this final challenge that has arguably been the most restrictive in the 
application of performance management systems within sport. According to Melville 
(2012), the increasing dependency of NGBs on public funding for their survival 
and/or expansion, and the criteria for receiving public funding, slowly forced attitudes 
to modernise and incorporate more professional managerial approaches, through a 
‘process of continuing development … towards greater effectiveness, efficiency and 
independence’ (Deloitte and Touche, 2003, p.2).  
While DCMS (2002a, p.18) claimed that the modernisation of UKS mirrored many of 
the hallmarks of SE’s experience, Houlihan and Green (2009, p.692) argued that ‘the 
level of disdain shown by government to [SE was] not as evident’, the most important 
manifestation of reform for UKS being the appointment of Sue Campbell as Reform 
Chair that ‘signalled the start of something very different.’ A significant change was 
the sharpening of UKS’s wider strategic goals and the implementation of its No 
Compromise approach, in a bid to increase Treasury funding for 2012. The No 
Compromise principle prioritised Olympic success, fundamental pre-requisites of 
which were modern, fit-for-purpose and professional NGBs, and the targeting of elite 
resources ‘solely at those athletes capable of delivering medal-winning 
performances’ (UKS, 2006a, p.1). UKS’s remit was to ensure that investment of 
public funds was not wasted, to challenge NGBs to spend funds to maximum effect, 
and to exert influence and intervene in NGB affairs to ensure that they were in good 
shape. The rationale behind such intervention reflected UKS’s modernising agenda, 
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also aimed at reducing NGBs’ dependency on UKS and the encouragement of 
greater self-sufficiency. However, as argued by Houlihan and Green (2009, p.693), 
this also led to incidents of ‘enforced self-sufficiency.’  
Green (2009. p.131) provided a particular critique of government’s modernisation 
agenda, by questioning whether ‘such radical restructuring of the major national 
sports bodies would have been effected … with such expediency, had the IOC votes 
for the 2012 Olympic games not favoured London.’ Interestingly, UKS (2005, p.1, 
cited in Green, 2009, p.131) noted that following the award of the Home Olympics in 
2005, ‘NGBs of Olympic sports argued that a single agency should have 
responsibility for performance pathway … from talent identification through to 
podium.’ For Green (2009, p.131), this hinted towards restructuring favouring 
Olympic success, rather than ‘organisational repair’ to achieve the ‘primary policy 
objectives for elite success and youth participation in sport’, as argued by Houlihan 
and Green (2009, p.682). Indeed, Jefferys (2012) suggested that Game Plan’s 
policies had been distorted following London's successful Olympic bid, leading to the 
safeguarding of elite funding in the medium term, particularly as the Conservative-led 
Coalition government believed the Home Olympics would secure a range of benefits 
over and above the impact on sport. The skewed focus towards elite sport was a 
prominent feature of government’s sport policy document, Playing to Win: A New era 
for Sport (2008)6, which undoubtedly reflected the pressures and expectations 
associated with London 2012. As noted by DCMS (2008, foreword), Playing to Win 
was a plan ‘to expand the pool of talented English sportsmen and women [in all 
sports]; and to break records, win medals and win tournaments for this country’, 
where such endeavour would be achieved through ‘shared goals, clear 
responsibilities, and everyone playing their part.’  
Notwithstanding the above, the London Olympic bid in 2005 was also premised on 
the utility of the 2012 Olympic Games to promote a sporting legacy of increased 
sports participation. The DCMS (2008), within its legacy plans, outlined government 
aims to make the UK a world-leading sporting nation by inspiring people to get 
involved in sport to increase participation levels, and advance elite-level 
achievements. However, according to Girginov (2013, p.4), this ‘could not be 
                                                          
6 Referred to as, Playing to Win,  throughout this thesis.    
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achieved without developing the organisational capacities of NGBs who form the 
backbone of the UK national sporting system’, which was certainly reflective of 
DCMS’s (2008, p.14) statement that: 
‘It was essential to review and refocus community sport and [SE] to give greater 
clarity of purpose; reduce inefficiency and bureaucracy; and make it easier for NGBs 
and sports to access funding to improve sport and ensure that under-represented 
groups get equal treatment.’  
According to Keech (2011, p.220), NGBs had also aggressively lobbied government 
for ‘increased funding and a redefined role for national sports’, as the belief was that 
SE responsibilities were too broad. The result was agreement from government to 
shift governmental objectives away from sport’s role in broader social outcomes, 
returning to a narrower focus on developing ‘sports for sport’s sake’. Thus, signalling 
a ‘substantial shift from a “bottom-up” mass participation strategy to a nationally- 
defined strategy for each sport’ (Keech, 2011, p.221), and government’s intention to 
put ‘experts and enthusiasts in charge, offering sports more freedom and control …, 
[as this] goes with the grain of what people in sport want’ (DCMS, 2008, p.21). As 
Parnell (2007, cited in Keech, 2011, p.220) argued, ‘we will never build a world class 
community sports infrastructure unless we are clear that sport is a good thing and 
competition is a good thing’, and that for sport development and participation to have 
a clearly defined focus, ‘NGBs (and clubs, coaches and volunteers within their 
domain) need to excel.’  
According to SE, NGBs were ‘placed at the heart’ of SE’s 2008-11 strategy, the 
assumption being that the networks of NGB community clubs would ‘drive delivery’ 
(SE, 2008, p.10; Green, 2009) on SE’s Grow, Sustain, Excel outcomes. The NGB-
centric approach undertaken by government/SE challenged NGBs to (SE, 2008): i) 
increase adult sports participation by one million by 2012-2013; ii) ensure more 
people were satisfied with important aspects of sport to sustain participation and 
avoid drop-off; and iii) develop talent support systems and pathways for each sport 
to improve and maintain talent identification. However, Keech (2011, p.226) noted an 
open acknowledgement from SE that half the projected increases in participation 
were based on the targets of eight key popular, well-managed and resourced sports, 
and argued that such a narrow focus could lead to failure if a ‘culture of greater 
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participation’ amongst all sport was not achieved. Keech (2011, p.226) also argued 
that WSPs empowered NGBs with ‘greater autonomy and control over the 
investment of public funds’ to meet targets set-down by SE, although additional 
assistance and support would inevitably be required for NGBs with fewer resources, 
weaker governance and smaller memberships. More importantly, NGBs were in the 
spotlight having wanted and achieved greater responsibility, but such autonomy 
equated to achieving participation targets to secure future investment of public funds 
into community sport (Keech, 2011, p.229).  
According to Green (2009, p.131), modernisation and reform within the sport policy 
environment required NGBs to ‘embrace funding decisions and new governance 
arrangements characterised by New Labour’s bias for “strong tools of government”’, 
with far less discretion within their own operational environment. A clear indication of 
which, was the requirement for NGBs to radically modernise to earn the right 
(emphasis mine) to partner with government (DCMS, 2002a, pp.145-147; DCMS, 
2008, p.15). The drive for modernisation reinforced by the threat financial sanctions, 
whereby ‘any sport not wishing to accept this challenge – funding [would] be 
switched to those that do’ (DCMS, 2008, p.2). For Houlihan and Green (2009, 
p.690), SE had become a ‘mechanism to control and not to actually delegate’, the 
increasing complexity of performance regimes posing a challenge for some NGBs 
still wedded to the notion ‘that they know what is best for their sports’ (Houlihan and 
White, 2002, p.165), and those resistant to self-regulation (Fahlén et al., 2015). 
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2.5) Creating a Sporting Habit for Life: an Olympic legacy 
The change in government in May 2010 from New Labour to a Conservative-led 
Coalition brought about a ‘sea change in politics’, and the transformation of the 
political landscape with heightened levels of scrutiny (d’Ancona, 2010). Indeed, SE 
(2011, p.2) acknowledged that sport was now ‘under the spotlight as never before’, 
particularly as the increased levels of scrutiny within the sport policy domain 
reflected continuing austerity and economic uncertainty (SE, 2010a, 2011). DCMS 
(2012, p.3) also highlighted the decreasing trend in 16-25 participation rates since 
2005 (especially in more traditional sports), and the continued drop-off among school 
leavers. Thus, the emphasis of government’s policy statement for sport, Creating a 
Sporting Habit for Life: A new youth sport strategy (2012)7, was a renewed focus on 
youth sport aimed at harnessing ‘the power of the Olympics and Paralympics to 
create a deep and lasting legacy of sports participation in every community’ (DCMS, 
2012, p.1). While the collective focus for sport continued to endorse the objective of 
mass participation, albeit with a particular focus on 14-25 year olds (SE, 2012a, p.4), 
the ultimate goal was to achieve a tangible ‘transformation of the UK’s sporting 
culture’ towards becoming an active nation (DCMS, 2012, p.2). To the extent that, 
against a backdrop of centralised austerity budgeting, government commitment to 
sport policy included an investment of £1bn of Exchequer and Lottery funding (SE, 
2012d, p.4), and the restoration of the Lottery to the original four pillars, increasing 
sport’s share to 20% (DCMS, 2012, p.1; SE, 2011) from 16.6% (UKS, 2010, p.6).   
The idea that the Home Olympics could provide a unique opportunity to deliver a 
‘long-term step change in people playing sport’ (DCMS, 2012, p.3), was plausible, 
but also decidedly questionable. Previous research suggested that mega-sporting-
events had no measurable impact on sports participation rates post-games, and 
limited effects on sports club membership (Hindson et al., 1994; Hogan and Norton, 
2000; Coalter, 2004; Veal et al., 2006; Girginov and Hills, 2008). According to 
Girginov (2013, p.6), while the Home Olympics had encouraged both cooperation 
and competition among NGBs, few had undertaken a holistic approach to leveraging 
the Games as an integral part of their WSP strategy, and most had utilised a more 
‘tactical approach by leveraging different programmes, initiatives and areas, thus 
                                                          
7
 Referred to as, Creating a Sporting Habit for Life, throughout this thesis.    
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narrowing the scope of the impact to a limited number of beneficiaries.’ In addition, 
Girginov (2013) claimed that NGBs felt that government’s positioning and promotion 
of the Home Games provided a stimulus for the development of their sport, 
increased the awareness of their sport, and stimulated resources in the key areas of 
grassroots development, sport talent systems and international success.  
However, Richard Caborn8, within his evidence to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Olympic and Paralympic legacy (HLSCOPL) (House of Lords Select 
Committee on Olympic and Paralympic legacy [HLSCOPL], 2013a, p.206), stated 
that SE had made ‘a fundamental mistake on legacy, and that was to change (sic) 
most of the funding to [NGBs].’ To some extent, SE subscribed to that view, as noted 
by the evidence given by Jennie Price, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of SE:  
‘There is not really a clear pathway to follow for this [increase in community sport 
participation]. We have to experiment; we have to draw from other sectors, because 
this is effectively a behavioural change challenge … If things do not work, and 
particularly if [NGB] funding does not work, we have a mechanism to remove that 
money’ (cited in HLSCOPL, 2013a, p.698).  
For SE (2013a, p.7), it was unlikely that any transformation of the nation’s sporting 
habits would be achievable without a degree of collaboration among their ‘strong 
network of organisations’, which would also require a ‘significant shift in focus for 
many NGBs’ (DCMS, 2012, p.9) to increase participation in young people aged 
under-16. Furthermore, SE (2012f) pointed towards the requirement for a new and 
sharper focus to achieve a meaningful and lasting community sport legacy, and 
increased participation at grassroots-level, which would be extremely challenging 
due to the declining trend in participation and tough economic climate. While 
government/SE signalled their intention to continue working alongside NGBs, it came 
with a tougher performance regime within a ‘strict payment-by-results system’, and a 
greater intent to use punitive action against those NGBs not performing. According to 
SE (2012f, p.3), NGB investment funding was a ‘privilege, not an entitlement’, 
awarded on a ‘competitive basis’ to those that provided the strongest plans and 
demonstrated ‘value for money.’ A clear statement from DCMS (2012, p.9) asserted 
that for those NGBs ‘fail[ing] to meet contracted objectives’, withheld funding would 
                                                          
8
 Richard Caborn served as the Minister for Sport (2001-07). 
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be made ‘accessible to other groups which can offer strong business cases for 
increasing participation.’ The aim of which was to send ‘a clear message to those 
NGBs who needed to change’ that it would be they who would lose out not the sport, 
which would continue to be funded ‘through other bodies, such as local authorities or 
charities’ (SE, 2014f). A strategy that had been adopted previously in relation to 
sports such as basketball, tennis, and fencing, wherein SE’s lack of confidence in the 
ability of those sport/NGBs to increase participation, resulted in the re-distribution of 
funds to non-affiliated organisations (SE, 2014e). For example, £6m was awarded to 
StreetGames to deliver Doorstep Sport Clubs, in addition to £3.38m previously 
invested in recognition of their significant progress in getting more young people 
from disadvantaged communities into sport (SE, 2014f). 
Evidence from the HLSCOPL Report (2013b, pp.8-11), also highlighted a number of 
policy concerns relating to community sport participation, including inter alia: the 
infrastructure at grassroots-level was ‘patchy’; a disconnect existed between 
grassroots and high performance; there was a ‘lack of a clear legacy plan for 
capturing the enthusiasm of the Games within all sports’, not helped by the 
limitations of the APS methodology; and a key driver to broadening NGBs’ 
participation base should be ‘a change of culture and board composition’ that also 
reflected participants’ views.  
By contrast, government’s continued recognition of and commitment to elite sport 
policy stability, also received criticism within the HLSCOPL Report (2013b, pp.8-11) 
on the basis that UKS’s No Compromise approach to elite funding was: ‘principally 
retrospective’; ‘not a “one size fits all” panacea’; and the ‘heavy focus on the volume 
of medals [had] an inherent bias against team sports.’ However, it is argued by 
Houlihan and Zheng (2013, p.338) that ‘the cost of maintaining a country’s relative 
position in the medals table is considerable and arguably locks countries on to a path 
from which it is difficult for them to deviate’, which resonates strongly with the UK 
government’s policy decision-making for elite sport. 
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2.6) Sporting Future: ‘sport for sport’s sake’ to ‘sport for social 
good’ 
The General Election in May 2015 brought about an unexpected victory for the 
Conservative party (Parker, 2015). This was followed shortly after by a Parliamentary 
debate on Sport and the 2012 Olympic legacy, the tone of which was clearly 
influenced by the HLSCOPL Report (2013b). Parliamentary discussions centred on 
key issues that were considered attributable to the non-delivery of the Olympic 
legacy, leading to then Minister for Sport, Tracey Crouch’s, announcement that she 
had ‘ripped up the old strategy, and … shall publish a consultation on a brand-new 
sport strategy that will reform how we deliver sport in this country’ (Hansard, 
2015a)9. This arguably supports Houlihan and White’s (2002, p.223) claim that when 
politicians are confronted with ineffective policy, they too often 'turn to administrative 
reform as a highly visible solution when a more effective response might be to 
improve leadership capacity of management.’  
The Parliamentary debate raised a wide range of sport policy issues including inter 
alia (Hansard, 2015a): 
i. The lack of communication and cooperation between government 
departments, not helped by numerous Ministerial changes within sport during 
the term of the Coalition government (four Secretaries of State and three 
Ministers for Sport); 
ii. The perceived malaise of ministerial preoccupations other than sport and the 
laissez-faire, hands-off attitudes towards sport; 
iii. A blame culture aimed at NGBs and the fixation on measuring participation 
figures through the APS, the latter deemed to be a blunt tool; 
iv. The use of alternative deliverers of sport who may be better placed than 
NGBs to tackle harder to reach groups; 
v. The need for a cross-government long-term policy and plan for sport that does 
not change as a result of a bad set of figures or Ministerial changes; and  
vi. A broader focus and definition for sport that should include the inactive and 
outdoor recreation. 
 
                                                          
9
 See Column 1002. 
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In addition to the Parliamentary voices that had debated the Olympic legacy, the first 
Triennial Review for UKS and SE (DCMS, 2015a, pp.5-6) suggested that both 
agencies should remain in their current form, but their effectiveness could be 
improved through inter alia: ‘closer working specifically in the areas of talent, 
participation and the governance of NGBs’; increasing participation levels by 
‘continuing to drive forward current reforms on channels of intervention, and 
evaluation and appraisal’; and significant efficiencies through NGB shared services 
and co-location. In addition, too many participation initiatives using different delivery 
mechanisms measured in different ways had caused difficulties in determining the 
levels of success, leading to the conclusion that sport was a ‘fragmented sector with 
several key players and no critical mass (DCMS, 2015a, p.43). The key 
recommendations of the Triennial Review in connection to UKS, SE and NGBs, are 
provided in the appendices (Appendix II).   
In December 2015, DCMS published Sporting Future, its first strategy for sport in 
more than a decade. Of particular note, was the inclusion of key headline themes 
contributed by ten different government departments (DCMS, 2015b), suggesting a 
genuine cross-Whitehall effort for joined-up government, to achieve the principal aim 
of harnessing the potential of sport and physical activity to deliver ‘social good’ and 
‘change people’s lives for the better’ (DCMS, 2015b, p.10). While the cross-
departmental nature of Sporting Future received strong political support, joined-up 
and co-ordinated delivery of sport had been a constant theme within previous 
governments’ sport policies. According to DCMS (2015b), the government’s policy 
intervention through Sporting Future had not resulted from previous government 
inefficiencies. Neither did SE receive any criticism (Gibson, 2015). The responsibility 
for the litany of failures was laid firmly at the feet of NGBs, as noted in Sporting 
Future (DCMS, 2015b, pp.10-20), sports’ inability to increase participation was 
attributable to ‘complacency’ amongst those who run sport, poor governance and 
corruption within sport, and the lack of a customer ‘demand-led’ focus, although 
DCMS (2015b, p.72) did acknowledge that the focus on participation numbers had 
‘disincentivised organisations from engaging those who have most to benefit from 
value of sport.’  
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The objectives of Sporting Future were to harness the power of sport for the good of 
society, invest in talent and stand up for the integrity of sport, through three key 
components (DCMS, 2015b, pp.6-7): i) a change in the way sport was funded – to 
ensure a more meaningful and measurable impact on improving people’s lives, 
rather than merely focusing on people taking part in sport; ii) NGBs of non-Olympic 
sports to be prioritised alongside NGBs of Olympic and Paralympic sports; and iii) a 
new mandatory governance code that would be rigorously enforced. Government’s 
reaffirmation of its commitment to Olympic and Paralympic success clearly extending 
policy continuity for elite sport (DCMS, 2015b, p.11). However, Sporting Future also 
sought to move sport policy away from the narrow focus on participation and medals 
(DCMS, 2015b, p.8), by way of a broader focus on engagement in regular and 
meaningful participation not only in sport and physical activity, but also volunteering, 
and experiencing live sport (DCMS, 2015b, p.19). For SE, Sporting Future 
demanded the development of innovative sports offerings that were not only 
‘accessible, sustainable environments – practically, financially and emotionally’, but 
also engaging enough to attract a more diverse audience (SE, 2016d, p.4). Central 
to the aims of Sporting Future has been a focus on five fundamental outcomes linked 
to: physical wellbeing, mental wellbeing, individual development, social and 
community development, and economic development, driven through three broad 
outputs within a new sport strategy framework, as shown in Figure 2.1. The key 
elements of the three strategic outputs particularly relevant to NGBs are provided 
Table 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Figure 2.1: Framework for a new Sport Strategy 2016-21 
 
Source: DCMS (2015b, p.18) 
 
Table 2.1: Strategic outputs of Sporting Future relevant to NGBs 
Output Key Implications for NGBs 
Sporting success 
Olympic/Paralympic support aligned to achieving key strategic outcomes. UKS’s primary 
objective to deliver medal success. UKS, NGBs, BOA, and the British Paralympic 
Association to acquire a better understanding on how medal success delivers the strategy’s 
outcomes, and work to increase their impact. 
 
Engagement in sport and 
physical activity 
Broader remit for SE - responsible for sport outside of school from the age of 5 (with a focus 
on core physical literacy skills at an early age);  
 
NGBs – greater customer-focus and increased partnership-working with charities and local 
authorities to use their ‘collective power’ to deliver results; strategic and best value 
investment of public funds to prioritise those who are least active; continued evidence-based 
monitoring and assessment against agreed KPIs to measure performance against outputs 
and outcomes.  
 
A strong and resilient sport 
sector 
A more productive, sustainable and responsible sport sector. Organisational and financial 
sustainability, ‘excellent governance’, and collaboration considered key concerns for the 
effective delivery of strategic outcomes;  
 
A more ‘sustainable mixed funding model’ desirable, in particular for those organisations 
considered to be resource-dependent, and orchestrated by both UKS and SE to: a) reduce 
the funds received from a single public sector source; b) increase the overall level of non-
public investment; and c) increase back office efficiencies, co-locations and shared services 
among sporting bodies (e.g. NGBs);  
 
A new mandatory governance code to be introduced for those organisations seeking public 
funding. Organisations unable to meet the requirements of the code will not be eligible for 
public funding. 
 
Source adapted from: DCMS (2015b) 
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However, Sporting Future was relatively agnostic as to precisely who should receive 
investment funding. SE advocating greater inward investment of public funding into 
the sporting sector (SE, 2015b, p.2), while DCMS considered those who could 
deliver on the outcomes were best placed to receive funding:   
‘All new government funding for sport and physical activity will go to organisations 
which can best demonstrate that they will deliver some or all of the five outcomes in 
this strategy … [I]t is likely that organisations which show that they can work 
collaboratively and tailor their work at the local level will be best placed to access 
funding’ (DCMS, 2015b, p.16). 
A clearer indication on how funding would be prioritised was provided within SE’s 
Towards An Active Nation 2016-2021 Strategy (2016e), which included a radical new 
approach to investment funding decisions, clearly aligned to government objectives 
and outcomes. In particular, the distribution of funding would focus on inactivity and 
under-represented groups, including women and girls and those with disabilities, 
lower socio-economic groups, and older people (DCMS, 2015b, p.10); and improved 
community cohesion and standards in school sport (DCMS, 2015b, p.6). In addition, 
there would be a greater drive towards sustainability in ‘organised’ sport, in 
recognition of the ‘dependence of many bodies on SE funding’ (SE, 2015b, p.2), and 
more significantly for NGBs, organisational-neutrality as the method of delivery to 
achieve agreed policy outcomes (SE, 2016e, p.12 – emphasis mine). Furthermore, 
the controversial APS monitoring system has been replaced by Active Lives (a 
system of measurement focused on how people are active overall rather than how 
often take part in sport) (DCMS, 2015b, p.11). For elite sport, however, while there 
were no significant changes in terms of sport policy, there were significant 
affordability challenges (UKS, 2016b) due to declining Lottery income (UKS, 2017, 
p.1), which by its very nature is ‘inherently volatile’ (UKS, 2017, p.3), to the extent 
that not every sport with medal potential has received funding for Tokyo 2020 (UKS, 
2016c). 
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2.7) Discussion and Conclusion 
Having reviewed the literature on UK sport policy, five overarching themes have 
been identified that reflect the aims and objectives of this study. Firstly, the changing 
relationship between the government, its sporting agencies (SE and UKS) and 
NGBs. It is clear that the increased salience and legitimacy of sport to government, 
the introduction of the Lottery, and sport policy since Raising the Game, has 
heralded a fundamental change in the relationship between government and NGBs 
from one of deference and a culture of entitlement, to a more client-contractual 
relationship that has encompassed a degree of ambiguity in the role play of NGBs 
within varying governmental visions for sport, and attitudinal fluctuations to excel or 
face the consequences. The relational realignment between government and the 
Sport Councils, as anticipated by Houlihan (1997, p.113), having redefined the roles 
of SE and UK to become the ‘policeman of sport rather than the developer of sport.'  
Secondly, increased centrality of NGBs to a range of government strategies, has not 
only generated substantial opportunities for increased provision and development, 
but also contributed to resource-dependency and a loss of autonomy. For example, 
conditional grant funding awarded to NGBs in support of government objectives, 
particularly with regard to health, education and social inclusion (Oakley and Green, 
2001; Houlihan and White, 2002; Green, 2003), and financial sanctions for non-
compliance. Green and Houlihan (2005) also noted that the Sports Councils, with 
encouragement from government, have been explicit in the exploitation of such 
resource-dependency through linking public funding to social objectives and a 
performance management style of monitoring.  
Thirdly, the requirement for NGBs to reform and modernise, in line with New 
Labour’s ‘Third Way’ ideology, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of service 
delivery. The impact of Best Value on NGBs is clearly evident, not only through 
increased conditional funding (the last 15 years has seen huge increases in state 
funding for NGBs, and for the most part they are far richer organisations now than 
they were in 2001), but also through SE’s incorporation of the policy as part of its 
‘priority sport’ criteria. NGBs have had to take greater responsibility for efficiency 
management and accountability, to ensure that they are ‘fit’ and ‘trustworthy’ 
partners for government and its agencies. The changed role of SE to a strategic-lead 
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agency to coordinate government policy through other organisations, and UKS’s No 
Compromise approach (both in line with Game Plan), have had a substantial impact 
on NGBs, particularly the adoption of principles and practices of strategic 
management to comply with government’s modernisation agenda.  
The fourth theme refers to the complexity of the performance management regimes, 
such as WSPs, resulting from NGBs’ increased dependency on public funding and 
the government’s critique of their inadequacies in terms of governance, 
professionalism, and abilities to deliver on policy outcomes. Although no longer 
applicable, WSPs were subjected to continuous monitoring and evaluation within a 
‘strict payment-by-results system’, where failure to meet contractual and 
performance obligations resulted in withholding and removal of funding from under-
performing NGBs.  
The final overarching theme is the increased willingness of SE to use alternative 
participation delivery partners unaffiliated to NGBs. SE’s mixed investment approach 
to sport delivery to achieve desired outcomes, demonstrating further the challenges 
faced by NGBs to respond to the multifaceted demands placed upon them by 
government, and its agencies (Green and Houlihan, 2005, 2006). For example, the 
obligations of NGBs to meet the needs and demands of SE and those of their 
members, and with that the potential implications for future funding, and internal 
tensions at the point where the worlds of amateurism and professionalism collide.   
In sum, this chapter examined how changing sport policy has altered government’s 
expectations of and relationships with NGBs, and affected the functional and 
operational context within which they work. The review of literature highlighted the 
increasing prominence of professionalism as a constituent of community sport policy 
involvement; the trend away from a passive to a contractual phase of governmental 
intervention; the emergence of conditional funding for NGBs in support of and 
delivery on government social objectives/outcomes; and allowed for identification of 
five initial analytical themes to guide and inform the selected analytical framework 
and case studies, as discussed in more detail within Chapters 3 and 4. The review 
also draws attention to challenging times ahead for NGBs and community sport (e.g. 
performance regimes and increasingly complex web of deliverers of sport) and lack 
of academic research in this field.   
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Chapter Three 
Theorising Policy at the Meso-Level 
 
3.1) Introduction  
According to Houlihan and Lindsey (2013), theory relevant to policy analysis can be 
largely divided into three categories: macro, micro and meso-level. Macro-level 
theory ‘seeks to provide an interpretation of the social world’ (Houlihan et al., 2009, 
p.4), micro-level examines individual actions and the decisions of actors in a specific 
locale, underpinned by a theory of individual behaviour (Green, 2005), and meso-
level theory is focused on problem identification, agenda setting, policy formulation 
and implementation processes, at both the policy sector level and that of national 
organisations (for example national sports organisations and governing bodies) 
(Houlihan, 2005; Parsons, 1995).   
This study is focused on national sport policy and SMNGBs, therefore the principal 
level of analysis is at the meso-level, where not only has recent theory-building and 
conceptual innovation generally taken place (e.g. Kickert et al., 1997; John, 1998; 
Marsh, 1998; Sabatier, 1999, 2007), but also much of the theorising within sport 
policy (Houlihan et al., 2009), particularly with regard to ‘[analysing] policy at the 
sectoral or sub-system level’ (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2013, p.12). This is not to deny 
the significant insights generated from macro- or micro-level theorising, as purported 
by Houlihan (2005). Indeed, it is acknowledged that meso-level frameworks ‘are not 
value free and are derived from often highly contentious and ideological theorisations 
at the societal level’ (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2013, p.12). However, within this study 
macro theory has served to ‘sensitise the researcher to particular relationships and 
different aspects of the policy process’ (Houlihan et al., 2009, p.3), as will an 
understanding of the concept of power, since ‘any discussion of the policy-making 
process must necessarily be grounded in an extrinsic consideration of the nature of 
power within the state’ (Hill, 2009, p.8). 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate three analytical meso-level frameworks, 
namely, new institutionalism, the MSF and the ACF, each assessed against a set of 
criteria to determine the most appropriate framework for analysing sport policy in this 
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study. This is followed by discussions on macro-level theories that have previously 
been applied to sport policy, and the concept of power, to acknowledge their 
importance within policy analysis and this study, and to sensitise the researcher to 
particular assumptions concerned with ‘the distribution of power at the societal level; 
the significance of the pursuit and protection of interests; and the relationship 
between the state and society’ (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2013, p.12). An overview of 
the theoretical evaluations is then provided, identifying the ACF as the selected 
theoretical analytical framework for this study, having satisfied, more fully, the 
selection criteria adopted for this research. A concluding section completes this 
chapter.  
 
3.2) Meso-level analytical frameworks 
Prior to evaluating the utility of the selected meso-level frameworks for policy 
analysis, it is important to further understand why the theoretical constructs for this 
study are seated at the meso-level rather than at the micro or macro-level. As 
alluded to above, it is acknowledged that all meso-level frameworks incorporate 
macro-level assumptions, for example, the ACF has neo-pluralist foundations and a 
notion of power, where power is dispersed, and coalitions compete for influence (as 
illustrated within sections 3.2.3 and 3.3 of this Chapter). Indeed, it could be argued 
that with the hierarchical dependence of UKS, SE and NGBs clustered around 
government, neo-pluralism could be utilised as a revealing explanatory framework 
within this current research. However, this study is interested in national level policy 
change and the interaction between national level organisations, down the spine of 
accountability from government to SE to SMNGBs (top-down), and the capacity of 
SMNGBs to have influence or not over policy direction (bottom-up), rather than a 
thesis focused on a societal- or individual-level (e.g. sports clubs).  
While the above has provided further justification for the analysis of policy at the 
meso-level within this research, Sabatier (2007, p.4) made the point that analysing 
policy at this level requires the analyst to: 
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‘find some way of simplifying the situation in order to have a chance of understanding 
it … [, since] … the policy process requires a knowledge of the goals and perceptions 
of hundreds of actors …, involving possibly very technical scientific and legal issues 
over periods of a decade or more when most of those actors are actively seeking to 
propagate their specific “spin” on events.’  
Policy analysis is further complicated by the range of concepts and theories 
available, for example, Sabatier (1999) identified the potential utility of eleven meso-
level approaches, each of which would view ‘the same situation through quite 
different lenses and are likely to see quite different things’ (Sabatier, 2007, p.5). Add 
to this the evolution and analysis of UK sport policy, then, as noted by Houlihan and 
Lindsey (2013, p.15), the ‘volume of applications of meso-level frameworks is 
certainly too small to suggest that one framework provides the most accurate 
description of the sport policy process or is the most effective tool for analysis.’ 
To evaluate the utility of meso-level frameworks for policy analysis, both Sabatier 
(1999, 2007) and Houlihan (2005) developed key selection criteria, as outlined in 
Table 3.1. Accordingly, Sabatier’s conceptualised selection criteria supports non-
specific policy analysis, whereas Houlihan’s adaptation of Sabatier’s work offers 
greater specificity towards sports-related policy. 
Table 3.1: Selection criteria for meso-level analytical frameworks 
 Sabatier Houlihan 
1 Address a broad set of factors to explain policy stability 
and change, including, conflicting values and interests, 
information flows, institutional arrangements, and variation 
in the socio-economic environment. 
  
Have the capacity to explain both policy stability and 
change, which is of particular importance in the sports 
domain.   
2 Have a positive theory to explain much of the policy 
process. 
Have the capacity to illuminate a range of aspects of the 
policy process.  
 
3 Subject to recent conceptual development, appropriate 
scrutiny, and/or empirical testing, to confirm their value 
and suitability as models and frameworks that credibly 
analyse the policy process. 
 
Have applicability across a range of policy areas, beyond 
sport, to provide a greater sensitivity to the distinctive 
features of the sport policy area, and the substantial 
potential for ‘spill-over.’ 
 
4 The concept and propositions of each framework must be 
relatively clear and internally consistent; identify clear 
causal drivers; give rise to falsifiable hypotheses; and 
apply to most of the policy process  - over a time span of a 
decade or more, as that is the minimum duration of most 
policy cycles’ (2007, p.3). 
Facilitate a medium term (5-10 years) historical analysis of 
change, on the basis that: a shorter duration merely 
produces a snapshot of policy; periodisation of a decade 
enables minor fluctuations in policy direction to be 
distinguished from sustained change and the identification 
of significant explanatory factors.  
Source adapted from: Houlihan (2005), Sabatier (1999, 2007) 
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Houlihan (2005, p.167) places emphasis on the importance of understanding the 
environmental conditions of stability and change, due to their particular relevance to 
the sports policy domain and the relatively rapid turnover of sports policy in many 
developed countries. In consideration of the above, the adoption of Houlihan’s 
criteria to examine three potential meso-level frameworks is the most logical option 
for this research. 
  
 3.2.1) New Institutionalism 
To understand policy and the policy-making process, the concept of an institution is 
seen as important (Steinmo, 2001; Cairney, 2012), despite the argument that ‘no-
one is entirely sure what an institution is and what institutionalism means’ (Cairney, 
2012, p.70), which is problematic for institutional analysis. Cairney (2012, p.69) 
suggested that ‘[i]nstitutions are not just the buildings or arenas within which people 
make policy – they are also the rules of behaviour that influence how they make 
policy.’ Ostrom (2007, p.22), identified ‘many different types of entities, including 
both organisations and rules’ within institutions, which ‘structure patterns of 
interaction within and across organisations.’ Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p.2), argued 
that institutions ‘shape how political actors define their interests and … structure their 
relations of power to other groups’, seen here as significant constraints and 
mediating factors in politics that ‘leave their own imprint’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, 
p.8). Cairney (2012, p.70) referred to this as new institutionalism, with a greater 
focus on rules and norms than on formal structures or ‘bricks-and-mortar institutions’, 
where new institutionalists ‘seek to show how institutions actually structure the play 
of power, often in ways hidden from view’ (Fischer, 2003, p.29). Arguably, the 
vagueness of institutionalism offers some explanation for the number of variants (see 
Lowndes, 2010), as Cairney (2012, p.77) claimed, ‘there are no hard and fast 
distinctions between each version … [and] … too much disagreement on which texts 
fit into which camps and too much variation within those camps.’  
While such theoretical problems and debates provide a potential distraction from the 
value of institutional analysis, Marsh and Stoker (2010, p.78) claimed that the 
strength of new institutionalism ‘may be found precisely in its multi-theoretic 
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character, which allows assessment of competing propositions drawn from different 
political theories.’ In addition, Hall and Taylor (1996, p.936) argued that some 
ambiguities could be dispelled if new institutionalism was disregarded as a ‘unified 
body of thought’, and that each analytical framework considered itself to be the ‘new 
institutionalism’, which could explain its increasing appearance in political science.  
In view of the diversity of institutionalist literature, this study has focused on three 
key variants (Cairney, 2012) that have been frequently debated (Hall and Taylor, 
1996), notably, historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and 
sociological institutionalism. The key assumptions and features of which are 
provided in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2: Key assumptions and features of selected new institutionalisms  
Historical Institutionalism Rational Choice Institutionalism Sociological Institutionalism 
 
 
Conceptualises the relationship between 
institutions and individual behaviour, 
based on group conflict and structural-
functionalism theories (see Steinmo, 
1992). 
 
Conflict among rival groups for scarce 
resources lies at the heart of politics –
privileging some while demobilising 
others. 
 
Institutional development through three 
key concepts:  
 
Historical contingency: events and 
decisions made in the past contribute to 
the formation of institutions that 
influence current practices;  
 
Path dependency: when commitment to 
an institution has been established and 
resources devoted to it over time, it 
produces ‘increasing returns’ and 
effectively becomes increasingly costly 
to choose a different path (see Pierson, 
2000; Peters, 2005; Greener, 2005; Kay, 
2006);  
 
Critical juncture: substantial 
institutional change creates a ‘branching 
point’ from which historical development 
moves onto a new path. 
 
 
 
Emphasises the importance of property 
rights, rent-seeking, transaction costs to 
the operation and development of 
institutions, and the role of strategic 
interaction in the determination of 
political outcomes. 
 
Institutions structure interactions, by 
affecting the range and sequence of 
alternatives on the choice-agenda, or by 
providing information and enforcement 
mechanisms that reduce uncertainty 
about corresponding behaviour of 
others.  
 
Allows ‘gains from exchange’, thereby 
leading actors towards particular 
calculations and potentially better social 
outcomes, e.g. the dilemma of collective 
action when individuals acting to 
maximise the attainment of their own 
preferences are likely to produce an 
outcome that is collectively sub-optimal. 
 
Behavioural assumptions posit that 
relevant actors behave strategically to 
maximise the attainment of preferences 
through extensive calculation. 
 
Assumes actors create institutions in 
order to realise value. 
 
 
 
Bureaucratic structures (government 
departments, firms, interest 
organisations, quangos) are seen as the 
product of intensive effort to devise ever-
more efficient structures for performing 
the tasks associated with modern 
society.  
 
Seeks to break down the conceptual 
divide between ‘institutions’ and ‘culture.’   
 
Assumes individuals are socialised into 
particular institutional roles, internalise 
the norms associated with these roles, 
and in this way, institutions affect 
behaviour, as relationships are built on 
practical reasoning.  
 
Institutional forms and practices are 
embraced and widely valued by 
organisations within a broader cultural 
environment.  
 
Practices may actually be dysfunctional 
with regard to achieving the 
organisations goals, described by 
Campbell (1989) as the ‘logic of social 
appropriateness’, in contrast to the ‘logic 
of instrumentality.’ E.g. expanding 
regulatory scope imposes many 
practices on societal organisations by 
public fiat, and professionalisation to 
press certain standards onto their 
members. 
 
Source adapted from: Hall and Taylor (1996), Cairney (2012)  
According to Hall and Taylor (1996, p.936), new institutionalisms ‘seek to elucidate 
the role institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes.’ Within 
the sport policy arena, Houlihan (2005, pp.169-170) pointed towards two broad 
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orientations of institutionalist literature that have a particular relevance to sport policy 
analysis: first, an organisational perspective that emphasises the significance of 
institutions as organisational entities, for example, agencies, departments and the 
state; and second, a cultural perspective that highlights shared values, norms and 
beliefs. Houlihan (2005) argued that both perspectives have an historical dimension, 
which highlights the ‘relative autonomy of political institutions from the society in 
which they exist …, and the unique patterns of historical development and the 
constraints they impose on further choices’ (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995, p.27). In 
other words, institutions have the ability to constrain choice (Campbell, 1998), 
‘through their capacity to shape actors’ perceptions of both the problems and 
acceptable solutions’ (Houlihan, 2005, p.170). Essentially, Houlihan’s observations 
reflect elements of historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalisms, hence 
the continued debate surrounding the practicalities of utilising new institutionalism as 
a fully articulated analytic framework. 
Nonetheless, the relevance of new institutionalism within sport policy analysis is 
evident from the works of Roche (1993), Henry (2001), Houlihan and White (2002), 
and Green (2003), all of which identified the organisational infrastructure of sport as 
an important variable in shaping policy, particularly as:   
‘the allocation of functional responsibility for sport, federalism, the use of ‘arm’s 
length’ agencies, for example [SE] and [UKS], and the presence of a minister of sport 
are all seen as having a noticeable impact on sport policy and its implementation’ 
(Houlihan, 2005, p.170). 
From a cultural perspective, the beliefs, norms and values associated with social 
class (Birley, 1996), gender (Hargreaves, 1994), disability (Thomas, 2003), and 
ethnicity (Carrington and Macdonald, 2000) have impacted on the character of UK 
sport policy (Houlihan, 2005).  
Arguably, the changing societal value of sport, the introduction of the Lottery, the 
changing roles of SE (to deliver government social objectives) and UKS (to deliver 
medals), and the changing functional and operational environment of NGBs, 
resonate with the historical contingency, path dependence, and critical junctures of 
historical institutionalism. In a similar vein, the reduction in the size of the state, the 
greater use of non-government agencies working at arm’s length, the increased use 
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of audit and accountability and performance measures to ensure compliance with 
government objectives, and the discipline and punishment for non-compliance, 
closely associate with rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Furthermore, 
NGBs have had to embrace institutional forms or practices through a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ and resource-dependency, but for some these practices have 
actually been dysfunctional and attributable to decreased levels of participation. 
An evaluation of new institutionalism suggests two of the four selection criterions are 
met. There is a plausible, yet limited explanation for both stability and change, and 
applicability across a range of policy areas. However, facilitation over a medium term 
historical analysis to policy change is not clear and an explanation of the whole 
policy process is difficult, ‘due to its privileging of structure over agency’ (Houlihan, 
2005, p.171). According to Houlihan (2005, p.170), the potential use of new 
institutionalism reflects the attention it directs to ‘both the behaviour of actors and the 
structures within which they operate, and its strength as a ‘powerful corrective to 
those who are ready to ignore the significance of state institutions in the policy 
process.’ However, Houlihan and Lindsey (2013, p.17) claimed that such 
significance is in many ways self-evident, and the extent to which and in what 
circumstances institutions matter, are invariably questions that remain unanswered. 
Houlihan (2005, pp.170-171) also argued that the indistinct treatment of policy 
dynamics, the tendency to ‘substitute ideas for interests, and the assumption that 
institutions strongly influence interests’ are notable weaknesses, the under-theorised 
framework serving at best as an ‘analytical or sensitising concept’, and at worst 
‘privileges institutions on the basis of weak evidence.’  
Literature also points towards neo-pluralism and governance as foundational macro-
level theories that underpin the analytical frameworks of new institutionalism. As 
Houlihan and Lindsey (2013) observed, there are noticeable links to neo-pluralism 
and governance theory, and less so with market liberalism as it is potentially at odds 
with the rhetoric of evidence-based policy. Lukes’ conceptualisation of power is also 
relevant to an understanding of the above analytical frameworks, particularly Lukes’ 
second and third dimensions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
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3.2.2) Multiple Streams Framework 
Drawing inspiration from Cohen et al.’s (1972) 'garbage can model' of organisational 
choice, the MSF emphasises the anarchical character of organisations and the policy 
process (Houlihan, 2005). Policy choice is considered to be a ‘garbage can’, within 
which ‘various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they 
are generated’ (Cohen et al., 1972, p.2). Zahariadis (1999, p.6) noted that 
‘complexity, fluidity and fuzziness are particularly appropriate characteristics of 
policy-making’, where decision-making situations are characterised in terms of 
organised anarchy. Fischer and Forester (1993) claimed that argument, persuasion 
and reasoning are also fundamental to policy formation, although Zahariadis (2007, 
p.69) argued that if ‘ambiguity is pervasive and central to politics, manipulation is the 
effort to control ambiguity … [and that] … political manipulation is more than just 
persuasion and identity construction.’ For Zahariadis (2003, 2007), political 
manipulation is primarily aimed at providing meaning, clarification, and identity, the 
logic of which sets the MSF apart from other lenses, as it uncovers the nature of the 
relationships between those who manipulate (policy entrepreneurs) and those who 
get manipulated (policymakers), thus pointing towards a neo-pluralist notion of 
power.  
Given the extent of ambiguity, complexity and residual randomness in the policy-
making process (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2013), Kingdon (1995) identified three 
distinct streams as key aspects of the MSF, namely, problems, policies and politics. 
According to Zahariadis (2007), three assumptions guide the streams: i) individual 
attention or processing is serial, systematic attention or processing is parallel (see 
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 2007; Cairney, 
2012); ii) policy-makers operate under significant time restraints – limiting the range 
and number of alternatives to which attention is given; and iii) the streams flowing 
through the system are independent. Policy windows and policy entrepreneurs are 
further structural elements highly significant to the framework (Zahariadis, 2007).  
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- Problem stream 
Comprised of conditions and issues that the public and policy participants want 
addressed, or policymakers have identified as requiring action, as opposed to those 
they have chosen to ignore (Kingdon, 1995; Houlihan, 2005). The media and policy 
entrepreneurs affix attention to problematic issues (Jones, 1994), as do focusing or 
triggering events, the degree of consensus given to the latter signposting a key 
strength of the MSF (Birkland, 1997, 2005). In sport, the lack of national sporting 
success or the decline in sport participation could be considered focusing or 
triggering events. However, Zahariadis (2007, p.720) pointed out that ‘attention is to 
an extent a function of what else preoccupies the minds of policymakers’, the scope 
of which can have a significant negative effect on the efficient utilisation of 
information, or a strong positive effect on the ability to predict the policy issue’s place 
on the agenda (Zahariadis, 2003). In addition, policy actor’s values and ideological 
beliefs shape their view of certain phenomena, and therefore, they are likely to 
advocate or even manipulate the definition of the problem to promote their own 
interests (Zahariadis, 2007).  
The use of indicators to monitor (routinely or specifically) the changing scales of the 
problem, and politically assess the magnitude of conditions, scope of change, and 
the performance of current policies (Zahariadis, 2007), are considered important 
focusing or triggering events within the problem stream. For example, the APS 
monitoring of participation in sport indicated reduced levels of participation, resulting 
in a consultation process to ensure reliable source data collection. In contrast, 
Houlihan (2005, p.172) suggested that successful ideas ‘can have a ripple effect 
through the political system by spilling over into other policy fields’, for example, 
sport policy actors becoming assimilated into social policy objectives (King, 2009). 
Interestingly, it is argued that the articulation of inclusivity concepts within the sport 
policy system, shows a vulnerability of sport policy to manipulation by diplomatic, 
health and educational interests (Dery, 1999; Houlihan, 2000a), and a capacity to 
explicitly consider the role of agency in the policy process (Houlihan, 2005). 
Arguably, this is a consequence of the ‘lack of systematic embeddedness of sport in 
national policy systems’ (Houlihan, 2005, p.172; Roche, 1993; Houlihan and White, 
2002).   
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- Policy stream 
Conceptualised as the ‘primeval soup’ (Kingdon, 1984, 1995), within which ideas 
sponsored by particular policy communities float around and occasionally combine, 
and rise to the top of the agenda. Alternatively, they are adopted by policy 
entrepreneurs who promote particular ideas, mobilise opinion (Houlihan, 2005, 
p.171), and maintain their salience on the political agenda (Green, 2003, p.19). 
However, few ideas reach the top of government’s agenda and receive serious 
consideration, and those that do must be considered technically feasible (delivered 
within certain resource parameters), and compatible with the dominant values and 
beliefs of the key policy actors (Kingdon, 1995). Zahariadis and Allen (1995; 
Zahariadis, 2007) argued that the level of institutional arrangements is also 
important, since the level of integration or linkages among participations affect how 
ideas develop in the policy stream, and how quickly they advance to prominence. 
Within the UK sport policy, the policy stream could be associated with the proposals 
for change amongst specialists, lobbyists and policy actors in terms of elite sport, 
community sport, and Physical Education (PE) and school sport. Other examples 
could include the central role given to NGBs to drive up participation levels, and the 
‘mixed economy’ approach of SE to tackle decreasing participation. 
- Political stream 
According to Houlihan (2005, p.171; Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007), the political 
stream ‘is independent of the other streams and comprises a number of elements 
including the national mood, organised political forces (political parties and interest 
groups for example), and government.’ Zahariadis (2007, p.73) noted that politicians 
frequently ‘formulate[d] an image of the balance of support and opposition’ from 
interest groups, and that the perceived trajectory ‘directly affects the issue’s 
prominence or obscurity.’ By monitoring public mood, government can act to 
promote certain items on the agenda or, conversely, dim the prospects of others. 
Similarly, a change in government or key administration personnel has a significant 
influence on politics, the combination of turnover in government and national mood 
exerting the most powerful effect on agendas (Zahariadis, 2007). For example, the 
success of elite athletes at the Beijing 2008 Olympiad resulted in greater government 
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investment for the 2012 Home Olympics, as well as an ongoing and proactive 
commitment to hosting more international sports events in the UK. 
- Policy window 
Kingdon (1995, p.165) defined policy windows as momentary ‘opportunities for 
advocates of proposals to push pet solutions, or to push attention to their special 
problems.’ Windows are opened by compelling problems or focusing events 
(predictable or unpredictable) in the policy stream (where a problem triggers a 
search for ideas), or the political stream (where ideas are being presented). At this 
point the three streams are likely to be coupled together at critical moments in time, 
and often for a short duration, wherein policy choices are made (Zahariadis, 2007). 
The coincidence and coupling of the three streams is a central aspect of the MSF, 
where issues achieve political recognition and attract policies (solutions). For 
example, predictable windows of opportunity within sport could be the four-year 
funding cycle that SE and UKS employ for NGB funding, whereas an unpredictable 
window of opportunity could be the decreased levels of participation, or a scandal 
such as match-fixing or a high-profile doping case.   
- Policy entrepreneurs  
For Kingdon (1995), policy entrepreneurs are policy actors who attempt to couple the 
three streams, the significance of which has been widely noted (Houlihan, 2005; 
Houlihan and Green, 2006; Sabatier, 2007; Zahariadis, 2007). According to 
Zahariadis (2007, p.74), ‘they are more than mere advocates of particular solutions; 
they are actors that are power brokers and manipulators of problematic preferences 
and unclear technology.’ Problematic preferences refer to decisions that are made 
without having formulated precise preferences, that is, ‘a collection of ideas [rather] 
than as a coherent structure’ (Cohen et al., 1972, p.1). Unclear technology refers to 
the blurred processes of organisations to turn inputs into outputs, where, for 
example, organisations have an awareness of responsibilities, but display a 
‘rudimentary knowledge’ of their role (where past experience and trial and error 
procedures are considered learning tools) (Zahariadis, 2007). For Zahariadis (2007), 
windows of opportunity require policy entrepreneurs to seek immediate seizure of the 
opportunity to initiate action; have persistence and be skilled at coupling by attaching 
problems to their solutions and find politicians receptive to their ideas; and be 
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cautious to ensure that the right policy window is used. The most successful are 
those with greater access to policymakers (e.g. matching ideology or beliefs), greater 
resources (e.g. time, money and energy), and employ manipulating strategies to 
accomplish their goal of coupling the three streams – to induce policy change. For 
example, Houlihan and Green (2006) presented Sue Campbell (the then CEO of the 
Youth Sports Trust [YST]) as a key policy entrepreneur in advocating the potential of 
PE and school sport to support the broader academic agenda.  
Despite the MSF’s wide appeal among policy analysts, criticisms resonate around 
the framework’s unrealistic assumptions and under-specification of certain processes 
(Zahariadis, 2007). Sabatier (1999) highlighted the lack of clear, falsifiable 
hypotheses within the MSF, while Bendor et al. (2001) were critical of the logic and 
conclusions of the original ‘garbage can’ model, arguing that results from the model 
were not findings, but flowed directly out of the assumptions of the MSF. Zahariadis’ 
(2003) counter-argument suggested that MSF decisions were conceived from the 
result of energy fluctuations in each stream, coupled purposefully by policy 
entrepreneurs, and that Kingdon (1995) had provided considerable empirical 
evidence across different countries and different policy fields (Birkland, 1997; 
Zahariadis, 2003). However, both Mucciaroni (1992) and Bendor et al. (2001) 
questioned the appropriateness of conceptualising independent streams, arguing 
that the streams should be viewed as interdependent, one triggering or reinforcing 
changes in another, ‘making coupling less fortuitous and the process more purposive 
and strategic’ (cited in Zahariadis, 2007, p.81).  
An evaluation of the MSF suggests that the framework offers at best a partial 
fulfilment of the first selection criterion on stability and change, by drawing attention 
to the ‘the role of agency, happenstance and opportunism’ (Houlihan and Green, 
2006, p.79), but ‘challenges the assumption of deeply entrenched institutionalised 
interests’ (Houlihan, 2005, p.172). Houlihan (2005) argued that such myopia towards 
structural factors and institutionalised power provides a less convincing explanation 
for policy change, particularly as Birkland (2005) claimed the framework does not 
examine change beyond the window of opportunity. The MSF has been successfully 
applied across different countries and different policy domains as noted above, 
including the study of sport policy (Houlihan, 2005), thereby fulfilling the third 
criterion. Arguably, timeframes of change are not an explicit part of the framework, 
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although Houlihan (2005) noted that its structure allows for the fourth criterion of 
medium-term historical analysis to be met. The second criterion is clearly not fulfilled 
as the MSF is a lens that focuses primarily on policy formation (agenda setting and 
decision-making), and neglects other stages in the policy process, especially 
implementation. It is therefore less illuminating in more centralised political systems 
like the UK (Houlihan, 2005). Furthermore, King (2009) and Houlihan and Lindsey 
(2013), questioned the suitability of the framework for analysing sport policy, as 
evidenced by its limited application to this field. Indeed, King (2009) rejected the 
theory due to a lack of empirical testing, citing two studies by Chalip (1995, 1996) as 
the sole evidence base for its application. However, Houlihan and Green’s (2006, 
p.89) study of the school sport policy process concluded that the MSF offered ‘a 
more plausible explanation of policy change.’ Houlihan (2005) also claimed a 
potential utility of the MSF in sport policy research, given the degree of change and 
opportunism in complex areas such as sport, where a high level of organisational 
fragmentation exists. Kristiansen and Houlihan (2017, p.447) provided such an 
example, having utilised the MSF to analyse private sport schools and elite athlete 
development in Norway. The research suggesting that ‘multiple and overlapping 
problems have received, at best, only partial policy solutions’, and that through 
government inaction sport schools have been allowed policy space to expand.  
Within this study, evidence suggests that focusing events and indicators have 
received political recognition, opened windows of opportunity, and attracted policy 
solutions from within policy communities. For example, social wellbeing, international 
sporting success, and arguably the APS and NGB four-year funding cycle. There is 
also evidence demonstrating how changes in government administrations and 
political ideologies have legitimised sport and influenced sport policy. Examples of 
which could be the large-scale government-wide priorities such as Labour’s ‘social 
inclusion’ and the Coalition’s ‘Big society’, which have arguably enhanced the utility 
of ‘spill-over’ and the ‘policy entrepreneur’ in UK public policy. Therefore, despite the 
limited appeal of MSF to sport policy research, the framework has potential value in 
the analysis of sport policy from an NGB perspective.  
The MSF also has distinctive pluralist and neo-pluralist features aligned to Lukes’ 
(1974, 2005) three dimensions of power. As noted by Zahariadis (2003, 2007), 
‘ideology’ within the MSF is viewed as invoking ‘idea-guided behaviour’ in policy 
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actors and the role and influence of policy manipulators (elites), which arguably 
indicates a shift towards a neo-pluralist account of power (King, 2009, p.40). King 
(2009) also argued that ideas and time constraints are important ingredients to the 
policy process, which emerge from a ‘contingent and often contradictory selection 
process’ (John, 1998, p.175), and as such provide a powerful corrective to rational 
models of decision-making. An argument supported by Houlihan (2005, p.172), who 
claimed that the framework ‘plays down too strongly the importance of structural 
factors and institutionalized power, perhaps due to its roots in pluralist macro-level 
theory’, placing the MSF distinct from macro-level ideological orientations such as 
market liberalism. 
 
3.2.3) Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The ACF was developed by Sabatier (1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,1999 – also  
see Sabatier and Weible, 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014) to deal with ‘wicked 
problems’, characterised as ‘problems involving substantial goal conflicts, important 
technical disputes, and multiple actors from several levels of government’ (Sabatier 
and Weible, 2007, p.189). The framework emerged as an alternative to the heuristic 
stages model that previously dominated policy studies. By combining ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ approaches to policy implementation, together with a commitment to give 
technical knowledge a more central role, the nuance of the ACF was to focus 
analysis on a broader set of processes than previous works (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993; Schlager, 1995; Green and Houlihan, 2004; Sabatier and Weible, 
2007). Sabatier (1998, p.98) claimed that: 
‘[i]ts goal was to provide a coherent understanding of the major factors and 
processes affecting the overall process – including problem definition, policy 
formulation, implementation, and revision in a specific policy domain – over periods 
of a decade or more.’ 
According to Pierce et al. (2017, p.35), over the past two decades, the ACF has 
emerged as a ‘popular, durable, and flexible framework’ for policy analysis. Indeed, 
the increasing scope of application of the ACF has led to significant revisions 
(Schlager, 1995; Sabatier and Weible, 2007), to the extent that it is now considered 
46 
 
a ‘framework supporting multiple, overlapping theoretical foci’ (Jenkins-Smith et al., 
2014, p.188).   
At the heart of the ACF are three ‘foundation stones’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, 
p.191): i) a macro-level assumption that most policy-making occurs among 
specialists within a policy subsystem, although the behaviour of these actors is 
affected by factors in the broader political and socio-economic system, pointing 
towards the ACF having roots embedded within neo-pluralism; ii) a micro-level 
‘model of the individual’ that is drawn from social psychology; and iii) a meso-level 
conviction that the best way to deal with the multitude of actors in a subsystem is to 
attempt to aggregate them into advocacy coalitions. Policy subsystems consist of 
‘those actors from a variety of public and private organisations who are actively 
concerned with a policy problem or issue … and who regularly seek to influence 
public policy in that domain’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.119). Advocacy 
coalitions are defined as groups of policy actors (e.g. elected and agency officials, 
interest group leaders, researchers and journalists), ‘sharing policy core beliefs [(a 
set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions),] who coordinate 
their actions in a non-trivial manner [over time] to influence a policy subsystem’ 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014, p.195).  
According to Sabatier and Weible (2007), the ACF assumes that actors seek out 
other actors with shared fundamental beliefs or potential beneficial resources in 
order to translate their beliefs into policy, and influence rules, budgets and 
government personnel to achieve goals over time (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 
1993a), by adopting one or more strategies (Sabatier, 1999). A key assumption is 
the time perspective of a decade or more for the analysis of policy change, reflecting 
the significance of Weiss’ (1977) enlightenment function in policy research, and the 
ACF’s focus on policy-oriented learning (Green and Houlihan, 2005). Furthermore, 
‘mapping beliefs and policies on the same canvas permits assessing the influence 
over time of the role of technical information or beliefs on policy change (Jenkins-
Smith and Sabatier, 1994, p.180; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). 
The origin or emergence of a subsystem is most likely to result from dissatisfaction 
with or neglect of a particular problem, enticing, for example, ‘a minority coalition 
breaking away to form its own subsystem or a new subsystem essentially the 
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product of a subset of a dominant coalition becoming large and specialised enough 
to form its own’ (Sabatier, 1988, p.139). A subsystem is characterised by both a 
functional/substantive dimension and a territorial one, fundamentally focused on the 
‘substantive and geographic scope of the institutions that structure interaction’ 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p.193). However, defining the political subsystem to be 
analysed is considered a key challenge within the ACF. As noted by Sabatier and 
Weible (2007, p.193), ‘delimiting the appropriate scope for a subsystem is … 
complicated by the existence of overlapping and nested subsystems …, [and that] … 
identifying the appropriate scope of a subsystem is one of the most important 
aspects of an ACF research project.’ For Sabatier (1988, p.160), the delimitation of 
subsystem boundaries is based on the relational existence among actors and ‘the 
frequency of interaction and transitivity of influence.’ The multiplicity of actors within 
sport seeking to influence policy decisions most likely include government 
departments, the Sports Councils, other relevant sporting organisations (e.g. NGBs, 
BOA, County Sports Partnerships [CSPs], and Sport and Recreation Alliance [SRA]), 
and specific academic institutions and media organisations.  
However, it is unclear whether UK sport policy sits within one policy subsystem or 
crosses multiple policy subsystems. The number of competing coalitions is also 
uncertain, the existence of which is arguably made more complex by the interests of 
actors primarily concerned with the utility of sport as a social tool (e.g. local 
authorities and social actors/organisations), against those more concerned with a 
commitment to sport for sport’s sake (e.g. NGBs). The delimitation issue is further 
complicated by related subsystems that occur along both functional and territorial 
lines (Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998) – a subsystem maybe be nested within another 
(the former is a subset of the latter) or two subsystems may overlap and interact 
frequently enough that a subset of actors is part of both (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1999). An example of which could be the involvement and overlapping of NGBs 
across potential competing advocacy coalitions for elite and community-grassroots 
sport. It is claimed that in any policy subsystem there will be between two and five 
competing coalitions, with at least one dominant coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1999; Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier and Weible, 2007), Pierce et al. (2017) having 
identified two or more advocacy coalitions in a vast majority of ACF applications.  
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Furthermore, the ACF distinguishes mature policy subsystems from nascent ones, 
the former characterised by a set of participants who regard themselves as a semi-
autonomous community, share expertise in a policy domain, and have sought to 
influence public policy in that domain for an extended period (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1999, pp.135-136). For Green and Houlihan (2005), the distinction between 
‘nascent’ (forming) and ‘mature’ policy subsystems, the conditions appertaining to 
their existence, and the ACF’s focus on regular interaction between groups of actors 
over a medium-term, are relevant to the sport policy sector, particularly as it is a 
relatively new and often marginal area of public concern. Indeed, Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier (1993b, p.47) stated that: 
‘[I]n a new policy area, knowledge about the seriousness of the problem and the 
validity of various causal assumptions is normally sufficiently uncertain, and the 
political resources of those challenging the status quo sufficiently modest that the 
initial governmental programme involves a significant research component, but little 
coercion.’ 
It is important to acknowledge here the significance of the concept of policy brokers 
within the sport policy sector. According to Green and Houlihan (2005, p.17), the 
organisational complexity within sport signposts a requirement for policy brokers to 
act as mediators, ‘interested in keeping conflict within acceptable limits.’ As noted by 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p.122), ‘conflicting strategies from various 
coalitions may be mediated by a third group of actors, … whose principle concern is 
to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense conflict.’ Proponents of 
the ACF also make the point that a vast majority of modern societal policymaking 
occurs within policy subsystems, and that to have any influence over policy  
participants must be specialists and negotiators within a policy subsystem (Sabatier 
and Weible, 2007), thus highlighting the neo-pluralist nature of the ACF.  
Moreover, the ACF posits that policy change over a decade or more is a function of 
three key processes, as illustrated by the flow diagram in Figure 3.1 and the 
summative explanation provided by Pierce et al. (2017, p.15): 
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‘[C]oalitions compete within a policy subsystem to translate their beliefs into policy. 
They use strategies to influence government authorities, which eventually influence 
policy. Coalition beliefs and actions are impacted by long- and short-term 
opportunities, constraints, and resources that are affected by both relatively stable 
parameters and external system events. The impacts of government decisions feed 
back into the subsystem, and also may affect factors external to the subsystem.’  
According to Green and Houlihan (2005, p.16; Marsh, 1998, Marsh and Smith, 2000; 
Hay, 2002), the ACF ‘takes account of the ‘interplay’, or dialectical relationship 
between exogenous and endogenous factors, which ‘frame the constraints and 
resources of actors in the subsystem and the interactions within the policy 
subsystem itself’ (Parsons, 1995, p.196). While endogenous processes are pursuant 
to the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions (Green and Houlihan, 2005, 
p.14); exogenous processes deal with: i) relatively ‘stable system parameters’ that 
rarely change or give impetus for behavioural/policy change, but are ‘important in 
establishing resources and constraints within which subsystem actors must operate’ 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p.193); and ii) dynamic external subsystem events, 
which are assumed to be ‘more susceptible to change over a decade or more and 
are a critical prerequisite for major policy change’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005, p.15). 
Sabatier and Weible (2007, p.199; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) argued that 
the impact of external perturbations or shocks on a policy subsystem could, 
potentially, ‘shift agenda, focus public attention, and attract the attention of key 
decision-making sovereigns.’ The effect of which is more likely to be ‘the 
redistribution of resources or opening and closing venues within the policy 
subsystem, which can lead to the replacement of the previously dominant coalition 
by a minority coalition.’  
Arguably, external perturbations or shocks to the subsystem have potentially shaped 
UK sport policy or prompted policy change, for example: changes in socio-economic 
and technology conditions - funding cuts and realignments to UKS, SE and NGBs 
during the 2008 global economic crisis, and the controversial use of the APS to 
gather empirical evidence on sports participation; changes in public opinion - media 
attention following the Atlanta 1996 Olympic Games, and consultations to determine 
how future elite funds should be distributed; changes in the systematic governing 
coalition – Thatcherism dramatically altered the composition of resources of various 
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coalitions and, in turn, public policy within the subsystem (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier, 1994, pp.182-183). In contrast, Major is widely acknowledged for changing 
governmental approaches to sport and creating the Lottery; and changes in other 
policy subsystems - school sport receiving influence from elite sport, and health 
issues impacting on the societal value of sport.  
Figure 3.1: Advocacy Coalition Framework (Revised version) 
 
Source: Sabatier and Weible (2007, p.202) 
Within Sabatier’s (1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, Sabatier and Weible, 
2007) conceptualisation of coalition shared-beliefs, the ACF utilises a tripartite 
hierarchy of beliefs, namely, ‘deep-core’, ‘policy-core’ and ‘secondary-aspects’ 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.133). The assumption being that these 
structural categories of beliefs offer decreasing resistance to change, where ‘deep-
core’ (normative) beliefs offer the greatest resistance and ‘secondary-aspects’ the 
least (Kübler, 2001, p.624). The latter requiring ‘less evidence and fewer agreements 
among subsystem actors and thus should be less difficult’ to change (Sabatier and 
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Weible, 2007, p.196). ‘Policy-core’ belief preferences are considered to be the glue 
that binds a coalition together (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p.192; Zafonte and 
Sabatier, 1998). Figure 3.2 illustrates the ACF’s structure of beliefs and their 
susceptibility to change. 
Figure 3.2: ACF: structure of beliefs and susceptibility to change 
 
 
Source adapted from: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988; 1999); Sabatier (1991); Parsons (1995) 
 
According to Green and Houlihan (2005), ‘deep-core’ beliefs include basic 
ontological and normative beliefs, for example, the relative valuation of individual 
freedom versus social equality or in sport, gender and race equality, and the 
importance of competitive sport or health benefits of sport. Such normative beliefs 
span most policy subsystems and are very difficult to change (Sabatier and Weible, 
2007). At this level the ACF assumes that beliefs ‘must be empirically ascertained 
and does not a priori preclude the possibility of altruistic behaviour’ (Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007, p.194). Actors tend to relate to the world through a set of perceptual 
filters composed of pre-existing beliefs that are difficult to alter, where dissonant 
information is screened out and endorsing information reiterated (Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007, p.196). In addition, actors from different coalitions are also likely to 
perceive the same information in very different ways, leading to distrust or ‘devil 
shift’. In other words, there is a tendency for actors to view opponents as less 
trustworthy, more evil, and more powerful than they actually are (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007).  
Secondary-Aspects 
Instrumental decisions and information 
searches necessary to implement policy- 
core 
Policy-Core 
Fundamental policy positions and 
strategies for attaining core values 
Deep-Core 
Fundamental norms and beliefs that apply 
to most policy subsystems 
• Susceptibility to change 
 
• High: Moderately easy but may 
take ten or more years 
• Susceptibility to change 
 
• Medium: Change still difficult 
• Susceptibility to change 
 
• Low: Change is difficult 
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‘Policy-core’ beliefs represent a coalition’s basic normative commitments and causal 
perceptions across an entire policy subsystem (Green and Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier 
and Weible, 2007). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) defined eleven components 
of ‘policy-core’ beliefs, including inter alia: the priority of different policy-related 
values; whose welfare counts; the relative authority of governments and market; the 
proper roles of the general public, elected officials, experts; and the relative 
seriousness and causes of policy problems in the subsystem as a whole. In sport, 
‘policy-core’ beliefs could arguably be the priority of elite sport development over 
sport for all, or the use of NGBs as a delivery mechanism to increase participation in 
sport. For Sabatier and Weible (2007, p.195), the general assumption of the ACF is 
that policy actors are ‘knowledgeable about relationships within their policy 
subsystem’, and will ‘apply certain deep core beliefs to develop policy core beliefs in 
that subsystem’, however, change is still very difficult. ‘Secondary-aspects’ are 
relatively narrow in scope (less than subsystem-wide) and address, for example, the 
seriousness of a problem or the relative significance of various causal factors in 
specific settings, or specific policy preferences regarding funding allocations (Green 
and Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Within sport policy, ‘secondary-
aspects’ might relate to the availability of sport facilities, the collection of sport 
participation data, or how NGBs perform and manage state funding.  
Furthermore, the ACF is characterised by two critical paths to policy change. The 
first path is policy-oriented learning, defined by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, 
p.123) as ‘relatively enduring alternations of thought or behavioural intentions that 
result from experience and/or new information and that are concerned with the 
attainment or revision of policy objectives.’ Based on the fundamental premise that 
‘policy-oriented learning often alters aspects of the coalition’s belief system, [but] 
changes in the policy core aspects of a governmental programme require a 
perturbation in non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem’ (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p.123). Thus, the ACF argues that a second significant path of 
external perturbations is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of major policy 
change (Sabatier and Weible, 2007), although it can lead to rapid changes in 
subsystem structure and individual ‘policy-core’ beliefs (Weiss, 1997). 
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Since its revision in 1999, the ACF has added two further paths to major policy 
change, primarily borne out of criticism of its American pluralistic origins (Sabatier 
and Weible, 2007). The ACF acknowledged that major internal shocks can also 
occur from within a policy subsystem, which not only confirm ‘policy-core’ beliefs in 
minority coalition(s), but also increases doubt within the dominant coalition. For 
example, monumental failures of policies and behaviours of a dominant coalition, 
leading to major policy change. In addition, both internal and external shocks (that 
put a policy subsystem problem in the public eye) have the capacity to ‘redistribute 
critical political resources (public support, financial support, etc.) … [that] … may tip 
the power structure of the policy subsystem’ (Sabatier and Weible 2007, p.204). 
However, while ‘policy-core’ belief systems ‘determine the direction in which an 
advocacy coalition (or any other political actor) will seek to move governmental 
programmes, its ability to do so will be critically dependent upon its resources’, which 
will vary between coalitions and change over time, and strongly affect a coalition’s 
‘ability to translate their beliefs into authoritative policy decisions’ (Sabatier, 1988, 
p.143). Examples of political resources that could be available for strategic utilisation 
by coalitions, include: (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, pp.201-204): allies in positions of 
legal authority; public opinion; empirical evidence to solidify coalition membership, 
influence decision-makers, and swaying public opinion (e.g. through ‘professional 
fora’); and skillful leadership to create attractive visions for a coalition, utilising a 
strategic and efficient use of resources, and seen as an important strategy, 
particularly as skillful leadership can bring about actual changes in policy (Kingdon 
1995). 
Criticism of the ACF has primarily focused on its presumption that shared-belief 
systems and interests of individual members are homogeneous, and the disregard of 
‘heterogeneous actors overcoming collective action problems and agreeing to 
coordinate their actions to achieve shared goals’ (Schlager, 1995, pp.264-265; 
Schlager and Blomquist, 1996). As Schlager (1995, p. 263) argued: 
‘being treated fairly, rather than similarly, by policies endorsed by a coalition, raises a 
critical distinction. To put it prosaically, a policy can treat actors similarly, only if the 
actors are similar, i.e. homogeneous. Thus, heterogeneity presents an obstacle to 
cooperation, but they matter, under certain conditions they leverage cooperation.’   
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Lober and Grin (1999) endorsed Schlager’s argument by stating that the ACF 
‘forgets that most actors have a more fundamental belief system relating to basic 
goals of their organisation or profession’ (cited in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 
p.134). Fenger and Klok (2001) criticised the ACF’s lack of acknowledgment of the 
contribution of interdependency, as an explanation for the behaviour of single actors 
and advocacy coalitions. It is important to provide here a distinction between 
dependence and interdependence. For this study, dependence refers to a reliance 
on external resources (e.g. public funding) for self-preservation (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978, cited in Slack and Hinings, 1992; Berry and Manoli, 2018), while 
interdependence relates to the contribution of policy actors towards the achievement 
of each other’s goals or objectives (Fenger and Klok, 2001). 
According to Fenger and Klok (2001, p.162), the concept of interdependency is 
related to the role scarce resources play in enabling actors to perform their actions, 
and as such is an important aspect of coalition formation and coordination. 
Competitive interdependency refers to action of one actor that interferes with another 
actor’s ability to take action to achieve its goals’, thereby facilitating conflict. 
Symbiotic interdependency refers to ‘one actor’s action contributes to another’s 
actions or goal achievement’, and as such is a springboard for cooperation. While 
Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) introduced imposed interdependencies into the ACF, it 
was based on coordination among actors with specific shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs, 
within and across subsystems. For Fenger and Klok (2001, p.163), Zafonte and 
Sabatier’s model of congruent and divergent beliefs required modification to include, 
‘indifferent beliefs’ and ‘independent interdependency’ as additional values, where no 
coalition would be formed as ‘actors would have no reason to coordinate their 
actions and no need to get into conflict. This changes when interdependency is 
brought in as an additional factor influencing coalition behaviour’, particularly in 
terms of the concept of ‘coalitions of convenience.’ This has potential value in the 
formation of coalitions within sport policy, particularly as NGBs have shifted from a 
position of autonomy to that of conditional autonomy, resource-dependence, and 
collective action to protect their interests. Figure 3.4 shows the modified version of 
coalition behaviour as a result of interdependency and belief congruence. 
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Fenger and Klok (2001) argued further that the ACF offered ‘little insight in the 
mechanism that would cause policy actors to change coalition behaviour’, following 
some external event that would have a major factor in policy change, which might   
lead to ‘intensified conflict and increasing competitive interdependency among 
actors’ (Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993 cited in Fenger and Klok, 2001, p.164).  
Figure 3.3: Coalition behaviour: Interdependency and Belief congruence 
(modified version) 
Interdependency                                                        Beliefs 
 Congruent Indifferent Divergent 
Symbiotic Strong  
Coordination 
Coalitions of 
convenience 
Unstable conflict, de-
politisation, learning 
 
Independent Weak  
coordination 
 
No  
coalitions 
Weak  
conflict 
Competitive 
 
Coalition with a severe 
collective action problem 
Weak  
conflict 
Strong  
conflict 
Source adapted from: Fenger and Klok (2001, p.164) 
Additional criticisms of the ACF question whether successful coalitions are those that 
learn better than others or those that hold greater resources and power. In this 
sense, coalitions may change as they advance ‘core’ interests, and in doing so, the 
ACF may not be robust enough for understanding any ‘mobilisation of bias’ in 
policymaking (Parsons, 1995). As noted by Bulkeley (2000, p.733), the ACF: 
‘does not address the ways in which actors “create” the social and political world in 
which they operate, inasmuch as it fails to grasp the interaction between actors within 
policy coalitions by conceptualising discourse as a means through which learning is 
communicated.’  
Skille (2008, p.189) noted further that while the ACF 'implies collective action, based 
on coordinated individuals with a shared-belief system, it does not [consider] the 
influences of institutions.’ Schlager (1995, p.244) had previously argued that the ACF 
finds difficulty in explaining ‘why actors holding similar beliefs form coalitions to 
collectively press their policy goals, how coalitions maintain themselves over time, or 
the strategies coalitions adopt to pursue policy goals.’ For Schlager (1995, p.250), 
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the focus on strategies was particularly important for ‘understanding when, how, and 
why coalitions skilfully exploit opportunities to promote their positions.’ 
Evaluating the ACF against the selection criteria, the framework arguably satisfies, in 
the most part, all four criteria. As noted by Houlihan (2005, p.173), the ACF ‘offers 
valuable insights into policy stability, where stability is explained in terms of dominant 
coalitions and the persistence of deep core and policy core beliefs.’ Although, 
Houlihan (2005) also argued that the explanation of policy change is ‘less 
convincing’, given the ACF’s reliance on a combination of exogenous events, 
instrumental rationality, and policy learning as the basis for change. In this respect, 
the ACF partly meets the first criterion. The second criterion is satisfied in full, as the 
ACF has a broader focus than many other meso-level frameworks and has the 
potential to illuminate aspects of the policy process beyond the preoccupation with 
agenda setting. As Parsons (1995, p.203) concluded, the ACF is ‘a notable 
contribution to synthesising a range of approaches into a coherent and robust theory 
which links the early phases of the policy cycle – problem definition and agenda-
setting with decision-making and implementation.’ However, Skille (2008, p.189) has 
been critical of this argument, suggesting that the ACF ‘does not consider the 
process of implementation accurately.’ The third criterion is met, as the ACF has 
been widely applied across a range of different policy sectors and has been subject 
to substantial debate and refinements as a result of application in the field (Houlihan, 
2005; Sabatier and Weible, 2007; Pierce et al., 2017). According to Sabatier (1999, 
p.120) the utility of ACF lies in the fact that it ‘provides a vehicle for assessing the 
influence of actors over [a decade of more]’, and thus fulfils the fourth criterion of 
policy change over a medium-term. 
In terms of the application of the ACF within this research, its potential value is 
strong, particularly as research utilising the ACF suggests that ‘actors tend to 
coalesce into discrete coalitions within the subsystem around some watershed 
event(s) that clarifies underlying conflicts regarding the particular (policy) issue in 
question’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005, p.18). Examples of which could be sport as a 
legitimate and regular focus for government expenditure and policy since the 1960s 
(Houlihan and White, 2002), and evidence that demonstrates increasing public policy 
involvement over the past three decades. Despite the limited application of the ACF 
in the sports policy arena (see Houlihan and White, 2002; Parrish, 2003; Green and 
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Houlihan, 2005), studies have highlighted the ACF as a ‘point of entry’ into 
understanding sport policy, particularly given its broad-based approach to the whole 
policy process’ (King, 2009, p.46). According to Green and Houlihan (2005) the 
attraction of ACF is its capacity to take account of structure and agency, and to offer 
explanations for both stability and change that can prompt further lines of enquiry in 
relation to sport policy and NGBs, which is the focus of this study. In this regard, with 
its attention to the role of ideas and beliefs, the ACF can be viewed as part of the 
post-positivist tradition in policy analysis and thus supports a critical realist position. 
As argued by Howlett and Ramesh (1995, p.48, 2003), ‘an important element of 
post-positivist approaches is their emphasis on the manner in which political actors 
group together in the form of discourse or advocacy coalitions.’ The evaluation of the 
ACF also suggests that the concept of policy subsystems and advocacy coalitions is 
closely linked to neo-pluralist macro-level assumptions and conceptualisation of 
power, an argument endorsed by a number of authors (Parsons, 1995; Green and 
Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier and Weible, 2007; King, 2009).  
 
3.3) Macro-level theorising: a sensitising approach 
From the review of meso-level theoretical literature, notable macro-level theories 
applied to the field of sport policy, include, neo-pluralism, public choice theory, and 
governance, the key dimensions of which have been provided in the appendices 
(Appendix III), to articulate the researcher’s awareness and understanding of state 
theory. The literature review identified a clear lineage of the ACF, the MSF and to a 
lesser extent new institutionalism, to neo-pluralism. Of particular note, neo-pluralism 
offers a macro-level framework by which power can be understood within the policy-
making process (Houlihan, 1997), emphasises the interactions across diverse actors 
and institutions (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009), and acknowledges active participation 
of the state, rather than control by citizens (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). According 
to Finer (1966 cited in Smith, 1990) neo-pluralists accept that relationships between 
interest groups and government agencies can become very close and exclusive, but 
also acknowledge that not all groups have equal access and power to influence the 
policy arena (Smith, 1990, p.303; Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009). Thus, neo-pluralism 
illuminates the nature of the relationship between actors and the strategies that 
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actors adopt to influence policy, as well as identifying the resources available to 
different actors involved in the negotiations (Houlihan, 1991).  
The relevance of neo-pluralism to this study is indicated by its strong association 
with the evaluated meso-level frameworks and the aims and objectives of this 
research. This is despite the potential utility of public choice theory, in the context of 
the role of strategic interaction in the determination of political outcomes, and the 
creation of institutions to realise value through the use of, for example, new public 
management (NPM) (Hood, 1991; Rhodes, 1994; 1997) and self-organising policy 
networks (Rhodes, 1997, pp.46-53, 2006). While there is also potential utility in 
governance theory, particularly where evidence suggests the use of a more of 
competitive entrepreneurial and consumerist ethos (e.g. consumer choice, efficiency, 
and cost-effectiveness) within the policy environment (Dunleavy et al., 2006; 
Thompson, 2008; Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009), many assumptions of governance 
theory are considered complementary to neo-pluralism, hence its connection to the 
ACF. As Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009, p.149) claimed, at the very least ‘governance 
provides a new context for pluralism’, or as Green (2009, p.141) remarked, ‘an 
illusory screen of plural, autonomous and empowered delivery networks for sport 
[that] obscures the very close ties to, and regulation from, the centre’, particularly in 
the context of the contractual-compliance and resource-dependent nature of the 
sport policy domain. 
 
3.4) Conceptualisation of Power 
While it is recognised that power is ‘probably the most universal and fundamental 
concept of political analysis’ (Hay, 1997, p.45; Cairney, 2012), it is equally 
considered a slippery concept that is consistently debated. As Lukes (2005, pp.70-
71) claimed:  
‘thinking clearly about power is not easy and it gets more difficult, offering more 
opportunities for confusion when we try to think about power in social life, not least 
because we all talk and write about it … in confusingly different ways.’  
The inclusion of the conceptualisation of power within this thesis, however, is not to 
advance any definitional debate on power, but rather to provide an understanding 
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and a clarification of how power is conceptualised in this current analysis (Lukes 
1974, 2005; Layder 1985; Hay 1995, 1997, 2002) of sport policy. As noted by Green 
and Houlihan (2005, p.6), considering ‘the conceptualisation of power relations, in 
the initiation of policy, in influencing policy outcomes, and in setting agendas … [is] 
central to an understanding of the policy process.’ Cairney (2012, p.46) also argued 
that power’s ‘wide range of meanings and applications produces the need to be 
specific about its use in public policy analysis.’ Broadly speaking, there are two 
contrasting views of power, as noted by Haugaard (2012, p.33), ‘power as 
domination, largely characterised as power over, and … power as empowerment, 
frequently theorized as power to.’ To demonstrate how power is operationalised in 
meso-level theorising of the sport policy process, focus is concentrated on two key 
theorists, Lukes and Foucault. 
 
3.4.1) Lukes: Three dimensions of power 
According to Hay (2002), the ‘faces of power’ controversy is perhaps the key post-
war debate over the nature and definition of the concept of power, centred on the 
extent to which power is defined and easily measured, the key characteristics of 
which are provided in Table 3.3 to highlight the distinctiveness of political power 
within three dimensions of power. 
While Lukes treats power as a capacity generated from a specific source, there are 
other social theorists, such as French post-structuralist, Foucault, who believed that 
power was omnipresent and diffused amongst society as a whole, and far more than 
a capacity or form of hegemony or ideology. Foucault’s conceptualisation of power is 
considered to be the fourth dimension of power (Digeser, 1992; Haugaard, 2012). 
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Table 3.3: The ‘faces of power’ controversy: political power in three dimensions 
Key Characteristics One-dimensional view Two-dimensional view 
 
Three-dimensional view 
Conception of power Power as decision-making. Power as decision-making, non-
decision making, and agenda- 
setting.  
Power as decision-making, 
agenda-setting (not necessarily 
through decisions), and 
preference-shaping and 
ideological control. 
 
Focus of analysis Formal political arena; 
behaviour and issues; and 
subjective interests seen as 
policy preferences revealed by 
political participation. 
Formal political arena; informal 
processes surrounding corridors 
of power; issues and potential 
issues; subjective interests seen 
as policy preferences or 
grievances. 
 
Civil society, especially the 
public sphere (in which 
preferences are shaped); issues 
and potential issues; subjective 
and real interests.  
Nature of power Visible, transparent and easily 
measured. Observable (overt) 
conflict.  
Visible and invisible (visible to 
agenda-setters or through 
gaining inside information). 
 
Largely invisible - power 
distorts perceptions and shapes 
preferences. 
How power is 
operationalised 
'A has power over B to the 
extent that he can get B to 
do something that B would 
not otherwise do' (Dahl 
1957, p.201). 
 
Power is perceived as a zero-
sum game - gains or losses of 
one party are exactly balanced 
with the gains or losses of the 
other party (Hyland, 1995). 
 
Some individuals or groups 
are more successful in 
dominating decision-making 
arenas (Dahl, 1961, Scott, 
2001). 
 
‘[P]ower is totally embodied 
and fully reflected in 
“concrete decisions” or in 
activity bearing directly 
upon their making’ (Lukes, 
2005, p.20). 
 
Power is an agency-
centred account borne out 
of the ‘concentration on the 
actions of individuals within 
the decision-making 
process’ (Hay, 1997, p.46). 
'A devotes his energies to 
creating or reinforcing social 
and political values and 
institutional practices that limit 
the scope of the political 
process to public consideration 
of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to A' 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 
p.149; Lukes, 2005, p.20). 
 
Power redefines 'the 
boundaries of what is to 
count as a political issue' 
(Lukes, 2005, p.23), through 
the setting (or systematic 
distortion) within the policy 
process and or action or 
inaction in decision-making.  
 
Regulatory power controls the 
parameters of debate on 
future policy direction and 
delivery processes for current 
policy (Houlihan et al., 2011). 
 
Unobservable power - erection 
of barriers (elites or 
hegemonic group) 
strategically limit agents’ 
ability to bring difficult issues 
to the table. Decision-making 
only considers minority 
interests (non-prevailing or 
threatening to pre-existing 
power dominance) (Hay, 
2002, p.176).  
 
‘A exercises power over B 
when A affects B, in a manner 
contrary to B’s interests’ 
(Lukes, 2005, p.37). 
 
Focused on the shaping of 
preferences or distorting of the 
perceived interests of others (a 
critique to the behavioural 
dimension of other power 
perspectives) (Hay, 2002). 
 
Subtle use of largely invisible 
power to modify interests of 
potentially opposing members 
of society, to the extent that 
their new and programmed 
desires may be contrary, or 
even harmful, to their real 
interests (Lukes, 1986). 
 
Power is assumed to be an 
expression of ideological 
indoctrination, or psychological 
control (Wrong, 1995). 
Source adapted from: Hay (2002); Lukes (2005) 
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3.4.2) Foucault: Fourth dimension of power 
A key characteristic of Foucault’s conceptualisation of power is that ‘power is not a 
thing or a capacity which can be owned by the State, social class or particular 
individuals’ (O’Farrell, 2005, p.99). Rather, power is omnipresent and located at the 
micro-level of social relations between agents (individuals and groups) (Faubion, 
2000). Foucault viewed this form of omnipresent power as productive, insomuch as it 
supports cooperation, contributes to and generates knowledge, and furthers cultural 
order (Faubion, 2000), in contrast to coercion and repression (Foucault, 1986; 
O’Farrell, 2005; Markula and Pringle, 2006). Power in Foucault’s conception is thus 
constructed as a pervasive, ubiquitous feature of all social relations (Hindess, 1996).  
Of particular interest are Foucault’s views on the power of domination through 
panoptical surveillance, and the notion of governmentality, the latter being defined as 
the ‘art of government’ (Foucault, 1994, p.201). The relevance of panoptical 
surveillance pertains to its presupposition of ‘induc[ing] … a state of consciousness 
and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power … , [where] 
the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary’ 
(Foucault, 1977, p.201; Hay 2002; Lukes, 2005), through self-disciplining (Hay, 
2002). Foucault used ‘governmentality’ to describe ‘the regulation of individuals’ 
lives, which includes procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics 
that allow for the exercise of power through the governing of others’ (Piggin et al., 
2009, p.89). Foucault (1994, p.202) explained the concept as the ‘problematic’ of 
government and how a population should ‘be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to what 
end, [and] by what methods.’ According to Rose (1990, p.xxii), the process 
advocates the ‘interlocking (although not necessarily synergistic) apparatuses for the 
programming of various dimensions of life … through which we are urged, incited, 
encouraged, exhorted and motivated to act.’ Rose (1993, p.286) also argued that 
governmentality, as conceived by Foucault, ‘suggests alternative ways of thinking 
the activity of politics’, that is, ‘various forms of power are used by governments, 
although not to impose constraints on a population.’ Instead, governing power 
ensures citizens believe in a ‘kind of regulated freedom’ (Rose and Miller, 1992, 
p.174). However, Raco and Imrie (2000, p.2191; Enroth, 2014) claimed that 
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‘increasingly, government seeks not to govern per se, but to promote individual and 
institutional conduct that is consistent with government objectives.’  
 
3.5) Evaluation of meso-level frameworks 
The evaluation of meso-level frameworks indicated a degree of overlap and 
complementary features among the different approaches, and that all demonstrate 
potential utility for this study, despite their weaknesses and limited application to UK 
sport policy. The evaluation also supported of Houlihan’s (2000) conjecture that no 
particular framework has the capacity to be a perfect fit (emphasis mine), in part due 
to the peculiarity of sports policy in the UK. Table 3.4 provides an overview of the 
meso-level evaluation and the potential usefulness of each framework. 
Table 3.4: Overview of meso-level framework evaluation 
Frameworks New Institutionalism MSF ACF 
Macro-level 
assumptions 
 
Noticeable links to neo-
pluralism & governance 
Distinctive pluralist and neo-
pluralist features 
Neo-pluralist foundations  
Power relations Lukes’ 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 dimensions; 
Foucault’s governmentality 
A neo-pluralistic notion of 
power (Lukes). 
A neo-pluralistic notion of 
power (Lukes) 
 
Key features Greater focus on rules and 
norms than formal structures. 
Uses rationality and beliefs, 
norms and values approaches 
to explain institutional roles and 
relationships in social and 
political outcomes.  
Primarily concerned with 
agenda setting & policy choice 
under conditions of ambiguity & 
time constraints. 
Conceptualised through three 
streams: problems; policies & 
politics. Synergy of streams 
enhances policy adoption. 
Dominant features include 
focusing events/indicators, 
policy windows, policy 
entrepreneurs, policy 
manipulation, and spill-over. 
 
Focused on advocacy 
coalitions, technical knowledge 
and beliefs within policy 
subsystems; interrelationships 
between exogenous/ 
endogenous factors that 
constrain/resource the policy 
community; dominant features 
include specialist policy 
subsystems, policy brokers, 
tripartite hierarchy of beliefs; 
and policy-oriented learning. 
Key strengths Powerful corrective to state 
significance; directs attention to 
actor behaviour within 
operational structures. 
Wide appeal - three streams 
conceptualise complex 
processes; significance of 
policy entrepreneurs is 
supported.  
Illuminates the whole policy 
process over time; accounts for 
structure/agency; highly 
regarded framework for policy 
analysis; the existence of 
advocacy coalitions is not 
disputed. 
 
Key limitations Not a fully articulated 
framework; privileges structure 
over agency; indistinct 
treatment of policy dynamics; 
under-theorised. Best utilised 
as a sensitising concept. 
  
Plays down the importance of 
structural/ institutional power; 
independence of streams 
questioned; focused too much 
on agenda setting; limited 
application to UK sport policy. 
Difficulties identifying and 
delimiting ‘coalitions’; weak 
underlying theory of power; lack 
of understanding of mobilisation 
of bias; limited application to 
UK sport policy. 
Meso-level 
selection criteria 
Satisfies fully 3, 4; partially 1 
Not satisfy: 2 
Satisfies fully 3, 4; partially 1 
Not satisfy: 2 
 
Satisfies fully 2, 3, 4; partially 1  
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The evaluation of meso-level frameworks has shown that while there are strengths in 
all three frameworks, the ACF satisfies, more fully, the selection criteria adopted for 
this research. Sabatier (2007) argued that the range of variables contained within 
meso-level frameworks and the relationship between them, serve as a conceptual 
map to guide the analyst, facilitating a deeper, more rigorous study, thus pointing 
towards the use of multiple theories to analyse policy. In this regard, the revisions of 
the ACF suggest that the framework supports multiple, overlapping theoretical foci, 
which strengthens the justification for its use within this current research, the 
underlying aim of which is to determine the extent to which SMNGBs are primarily 
policy ‘shapers’ or policy ‘takers’, within the UK sport policy domain.  
To answer this question, it is important to understand the historical implications for 
NGBs of sport policy, the political environment in which they operate, and the causal 
effects on their own field of operations, all of which have neo-pluralistic values, as 
has the ACF. For example, interest groups such as NGBs lobbying for greater 
responsibility, increased funding, and a redefined role, has arguably resulted in 
government’s shifting priorities from a ‘bottom-up’ mass participation strategy for 
sport, to nationally-defined strategy for each sport. Houlihan and Lindsey (2013, 
p.199) also noted a ‘relative vacuum of organised interests has created an 
opportunity for an extension of influence by NGBs’, and as Sabatier and Weible 
(2007) claimed, to have any influence over policy, policy actors must be specialists 
and negotiators within a policy subsystem, which points towards the utility of the ACF 
in the analysis of sport policy and SMNGBs.   
The ACF also emphasises the importance of ‘exogenous shocks’ or external events 
in the promotion of policy change, where arguably, John Major’s approach to sport 
policy, the Lottery, and the London 2012 Olympic Games stimulated changes in 
policy and relationships with NGBs. Thus, pointing towards a neo-pluralistic focus on 
the power of groups in policy-making and the dependency on resources, within an 
institutional and historical context. Similarly, neo-pluralism and its association with 
Lukes’ second and third dimensions of power, acknowledges the decentralisation of 
the modern state as a network of multiple agencies (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). 
Marsh (1995, p.273) claimed further that ‘political outcomes are … the product of 
conflict between interests … for the allocation for scarce resources in a context 
characterised by structural inequality’, which is a key constituent of the ACF. As 
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Hoye et al. (2010, p.111) argued, youth sport policy was developed by a coalition of 
interests (including YST, SE and DCMS), who 'dominate the discourse around 
school sport and PE and make it difficult, if not impossible, for some issues, 
especially those around non-competitive sport, to receive an airing at this senior 
policy level' (Lukes’ second dimension). The same authors suggested that school 
staff and pupils were subtly socialised through the PE and Sport Strategy for Young 
People (PESSYP), towards accepting 'school sport opportunities as not only normal, 
but desirable’ (Lukes’ third dimension). It could also be argued that the increased 
level of operational accountability placed upon NGBs by government/SE/UKS, in 
particular SMNGBs, has influenced or shaped NGB preferences contrary to their 
genuine interests.   
From a governance standpoint, while many assumptions of governance complement  
neo-pluralism, it is clear that past changes in government administrations have 
affected the way politics is conducted, with a shift towards governing ‘at arm’s length’ 
(Green, 2009), the influence of NPM on NGBs and the resource-dependent 
relationships that exist. However, Houlihan and Green (2009, p.681) also observed: 
‘[an] apparent paradox between the rhetoric of empowerment and autonomy, on the 
one hand, and the strengthening of the government’s capacity to set the strategic 
direction for policy and also micro-manage the activities of the units of the state, on 
the other.’  
This resonates with debates on power and the state associated with Foucault’s work 
on governmentality. As argued by Lemke (2002, p.60): 
‘[The] concept of governmentality construes neoliberalism not just as ideological 
rhetoric, as a political-economic reality … but above all as a political project that 
endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists … and that 
collective bodies and institutions … and states have to be “lean”, “fit”, “flexible”, and 
“autonomous.”’  
An example of governmentality would be the greater responsibility given to NGBs for 
efficiency management and accountability, to ensure that they are ‘fit’ and 
‘trustworthy’ partners for government, in line with the ‘Best Value’ scheme introduced 
by New Labour under their ‘Third Way’ ideology. For Houlihan and Green (2009, 
p.682), ‘the net effect of the application of these technologies is to ensure that 
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organizations are instrumental in their own self-government and engaged in the 
reflexive monitoring of their organization’s actions’, which is again reflective of 
Foucault’s notion of panoptical surveillance. It could be argued that the level of 
monitoring of NGBs through performance measurements and disciplining for failure 
to achieve government targets, has induced a state of consciousness and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power, as can be seen 
from Houlihan’s (1997) conjecture that the Sport Councils police sport rather than 
develop sport.  
  
3.6) Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the theoretical literature on policy analysis and evaluated 
three meso-level analytical frameworks that were considered to offer the greatest 
potential value in the analysis of the UK sport policy process, in relation to SMNGBs. 
While the evaluation identified the ability of all three frameworks to cast some light, in 
different ways, on the analysis of sport policy, the ACF offered a richer, more 
complete and satisfying framework to use. The evaluation of macro theories 
acknowledged that meso-level theories are not value free and are underpinned by 
macro-level assumptions. Similarly, any discussion of the policymaking process 
necessitates an extrinsic consideration of how power is distributed and 
operationalised. The consideration given macro-level assumptions and nature of 
power relations has served to sensitise the researcher to particular relationships and 
different aspects of the policy process, while the ACF and analytical themes 
identified have served to inform and guide the choice of instruments in terms of the 
collection and analysis of research data for this thesis, as discussed more fully within 
the methodology and research design Chapter that follows.  
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Chapter Four 
Methodology and Research Design 
 
4.1) Introduction 
The previous two chapters discussed the historical and theoretical context of this 
research. The purpose of this chapter is to outline and justify the philosophical 
position, methodology and choice of instruments that have informed and guided the 
research design of this study, the overall aim of which has been to determine 
whether SMNGBs are primarily policy ‘shapers’ or policy ‘takers’, supported by the 
following research objectives:   
 
(a) Understand the historical context of contemporary sport policy within which 
SMNGBs operate;  
(b) Examine the development of governmental relationships with SMNGBs; 
(c) Investigate the impact of changing sport policy on SMNGBs, by means of a 
thematic analysis of operational activities; 
(d) Ascertain the strategies utilised by SMNGBs to adapt to, and operate within, a 
changing policy and operational environment; and 
(e) Evaluate the utility of the ACF. 
The structure of this chapter follows the ‘directional, and logical, relationship between 
the key components of ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods and sources’ 
within the research process, as advocated by Grix (2002, p.179; Hay, 2002). The 
chapter therefore begins with the ontological and epistemological assumptions that 
have served to shape this thesis, reflecting on the critical realist approach adopted 
for this study. This is followed by discussions on the qualitative methodology and 
multiple case-study research design adopted for this current research, and the use of 
document analysis and interviews as primary methods of data collection, including 
rationales for the selection of case studies, documents and interview participants. 
The chapter continues with a discussion on the use of a thematic analysis of data, 
and the identification of specific themes that were considered more appropriate 
dimensions and mechanisms to determine the capacity of SMNGBs to shape or take 
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policy. This is followed by a discussions on reliability and validity and the utilisation of 
a periodised timeline. The concluding section of this chapter summarises the logic 
and appropriateness of the methodology and methods used in this study, within a 
critical realist paradigm.      
 
4.2) Ontology 
‘Research is a systematic process of discovery and advancement of human 
knowledge’ (Gratton and Jones, 2010, p.4), linked together by an interrelated set of 
core components that constitute the ‘building blocks’ of generic social research (Grix, 
2002, p.175), as illustrated in Figure 4.1. As ontological and epistemological 
assumptions underlie research (Grix, 2002), the presupposition is that ‘ontology 
logically precedes epistemology which logically precedes methodology’ (Hay, 2002, 
p.5) and so on, which does not mean each component is a co-determinant of the 
other, but rather shows the order of constituent parts (Grix, 2002). 
Figure 4.1: The interrelationship between the building blocks of research  
 
Methodology Methods Sources 
 
 
 
     What’s out  
  there to know? 
 
 
      What and how  
  can we know about it? 
 
 
 
           How can we go 
           about acquiring 
           that knowledge? 
 
 
 
               Which precise procedures  
               can we use to acquire it? 
 
 
 
 
Which data can we collect? 
Source: Hay (2002, p.64)  
 
Ontology  
 
  
 
Epistemology  
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Ontology is the study of existence, the very nature of being (Furlong and Marsh, 
2010; Gratton and Jones, 2010) and the ‘starting point of all research’ (Grix, 2002, 
p.177). The ontological position determines the answer to the questions, ‘what is the 
nature of the social and political reality to be investigated’ (Hay, 2002, p.63), ‘what 
exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how [they] interact with each 
other… [, and] … what we believe constitutes social reality’ (Blaikie, 2000, p.8). Only 
by answering the ontological question can the epistemological question of what can 
be known about this reality, be addressed (Grix, 2002). It follows then that 
epistemological considerations reflect the underlying ontological assumptions, which 
then logically flow with clear methodological implications (Furlong and Marsh, 2010). 
However, the relationship between ontology and epistemology is a contentious issue 
with no ‘uncontentious’ resolution (Furlong and Marsh, 2010, p.188; Bates and 
Jenkins, 2007; Hay, 2007).  
According to Furlong and Marsh (2010), there are two broad ontological positions: 
foundationalism, also termed objectivism, realism or positivism; and anti-
foundationalism, also termed constructivism, relativism or interpretivism. The 
different terminology refers to the same position (Furlong and Marsh, 2010).  
Foundationalism posits that there is a ‘real world out there’, independent of our 
knowledge of it (Furlong and Marsh, 2010, p.185), and those that adopt such a 
position postulate the existence of objective, absolute and unconditional truths 
(Johnson and Lakoff, 1997). This implies that social phenomena and their meanings 
have an existence beyond the reach or influence of social actors (Grix, 2002; 
Bryman, 2004). Thus, foundationalists focus upon identifying the causes of social 
behaviour in order to establish causal relationships between social phenomena with 
an emphasis on explanation (Furlong and Marsh, 2010). By contrast, anti-
foundationalism sees the world as socially constructed, the assumption being that 
‘social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social 
actors and produced through social interaction’ (Bryman, 2004, p.17; Blaikie, 2003). 
For Blaikie (2003, p.203), anti-foundationalism is ‘a pre-interpreted, inter-subjective 
world of cultural objects, meaning and social institutions’, the focus of which is on the 
meaning of behaviour with an emphasis upon understanding rather than explanation 
(Furlong and Marsh, 2010). According to Parsons (2010, p.80), social constructs are 
shaped by ‘ideas, beliefs, norms, identities, or some other interpretive filter through 
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which people perceive the world’, where truth comes from such human engagement 
with the world (Crotty, 1998). Although not dismissive of the existence of structure or 
institutions in reality, Furlong and Marsh (2010, p.191) argued that such ‘reality’ has 
‘no social role/causal power independent of the agent’s/group’s/society’s (sic) 
understanding of it.’ The distinction between foundationalism and anti-
foundationalism is made easier by Bryman’s (2001, p.17) reference to an 
organisation, whereby foundationalism sees an organisation as a ‘tangible object’ 
and something that has ‘a reality that is external to the individuals who inhabit it’, 
whereas anti-foundationalism views an organisation as being defined and shaped by 
the people within it. 
 
4.3) Epistemology 
Epistemology is concerned with the theory of knowledge, ‘the claims or assumptions 
about the possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, whatever it is 
understood to be’ (Blaikie, 2000, p.8). Epistemological assumptions provide ‘a view 
and justification for what can be regarded as knowledge - that is, what can be 
known, and what criteria such knowledge must satisfy in order to be called 
knowledge rather than beliefs’ (Blaikie, 1993, p.7). According to Furlong and Marsh 
(2010, p.185), epistemology relates to: i) identification of ‘real’ or ‘objective’ relations 
between social phenomena; and ii) the extent to which ‘real’ relationships between 
social phenomena can be established simply through direct observation, or whether 
there are relationships which ‘exist’ that are not directly observable.  
Ontologically, a foundationalist would assume that reality and therefore social 
phenomena exists independently of our thought processes. In contrast, an anti-
foundationalist would argue that there is not a ‘real’ world, which exists 
independently of the meaning actors attach to their action, and suggests no observer 
can be ‘objective’ as the world is affected by the social constructions of ‘reality’ 
(Marsh and Stoker, 2002, p.19). Thus, anti-foundationalism posits an interpretivist 
theory of knowledge and evokes a double hermeneutic, whereby the world is 
interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level), and their interpretation is 
interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level) (Furlong and Marsh, 2010, 
p.186). Foundationalists, on the other hand, follow a scientific approach, which aims:  
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'to detect the regularities in nature, propose a generalisation, deduce what it implies 
for the next case and observe whether the prediction succeeds. If it does, no 
consequent action is needed; if it does not, then either discard the generalisation or 
amend it’ (Hollis and Smith, 1990, p.50).   
The argument here is that direct observation is the only way through which 
knowledge can be generated, thereby rejecting anti-foundationalist assumptions of 
unobservable, deeper structures to the social phenomena.  
Within the competing epistemologically scientific and hermeneutic approaches are 
different classifications of epistemological positions, which have an even greater 
degree of ambiguity and disagreement (Furlong and Marsh, 2010). In broad terms, 
there are three common epistemological positions - positivism, critical realism (post-
positivism), and interpretivism, which have been widely adopted in social and 
political science. Grix (2010, p.77) described these three ‘broad headings’ as models 
for research within specific disciplines, which collectively house ‘many “families” of 
research strands’ along a continuum to denote that definition is not absolute, as seen 
in Figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2: Continuum of key paradigm/epistemological positions in human 
and social sciences 
 
Foundational         Anti-foundational 
                      Critical Realism    
  
 
 
 
 
Source adapted from: Grix (2010) 
 
The shaded areas depict the borders between paradigms where much of the ‘real-
world’ research is prevalent, and signify the point at which ‘hard’ proponents of one 
paradigm meet ‘soft’ proponents of the other, the gradation towards an 
epistemological approach dependent upon your direction of travel (Grix, 2010, p.62). 
A clinical division between foundationalist and anti-foundationalist paradigmatic 
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research is therefore problematic. Indeed, research to understand and to inform 
policy and management debates in sport is arguably a case in point, as Downward 
(2005, p.304) claimed, such research poses ‘quite fundamental philosophical 
challenges.’ The differences between the three epistemological approaches can be 
seen by highlighting distinctions in the core epistemological perspectives of each of 
the above positions, as illustrated in Table 4.1. According to Blaikie (2003, p.127), 
however, no epistemological or ontological approach lacks critics since ‘there is not 
neutral ground from which it is possible to make ‘objective’ evaluations.’ Indeed, 
Clough and Nutbrown (2002) argued that a philosophical approach is the one that is 
most appropriate to the underlying aims and objectives of the research. 
Table 4.1: Core epistemological perspectives of Positivism, Critical Realism 
and Interpretivism 
 Positivism Critical Realism Interpretivism 
 
Ontology Foundationalist Foundationalist Anti-Foundationalist 
 
Epistemological 
Assumptions 
Scientific/Objectivist  
 
Phenomena: directly observable.  
 
‘Advocates the application of 
the … natural sciences to the 
study of social reality and 
beyond’ (Bryman, 2004, p.11). 
 
Knowledge must be free from 
social values.   
 
Scientific/Subjectivist  
 
Phenomena: not directly 
observable. 
 
‘[P]redicated upon the view that 
a strategy is required that 
respects the differences 
between people and the objects 
of the natural science and 
therefore requires the social 
scientist to grasp the subjective 
meaning of social action’ 
(Bryman, 2004, p.13). 
 
Hermeneutic/Subjectivist 
 
Phenomena: not directly 
observable. 
 
Provides ‘scientific principles 
that are capable of capturing the 
nature of reality’ (Blaikie, 1993, 
p.59). 
 
 
 
Methodology Objectivity: knowledge is derived 
from human sensory, 
experimental or comparative 
analysis. 
 
Quantitative methods privileged 
- use of rigorous scientific 
methods. 
Science is an empirically based, 
rational and objective enterprise, 
to provide true explanatory and 
predictive knowledge.  
 
Quantitative (observable data) 
and Qualitative (unobservable 
data) 
  
Knowledge is derived from 
socially constructed concepts 
and meanings.  
 
Qualitative methods privileged. 
Role of research Contribute to predictive and 
explanatory knowledge of the 
external world, and causal 
relationships to make causal 
statements, including human 
behaviour.  
 
Findings: objective/generalisable  
Contribute to explanatory 
knowledge of the connections 
between phenomena and 
underlying structures and 
mechanisms at work, e.g. causal 
relationships, and importantly, 
relationships between social 
phenomena that can’t be 
observed. 
 
Believe objective analysis is 
impossible in research as all 
knowledge is discursively laden 
and causal relationships 
impossible. Thick forms of 
description are the primary 
objective, concerned with 
understanding not explanation. 
Theoretical 
dependency 
Concepts and generalisations 
can be established between 
social phenomena, using theory 
to generate hypotheses which 
can be tested and falsified. 
 
 
Models are hypothetical, which 
may reveal the underlying 
mechanisms of reality. 
At one level these accounts are 
re-descriptions of everyday 
accounts; at another level they 
are developed into theories. 
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Structure Vs 
Agency Debate 
Structure-centred approach: 
there are no deep structures 
which cannot be observed 
Structures do not determine 
outcomes, rather they constrain 
and facilitate agency determined 
behaviour, therefore contends 
not all phenomena are directly 
observable. 
 
Agency-centred approach: 
focused on the meaning of 
agents. Contends the world is 
socially constructed and 
therefore phenomena are not 
directly observable. 
Source adapted from: Sparkes (1992); Marsh et al. (1999, pp.11-14); Blaikie (2003); Bryman (2004); 
Furlong and Marsh (2010)  
 
On reflection of the above ontological and epistemological perspectives, a critical 
realist paradigm has been adopted for this study, on the basis that critical realism 
offers: i) a view of reality that sees the world as ‘structured, potentially hierarchical 
and has both individual and social features’ (Downward, 2005, p.307); ii) a useful 
and coherent interdisciplinary approach to sport (Downward, 2005); iii) a causal 
relationship in the production of outcomes (Lawson, 1997, 2003; Sayer, 2000), seen 
as constituent features within this research; and iv) a strong link to the ACF as a 
theoretical framework for analysing policy.  
 
4.4) Critical Realism 
According to Baert (2005, p.87), critical realism fills a philosophical void in the natural 
and social sciences, salvaging ‘the naturalistic project of positivism and falsification 
while taking on board that knowledge is a social construct.’ Given the attention to 
social theory and its penchant for wholeness, critical realism is regarded as within 
the blurred boundaries of the broad philosophical constructs. Yet, despite its 
relatively new orientation, critical realism is on the ascendance (Baert, 2005; Easton, 
2010) within many disciplines including, economics (Lawson, 1997), sociology 
(Sayer, 2000) and sport policy, management and tourism (Downward, 2005). As 
advocated by Baert (2005, p.89), its importance echoes what many social and 
political scientists are already doing, that is, establishing social research:  
‘as a scientific endeavour …without relying on a heavily deductive-nomological 
outlook …, [and] does so by providing a long overdue cogent critique of positivist 
epistemology, and, significantly … avoids the looming spectre of relativism.’  
Indeed, critical realism purports to ‘recognise the reality of the natural order and 
events and discourses of the social world’ (Bryman, 2012, p.29), and posits that ‘we 
will only be able to understand – and so change – the social world if we identify the 
73 
 
structures at work that generate those events and discourses’ (Bhaskar, 1989, p.2), 
both observable and unobservable. This is in contrast to naïve realism that ‘fails to 
recognise that there are enduring structures and generative mechanisms underlying 
and producing observable phenomena and events’, and is therefore ‘superficial’ 
(Bhaskar, 1989, p.2). According to Easton (2010, p.119), critical realism ‘combines 
ontological transcendental realism and an eclectic realist/interpretivist 
epistemology.’ In other words, explanations of cause emerge from the combination 
of agency and institutions to bring about effects. As explained by Downward (2005, 
p.313), ‘[i]ndividuals are borne into a world of pre-existing structures and norms, 
which help to mould but not determine behaviour, which is intentional and has the 
potential for spontaneous change’, thus avoiding ‘epistemic fallacy10.’  
According to Sayer (1992, p.5), key assumptions of critical realism posit that:  
 ‘The world exists independently of our knowledge of it’ and is ‘differentiated 
and stratified’, where natural or social objects (entities/structures), 
‘necessarily have particular powers or ways of acting and particular 
susceptibilities’, capable of generating events; 
 
 Knowledge is fallible, theory-laden, not immune to empirical check, and its 
effectiveness to inform and explain is not accidental. It neither develops 
‘wholly continuously, as the steady accumulation of facts within a stable 
conceptual framework, nor discontinuously, through simultaneous and 
universal changes in concept.’ It is a ‘social practice’, and largely linguistic, 
where ‘social relations of knowledge production influences its content … , 
and the nature of language and the way we communicate are not incidental 
to what is known and communicated’; and 
 
 Social phenomena (actions, texts, institutions) are concept dependent, 
‘which necessitates explanation, understanding, and interpretation of their 
production, material effects and meaning, and exist regardless of 
researcher’s interpretation of them. In order to be able to explain and 
understand social phenomena we have to evaluate them critically.’ 
                                                          
10
 ‘Epistemic fallacy’ is the assumption that ontological issues can be reduced to epistemological ones (Bhaskar, 1978; Collier, 
1994; Lawson, 1997). 
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Critical realists assume reality is a structured open system, subscribing to a 
stratified notion of reality that encompasses three distinct organically related 
domains (Bhaskar, 1978). As explained by Baert (2005): 
The ‘real’ domain - denotes the intransitive dimensions of knowledge, where real 
events, structures and mechanisms that make up the world exist, independent of 
people’s knowledge of them, and where actual causes, structures and powers to 
make things happen exist (e.g. the health benefits of sport);  
The ‘actual’ domain – describes the point at which powers and causes act, and 
patterns of events occur (e.g. changes in government priorities and policy);  
The ‘empirical’ domain – illustrates the transitive dimensions of knowledge (tools 
available to the researcher), where previously established facts or antecedent 
methods and theories reside, and observations are perceived, made and 
experienced by observers (Downward, 2005; Easton, 2010) (e.g. the ACF as a tool 
for analysing sport policy or the APS as an instrument for measuring NGB 
performance). 
The distinction between ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ objects of knowledge has been 
used to validate the credentials of critical realists (Bhaskar, 1978; Collier, 1994). As 
noted by Baert (2005, p.91), critical realism is ‘at variance with transcendental 
idealism in taking the objects to be intransitive opposed to transitive, and it opposes 
empiricism in treating the intransitive realm as layered, not simply limited to the 
instantly observable.’ For Baert (2005, p.93), this generative theory relies on a 
notion of ‘natural necessity’, which explains change or stability of phenomena in 
terms of their intrinsic features. To explain further, using sport as an example, if 
participation levels reduce against the objectives of sport policy, it is possible to 
argue that NGBs were the cause. Indeed, NGBs have received criticism for their 
inability to increase the numbers of those playing sport. But realists would argue 
that participation has reduced due to the internal structures or ‘molecular make-up’ 
(Baert, 2005) of NGBs, and that relationships and the increased complexity of 
performance measures, have merely triggered the mechanisms (the sport policy 
process) in place to deliver government objectives.  
75 
 
For the social and political researcher, the stratified notion of reality predicates a 
double hermeneutic operational environment (Downward, 2005). As Sayer (2000, 
p.17) pointed out:  
‘critical realism acknowledges that social phenomena are intrinsically meaningful, 
and hence that meaning is not only externally descriptive of them but constitutive of 
them (though of course there are usually material constituents too). Meaning has to 
be understood, it cannot be measured or counted, and hence there is always an 
interpretative or hermeneutic element in social science.’  
Downward (2005, pp.316-318) also suggested that there is logic for a triple 
hermeneutic by way of ‘policymakers synthesising and acting upon research 
findings’, and argued that ‘by construction, sport policy and management insights 
presuppose a realist perspective.’ 
Critical realists also espouse the notion of ‘retroduction’ that sums up the way in 
which knowledge depends on ‘knowledge-like antecedents’ (Collier, 1994, pp.160-
167), or ‘retroductive reasoning’ (Blaikie, 2004, p.29). This refers to a ‘mode of 
inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms 
which are capable of producing them (Sayer, 1992, p.107). In other words, as 
purported by Baert (2005, p.94), ‘it indicates the process by which researchers 
account for new phenomena through analogies with phenomena with which they are 
already familiar, to uncover mechanisms, structures and power underneath the 
immediately observable surface.’ This is in contrast to deductive and inductive 
approaches, the former using theory to develop hypotheses, while the latter 
constructs theories from observations and findings (Bryman, 2012). This research 
has adopted a retroductive approach using existing theory to guide the research to 
determine whether SMNGBs are primarily ‘policy shapers’ or ‘policy takers’, within an 
historical context. 
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4.5) Methodology 
Methodology is concerned with ‘the ways we can go about acquiring … knowledge’ 
(Hay, 2002, p.64; Grix, 2010), whereas research methods are defined as the 
‘techniques or procedures used to collate and analyse data’ (Blaikie, 2000, p.8). 
According to Grix (2002, p.179), methodological considerations or issues relate to 
the 'potentialities and limitations of research methods', which are generally reduced 
to the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy debate (Bryman, 2012). For some authors, 
the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is ambiguous and false 
(Layder, 1993; Silverman, 2000; Grix, 2010; Bryman, 2012). For others the 
differences are ‘deeper than the superficial issue of the presence or absence of 
quantification’ (Bryman, 2012, p.35). While the distinction between the two research 
strategies is useful, it is important to acknowledge that both quantitative and 
qualitative research are considered umbrella terms, under which a diverse range of 
‘paradigms, approaches to data, and methods for the analysis of data’ are 
categorised (Punch, 2000a, p.139). According to Silverman (2005, p.6), ‘no method 
of research, quantitative or qualitative, is intrinsically better than the other’, 
particularly when the aim of both types of research is to make inferences, and use 
‘the facts we know to learn something about facts we don’t know’ (King et al., 1994, 
p.119).  
What is important, however, is that the chosen methodology and techniques for data 
collection are the most appropriate to logically fit the research question(s) being 
asked (Punch, 2000b; Mason, 2002), and ‘the nature of the object of study and what 
one wants to learn about it’ (Sayer, 2000, p.19). In consideration of the aims and 
objectives of this study, a qualitative research methodology was adopted, comprising 
of an intensive multiple case-study research design within which the primary 
research methods for data collection were document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews. The use of qualitative methods also fits within a critical realist paradigm, 
since ‘critical realism endorses or is compatible with a relatively wide range of 
research methods’ (Sayer, 2000, p.19). Sayer (2000, p.21) also made the point that 
critical realism can be linked to an intensive approach, aimed at discovering 
substantial relations or connections between ‘causal groups in which particular 
individuals are actually involved, that is, the groups or networks of specific people, 
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institutions, discourses and things with which they interact’, as is clearly the case 
within this research. 
 
4.5.1) Multiple case-study design and rationale 
In simple terms, case studies ‘take as their subject one or more selected examples 
of a social entity which are studied using a variety of data collection techniques’ 
(Hakim, 2000, p.59), deemed to be most appropriate for developing a full 
understanding of the case(s) (Punch, 2000b). According to Yin (2003b, p.4), case 
studies are the ‘method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not readily 
distinguishable from its context.’ For example, investigating the extent to which 
SMNGBs are ‘policy shapers’ or ‘policy takers’, could be thought of as a case study 
into the capacity of non-traditional sports or unfunded-elitist sports to influence 
national sport policy. The underlying premise being a study of an occurrence or 
response to an event/mechanism/policy outcome in one sport constitutes a case 
study of the wider phenomena, as opposed to a complete study of an aspect of that 
sport. Furthermore, Yin (2003c, p.9) posits that a case study is best used when ‘a 
“how” or “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over 
which the investigator has little or no control’, such questions dealing with 
‘operational links … traced over time, rather than mere frequency or incidence’ (Yin, 
2003c, p.6). For example, within this study the researcher has no control over 
whether NGBs influence sport policy or not.  
According to Stark and Torrance (2005, p.33), case studies seek to: 
‘engage with and report the complexity of social activity in order to represent the 
meanings that individual social actors bring to those settings and manufacture in 
them (sic), [the assumption being] that ‘social reality’ is created through social 
interaction, albeit situated in particular contexts and histories, and seeks to identify 
and describe before trying to analyse and theorize.’ 
In other words, a holistic understanding of ‘a set of issues, and how they relate to a 
particular group, organisation, sports team, or even a single individual’ (Gratton and 
Jones, 2010, p.107) or in this case SMNGBs. The intensive nature of case studies 
aim to ‘tease out and disentangle a complex set of factors and relationships’ (Easton, 
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2010, p.119), rather than generalising to the population at large. In doing so, the 
intention is to achieve a ‘rich description’ (Geertz, 1973) of a phenomenon in order to 
represent it from participants’ perspectives, and seeks to ‘illuminate’ the 
researcher/reader’s understanding of an issue (Parlett and Hamilton, 1988; Gall et 
al., 1996; Stark and Torrance, 2005; Bryman, 2012). As argued by Phillpots et al. 
(2010), case studies address the complexity, diversity and uniqueness of each social 
entity (SMNGB), and the key agent’s perceptions, beliefs, values and ideas, and the 
role of structures in shaping them, which strongly endorses a critical realist position. 
The use of multiple case studies has been validated by a number of authors. Herriott 
and Firestone (1983), for example, emphasised the robustness of the multiple-case 
study, while Yin (2009) argued that multiple-case studies result in more compelling 
findings, as the single-case study ‘cannot be regarded as a complete study on its 
own’ (Yin, 1994, p.41), and creates potential ‘fears about the uniqueness or artificial 
conditions surrounding the case’ (Yin, 2003c, p.54). In many respects, multiple-case 
studies involve ‘focused comparisons’, whereby the logic of multiple-case design 
enables researchers to provide an ‘intensive comparison of a few instances’ (Hague 
et al., 1998, p.280). This study, however, has not adopted a comparative research 
design; rather the use of multiple-cases has served to draw cross-case conclusions 
between two or more cases. The logic of comparison implying that ‘we can 
understand social phenomena better when they are compared in relation to two or 
more meaningfully contrasting cases or situations’ (Bryman, 2012, p.72). For Yin 
(1994, p.47), the logic underlying the use of multiple-case studies advocates that 
‘each case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a 
literal replication) or (b) produces contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a 
theoretical replication).’ In this sense, the three cases selected for this study may not 
only provide similar results regarding their capacity to influence national sports policy 
or not, or the strategies used to adapt to policy changes, but also offer distinct 
variations. Furthermore, cross-case conclusions underpinning the theoretical basis 
and framework of this study might be useful for investigating policy influence or 
conformity in other sports, or indeed the same sports in other countries or 
comparisons between countries. Thus, the utility of the logic of comparison ‘directly 
tackles the question of generalizability by demonstrating the similarities and 
79 
 
differences across a number of settings’ (Peräkylä, 2004, p.296 cited in Silverman, 
2005, p.129).    
Criticism of case study research is centred firmly on the external validity or 
generalisability debate (Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Stark and Torrance, 2005; Easton, 
2010; Bryman, 2012). Interestingly, Schlager and Blomquist (1995, p.651) argued 
that within the ACF, ‘case studies are not general theoretical explanations of how 
political actors create, implement, and change public policies in order to advance 
their own purposes and respond to perceived problems.’ However, a counter-
argument to the above critique, resides in the claim that the role of theory in case 
studies is ‘the single most important aid in doing case study research’, as not only is 
‘theory helpful in designing a case study, [it] also becomes a vehicle for generalising 
a case study’s results’ (Yin, 2003b, p. xiv). It is further argued that the use of 
multiple-case studies has the potential to improve theory-building (Bryman, 2012), by 
establishing the circumstances in which theory will or will not hold (Yin, 2009). This is 
clearly seen in the context of this study by way of an evaluation of the utility of the 
ACF in examining the sport policy process, and SMNGBs, as policy actors, to 
determine their capacity to influence policy direction, which also has a distinct link to 
critical realism’s notion of retroduction, whereby existing theory is used to uncover 
mechanisms, structures and power underneath the immediately observable surface. 
For example, the ACF’s notion of deep structures, coalitions and beliefs is strongly 
related to the critical realists’ view of reality, as being structured, potentially 
hierarchical and has both individual and social features. This can be seen through 
the spine of accountability within community sport policy from government through to 
SMNGBs, where structures do not determine outcomes, but rather constrain or 
facilitate agency determined behaviour, which are constituent features within this 
research and fundamental to critical realism.  
Retroduction within this multiple-case study design is augmented further through the 
integration of Lukes’ three dimensional theory of power within the ACF, when applied 
to multiple cases to provide insight into the dynamics of coalitions and relationships 
between SE/UKS and SMNGBs. Indeed, it is possible to view the closeness of the 
neo-pluralistic origins of the ACF with Lukes’ dimensions of power through each 
dimension. Lukes’ first dimension of observable and concrete decision making would 
be reflective of SMNGBs doing something wouldn’t otherwise do, in this case 
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involvement within the sport policy environment, and undertaking SE’s bidding in 
return for financial resources, target-setting-resource-dependency relationship. 
Power is unequal in terms of dominant NGBs versus those that are marginalised, for 
example, medal winning sports versus non-medal winning sports. The second 
dimension of power, focused on agenda setting and barriers to entry into the 
decision-making process of policy, can be seen through SE and the pendulum swing 
in community sport between sport for sport’s sake, sport for social good and physical 
activity, where the influence of even the largest of NGBs has been marginal. While 
Lukes’ third dimension of power and ideological control is more challenging, it is 
observable through the acceptance of the idea that sport does good things, is good 
for communities and individuals, and an idea that has been deeply entrenched in 
popular consciousness. The shaping of NGB/SMGB preferences also has a strong 
connection to ideological and psychological control of Lukes’ third dimension, 
particularly government’s action through SE to remove ‘Blazer Brigade’ from within 
NGBs to ensure NGBs are professionally managed, the impact of which has been an 
organisational-identity crisis among SMNGBs, as revealed within the empirical 
findings of this research.   
 
4.5.2) Case selection and rationale 
According to Yin (2003b, p.9), selecting cases ‘is one of the most difficult steps in 
case study research.’ Cases should not simply be the most convenient or accessible, 
but selected through a process that incorporates specific reasons for inclusion, and a 
‘sufficient level of prior screening … to help the researcher decide whether a case 
meets … pre-established criteria’ (Yin, 2003b, p.10). As this study is informed by a 
qualitative research methodology and follows a theoretical rather than statistical 
logic, Mason (1996, pp.93-94) argued that the selection of cases should be centred 
on ‘their relevance to your research questions, your theoretical position … and most 
importantly the explanation or account which you are developing.’ The underlying 
research question for this study is a critical realist investigation on whether SMNGBs 
are primarily ‘policy shapers’ or ‘policy takers’ within the UK sport policy domain, 
utilising the ACF as a theoretical framework from which to evaluate the sport policy 
process.  
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A rationale for SMNGBs as the unit of analysis can therefore been seen from a 
theoretical position, however, greater clarification is required as to what is meant by 
a small to mid-sized NGB and their importance to this research. Thorhallsson and 
Wivel (2006) argued that the identification of smallness is problematic given the 
myriad of ways size can be expressed. Trõnurist (2010) and Sutton (2011) 
suggested that smallness can be best viewed lying on a continuum. In this sense, 
the organisational size of NGBs can been conceptualised along a continuum of state 
funding for NGBs, reflecting SE investment awards for community/grassroots sport 
during the 2013-17 funding cycle, as illustrated in Figure 4.3 (ring-fenced funding has 
been excluded based on the assumption that they are unconfirmed awards). It is 
important to note that this study is interested in Summer Olympic sports in England 
and not Paralympic sports, hence the exclusion of those NGB/sports from the 
selection process. 
Figure 4.3: Continuum of NGB state funding (Sport England 2013-17 Olympic 
sport investment) 
 
Large NGB    Mid-sized NGB     Small NGB 
£32m           £9.2m     £0.9m 
      
Cycling  Athletics  Badminton  Hockey  Canoeing  Sailing  Triathlon  Judo  Volleyball  Boxing  Table-Tennis  Taekwondo  Shooting  Modern-Pentathlon  
    Football  Rugby Union  Golf  Gymnastics  Swimming  Rowing  Tennis  Equestrian  Basketball  Archery  Fencing  Handball  Weightlifting  Wrestling 
 
Source adapted from: SE (2013c – see Appendix IV)  
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Accordingly, SMNGBs of Olympic sports in England with potential value for 
inclusivity within this study were those that met the following initial phase of pre-
selection criteria:   
(a) Regarded as competitive/community sports but not elite sports, due to the 
removal of elite funding by UKS (for the Rio 2016 funding cycle), as indicated 
from UKS’s historical funding data11; and 
 
(b) Receive smaller levels of funding from SE (in relation to 
community/grassroots participation) relative to the average funding of NGBs 
of Olympic sports during the 2013-17 funding cycle (i.e. less than £9.2m – see 
Appendix IV). 
 
It should be noted that the Olympic sports of football, golf, rugby union and tennis 
receive no elite funding from UKS, as there is an ‘expectation that they self-fund’ 
(UKS, 2012, p.4). However, the above sports were excluded from selection on the 
basis that they are generally considered to be traditionally larger NGB/sports in 
England, receive higher levels of SE funding above the calculated average, and are 
highly self-funding.   
To ensure that case study selection provided contrasts for cross-case comparisons 
and conclusions, a second phase of pre-selection was undertaken linked to SE’s 
APS (1x30) 16-plus data (2006 to 2016) on levels of participation, with each potential 
SMNGB case being representative of one of the following criteria:  
i) An insufficient sample size to provide statistical data for the APS; 
 
ii) No change or a significant change upwards in participation levels between 
APS1 and APS10; and 
 
iii) A significant change downwards in participation levels between APS1 (and 
APS10. 
 
                                                          
11
 UKS’s historical funding data. Available online from: http://www.uksport.gov.uk/our-work/investing-in-sport/historical-funding-
figures 
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To demonstrate the results of the second pre-selection phase, a snapshot of SE’s 
APS data has been provided in the appendices (Appendix V), focused on the 
changes in participation levels between APS1 (2006) and APS10 (2016). Table 4.2 
identifies those Olympic sports that met the above pre-established selection criteria. 
Table 4.2: Pre-selected Olympic Sports as potential case studies    
Olympic sports 
with a 
representative 
NGB in 
England 
Removal of 
funding 
provided by 
UKS (‘No 
compromise’ 
principle) 
Smaller levels 
of SE funding 
relative to more 
traditional 
sports in 
England 
Insufficient 
sample size to 
provide 
statistical data 
for the APS 
No change or a 
significant 
change 
upwards in 
participation 
levels between 
APS1 and 
APS10 
A significant 
change 
downwards in 
participation 
levels between 
APS1 and 
APS10 
Basketball      
Fencing      
Handball      
Table Tennis      
Volleyball      
Weightlifting      
Wrestling      
 
The potential SMNGBs available for selection and inclusion as case studies within 
this research were as follows:   
 
Olympic sport SMNGB 
  
Basketball  Basketball England  
Fencing  England Fencing 
Handball  England Handball Association 
Table Tennis  Table Tennis England   
Volleyball  Volleyball England 
Weightlifting  British Weightlifting  
Wresting  British Wrestling 
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From the second phase of pre-selection, table tennis and its representative SMNGB, 
Table Tennis England (TTE), met the criterion for a sport with no change or a 
significant increase in participation levels, as measured by APS. The sports of 
volleyball and basketball both met the criterion for a significant decrease in 
participation levels, as measured by APS. Following a review of document 
availability and accessibility, Basketball England documentation was found to be 
very limited in contrast to Volleyball England (VE), and thus Volleyball England was 
selected as the case study from which more could be learnt for this study, as 
endorsed by Stake (2005). Fencing, handball, wrestling and weightlifting all met the 
criterion for a sport having an insufficient sample size to be measured by APS. 
However, in consideration of Hakim’s (2000, p.62) argument that ‘some degree of 
prior knowledge may be necessary for suitable cases to be selected’, handball was 
the selected case study on the basis of accessibility, and the researcher’s prior 
knowledge of handball and the England Handball Association (EH). 
 
4.6) Research methods and sources 
According to Mason (2002, p.27; Punch, 2000a), the choice of research methods 
and sources should be strategic and ‘the most appropriate for answering your 
research questions.’ The data collection techniques deemed most appropriate for 
this study, included document analysis and semi-structured interviews. Such 
techniques clearly lend themselves to qualitative enquiry (Grix, 2010), as interviews 
‘collect data concerned with concepts that are difficult or inappropriate to measure … 
and tend to explore questions of ‘why’ and ‘how’, rather than … ‘how many and 
‘when’ (Gratton and Jones, 2010, p.155). The analysis of documentary sources is 
seen by many qualitative researchers as a meaningful and appropriate method of 
social and political research (Mason, 2002). This research has also been guided by 
theoretical assumptions that signpost an appropriate strategy for data collection, 
Pierce et al. (2017) pointing towards document analysis and interviews as the 
primary research methods of the ACF, especially when the ACF posits a tripartite 
hierarchy of beliefs, values and norms to explain policy change that cannot be easily 
investigated using quantitative methods.  
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As shown previously, the methodology of this research logically fits within the critical 
realist paradigm, as do the research methods for data collection and interpretation. 
While getting a clear understanding of the nature of deep structures may have its 
limitations, the analysis and critical evaluation of empirical data can provide the 
means to move closer towards a greater understanding, by being skeptical about 
what is heard or read, thus reflecting the critical aspect of critical realism. While 
documents represent the output of government and national organisations, 
interviewed participants, speaking on behalf of SMNGBs, government and SE, 
provide an insight into their perspectives on particular issues or policy. The 
beliefs/values/ideas of, for example, CEOs, in their capacity as representatives of the 
organisations they serve, are not talking about themselves, but talking about the 
experiences of the SMNGB in relation to impact of sport policy, strategies utilised, 
and the potential influence or not shape national sport policy, rather than policy 
concerned with individual clubs. The latter giving rise to the potential for another 
layer of meaning beyond the empirical data, which has to be understood, not 
measured or counted, and therefore interpretative or hermeneutic. The above 
emphasing the critical realist’s stratified notion of the real, the empirical and the 
actual, strengthening the justification for the methodological approach, multiple case-
study design and choice of instruments that have informed this study.  
Notwithstanding the above, an element of quantitative data has been utilised for the 
purpose of: i) understanding the operational environment of NGBs from a financial 
and policy perspective (e.g. state funding and participation rates); ii) using numerical 
data to support the process of case selection; and iii) to corroborate the empirical 
data collected from interviews and document analysis. It is also important to note 
that the use of quantitative data in combination with qualitative should not be 
regarded as a mixed method approach, but as a useful source of secondary data to 
support the research process. 
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4.6.1) Document Analysis 
According to Yin (2003a), document analysis is an important source of data in case 
study research, particularly as Scott (1990, p.28) claimed it provides an 
understanding of ‘the meaning and significance of what the document contains’, and 
for May (2011, p.208), an understanding of ‘events, process and transformations in 
social relation.’ Grix (2010, p.134) noted further that ‘you have a resource from which 
you can construct … interview questions [and] ‘check’ against reality in fieldwork.’ 
Document analysis is also considered a primary method of triangulation (MacDonald, 
2008), since ‘both accuracy of documents and their authorship [can] be validated by 
individuals who produced them’ (Forster, 1994, p.155). In addition, documents are 
viewed as being a distinct level of reality in their own right (Atkinson and Coffey, 
2011), especially their contribution to ‘a behind-the-scenes view of many aspects of 
a phenomenon that might not be revealed through observations and interviews’ 
(Tenenbaum and Driscoll, 2005, p.599), for example, minutes of Board meetings. 
Scott (1990) broadly distinguishes documents between those that are personal (e.g. 
diaries, letters, autobiographies), and those that are official, deriving from either the 
state (e.g. policy-related documents) or a ‘very heterogeneous’ (Bryman, 2012, 
p.550) group of private sources (e.g. company documents) (Yin, 2003a; May, 2011). 
For Bryman (2012, p.554), mass-media outputs (e.g. newspapers, magazines and 
online videos) are potential document sources and, increasingly, virtual documents 
are considered a ‘potent source of documents for both quantitative and qualitative 
data analysis.’ This supports the use of online SMNGB magazines and video content 
from Annual General Meetings (AGMs), as sources of empirical data. The latter 
becoming data when transformed into text (Silverman, 2001; Mason, 2002).  
Generally speaking, all documents are written with a purpose in mind and based on 
particular assumptions, the presentation of which is variable (Mason, 2002; Yin, 
2003a; Grix, 2010; Bryman, 2012) and inevitably creates consequences – ‘intended 
or unintended’ (Mason, 2002, p.110). Prior to selecting specific documents, it is 
essential to be ‘fully aware of the origins, purpose and original audience’ (Grix, 2010, 
p.133), and to scrutinise each document to the same degree within a clear and 
consistent set of principles, for dealing with ‘selectivity and perspective in handling 
documents’ (Mason, 2002, pp.106-113). Scott (1990, p.6; Bryman, 2012, p.544), 
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produced a robust set of criteria to assess the quality of documents, which reflected 
a document’s authenticity (originality, consistency, source, author), credibility 
(sincerity, accuracy), representativeness (subject, timeframe, untypicality), and 
meaning (literal or interpretative, clarity and comprehensibility).       
Within this study, documents investigated and analysed derived from the state and 
government agencies (e.g. DCMS/SE/UKS - policy-related strategic documents, 
Board meeting minutes, annual reports), private sources (e.g. SMNGB annual 
reports, strategic documents, WSPs, Board meeting minutes), and virtual documents 
(e.g. official magazines, online sources). The use of the internet reflecting its 
intensive use by government, its agencies (UKS/SE) and selected SMNGBs, where 
published documents are generally available online and within the public domain. 
Referring to Scott’s (1990) document quality assessment criteria, Bryman (2012, 
p.550) argued that state documents are considered authentic and have meaning in 
the sense of being clear and comprehensible, although the issue of bias has 
potential implications in terms of credibility. In this respect, the researcher should 
resist temptations to treat such documents as a ‘depiction of reality’, since 
documents in the public domain, state or otherwise, ‘are shaped by the structure and 
activities of the departments or organisations responsible for them’ (Scott, 1990, 
p.96). In assessing the representativeness of state documents, while Bryman (2012, 
p.550) considered their uniqueness to complicate document quality, it is the official 
or quasi-official aspect of the state document that is of greater interest to the 
qualitative researcher, to establish a ‘cogent theoretical account’ within single or 
possibly multiple contexts.  
In terms of documents deriving from private sources, Bryman (2012) suggested that 
authenticity and meaning are likely to be evident, but the evaluation of credibility and 
representativeness requires greater analysis, particularly as written documents are 
from the authors’ viewpoint (Scott, 1990). In addition, there is the potential 
representative issue of ‘survival’ and ‘availability’ of selected documents (Scott, 
1990, p.25; McCulloch, 2004). This has implications for completing the research 
(Yin, 2003a), since ‘[m]aterial which might enable a wealth of insight [could] be 
tantalisingly elusive’ (Andrew, 1985, p.156 cited in McCulloch, 2004, p.43). For 
virtual documents and or media outputs, while there is deemed to be an element of 
authenticity, Bryman (2012, p.553-4) contended that authorship is often unclear, 
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accuracy is unreliable, and credibility a frequent issue, although uncovering the 
‘errors or distortions is often the objective of the analysis.’  
While the use of document analysis raises potential problems, for example, bias and 
inaccuracy (Scott, 1990), it has also been extensively employed within sport policy-
related research (e.g. Theodoraki and Henry, 1994; Green, 2004, 2006; Green and 
Houlihan, 2005, 2006; Piggin et al., 2009), and is one of the most frequent data 
collection methods for the ACF (Pierce et al., 2017), inclusive of government and 
governmental agency reports, responses to government consultations, secondary 
literature, and newspaper reports. Interest group publications (e.g. SMNGBs) also 
offer better prospects for systematic empirical work on changes in belief systems, 
especially ‘given the rather technical nature of many Secondary Aspects and the 
focus on changes in beliefs over a decade or more’ (Sabatier, 1988, p.147). The 
complementary use of other methods of data collection and data sources minimises 
the effect of bias (Grix, 2010) and enhances reliability (McCulloch, 2004). 
 
4.6.2) Interviews 
Interviews are the most commonly used method of data collection in qualitative 
research (Mason, 2002; Gratton and Jones, 2010), and an important source of case 
study information (Yin, 2003a), particularly where such information is considered to 
be of a complex and contextual nature (Veal, 1997). Interviews are also seen as ‘a 
resource for understanding how individuals make sense of their social world and act 
within it’ (May, 1997, p.129), through a focus on beliefs and personal experiences 
and the distinct features of situations and events (Vromen, 2010). Such different 
interpretations of reality embrace the ontological and epistemological position of 
critical realism. In this sense, ‘if individual agency is deemed important in aiding the 
understanding of policy-making, then the ‘assumptive worlds’ (Young, 1977) of ‘key 
actors should be explored’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005, p.7).  
According to Grix (2010), interviews can be broadly classified under four categories: 
structured, semi-structured, unstructured, and group interviews or focus groups. 
Within this research, semi-structured interviews were considered to be the most 
appropriate interview technique, especially since their in-depth and intensive nature 
89 
 
‘allow people to talk freely and to offer their interpretations of events’ (Green and 
Houlihan, 2005, p.7). Indeed, the semi-structured interview’s use of ‘an interview 
guide, open-ended questions and informal probing to facilitate a discussion of issues’ 
(Devine, 2002, p.198), has the potential to encourage ‘thick and rich descriptions … 
in order to fill out the picture of whatever the researcher is trying to understand’ 
(Smith and Caddick, 2012, p.64). As Keat and Urry (1975, p.205) argued, the in-
depth interview is appropriate when seeking to ‘understand actors’ perspectives that 
attach subjective meaning to their actions and interpret action of their own situation 
and that of others.’ Justification for adopting semi-structured interviews is further 
endorsed by Green and Houlihan (2005, p.7), who argued that interviews enable the 
researcher to: i) gain a more (agent-) informed understanding of historically-
developed processes and developments relating to sport policy and NGBs; ii) allow 
distinctions to be made between the tendency towards ‘rhetoric’ in public policy 
documents, and the greater chance of obtaining a realistic opinion from NGBs, 
government and government agency insights into their perspectives on particular 
issues or policy; and iii) attempt to discern the normative values and belief systems 
underlying NGBs, government and government agency perspectives, as well as their 
perceptions of the constraining/facilitating structural context within which they 
operate. The use of semi-structured interviews within multiple case study research is 
also supported by Bryman (2012, p.472; Yin, 2003a), since some structure is needed 
‘to ensure cross-case comparability.’  
The potential weaknesses of qualitative interviewing were also considered, for 
example: the use of greater resources (time, travel and costs that may result in 
reduced sample sizes), and the potential to introduce bias on behalf of the 
interviewers, often unconsciously (verbal and or non-verbal reactions such as 
nodding and gesturing) (Gratton and Jones, 2010, pp.157-158); and interviewee 
domination (elite interviews – see Peabody et al., 1990; Richards, 1996; Lilleker, 
2003) can create directional change, problems of recall, misperception and 
insufficient or incorrect knowledge, all of which could impact on the quality of the 
data collected. More specifically, reliability and validity problems still remain, since 
the interpretation of the data is required on behalf of the researcher, and ambiguity is 
residual no matter ‘how carefully we word the questions and report or code the 
answers’ (Fontana and Frey, 1998, p.47).  
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To minimise, or where possible, eradicate the impact of such potential limitations, the 
researcher drew upon a number of interview procedures and techniques within 
qualitative research, particularly in relation to the interview design, the method of 
conducting interviews, the researcher’s skills to maximise the benefit of the interview, 
and the analysis of the data collected from interviews (Mason, 2002; Gratton and 
Jones, 2010; Bryman, 2012). The researcher’s interview preparations also provided 
a limiting effect on potential issues (Peabody et al., 1990; Lilleker, 2003), for 
example, the use of a structured interview guide to meet the research aims and 
objectives (Bryman, 2012), using language that was comprehensible, relevant and 
unambiguous (Gratton and Jones, 2010). In addition, rigorous planning 
complemented the researcher’s ‘set of intellectual and social skills’ (Mason, 2002, 
p.67; Kvale, 1996), the interviews being undertaken in a professional, enthusiastic, 
and confident manner, throughout the whole interview process (Gratton and Jones, 
2010). In this respect, the researcher, who is aged 55, has previous experience as a 
senior executive, interacting and communicating with people at all levels, is a 
graduate of and lecturer in sport management and policy, and as such has a 
‘repertoire of demeanours and sets of social skills’ that could be drawn upon (Mason, 
2002, p.73). Furthermore, a pilot interview was undertaken prior to conducting the 
research interviews, to ascertain the ‘substance and style, scope and sequence’ 
(Mason, 2002, p.67) of the interview questions, and act as a mechanism for 
developing and enhancing the researcher’s interviewing skillset (Kvale 1996; Gratton 
and Jones, 2010; Bryman, 2012).   
Additionally, the interviews were conducted using digital audio-recording devices and 
transcribed verbatim, considered by many as the method of choice within qualitative 
research (Bryman, 2012). This is particularly the case for semi-structured interviews, 
since the ‘interviewer is supposed to be highly alert to what is being said – following 
up interesting points made, prompting and probing, [and] drawing attention to any 
inconsistencies in the interviewees answers’ (Bryman, 2012, p.482). Moreover, 
recording the interview places a greater focus on the conversation, and enhances 
the rapport between the interviewer and interviewee that may result in the divulgence 
of unexpected data (Gratton and Jones, 2010). The recording and transcribing of 
interviews also allowed for repeated examinations of the interviewees’ answers; 
public scrutiny of the data to counter accusations of bias, and provided a record of 
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the exact words, phrases and tone of the interviewee thereby enhancing the 
reliability of the data collected (Bryman, 2012). 
 
4.6.3) Selection of interview participants and rationale 
The selection of interview participants requires a clear rationale to demonstrate that 
selection is ‘appropriately conceived and executed’ (Mason, 2002, p.120), and 
encapsulates a ‘relevant range’ of ‘pivotal significance’ to allow the researcher to 
‘develop an empirically and theoretically grounded argument’ (Mason, 2002, pp.121-
124). Bryman (2012, p.406) argued that ‘how people are chosen’ for interview is 
often one area that lacks transparency within qualitative research, and selection size 
is often ‘a common area of confusion’ (Gratton and Jones, 2010, p.168). 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p.370), ‘many qualitative researchers 
employ … purposive, and not random sampling methods. They seek out groups, 
settings and individuals where … the processes being studied are most likely to 
occur’. In other words, purposive sampling is a strategic way to link sources of 
information to research questions (Bryman, 2012). Mason (2002, p.124) described 
this method of ‘strategic sampling’ as ‘theoretical sampling’, concerned with 
‘constructing a sample … which is meaningful theoretically and empirically, because 
it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which help to develop and test your 
theory or argument.’ Mason seemingly treats theoretical and purposive sampling as 
synonyms, whereas for Bryman (2012, p.416), purposive sampling acts as a ‘master’ 
concept around which other sampling approaches such as theoretical and snowball 
sampling, can be distinguished. For Silverman (2005, pp.129-130), however, the 
only difference between the theoretical and purposive sampling is when the 
“‘purpose’ behind “purposive”’ sampling is not theoretically defined, and that 
purposive sampling ‘demands that we think critically about the parameters of the 
population we are studying and choose our sample case carefully on that basis.’  
In light of the above discussion, this research adopted a purposive approach to 
selecting interviewees on the basis that the selected participants were ‘key 
informant[s]’ (Gratton and Jones, 2010, p.170), directly relevant to the research aims 
and objectives, and considered to be meaningful theoretically, empirically and 
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contextually (Mason, 2002). Participant selection was based upon positions, relevant 
experiences, and the ability to provide specialist knowledge, to ‘complement data 
collected from other sources’ (Gratton and Jones, 2010, p.170; Grix, 2009). 
Participant pre-selection constituted the fulfilment of one or more of the criteria 
detailed in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Pre-selection criteria for interview participants 
 
Currently holds or has held a position of strategic overview with the selected NGBs, and potentially, UKS and SE, e.g. CEO, 
Chair, Board member or senior manager/team member. 
 
 
Has been or is currently involved at a senior strategic level of planning, decision-making and publishing of documents within their 
organisation, in particular, sport policy documents, WSPs, strategic documents, annual reports and so on. 
 
 
Has been or is involved in a specific role directly with the selected SMNGB case studies/sports, the government and government 
agencies (UKS, SE), for a period of time over a decade or more in order to map changing policy decisions and operational 
environments of SMNGBs, as required by the ACF to acquire a reasonably accurate account of policy change. 
 
 
Has had or has direct responsibility for liaison and relationship management between the government, its agencies (UKS, SE) 
and the selected SMNGBs. 
 
 
Participants meeting pre-selection criteria, and subsequently interviewed are detailed 
in Table 4.4, which also provides information on the coded identity of interviewees 
and interview dates for the ensuing empirical chapters. 
Table 4.4: List of interview participants   
Interview Code Interview Date Role/Position Organisation 
CEOEH 15/08/2018 CEO SMNGB: England Handball 
CEOVE 14/08/2018 CEO SMNGB: Volleyball England 
CEOTTE 24/09/2018 CEO SMNGB: Table Tennis England 
SMTTE 05/10/2018 Senior Management SMNGB: Table Tennis England 
SEC 04/09/2018 Chair Sport England 
SESLR 17/08/2018 Strategic Lead NGBs Sport England 
DCMSa 11/10/2018 Senior Management DCMS 
DCMSb 11/10/2018 Policy Advisor DCMS 
SRADP 26/09/2018 Director of Policy Sport Recreation and Alliance 
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In-text citations relevant to interviewees refer to the above interviewee code, and 
relate to the transcribed interview and interview date, unless otherwise stated. A 
short biography of those interviewed has been provided within the appendices 
(Appendix VI), to demonstrate their relevance to the research aims and objectives of 
this study. A copy of the semi-structured interview guide and questions, and an 
exemplar transcribed interview are also included within the appendices (Appendix VII 
and Appendix VIII, respectively). 
 
4.7) Data Analysis 
According to Smith and Caddick (2012, p.67; Bryman, 2012), several ‘analytical 
lenses’ are generally used within qualitative research, notably, analytic induction, 
content and discourse analysis, grounded theory, narrative analysis, and thematic 
analysis. Thematic analysis was considered the most appropriate and applicable 
method to achieve the research aims and objectives of this study, particularly its 
capacity to provide a more detailed analysis by ‘identifying, analyzing, interpreting 
and reporting patterns [and themes] within data’ (Smith and Caddick, 2012, p.68). 
Braun and Clarke (2006, p.77; Boyatzis, 1998) argued that thematic analysis offered 
‘an accessible and theoretically flexible approach to analysing qualitative data’ (see 
Hall et al., 2012 for an example application to sport research).  
Furthermore, the utilisation of thematic analysis has vastly increased as a means of 
making sense of qualitative data analysis (Bryman, 2012; Smith and Caddick, 2012), 
as it encompasses the activity of searching for themes or codes (Bryman, 2012), 
which are not seen as being finite, but are identifiable ‘before, during and after data 
collection’ (Ryan and Bernard, 2003, p.275). For example, the literature review and 
the researcher’s existing knowledge contributed to this process, as well as the data 
collection itself (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Ryan and Bernard, 2003), as seen by 
the emergence of themes within this study. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), 
additional advantages of thematic analysis include inter alia: a useful method for 
working within a participatory (e.g. multiple case studies) research paradigm, with 
participants as collaborators; the summation of key features from voluminous data, 
and/or a thick description of the data set; illumination of similarities and differences 
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across the data set, and the emergence of unexpected insights; and an allowance 
and usefulness for the interpretation of data from different theoretical perspectives.  
However, it is important to acknowledge that thematic analysis has potential 
weaknesses, such as its lack of an ‘identifiable heritage’ (Bryman, 2012, p.578), and 
minimalistic organisation and description of the data collected (Smith and Caddick, 
2012). According to Patton (2002, p.433), thematic analysis also refrains from 
following any ‘formulae for determining significance’ or allowing any provisions for 
‘replicating the researcher's analytical thought processes’ or ‘measuring reliability 
and validity.' Boyatzis (1998) identified three further potential obstacles in the 
process of thematic analysis: i) the researcher projecting their own values; ii) 
inadequate sampling; and iii) the researcher’s mood and their style of working. A 
significant disadvantage, according to Braun and Clarke (2006, p.97), is its ‘limited 
interpretative power beyond mere description if it is not used within an existing 
theoretical framework.’ 
To counter some of the limitations stated above, this study has used existing 
theoretical constructs to explain empirical findings thus negating the issue of limited 
interpretative power. The selected case studies and interviewees for this research 
are also considered adequate, appropriate and applicable. The researcher also has 
knowledge of the subject area, although it is accepted that some aspects of the 
researcher’s values, mood and working style may have had a limited impact on the 
study. However, as argued by Grix (2010, p.118), ‘no one can be fully detached from 
any type of research – or offer a value free analysis – precisely because researchers 
are the sum of their accumulated knowledge, which is based on certain assumptions 
about the world.’  
In terms of theme identification and codification, Bryman (2012) suggested that a 
framework approach (e.g. Ritchie et al., 2003) and recommendations from Ryan and 
Bernard (2003) were useful pointers for data analysis. Of further usefulness is Biddle 
et al.’s (2001) framework for organising data units (statements, sentences, and so 
on) into clusters of common themes from raw data to first order and second order 
themes in a logical sequence, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: A framework for the thematic analysis of qualitative data
 
Source: Biddle et al. (2001, p.797 cited in Gratton and Jones, 2010, p.243) 
Furthermore, Braun and Clarke (2006; Bryman, 2012, Smith and Caddick, 2012) 
provided useful descriptions and explanations of analytical phases when undertaking 
thematic analysis, as summarised below: 
1) Immersion - familiarisation with all data - from literal, interpretive and reflexive 
perspectives (Mason, 2002); 
2) Generating Initial Codes - timely and systematic identification and production 
of coding across the entire data set, and gathering and collation of data 
relevant to each code; 
3) Searching for and identifying themes - re-focused analysis, extracting coded 
data into more meaningful overarching themes; 
4) Reviewing themes – checks and balances – to ensure themes fit within the 
entire data set, and data coheres ‘meaningfully, while clear distinctions 
between themes [are] identifiable’ (Smith and Caddick, 2012, p.68); 
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5) Writing the report - prevalence of the theme (evidence), embedded within a 
compelling analytical tale that provides a clear interpretation of the data, 
illustrates what the idea is all about and addresses the research question(s). 
Miles and Huberman (1994) also recommended the use charts, tables, 
networks and other graphical formats for a good display of data on a continual 
basis, as is the case within this study. 
 
A manual thematic data analysis was also adopted for this research, which does not 
imply any dismissiveness of the potential advantages of using analytical computer 
software, such as NVivo (Bazerly, 2007). Rather, a manual process was considered 
more desirable as ‘it gives a “feel” for the data and allows increased familiarity with 
transcripts’ (Gratton and Jones, 2010, p.246), viewed as particularly relevant for 
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) phases of thematic analysis. Furthermore, Dey (1993, 
p.61) argued that ‘the use of a computer can encourage a “mechanistic” approach to 
analysis’, whereby ‘the roles of creativity, intuition and insight into analysis are 
eclipsed’, which may impact on the generation, identification and reviewing stages of 
theme selection, and fail to identify context (Gratton and Jones, 2010). Krane et al. 
(1997, p.215) also pointed out that ‘none of these procedures [manual methods or 
computer programmes] directly affects the value of the study; they are merely ways 
for the inquirers to work with their data … [and] … are really doing the same thing 
conceptually’, provided ‘the analysis is carried out correctly’ (Gratton and Jones, 
2010, p.246). In other words, the analytical effort that allows for the ‘construction of 
explanation and argument in relation to your intellectual puzzle’ (Mason, 2002, 
p.171). 
Following a more in-depth analysis of relevant sport policy documents and NGB-
related documents, in line with the analytical phases described above, a degree of 
overlap was revealed between the themes identified from the literature review. In 
consideration of those overlaps, a more specific set of analytical themes were 
identified to guide the selected case studies and achieve the research aims and 
objectives, as detailed in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5: Specific analytical themes and determining factors 
Analytical Themes Determining Factors  
 
Governance Constant scrutiny, measuring, monitoring and evaluation on the basis of ‘earned autonomy’; 
the requirement for effective governance; the shift from good governance to excellent 
governance, and from a voluntary code to a mandatory code. 
 
Funding The impact of the Lottery; scepticism regarding NGBs’ professionalism, and organisational 
and managerial capacity; modernisation reinforced by the threat financial sanctions; the No 
compromise funding system for elite sport;  progressive reliance on public funds - reduced 
subsidies; and income diversification and commercial revenue generation.  
 
Capacity Building: 
workforce and 
facilities 
Implementation of WSPs in terms of capacity building and effective use of government 
funds, particularly in respect of workforce development and facilities, and development of 
accessible, sustainable environments. 
  
Participation Introduction of KPIs to meet government objectives for increasing participation; 
reassessment of management, plans, or subsequent performances; delivery of stretching 
and difficult targets; slow progress to deliver contractually agreed WSP outcomes and 
harsher performance regimes for NGBs; and the use of alternative delivery mechanisms. 
 
Partnerships Delivery of community sport through partnerships; a more concerted effort towards a mixed 
economy approach to funding grassroots participation; resource maximisation through 
value for money, funding partners, and collaborative brokerage at a local level to access 
funding. 
 
 
More importantly, the specific themes related to dimensions of operational activities 
within SMNGBs, which were considered priorities for both SE and SMNGBs and 
mechanisms for delivering desired policy outcomes, and as such viewed as 
determinants relevant to policy shaping or taking, for example, the imposition of 
governance on SMNGBs as a policy directive. The multiple case-study research 
design and the selection of three SMNGB case studies allowing for a reflective and 
iterative methodological approach, using the critical realist notion of retroduction to 
provide analytical generalisations to theoretical propositions, to determine the 
capacity of SMNGBs to shape or take policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
4.8) Reliability and Validity  
Qualitative research is often thought to produce ‘soft, unscientific results’ (Devine 
(2002, p.204), yet Silverman (2005, p.209) argued it is not ‘a soft option … [and] 
demands theoretical sophistication and methodological rigour.’ Indeed, Smith (2007, 
p.5) stated that qualitative research is ‘more than method … It is about 
methodology.’ According to Silverman (2005, p.209), such methodological 
awareness provides an indication of the quality of research through the researcher’s 
commitment to demonstrate that the procedures used ensured methods ‘were 
reliable’ and ‘conclusions valid.’ Validity is essentially another word for truth (Smith 
and Caddick, 2012; Silverman, 2005), or the ‘truthfulness of one’s conclusions’ 
(Vaughn and Daniel, 2012 cited in Smith and Caddick, 2012, p.69). More specifically 
to this research, ‘the extent to which an account accurately represents the social 
phenomena to which it refers’ (Hammersley, 1990, p.57). Reliability on the other 
hand, is concerned with the consistency of methods and procedures by which data 
are collected (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Gratton and Jones, 2010).  
However, the issue of research quality and the appropriateness of reliability and 
validity, in relation to qualitative investigations, is a contested area (Gratton and 
Jones, 2010; Bryman, 2012). The slipperiness of the concepts is compounded by the 
lack of consensus, the proliferation of criteria lists, and the alternative views of 
reliability and validity (see Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Yardley, 2000; Bryman, 2012; 
Smith and Caddick, 2012). According to Gratton and Jones (2010, p.98), qualitative 
research should be ‘trustworthy, authentic, reliable, rigorous, and credible’, which are 
seen as a set of operationalising criteria to address the reliability, validity, and quality 
issues/limitations within this study, particularly as Yin (1994, 2003c) highlighted a 
lack of reliability and construct validity as a common criticism of case study research.   
To address reliability and construct validity issues, this study adopted Yin’s (1994, 
pp.90-99) recommendations to demonstrate consistency and transparency, 
including: i) utilisation of multiple sources of evidence, aimed at the development of 
converging lines of inquiry, and thus a process of triangulation; (ii) creation of a case 
database to organise and document the data collected from the case studies, 
including interview transcripts, observations on document analysis, and rigorous 
recording of references used. Within which the setting, context, participant, research 
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strategy and data analysis methods, are described in a sufficiently detailed manner 
(Moisander and Valtonen, 2006); and (iii) maintenance of a chain of evidence – the 
principle of which, is to allow an external observer to trace the derivation of any 
evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions. In 
addition, this research broadly followed Yin’s (2009) iterative model, which implies ‘a 
continuous moving back and forth between diverse stages of the research project’ 
(Verschuren, 2003 cited in Easton, 2010, p.119). In this regard, the analysis of the 
first case study provided an initial insight and further understanding of the concepts 
used in the analysis of the data, and together with the analysis of subsequent cases 
made certain that a reflective and reflexive approach was adopted for the whole 
research process. The use of three case studies serving to strengthen validity by 
providing cross-case analyses for analytical generalisations to theoretical 
propositions (Yin, 2003a).  
Furthermore, authenticity in terms of honesty, accuracy (Mason, 2002), and fairness 
(Gratton and Jones, 2010), can be seen by the careful selection of participants, 
based on their relevance to the research questions, the theoretical position, and the 
explanation or account developed (Mason, 1996) within this study. The same can be 
said for the confidential and structured nature of the interviews, undertaken by 
informed consent at neutral times to minimise ‘subject error’, with anonymity 
stressed to avoid ‘subject bias’ (Gratton and Jones, 2010, p.93). The recording and 
transcription of interviews allowed for repeated examinations of the interviewees’ 
answers and public scrutiny of the data to counter accusations of bias, as well as 
offering alternative explanations to support the judgement of evidence and its 
interpretation (Lieblich et al., 1998), from a range of different perspectives. Thus, 
providing a form of ‘within-interview triangulation’ (Dean and Whyte, 1978 cited in 
Gratton and Jones, 2010, p.167). Reliability, credibility and rigour are demonstrated 
further through professional scrutiny from supervisors and internal reviewers, and the 
chosen research strategy, inclusive of the techniques used for data collection and 
analysis, which were deemed the most logical and appropriate for this research 
(Mason, 2002). The latter signposting the construct of a coherent and meaningful 
picture, both internally (how the constituent parts logically fit together – Grix, 2010), 
and externally, using existing theories and previous research (Lieblich et al., 1998).  
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As alluded to above, a significant, though contested technique for demonstrating 
validity is ‘triangulation of method’ (Mason, 2002, p.190). Whereby, multiple methods 
of data collection are utilised to investigate the same phenomena (Mason, 2002; 
Gratton and Jones, 2010; Grix, 2010), the aim of which is to share strengths, 
eliminate weaknesses and corroborate results (Houlihan and Green, 2006). 
Arguably, the popular conception that triangulation simply means observing ‘an 
object of study from different angles using different methods’ is problematic, due to 
the ‘different ontological and epistemological underpinnings of research strategies, 
consisting of combinations of methods’ (Grix, 2010, pp.135-136; Mason, 2002). That 
said, Grix (2010) argued that methods should be viewed as tools for collecting data 
and should not be looked upon as being automatically ‘rooted in epistemological and 
ontological commitments’ (Bryman, 2001, p.445). Grix (2010, p.135) elaborated 
further on this point by stating:  
‘As long as you are aware how you are employing specific methods and what this 
method is pointing towards, and how this relates to the ways in which you employ 
other methods, there should be no problem. The key point is to check whether your 
methods are ontologically consistent with one another, and, as a consequence, 
whether they are epistemologically consistent.’ 
In addition, it is argued that the use of data triangulation to cross-check data 
collected from semi-structured interviews and document analysis, ‘attempt[s] to get a 
“true” fix on a situation by combining different ways of looking at [the phenomena] or 
different findings’ (Silverman, 2005, p.212). According to Mason (1998, pp.25-26): 
‘seeking to corroborate one source and method with another, or enhance validity and 
reliability through some form of triangulation of method … you will need to think about 
on what basis one set of data, or method, can corroborate another. This will involve 
asking whether the two sets of data tell you about the same phenomena or whether 
the two methods yield comparable data.’  
The data collection methods for this study were considered both complementary and 
comparative, and seen as both reliable and valid by many researchers (Gratton and 
Jones, 2010).  
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While data triangulation may give the impression that validity has been strengthened, 
there is emphasis on the researcher to err on the side of caution, and to remain 
aware of any potential problems (Mason, 2002; Gratton and Jones, 2010), 
particularly as the blurred boundaries of reliability and validity can be challenging for 
the qualitative researcher. However, rather than allow this research to be ground 
down by such methodological issues (this is not a methodological thesis), it is an 
awareness of the operationalisation of the concepts of reliability and validity, and the 
degrees to which they are attainable and demonstrable that has been of importance 
to this study. The aim being to ensure that the end product of this thesis is a 
methodologically informed, critical, engaging, interesting and exciting piece of sport 
qualitative research, which can be held to be ‘valid or true [as] it represents 
accurately those features of the phenomena that it is intended to describe, explain or 
theorise’ (Yin, 1994, p.92). As Hammersley (1992, p.69) argued, ‘we must judge the 
validity of claims [about truth] on the basis of the adequacy of the evidence offered in 
support of them.’ Thus, findings or conclusions are ‘likely to be much more 
convincing and accurate if … based on several different sources of information.’ 
Although for Devine (2002, p.206), ‘all empirical material, be it quantitative or 
qualitative in kind, is subject to different interpretations’, and so in essence, ‘there is 
no definitive interpretation that is the “truth.”’ 
  
4.9) Periodisation 
An integral part of this study has been an understanding of the historical context of 
contemporary sport policy within which NGBs operate, an analysis of the impact of 
changes in sport policy on SMNGBs, and an evaluation of the explanatory value and 
utility of the ACF within the UK sport policy process. In order to fully comprehend the 
development of UK sport policy, a periodised timeline was utilised to map the 
evolution of the policy area. While an in-depth debate on the concept of periodisation 
is beyond the scope of this research, it is acknowledged that periodisation is a 
contentious matter (see Struna, 1985; Katznelson, 1997; Hobsbawm, 2000; 
Lieberman, 2001; Phillips, 2002; Hérubel, 2008; Houlihan and Lindsay, 2013).    
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According to Houlihan and Lindsey (2013, p.5), the dimensions of change within 
sport policy ‘involves the search for, and analysis of, pattern, trends, key events, 
continuities and breaks with the past with the aim of giving meaning to a collection of 
events and policy decisions in a particular time period’, where a metaphor style of 
periodisation has the potential to highlight surface or superficial change. For example, 
changes in the way Lottery funding is distributed to sport and how this impacts on the 
administration of NGBs, or changes that occur at a much deeper, societal level, such 
as actions by the state or changes in societal values regarding the importance or role 
of sport (Houlihan et al., 2011). Furthermore, Houlihan and Lindsey (2013) highlighted 
the usefulness of the metaphor of levels within the ACF to analyse sport policy, while 
Sabatier (2007) claimed that a time period of at least 10 years is a pre-requisite for an 
accurate analysis of policy change. Arguably though, a period greater than 10 years 
may be required to identify policy trends and watersheds that influence the trajectory 
of sport policy. Despite the slipperiness of the concept, it is possible to take a more 
pragmatic approach to periodisation within this study, based on significant events or 
moments that prompted sport policy change and provide distinctions between time 
spans, as illustrated in Table 4.6. 
The identified time periods relate to periods of stability and continuity, following a 
particular watershed, usually a change in government or PM, which have impacted on 
government/UKS/SE relationships with, and expectations, functions and operations of 
NGB/SMNGBs. Indeed, it could be argued that the salience of sport to government 
was a new menalité that embraced Labour, Conservative and Coalition political 
thinking of sport as a tool for social good, which was not present pre-1960 when sport 
was ‘almost the quintessential voluntary activity’ (Holt and Mason, 2000, p.146). The 
final period identified began in 2015 and it is acknowledged that this may well extend 
beyond the end date for this research in 2018. 
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Table 4.6: Periodised Timeline  
Periodisation 1960-1995 1995-2000 2000-2010 2010-2015 2015-2018 
Justification Labour’s Welfare 
state;  
 
Thatcherism’s 
‘New Right’; 
 
Sport – legitimacy 
as welfare 
provision;  
 
Setting the scene. 
 
Conservative 
Major’s ‘One 
Nation’;  
 
Traditionalist 
ideology; 
 
Government and 
sport – ‘passive’ 
relationship; 
 
Sport for sports 
sake. 
 
 
New Labour, Blair’s 
‘Third Way’;  
 
Best Value 
ideology 
 
Government and 
sport – 
‘compliance-
contractual’ 
relationship; 
 
Swinging 
pendulum between 
sports for sport’s 
sake and sport for 
social good. 
 
Coalition’s ‘Big 
Society’;  
 
Sport for sports 
sake 
 
Olympic Legacy 
Conservatives - 
Cameronite 
modernisation, 
May’s pragmatism; 
 
Sport for social 
good  
 
 
Significant 
Events or 
Moments 
Wolfenden (1960);  
 
GB Sports Council 
established (1965) 
- reconstituted 
(1972) 
 
Sport for All (1975);  
 
Sport in the 
Community: The 
Next Ten Years, 
(1982);  
 
Sport in the 
Community – Into 
the Nineties 
(1988). 
 
DNH established 
(1992); 
 
DCMS created 
(1997); 
 
National Lottery 
(1994);  
 
Sport: Raising the 
Game (1995) 
 
Failures at Atlanta 
1996 Olympic 
Games  
 
Restructure of GB 
Sports Council 
(1999). 
  
Reform and 
modernisation of 
UKS/SE (2003-04); 
 
Successful Home 
Olympics bid 
(2005); 
 
Sporting Future for 
All (2000);  
 
Game Plan (2002);  
 
Playing to Win 
(2008) 
 
NGB-centred 
strategy for sport 
 
London Olympic 
Games (2012); 
 
Creating a Sporting 
Habit for Life 
(2012). 
 
Sporting Future: A 
New Strategy for 
an Active Nation 
(2015); 
 
Changed remit for 
NGBs. 
 
 
4.10) Conclusion 
This chapter has provided discussions and an overview of the research strategy, and 
the methods considered to be the most logical and appropriate, in relation to the 
underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions of this research, the 
achievement of the research aims and objectives; and answering the research 
questions within this study. The directional relationship between ontology, 
epistemology, methodology, methods and sources presupposes a logical link 
between the above constituents of research. This implies that ontological and 
epistemological assumptions impact on the choice of methodological approaches, 
which equally have a bearing on the selection of research methods within any given 
104 
 
study. It is therefore argued that this research is judged on how its constituent parts 
logically link together, as endorsed by Grix (2002).     
A critical realist position has been adopted for this study, the assumptions of which 
are that both observable and unobservable social and political phenomena exist 
independently of our individual beliefs, structures constrain and facilitate rather than 
determine outcomes, and causal explanations and meaning of social phenomena 
require an understanding of the dialectical relationship between structure and 
agency (institutions and causal groups), within broad historical, political and social 
contexts of which the phenomena are located. Critical realism supports an intensive 
qualitative multiple case study approach to investigation, and the use of document 
analysis and interviews as methods for data collection. Within this research, three 
small to mid-sized NGBs of Olympic sports in England were selected as case 
studies, namely, England Handball, Table Tennis England, and Volleyball England. 
The aim here being to analyse the complexity, diversity and uniqueness of each 
social entity, their perceptions, beliefs, values and ideas, and the role of structures in 
shaping them (Phillpots et al., 2010). The relationship between SMNGBs and sport 
policy has been treated theoretically through the use of the ACF, to analyse sport 
policy and provide competing explanations to understand the effect of sport policy on 
the structure of SMNGBs, their external relationships with government and its 
agencies (UKS/SE), and their position as ‘policy shapers’ or ‘policy takers’ within the 
UK sport policy domain. This links with the critical realist notion of retroduction.   
The choice of document analysis and semi-structured interviews as the primary 
methods of data collection, were considered strategic and appropriate to answer the 
research questions, complementary and comparative (Mason, 2002), as well as 
having the greatest potential to yield corroborative findings that were ‘convincing and 
accurate’ (Yin, 1994, p.92), and develop an empirically and theoretically grounded 
argument (Mason, 2002). The semi-structured interviews with key informants, 
together with the analysis of key documents (e.g. strategic documents, WSPs, 
annual reports, and sport policy documents) invited useful insights into the beliefs, 
interpretations, perceptions, opinions and judgements in relation to the relevant 
themes of governance, funding, capacity building, participation, and partnerships. 
The themes selected were considered to be dimensions of operational activities 
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linked to mechanisms for delivering desired policy outcomes, and determinants of 
policy shaping or policy taking. 
A periodised timeline was used to identify time spans as periods within which sport 
policy directives changed or remained stable under particular political ideologies. 
The significance of which was to illuminate the impact of government and 
governmental agencies on SMNGBs, and vice versa. The employment of 
retroductive thematic analysis offered ‘an accessible and theoretically flexible 
approach to analysing qualitative data’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.77), where the 
initial case study was analysed to provide greater insight and understanding of the 
theoretical concepts for subsequent case study analysis, and thus allow theoretical 
generalisation. The emphasis on data triangulation and the precise documentation of 
the data base and maintenance of a chain of evidence, providing a demonstrable 
and attainable degree of validity and reliability for the reconstruction of the study 
from research question to conclusions. Document analysis, thematic analysis and 
cross-case analysis of similarities and differences between the data yielded from the 
different sources and the theoretical policy framework, building a picture of the 
causality between structure and agency, and therein the extent to which SMNGBs 
are primarily ‘policy shapers’ or ‘policy takers’, in line with the critical realist paradigm 
adopted for this study, and as demonstrated in the empirical chapters that follow. 
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Chapter Five 
The UK Sport Policy Subsystem 
 
5.1) Introduction 
This chapter is focused on the conceptualisation of the sport policy subsystem within 
the UK, utilising the ACF as a theoretical framework for analysing sport policy, which 
has received only partial application in previous studies. The purpose of this chapter 
is therefore to provide a stronger application of the ACF to identify and define: the 
UK sport policy subsystem and policy actors; the existence of advocacy coalitions, 
the factors that have influenced policy stability and change over a decade or more; 
and importantly, to give context to the empirical SMNGB case-study chapters that 
follow. The evidence provided in this chapter has illuminated a number of significant 
findings in relation to the aims and objectives of this research, including inter alia: i) a 
sport policy subsystem that has yet to reach the stage of maturity occupied by older 
and more established policy subsystems; ii) the existence of sport advocacy 
coalitions engineered by government; iii) compliance, shared interests/objectives, 
economic/financial motivations, and interdependencies are also conditions for 
participation within the UK sports policy subsystem and coalition membership; iv) the 
sport policy subsystem is complex and subject to overlaps within and between 
subsystems; and v) major policy change in sport can be seen as the effect of 
external and internal shocks at all levels of the ACF belief system.  
 
5.2) Development of the sport policy subsystem 
It is evident that prior to the 1960s central government ‘played little or no part in 
sport’ (Coghlan and Webb, 1990, p.5), and no clearly definable policy for sport 
existed (Holt and Mason, 2000). However, evidence points towards the existence of 
a CCPR-led advocacy coalition that stimulated government’s interest in sport, and 
the subsequent emergence of a ‘nascent’ sport policy subsystem within the UK. As 
noted by Coghlan and Webb (1990), the CCPR, whose bulk of membership was 
formed of NGBs, enticed a host of influential names in sport, academia and public 
life, to coalesce around the belief that sport had an important role to play in society, 
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and that government could and should have a greater involvement in sport. While 
this supports ACF assumptions that coalition formation can be the product of the 
belief in collective action as a means to bring about beneficial policy change 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014).  
This was clearly a watershed event for UK sport policy, Wolfenden having given ‘a 
focus to political debate that sport [had] lacked prior to 1960’ (Jefferys, 2012, p.73), 
which ‘no government could ignore’ (Coghlan and Webb, 1990, p.11), and is quite 
rightly viewed as a significant moment in the history and development of British 
sport’ (Holt and Mason, 2000, p.149). However, Wolfenden should equally be viewed 
as the architect of UK sport policy, a ‘nascent’ sport policy subsystem having 
resulted from a gradual process of incremental changes in attitude towards sport, 
and an acceptance by the major political parties of the benefits of sport. Stritch (2015, 
p.438) having defined ‘nascent’ subsystems as:  
‘issue areas that have only recently emerged on the public agenda, which have little 
history of public policy outputs, which have previously received little or no serious 
consideration in public decision-making forums, and where advocates have only 
recently become active.’  
Arguably though, the government’s construction of the Sports Council in 1972, as a 
semi-autonomous body, and its absorption of operations previously undertaken by 
the ASC/CCPR, weakened the power and authority of the CCPR (Macfarlane, 1986), 
thus displacing a potentially dominant CCPR-led coalition, to exercise greater control 
over sport, not less. For example, the Sports Council was obligated to give due 
regard policy statements set by government (Coghlan and Webb, 1990), was 
controlled by a system of ministerial appointments at Board and Executive levels, 
and its power to lobby had been ‘muted by its governmental masters’ (Macfarlane, 
1986, p.80). This system of control illustrates Lukes’ first dimension of power of 
observable and tangible decision-making; the second dimension by defining the 
boundaries of the Sports Council to limit its scope within the policy process; and the 
third dimension by shaping the Sports Council’s preferences. Arguably, this nullifies 
any consideration given to the existence of a Sports Council-led coalition.  
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Instead, it could be argued that the Sports Council acted as a ‘policy broker’, keeping 
conflict among the sports lobby membership within acceptable limits, while arguing 
discretely for a change in the status quo. As noted by various authors, self-interest, 
mistrust, infighting and wars of attrition had become habitual among many of those 
purporting to represent the interests of sport, while government demonstrated a 
distinct lack of enthusiasm in support of the Sport Councils’ strategic plans for sport 
(Houlihan, 1991, 2000b; Pickup, 1996; Jefferys, 2012). Government’s inactivity and 
non-decision-making highlighting Lukes’ second dimension of power. Conversely 
though, evidence suggests that SC’s attempts at policy brokerage had weakened its 
potential influence and power, to the extent that it had become a ‘pale shadow of its 
original concept’ (Jefferys, 2012, p.193, 2016).  
For the ACF, a mature policy subsystem is characterised by a set of participants who 
regard themselves as a semi-autonomous community, share expertise in a policy 
domain, and have sought to influence public policy in that domain (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999), for a period of a decade or more (Sabatier, 1998). Utilising the 
assumptions of the ACF, evidence would suggest the UK sport policy domain had 
reached maturity. In this regard, many policy participants were at best only semi-
autonomous, as evidenced by the increasing levels of compliance and resource- 
dependency of various sports bodies (e.g. NGBs) in the receipt of government grant-
aid, but are likely to have shared expertise through inclusion within the Sports 
Council’s policy initiatives (Sports Council, 1982, 1988) and attempted to influence 
sport policy by way of involvement in the construction of the ‘nascent’ policy 
subsystem beliefs, though with less influence on content of the belief system than 
government and the Sports Council. Paradoxically, the limited involvement from 
government and the extent of conflict and fragmentation among policy actors (e.g. 
conflict between BOA and CCPR), would suggest an enduring ‘nascent’ policy 
subsystem, in line with ACF assumptions (Jenkins and Sabatier, 1993b; Stritch, 
2015).  
However, it is evident that government intervention, following the Prime Ministerial 
change from Thatcher to Major, prompted the swift development of the sport policy 
subsystem and arguably its progression to an observable of phase of maturity. Yet  
evidence also points towards government constricting the transition of the sport 
policy subsystem to a higher stage of maturity, as seen by government’s indecision 
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on the location of sport within Whitehall and its eventual attachment to DCMS, itself 
regarded as a ‘bit player’ among the heavyweights such as health, education, and 
defence (Burrell, 2016). As noted by interviewee DCMSa12, government perceived 
sport as part of the ‘Ministry of Fun13.’ Again, this has a strong connection to Lukes’ 
second dimension of power, by distorting sports involvement within the policy 
process to restrict its capacity for setting agendas and influencing policy decisions.  
Interestingly, further evidence suggests that the sport policy subsystem has 
remained ‘nascent’ for longer, owing to sports’ lesser significance as a social tool 
and lower status as a policy domain within the heights of government:  
‘Sport has always been perceived as a nice to have and not necessarily as significant 
a social good as perhaps some other social goods within communities. It’s just 
something that people do; it’s a game that’s played, and so in that way sport policy is 
kind of still very nascent in that respect’ (Interviewee: DCMSb14). 
While the perception is that a ‘nascent’ sport policy subsystem still exists, this is 
arguably not the case, as seen by the development of sport policy from Raising the 
Game to Sporting Future. What can be said is that the sport policy subsystem has 
not reached a stage of maturity relative to older established policy subsystems, as 
noted above, but has considerably increased the degree of its maturity, as 
demonstrated by the conversational change within Whitehall, evidenced by the 
remarks of interviewee DCMSa:  
‘[N]obody ever says to [DCMS] anymore do you realise there’s a government 
department dealing with sport, where they might have done a few years ago.’  
The above evidence drawing attention to the potential vagueness in the ACF’s 
defining characteristics of a mature policy subsystem, and the difficulties determining 
the point at which a ‘nascent’ policy subsystem reaches maturity, while also 
suggesting that policy subsystems can transition through different stages of maturity, 
dependent on the extent of government intervention and public awareness of 
particular subsystems.    
                                                          
12
 References to interviewee DCMSa relate to an interview dated 11
th
 October 2018. 
 
13
 “Ministry of Fun” sobriquet, coined by David Mellor in an effort to brighten up the dowdy “Department of National Heritage” 
title by which the DCMS was known before 1997. Available online from: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-ministry-of-
fun-has-serious-challenges-ahead-a6818071.html 
14
 References to interviewee DCMSb relate to an interview dated 11
th
 October 2018.  
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5.3) Relational patterns of policy actors and subsystem 
boundaries  
The ACF assumes that the delimitation of subsystem boundaries is based on the 
relational pattern among policy actors and the ‘frequency of interaction and 
transitivity of influence’ (Sabatier, 1988, p.160). Figure 5.1 provides a representative 
view of policy actors involved within the UK sport policy subsystem, and identifies 
their relational existence based on influence, as denoted by DCMS (2002a). As can 
be seen, there is a definable, yet complex, multiplicity of actors 
(individuals/organisations) or coalition partners15 that potentially seek to influence 
sport policy. While the direction of influence is somewhat vague, there is a strong link 
between influence and the directional flow of funding. Governmental intervention 
having moved from passive to more contractual-based, in recognition of increased 
conditional funding in support of government social objectives. This connects 
strongly to Lukes’ first dimension of power, in terms of compliance and financial 
dependency, and the third dimension in respect of shaping NGB preferences to meet 
policy outcomes.  
Furthermore, the increasing use of sport as an instrument of government for ‘social 
good’, and the expansion of the ‘mixed economy’ funding model for sport at a 
societal level, has provided an opportunity for social actors in sport to become active 
within the sport policy domain. Thus, emphasising the greater potential for 
overlapping policy subsystems, as evidenced by the contribution of sport and 
physical activity across ten different government departments within Sporting Future 
(DCMS, 2015b).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Coalition partners are considered distinct from the wider network of partners, and represent those partnerships that may 
share similar beliefs or interests within coalitions, and provide possible opportunities to enhance the capacity to influence sport 
policy. 
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Figure 5.1:  Relational pattern of policy actors based on influence  
 
 
Source: DCMS (2002a) 
 
The involvement of NGBs as a key partner of and delivery mechanism for 
government and governmental agencies’ policy objectives, has also accentuated the 
degree of overlap between coalitions and different subsystems. To provide a sense 
of the potential overlaps, Figure 5.2 illustrates the partnership base of England 
Handball, and its involvement within and across different policy subsystems, such as 
social, health and education, as well as sport, such overlapping characteristics of the 
UK sport policy subsystem also endorsed by all interviewees, for example, 
interviewee SRADP16 asserted that ‘sport absolutely delivers across multiple areas 
of responsibility.’ This has clear implications for delimiting the scope of the ACF, 
where the existence of overlapping and nested subsystems is considered a 
complication (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 
                                                          
16 References to interviewee SRADP relate to an interview dated 26th September 2018. 
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Figure 5.2: Partnership base of England Handball 
  
 Source: England Handball
17
 ([EH] 2017, p.18) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 NHS/PCTs refer to National Health Service and Primary Care Trusts, respectively – missing at source. 
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5.4) Mapping sport policy subsystem beliefs  
It is assumed within the ACF that ‘mapping beliefs and policies on the same canvas’ 
allows an assessment of the influence of technical information or beliefs on policy 
change over time (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994, p.180). From the analysis of 
government and SE documentation, it has been possible to identify key subsystem 
beliefs since 1995, which highlighted a high degree of alignment and overlap at all 
levels of the ACF belief system. This suggests that the sport policy subsystem has 
been constructed or at least substantially shaped by government, as have the 
agency-led coalitions that currently occupy the policy subsystem.  
By mapping the beliefs of government and SE, it has also been possible to see how 
technical information and beliefs have influenced sport policy, for example: 
modernisation and reform through New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ ideology; the use of 
NGBs as a delivery mechanism to increase participation in sport as ‘repositories of 
social capital’ (Sam, 2009, p.499); and the increased salience to government of 
health related issues. Evidence has also shown that policy actors have the potential 
to move beyond the boundaries of coalition shared-beliefs, and policy subsystems 
and coalitions can be engineered by government on the basis of compliance, 
shared- interests, priorities, and objectives, financial incentives and punitive 
sanctions, as well as shared-beliefs. Due to the extent of material relating to the 
belief system of government and SE, detailed information has been presented in the 
appendices (see Appendix IX [Deep-Core beliefs], X [Policy-Core beliefs], and XI 
[Secondary-Aspects]). The belief system of UKS has been excluded on the basis 
that elite policy has remained relatively stable over the medium term, and SMNGBs 
investigated within this study are primarily considered competitive/community sports, 
as a result of their loss of elite funding. 
Canvas mapping beliefs and policies has also highlighted potential issues with the 
ACF’s belief system, in particular, the ACF takes no account of cultural, societal or 
philosophical ‘deep-core’ beliefs (which may also be subsystem specific in origin), for 
example, Evidence also suggests that the fundamental value of the sport policy 
belief system is not based on empirical evidence, as the ACF would assume, but 
philosophical in terms of government’s role in society, in that ‘a civilised society 
should support sports and arts’ (Interviewee: DCMSa).  
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5.5) Advocacy Coalitions in Sport Policy: Reality or Myth? 
According to Sabatier and Weible (2007), ‘policy-core’ shared-beliefs are the glue 
that bind coalitions together, the ACF assuming that actors seek out other actors 
with shared fundamental beliefs or potential beneficial resources in order to translate 
their beliefs into policy, and influence rules, budgets and government personnel to 
achieve goals (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993a). As alluded to above, the 
emergence of the UK sport policy subsystem can be attributed to the collective 
action of a CCPR-led coalition, based on shared-beliefs and potential beneficial 
resources. Evidence suggests that three advocacy coalitions now compete within the 
sport policy domain, constructed or substantially shaped by government, each with a 
distinct clarity of purpose, roles and responsibilities for elite sport, community (social 
and grassroots) sport, and school sport. As noted within Playing to Win (DCMS, 
2008, p.6): 
‘The sporting landscape has changed. Out of the confused structures of previous 
years has come a structure that puts three bodies in charge of the main building 
blocks of sporting success across England and the UK: PE and school sport ([YST]), 
community sport ([SE]) and elite sport ([UKS]).’ 
Evidence of an elite sport advocacy coalition was previously identified by Green and 
Houlihan (2004, p.399), on the basis that: 
‘the endogenous drive towards greater elite success was powerfully reinforced, on 
the one hand by [UKS] through its modernization agenda and the promotion of the 
rational–bureaucratic model of NGB organization, and by the increasing resource 
dependency of NGBs on National Lottery funding on the other.’  
Interestingly, Green and Houlihan (2004) noted the potential for an advocacy 
coalition in social and community sport, although its likelihood remained remote due 
to limited access to funding and organisational resources. However, evidence 
strongly indicates the existence of a SE-led community sport coalition, where the 
endogenous drive towards mass participation has been powerfully reinforced by SE  
(particularly for health benefits), again through modernisation, reform, and the 
increasing dependency of NGBs on public funding arising from the greater access to 
opportunities and Lottery funds; exogenously derived from government’s pro-social 
agenda. This evidence in itself suggests that coalitions are not merely a product of 
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shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs, but also engineered on the basis of compliance, shared- 
interests/objectives, financial incentives and sanctions. Evidence also infers that 
coalitions can be constructed by government to act as a mechanism for realising 
government objectives, linked to changes in government priorities and political 
agendas. As demonstrated by government’s relationship with SE: 
‘We have a management agreement with [SE], which stipulates the Secretary of 
State’s priorities, and these are therefore government’s priorities … [SE] have to 
write their own strategy and have operational independence from government, [but] 
they are there to deliver on government’s priorities … It’s for [SE] to set itself up, to 
construct itself in such a way that it feels best able to deliver on those priorities. So, 
we would very much see SE absolutely aligned with what DCMS want to achieve’ 
(Interviewee: DCMSb). 
It is also argued that coalitions within the sport policy subsystem, and NGBs for that 
matter, have the potential to overlap as illustrated in Figure 5.3. The diagrammatic 
overview of the lead responsibilities of the trio of sporting coalitions indicating the 
points of intersection between the coalitions, for example, the interconnection 
between community-school links and the talent pathway.  
Figure 5.3: Overlaps across the trio of sporting coalitions
 
 
Source: DCMS (2008, p.7) 
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The interaction between government/SE/UKS and NGBs demonstrates a high 
degree of coordinated activity to meet shared goals, and an alliance that benefits 
from resources, such as public funding, which arguably meets ACF assumptions of 
the composition of advocacy coalitions, that is, shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs and 
significant engagement in coordinated activity over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1999).  
 
5.6) Changing tides of UK sport policy 
The persistence of the Sports Council’s Sport for All campaign from 1972 to 1993, 
arguably resulted from the disarray characterised by a ‘nascent’ policy subsystem 
and a weakened Sports Council, as evidenced by the conflict and competition 
among policy actors (McIntosh and Charlton, 1985; Pickup, 1996), and limited 
governmental coercion (Houlihan, 1991; Jefferys, 2012). Attempts to develop a more 
coherent policy met with continued governmental resistance, disruption, and 
attitudinal fluctuations, epitomised by the dysfunctional relationship between 
government and the Sports Council. The lack of a strong or unified ministerial 
responsibility for sport, arguably a consequence of the shifting designations and 
definitions of what sport was and where it belonged, to the extent that by 1994, 15 
different departments apart from the DNH had an interest in sport policy (Houlihan, 
1991; Jefferys, 2012).  
However, evidence suggests that a sequential set of external shocks within the sport 
policy subsystem brought about not only a major change in sport policy, but also a 
level of subsystem maturation. The Prime Ministerial change in the early 1990s from 
Thatcher to Major provided a change in the systematic governing coalition implicit 
within the assumptions of the ACF, and a change in ‘policy-core’ beliefs, elevating 
sport as an instrument of government, as noted by Major (1999), sport had been 
previously subjected to ‘misguided attitudes and mistaken policies’ (DNH, 1995, p.1). 
It is also evident that public criticisms concerning failure at the Atlanta 1996 
Olympiad were sufficient external perturbations to bring about major policy change. 
As Dutton (2006, p.21) claimed these factors had ‘created pressure on the 
government, politicians and [SE] to introduce Lottery revenue programmes … to 
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begin to reverse the failures’, as seen by the shift in government priorities from mass 
participation, to a twin track of elite performance and school sport within Raising the 
Game, there being a serious intent to focus on sport ‘in a way it had never done 
before’ (Holt and Mason, 2000, pp.153-154). Moreover, it is argued that the creation 
of the Lottery provided a significant external development to the sport policy 
subsystem, which facilitated government intervention in sport policy, and signified a 
key moment in the UK and government’s relationship with sport. In particular, the 
Lottery provided government with a policy instrument to achieve its priorities, while 
providing sport/NGBs accessibility to previously unimaginable financial resources. 
Yet, there is an apparent disregard within the ACF of government-led initiatives, such 
as the Lottery, which act as external shocks to stimulate a policy subsystem, and 
enable major policy change. 
If Wolfenden is seen as the ‘architect’ of the UK sport policy subsystem, Major 
should be acknowledged as the person who raised the political status of sport; 
revolutionising the prospects for sport through the introduction of the Lottery; and 
laying the foundations for the development of future strategies and policies for sport,  
as evidenced by the high degree of overlap between New Labour’s Sporting Future 
for All (2000) and Major’s Raising the Game (1995), particularly the twin track for 
elite performance and school sport. However, Blair’s New Labour government raised 
the profile of sport as a ‘social tool’, having highlighted its potential to cross the 
boundaries of different policy subsystems, such as health and education. For 
example, policy change included a renewed focus on physical activity in schools for 
health benefits, signposting health’s increasing salience to government. Policy 
change was also evident from an elite perspective with a move towards 
improvements in talent identification and the talent pathway, to help achieve 
consistent success in the international arena, as recommended by Cunningham 
(2001, p.5). International sporting success was seen as a means to generate ‘pride 
and a sense of national identity, a ‘feelgood factor’, (DCMS, 2002a, p.9), in part due 
to an apparent ‘growing public awareness that success in, and support of, 
international competition is as important as providing access to sporting 
opportunities’ (UKS, 2003, p.8).  
Game Plan (2002) signified a further significant change in policy and the adoption by 
government of a contractual approach to funding, which clearly reflected New 
118 
 
Labour’s Best Value political philosophy, and arguably represented a ‘deep-core’ 
belief. The key impact on ‘policy-core’ beliefs was the implementation of policy 
through a process of reform and modernisation, to ensure a ‘fit-for-purpose’ regime 
to partner government and ‘joined-up delivery against sporting objectives’ (SE, 
2001a, p.12). From an ACF perspective, it is possible to argue that policy change 
resulted from not only an external perturbation to the sport policy subsystem (change 
in government), but also a change in the relatively stable parameters in terms of the 
‘deep-core’ beliefs of political ideology. An example of the impact of ideological 
change would be the requirement for NGBs to earn the right to have a partnership 
with government, and the drive for NGB modernisation reinforced by KPIs and the 
threat of withdrawal of funding, whereby ‘any sport not wishing to accept this 
challenge – funding [would] be switched to those that do’ (DCMS, 2008, p.2). Such 
evidence not only demonstrates Lukes’ third dimension of power, but also illuminates 
the shift in government values from passive to contractual subsystem politics, as well 
as the rise of compliance regimes, shared-interests/objectives, and 
economic/financial motivations as conditions for participation within the UK sport 
policy subsystem, and coalition membership, exemplifying both the first and second 
dimensions of Luke’s concept of power.   
Evidence also indicates that London’s successful bid in 2005 to host the 2012 
Olympic Games provoked a further external shock to the sport policy subsystem, 
which triggered a change in the way sport policy was funded and delivered, as seen 
in Playing to Win (2008). It is evident here that NGBs had been elevated to the 
forefront of government and agency consciousness as a delivery mechanism 
capable of achieving government aims and objectives, which also coincided with 
NGBs’ lobbying for greater involvement within the policy environment:    
‘We’d won the right to host the Olympics in 2005, and there was a great debate about 
what should be our aims and objectives for that … The idea grew up that actually it 
shouldn’t just be about elite; it should be about [being] transformational for all sport, 
and therefore “who’s going to do that?” Well, it’s got to be [NGBs]’ (Interviewee: 
SEC18). 
                                                          
18
 References to interviewee SEC relate to an interview dated 4
th
 September 2018. 
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‘[I]nfluential [NGBs] were vocalising the fact that they could drive [SE’s] outcomes, if 
they were given the money [through a single investment, rather than disparate 
amounts of investment]’ (Interviewee: SESLR19). 
While the above evidence points towards NGBs’ collective willingness to achieve 
shared-objectives, further evidence indicates that the use of NGBs was more 
opportunistic than strategic, on the basis that no alternative delivery mechanism 
existed:  
‘[NGBs] were the only show in town, so [government] had to invest in them as there 
was nothing else’ (Interviewee: SRADP). 
Interviewee DCMSb also claimed that the relationship between government and 
NGBs had developed ‘very organically’, as NGBs had ‘access to the largest number 
of people in the sport market that government could talk to.’       
Arguably, the Coalition government’s Creating a Sporting Habit for Life (2012) was 
merely old wine in a new bottle; the historical issues of stemming the flow of school 
drop-off and increasing youth participation, having been evident in previous policy 
documents. For elite sport, evidence suggests a strong desire for continuity, in 
particular, UKS’s strategy for high performance sport investment was seen as being 
‘increasingly understood and respected’ (UKS, 2011, p.9). DCMS (2014, p.6) 
asserting that there were ‘no plans to review the [No Compromise] approach, as we 
have no wish to give other nations a competitive advantage over Team GB.’ 
However, the lack of progress by government in achieving participation targets, 
signified policy on the verge of failure rather than in a state of equilibrium. It also 
signalled challenging times for community sport and NGBs, particularly in lieu of the 
new payment-by-results performance regime, and the widening of an already 
complex network of deliverers of sport. For example, the government’s new 
partnership with SE was arguably less about policy objectives and more to do with 
process, specifically a ‘more rigorous, targeted and results-orientated way of thinking 
about grassroots sport’, which would focus ‘all energies into reaching out to young 
people more effectively’ (DCMS, 2012, p.1).  
                                                          
19 References to interviewee SESLR relate to an interview dated 17th August 2018. 
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SE’s changed remit was to take ‘sport out of its traditional structures and 
environments and into young people’s lives’ (SE, 2012d p.2), signposting a more 
concerted effort towards a mixed economy approach to funding grassroots 
participation, while the collective focus of sport would continue to have 'the spirit of 
mass participation, but with a particular focus on 14-25 year olds’ (SE, 2012d, p.4). 
For example, SE’s increasing support of StreetGames, who not only aligned to SE’s 
strategy (SE, 2012d, p.5), but also reflected a more attractive proposition than the 
‘single sport NGB option’, for solving problems with youth engagement (SE, 2012e, 
p.6). Support for non-NGB organisations is demonstrated by the meteoric increase in 
the level of funding invested into StreetGames from £300,000 in 2010-11 (SE, 2011, 
p.8) to an in-principle four-year award close to £19.5m for the 2013-17 funding cycle 
(SE, 2012b, p.5). It could be argued that increased role of ‘social actors’, such as 
StreetGames, provided an internal shock to the sport policy subsystem by increasing 
doubt in the ability of NGBs to meet policy objectives, which provided a critical path 
to major policy change within Sporting Future. 
Since Game Plan, the central objective for SE had been increased regular and 
sustained participation in sport, especially through a core strategy of developing 
long-term relationships with and investment in sports’ NGBs to deliver ‘stretching and 
difficult targets’ (SE, 2011, pp.2-3). However, it is evident that in support of Creating 
a Sporting Habit for Life, SE would not have a government-set target for national 
participation, DCMS being ‘merely keen’ on increasing participation in 14-25 year 
olds (SE, 2012a, p.3). While this raises doubts over government’s commitment to its 
own legacy plans, NGBs would be ‘performance managed’ to meet internal WSP 
2013-17 agreed targets, so that SE could ‘demonstrate to the [National Audit Office] 
that both impact and value for money were being delivered’ (SE, 2012a, p.3). Such 
evidence not only highlights SE’s determination to preserve its status quo with 
government, through the continuance of the compliance nature of the SE-led 
coalition, but also the prospect of major policy change. 
Indeed, the question of government’s commitment to sport policy was significantly 
criticised within the HLSCOPL Report (2013b). Arguably, this set in motion a further 
game-changer in the way sports participation and community sport was funded and 
delivered. A lack of robustness in government policy to deliver on its legacy 
ambitions, and a ‘lack of a clear legacy plan for capturing the enthusiasm of the 
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Games within all sports’, having been highlighted (HLSCOPL, 2013b, p.8). It could 
be argued that this represented a major internal shock to the sport policy subsystem 
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994; Sabatier and Weible, 2007), with these serious 
criticisms of the sport policy subsystem having been placed in the public domain. 
The consequence of the accumulation of criticism of policy failure was a 
redistribution of critical political resources, particularly financial support, away from 
NGBs and ‘sports for sport’s sake’ to ‘sport for social good’, thus altering the 
structure of the policy subsystem by way of a clearer focus on physical activity for 
the inactive. The nature of the government’s Sporting Future (DCMS, 2015b, p.10) 
policy document can thus be considered a radical departure from historical central 
government policy, and signified not only a step-change in community and 
grassroots sport policy, but also a dramatic change in emphasis for SE. The 
changed focus of government priorities, premised on a genuine cross-Whitehall 
effort for joined-up government, was intended to achieve a principal aim of 
harnessing the potential of sport and physical activity to deliver ‘social good’, and 
‘change people’s lives for the better.’  
However, evidence points towards the continued existence of a quandary within 
government as to the role sport can play in public service. As noted by Baroness 
Heyhoe-Flint, ‘[government] must manifest itself in understanding the role that sport 
and recreation can play in achieving its objectives’ (Hansards, 2015b20). Yet, 
evidence suggests a lack of coordination within government, and that sport’s 
potential contribution to an array of government departmental agendas remains 
under-valued, unacknowledged and misunderstood:   
‘[Within] Sporting Futures there is a signature there from the ministers of all the 
various departments, but the inter-ministerial group has only I think met once, since 
Sporting Future was written. So, to what extent do they truly buy into this in every 
department? Sport can do so much for so many of their agendas, yet I don’t think 
that every one of those departments quite gets the power of sport to achieve its aims’ 
(Interviewee: SEC). 
 
                                                          
20
 See column 402. 
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Conversely though, it could be argued that the sporting sector demonstrated a 
reluctance to utilise its significant influence to shape policy, in contrast to other policy 
sectors, which has potential implications for the application of the ACF, in the 
analysis of UK sport policy. Evidence suggests that sport policy actors’ preferences 
have been framed by a fear of ‘rocking the boat’, a reluctance to promote their 
valuable contribution to society, an acceptance of sustained levels of conservatism 
and compliance, and a willingness to be subjected to policy rather than shape it. 
Thus, pointing towards the notion of power as psychological control (Wrong, 1995) in 
association with Lukes’ third dimension of power:    
‘the sports sector punches very significantly below its weight, in terms of its influence 
on government, in relation to the size of the sector, the economic role of the sector, 
the genuinely great stuff that the sport sector does at local level, and the social 
impact [of] sport. The profile and the credit that the sector gets for doing that within 
government is minimal. As a sector we are very subject to rather than shaping 
changes in the strategic environment. Culturally, the sector is very conservative and 
very compliant as well, so people do as they’re told and uphold the rules, which is 
different from other sectors’ (Interviewee: SRADP). 
 
5.7) Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide a more in-depth utilisation of the ACF to 
provide a theoretical conceptualisation of the UK sport policy subsystem, and 
provide context for the following case-study Chapters, particularly with regard to the 
identification and definition of sport policy subsystem and policy actors, advocacy 
coalitions, and factors that have influenced policy stability and change over a decade 
or more, in line with ACF assumptions. The findings also point towards potential 
issues with the ACF in terms of the characteristics of mature subsystems, the ACF’s 
belief system, delimitation boundaries of coalitions and subsystem boundaries, and 
the height from which the ACF observes policy subsystems, which are discussed in 
detail within Chapter 9.     
Evidence suggests that a CCPR-led advocacy coalition and the Wolfenden Report of 
1960, provided an opportunity for policy actors to coalesce around the issues 
identified within the Report, to produce a ‘nascent’ policy subsystem to translate their 
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beliefs into public policy. Arguably, the UK sport policy domain remained in a 
‘nascent’ state for nearly three decades, due in the most part to limited government 
coercion and the enduring conflicts among policy actors, as the ACF would expect to 
see in a ‘nascent’ policy subsystem, despite the Sports Council’s potential 
positioning as a ‘policy broker’, and arguably the semi-autonomous nature of various 
policy actors (NGBs, BOA, CCPR and SC). While evidence signposts a degree of 
maturity in the development of the sport policy subsystem, its failure to reach the 
stage of maturity attained by other policy subsystems (e.g. health and education), is 
arguably a consequence of sports’ perpetual fragmentation within a disjointed political 
system, which is further complicated by the existence nested and overlapping 
subsystems, coalitions and policy actor.   
The mapping the key beliefs and policies of government/SE not only identified the 
role and influence of technical information and beliefs on policy change, but also a 
degree of overlap and alignment within a UK sport policy subsystem that has 
arguably been constructed by government rather than by advocacy coalitions. 
Evidence suggests that a trio of advocacy coalitions for elite, community and school 
sport occupy the policy subsystem, having emerged from government intervention, 
and engineered by government to achieve its own objectives. While, the ACF’s 
assumptions of shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs as the norm for coalition 
membership/activity is still highly applicable, evidence suggests that coalitions are 
not merely the product of shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs, but can also be constructed 
and maintained through compliance, shared-interests/objectives, financial incentives 
and sanctions. This is exemplified by the SE-led social/community sport coalition and 
membership’s support to drive increased participation against a myriad of 
government objectives. The interaction between government/SE and policy actors 
(e.g. NGBs) also demonstrates a high degree of coordinated activity to meet shared 
goals, which arguably meets ACF assumptions regarding the structuring of advocacy 
coalitions through shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs, and significant engagement in 
coordinated activity over time. Yet, the requirement for NGBs to modernise and 
reform to become ‘fit-for-purpose’ to partner government, and the increasing 
dependency of NGBs on public funding arising from the greater access to 
opportunities and Lottery funds, demonstrates the power relationship between 
coalition members within the UK sport policy subsystem.   
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Evidence indicates that the UK sport policy subsystem has experienced a series of 
external shocks, which have shaped the trajectory of sports policy, thus highlighting 
the ACF’s usefulness in the explanation of major policy change. Examples of which 
are the Prime Ministerial change from Thatcher to Major, and the latter’s belief that 
sport matters to society; and the introduction of the Lottery which served to provide 
previously unimaginable financial resources for policy actors within the sport policy 
subsystem, the composition of which is complex, and influence predominantly 
follows the ‘money-trail.’ A further external shock was London’s successful bid to 
host the 2012 Olympic Games, which provoked a major change in the way sport 
policy was funded and delivered, elevating NGBs to a front-line mechanism for 
delivering government aims and objectives. However, evidence shows that the 
transition of NGBs to a higher level of responsibility was not strategic but 
opportunistic, as no alternative delivery method existed. It is also argued that the 
change from a generally non-interventionist Conservative philosophy to New 
Labour’s ‘Third Way – Best Value’ ideology, represented an external perturbation 
that explicitly changed the way government sport policy was funded and 
implemented, and again emphasises the usefulness of the ACF to explain policy 
change. The shift in government values for sport policy from a passive to contractual 
phase signalled an increased concern with compliance, shared-interests/objectives, 
and economic efficiency as conditions for participation within the sports policy 
subsystem and coalition membership.  
Arguably, the HLSCOPL Report fashioned a major internal shock to the sport policy 
subsystem. In line with ACF assumptions, the perceived view of policy failure being 
placed in the public eye, which prompted a move away from ‘sports for sport’s sake’ 
to ‘sport for social good’, as seen in Sporting Future. This resulted in a changed focus 
for the SE-led coalition towards the inactive, served by an organisational-neutral 
‘mixed model’ approach to funding. Such evidence confirmed that the UK sport 
policy subsystem was not confined to shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs, but also embodied 
shared-interests/objectives, compliance processes, and financial inducements and 
sanctions, which are also determinants of entry to and exit from coalition 
membership. 
Within the UK sport policy subsystem, evidence has also shown how Lukes’ three 
dimensions of power have been operationalised. Lukes’ first dimension of power can 
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be demonstrated by observable and tangible decision-making, for example, 
compliance with government requirements and contractual obligations to achieve 
government policy outcomes to secure public funding. The second dimension is 
associated with the defining the boundaries of agency-led coalitions, and limiting the 
scope of policy actors within the policy-making process. Furthermore, government 
indecision as to the location of sport within Whitehall, suggests a distortion of sports 
involvement within the policy process, restricting its capacity to set agendas and 
influence policy decisions, again highlighting Lukes’ second dimension of power. The 
third dimension of power is evident through the shaping of NGB preferences and 
psychological control, which have produced a policy environment that espouses a 
fear of rejection linked to resource-dependency, a willingness to be controlled by way 
of compliance, and the potential for acceptance of policy rather than influencing 
policy.  
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Chapter Six 
England Handball 
 
6.1) Introduction 
This chapter represents the empirical findings in relation to the case of England 
Handball (EH), the NGB of handball in England, in line with the research aims and 
objectives of this study, which have also guided the structure of this chapter. 
Following an introductory contextual profile of EH, a detailed analysis and discussion 
is provided on the development of EH’s governmental relationships, and the 
operational impacts and approaches to changing sport policy, aligned to the specific 
themes identified within the methodology chapter as mechanisms for delivering 
desired sport policy outcomes and determinants relevant to policy shaping or taking.  
Threaded throughout this empirical chapter are relevant links and discussions that 
reflect the nature of power and the utility of the ACF. The concluding section 
summarises the key findings of this case study on EH, in particular, the pragmatic 
and flexible use of the sport policy environment to drive development, in unopposed 
acceptance of its contractual obligations, and its positioning as primarily a ‘policy 
taker’ on the basis of shared beliefs and self-preservation.   
Handball was introduced to the UK in 1966 and formalised through the founding of 
the British Handball Association (BHA)21 in 1968 (EH, 2012, p.9). The formation of 
EH to develop handball in England was prompted by the restructuring of the Sports 
Councils in 1997, and devolution to the Home Nations. Evidence suggests 
EH/handball has seen progressive growth in its development, particularly from the 
mid-2000s (EH, 2012), as noted by a former Chair of EH: 
‘When I was asked to return to the game in 2005 … We had no income, no courses, 
no Schools Association, no official tutors - in fact no organisation. [EH] is definitely on 
the move - growth in all areas is continuing at a pace, there is an increase in staff 
numbers, a huge increase in the number of players and clubs, and a very large 
increase in the number of qualified coaches’ (EH, 2013b, p.6). 
                                                          
21
 BHA is the responsible governing body for elite performance in handball, both men and women GB teams having competed 
at an Olympic Games, for the first time, during the London 2012 Olympic Games (EH, 2012).  
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Growth and development can also be seen by increased SE funding from £98,000 
(2009-13) to £1.3m (2013-17) (EH, 2013b, p.6), and significant improvements in 
EH’s club competition structure, which currently boasts 237 teams across all leagues 
compared to 131 in 2014 (EHA, 2017g).  
According to EH’s Strategic Plan 2017-21 (2017g), the current landscape of handball 
in England, includes inter alia: 
 Over 3,500 participants regularly playing handball; 
 Club membership of 2,300; 
 14,000 school children play handball; 
 1,422 teams entered the 2017 Schools Competition;   
 65 University teams; 
 Five under-16 Regional Academies operational; 
 8,000 people hold an EH qualification. 
 
Handball was awarded elite funding from UKS to the value of £5.9m over the Beijing 
2008 and London 2012 funding cycles22, to at least compete ‘credibly on home soil’ 
(UKS, 2006, p.8). However, GB teams for both men and women were unable to 
progress past the preliminary rounds, the consequence of which was the withdrawal 
of elite funding in December 2012, under UKS’s No Compromise principle (White, 
2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 UKS’s historical funding data is available online from: http://www.uksport.gov.uk/our-work/investing-in-sport/historical-
funding-figures 
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6.2) Development of governmental relationships 
It is evident that EH’s formation in 2009 was largely constituted on the basis of a 
close and mutually beneficial relationship with government and SE, as a means to 
develop a sport that was ‘under the radar in Britain’ (Meli, CEO of EH, cited in 
HLSCOPL, 2013a, p.205), and as alluded to above, limited by a lack of resources to 
achieve independent growth. As clearly indicated within EH’s 2013-17 WSP (2012, 
p.9), a crucial part of EH’s designated role was to ‘take advantage of the potential 
opportunities provided by SE’, which not only signposts a willing intent to align with 
government and SE ‘policy-core’ beliefs, but also self-interest and shared interest as 
features of SE-led coalition membership.   
According to Mcsteen (2013), in an online news article, handball was considered an 
‘influential voice in shaping sport, community and health policy at a [g]overnmental 
level’ throughout the world, pointing towards the sport’s potential within the UK policy 
environment. In particular, EH believed that handball offered young children the 
opportunity to improve their physical literacy, seen as a complementary alignment to 
‘policy-core’ beliefs of government/SE (Creating a Sporting Habit for Life), whereby 
the four key skills of running, jumping, throwing and catching matched the principal 
components of handball (EH, 2013b, pp.7-8). Evidence also revealed EH’s use of 
the above complementary alignment to policy priorities, as a potential political 
resource to raise the awareness and profile of handball, and arguably a strategic 
attempt to establish EH’s credibility as a policy actor within the sport policy 
subsystem, and strengthen its membership of the SE-led coalition. As noted by the 
Parliamentary Sports Fellow23 for handball (Clive Efford MP, Shadow Minister of 
Sport [2011-2016]), the sport was ‘fantastic … for all ages, but especially young 
people who can benefit from the varied skills that are required in the game to help 
develop their physical literacy’ (cited in EH, 2014a). According to interviewee 
SRADP, relationships with MPs, Ministers, and SE officials can provide a route to 
                                                          
23
 Parliamentary Sports Fellowship scheme of matching MPs and peers from all parties with sports organisations, offered the 
opportunity to build a better understanding of sport in Parliament. Available from: https://www.sportengland.org/news-and-
features/news/2013/june/7/sport-england-parliamentary-sports-fellowship-scheme/ 
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influence government, and arguably ‘a more effective’ means of channelling ‘insider 
influence.’   
For SE (2010b), handball, was seen as a development sport and received no funding 
against SE’s Grow, Sustain and Excel outcomes for the 2009-13 funding cycle, the 
focus of SE’s intervention directly linked to the modernisation of EH (e.g. 
infrastructure, recruitment, workforce development), in line with Game Plan, with a 
specific and conditional requirement to appoint a CEO, thus demonstrating the 
compliance nature of the SE-led coalition, and EH’s willingness to comply as 
evidenced by the appointment of a CEO in 2013. Arguably though, EH’s decision to 
appoint as CEO the previous SE NGB Relationship Manager for handball (2009-13), 
could be viewed as the strategic use of compliance as an influential resource, 
particularly as the knowledge gained from working within a government-agency 
could provide EH with a clearer understanding of the policy environment and a 
potential capacity to influence policy at a governmental level, especially in 
consideration of the comments made by interviewee SESLR: 
‘[SE] relationship managers that have gone into [NGBs], have been able to get a real 
breadth of understanding around sport policy, sport governance, a range of 
organisations and how they invest in participation and talent transfer, so they get a 
really good schooling, I would say, to take into a [NGB] role.’ 
An illustration of the connection between the CEO of EH and SE can be seen by the 
emphasis EH placed on the effective use SE investment, which would be used 
‘wisely’ to show that EH was ‘deserving of the award’ (Meli, CEO of EH, cited in EH, 
2013b, p.7), again signposting EH’s intent to align with government and SE policy 
and a willingness to accept the contractual-compliance obligations of the SE-led 
coalition. A clear demonstration of the synchronicity between EH’s strategic plans 
and those of SE, particularly in relation to the ‘policy-core’ beliefs of the Playground 
to Podium sporting continuum, can been seen from EH’s (2013c, p.2) mission 
statement:  
‘[To create] a growing and sustainable national framework to promote the 
development of handball in the education sector and the community, that will 
increase participation, broaden competition and pathway, and produce competitive 
national teams.’  
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A position reinforced through EH’s 2013-17 WSP (EH, 2012, p.15)24, whereby the 
main priorities of SE ‘align[ed] closely with [EH’s] vision for moving forward.’  
Evidence is also supportive of the significance of London’s successful bid to host the 
2012 Olympic Games, and the impact of the Lottery, as external shocks to the sport 
policy subsystem that not only changed the UK sporting landscape, but also elicited 
major policy change and greater responsibility to NGB/SMNGBs to deliver on 
government outcomes for sport: 
‘[The winning London bid] was such a significant moment in time …, there was 
suddenly a move to see [Lottery funding] exponentially grow. It quickly became 
apparent that [NGBs] were going to be a group of the major recipients’ (Interviewee: 
CEOEH)25.  
Further comments made by interviewee CEOEH revealed the relatively 
instantaneous onset of competition between NGBs that emerged from the greater 
access to Lottery funding, and their elevated role to the primary deliverers of 
government sport policy, there being ‘a lot of scrambling and jockeying for position’ 
to see who could get ‘a big slice of the pie.’ Moreover, evidence shows that 
competitiveness among NGBs overshadowed collective activity to meet shared 
government/SE-objectives, due to the emphasis placed on individually agreed APS 
targets, which largely elicited independent behaviour, as acknowledged by 
interviewee CEOEH, ‘you [were] responsible for your numbers, so [you didn’t] want 
to share that.’ Arguably, this shows the degree to which the sport policy subsystem 
and operational environment was engineered to position NGB/SMNGBs as primarily 
‘policy takers’, where acceptance of policy rather than opposition was preferable, 
particularly for those whose priority was to avoid a situation where it had to 
‘persuade people to open up the purse strings’ (Interviewee: CEOEH), as in the case 
of EH.  
 
                                                          
24
 See SE’s NGB National Priorities online data for 2013-17 WSPs for further information on handball’s alignment with SE policy 
and objectives: Available online from: https://www.sportengland.org/media/10084/20130920-ngb-priorities-spreadsheet-final.xls 
 
25
 References to ‘interviewee CEOEH’ relate to an interview dated 15
th
 August 2018. 
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Further opportunities for EH/handball to develop as a sport, and meet its contractual 
obligations to government/SE, were presented by the Home Olympics in 2012. 
According to EH’s Annual Report 2012-13 (2013b, pp.7-8), there had been a ‘huge 
surge in interest after the London 2012 Olympics’, a claim supported by the media 
particularly in regard to handball’s apparent ‘impact on the consciousness of the 
British Public’ (Veal, 2012), and that since 2012 EH’s primary focus has been the 
maximisation of any potential ‘Olympic effect.’ As noted by interviewee CEOEH, ‘our 
work has really been to capture the swell of interest from 2012 and maintain it, which 
is a challenge for a small organisation with limited funding.’  
Of significance here is EH’s invitation in June 2013 to give evidence to the 
HLSCOPL (2013a), handball’s inclusion of which, according to the CEO of EH (Meli, 
cited in McSteen, 2013), was ‘not a token gesture … [but] a fantastic opportunity to 
give handball another push and to raise the profile a bit more and keep it in the 
spotlight.’ Arguably, this provides a further example of EH’s use of political 
resources, and the potential for ‘insider influence’ to promote the sport within the 
sport policy subsystem, although it is uncertain whether the ACF considers such a 
political platform as a resource, since it assumes political resources relate to 
coalitions rather than individual coalition members. However, evidence provided to 
the HLSCOPL gave an indication of the slow recognition among NGB/SMNGBs of 
the lessening of their autonomy and previously privileged position of equality, and 
their increasing dependency (on public funding) and vulnerability to diminishing 
levels of public funding when non-compliant with government/SE’s policy 
requirements:  
‘[A]ll sports were treated the same and went through the same process … [and] 
started to realise that [it] was not a divine right any more to get public funding. It had 
to be earned against good-quality plans that are going to deliver and, if they do not 
deliver, they are going to get money taken away. [SE] showed its teeth in the last four 
years when it did take money away. It was the first time it had been done’ (Meli, cited 
in HLSCOPL, 2013a, p.219). 
The shift away from the light touch of financial sanctions to a more decisive 
approach of diverting funds away from non-compliant NGBs, and government/SE’s 
increasing interest in supporting a wider range of delivery organisations, prompted 
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the creation of the National Governing Body CEO Forum (NGBCEOF)26, which was 
also in response to concerns over the lack of support from governmental agencies to 
NGB CEOs, especially CEOs of SMNGBs, where arguably their responsibilities 
necessitated substantial support. As explained by interviewee CEOEH:     
‘[SE] delivered a programme for participation development directors … [UKS] did it 
for performance directors. Sport and Recreation Alliance did one for Chairs of 
governing bodies. No-one did anything for the Chief Execs, the people who were 
actually running the organisation. So, we actually ended up setting it up for 
ourselves.’  
Interviewee CEOEH elaborated further by stating: 
‘[W]e needed to have a voice; we needed to show that we were more than just about 
development, more than just about participation. It kept the profile of sport and 
therefore the profile of [NGBs] high, at a time when it was potentially on the wane … 
It provided a collective voice [with a] very clear focus on stuff we could do as a united 
force.’  
Arguably, the NGBCEOF represents a ‘professional fora’, particularly for SMNGBs, a 
key characteristic of which is the use of data to defend and promote interests and 
beliefs (Sabatier and Weible, 2007), which clearly informed the NGBCEOF’s ‘The 
State of Play’ (National Governing Body CEO Forum [NGBCEOF], 2015) impact 
document, as seen in Figure 6.1. Such collaboration among SMNGBs in the 
reaffirmation of shared-beliefs, values, and strategic importance of sport and 
salience to various governmental departments, signposts an increasing interest in 
influencing the policy environment at a governmental level in areas where sport can 
have an impact on policy outcomes, as clearly articulated by the stated intention of 
the NGBCEOF (2015, p.2), to be the ‘go to group for policymakers who impact on 
sport, and to influence policy that impacts on sport.’ According to EH Board minutes 
(EH, 2015b, p.5), the SMNGB’s planned response to the changing relationship with 
government/SE was to ‘present consistent points, with other [NGBs]’, through its 
membership of the NGBCEOF, to ensure handball was ‘not seen as a poor relation 
with a lack of money, yet was in a position to state the issues.’  
                                                          
26
 NGBCEOF represented 39 of the leading NGBs of sport in England leading up to the 2015 General election. According to 
interviewee CEOEH, the forum now represents less than 30 NGBs, consisting of predominantly SMNGBs, the major 
sports/NGBs (e.g. cricket, football, rugby and tennis) having pulled out as they have their own voice and are large enough to 
meet and influence government on their own.   
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Figure 6.1: NGBCEOF Impact in 2014 
 
Source: NGBCEOF (2015, p.10) 
The above evidence not only highlights the concern to establish a coalition of 
SMNGBs, but also demonstrates the breadth of their interests. As claimed by 
interviewee CEOEH, ‘there are very few policy areas that sport … in its widest 
possible context, physical activity, doesn’t potentially … have an impact on.’  
However, the potential to influence policy is likely to be dependent on whether their 
collective voice is capable of engaging with government, or as pointed out by 
interviewee SRADP, ‘whether government is prepared to listen to something which 
could be perceived as a bit colloquial.’  
While there are indications of EH’s aspirations to influence sport policy, evidence 
shows an increasing willingness to align with government and SE policy and 
maintain its membership of the SE-led coalition, as seen by EH’s greater focus and 
achievement in community sport rather than elite sport (EH, 2014b; EH, 2015f; EH, 
2015c; EH, 2015b). This has clearly supported handball’s development as a sport 
and EH’s relationship with government and SE, as evidenced by the improved four-
year funding award to EH from SE for the 2017-21 funding cycle, whereby handball 
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was one of only a few sports to receive increased funding (EH, 2017b; SE, 2017b). 
Furthermore, the reduced centrality of NGBs arising from the government’s 2015 
policy document, Sporting Future, and SE’s mixed economy approach for their 2016-
21 Active Nation strategy, has not weakened EH’s beliefs of the mutual benefits of 
complementary alignment to policy objectives. For example, EH claimed that its 
strengths matched SE’s changed remit and targeted investment areas, such as 
young people down to 5-years old, under-represented groups, female participation, 
and those from lower socioeconomic and minority ethnic backgrounds (EH, 2016d, 
pp.2-3). In addition, and as noted within EH Board minutes, EH believe that not 
many other sports can provide ‘the simplicity of access and the demographic make-
up’ of handball (EH, 2016d, p.4), or have ‘more influence over those participating 
[regularly], despite [handball’s] lower participation numbers, than, for example, 
football’ (EH, 2016g, p.3).  
The observable acceptance of policy change rather than opposition to the changing 
policy environment, identifies EH as primarily a ‘policy taker’, however, further 
evidence endorses a position of contentment to comply and align with the shared 
‘policy-core’ beliefs of government and SE on the basis of self-preservation, as 
asserted by interviewee CEOEH:   
‘[W]e have to recognise that if we’re going to take [SE’s] money, we’re going to have 
to dance to whatever tune they want us to or whatever tune they are playing, and if 
that means we have to meet certain governance criteria to get the money, then we’re 
going to do that’ (Interviewee: CEOEH). 
Undoubtedly, SE has played a significant role in shaping EH, as well as other 
SMNGBs, as interviewee CEOEH indicated, ‘there’s no doubt that the policies and 
the programmes and the approach and strategy, more [SE] and less so [UKS], has 
brought about the changing shape of [NGBs].’ Yet, the vulnerability of NGBs, 
particularly SMNGBs, to shifts in government policy, and their observable passivity to 
policy change, does raise questions on sport/NGBs’ continuity in or suitability for the 
sport policy environment and a role within government. A point made more 
significant by an emerging issue of organisational-identity for SE, resulting from 
government’s shifting priorities towards the inactive and ‘sport for social good’, and 
the re-emergence of ‘sport for sport’s sake’ on the periphery of political concern:    
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‘Sport England is a misnomer. It’s no longer Sport England, its Physical Activity 
England … [T]he focus is now on inactivity … [, which] took a lot of [NGBs] by 
surprise. There was a perception [by SE] that perhaps [the focus on NGBs] hadn’t 
seen as big a growth as they were expecting … [Policy] now sits within a wider 
context, [and] … sport is now but a small part of a broader look at health, wellbeing, 
and stuff like that. Arguably, there isn’t a government strategy for sport. There is a 
strategy in which sport sits, but it’s more a question of [sport is] still a poorer relation 
to other areas of delivery’ (Interviewee: CEOEH). 
At an elite level, handball, together with other unfunded SMNGBs, have organised 
themselves into a collective through the ‘Every Sport Matters’ ([ESM], 2017) forum, 
calling for a change in the way Olympic and Paralympic sport is funded. Media 
criticism surrounding the withdrawal of elite funding from handball highlighted the 
challenges faced by team sports, in particular those emerging or developing, to 
construct their own Olympic Legacy, for example, the absence of athlete ‘role 
models’ (see Slater, 2012; White, 2012; Compton, 2013; Hawkins, 2013), the impact 
of ejection from the UKS-led coalition thwarting elite development, as evidenced by 
interviewee CEOEH’s comment that ‘[UKS] asked [handball] to go from nowhere to 
somewhere, and just sent us back to nowhere again.’ This points towards an 
emerging dichotomy between funded/established-elitist sports (the ‘haves’) and 
unfunded/developing-elitist-competitive sports (the ‘have nots’), also identifying the 
No Compromise principle as a notable restriction to coalition membership, illustrating 
characteristics of Lukes’ second dimension of power and the erection of barriers to 
access the policy agenda and limit debate on elite sport policy.  
The evidence also supports emergence of a minority coalition of 
unfunded/developing-elitist-competitive sports (the ‘have nots’), nested within the 
UKS-led coalition, having coalesced around shared-beliefs that medal-return should 
not be the sole driver of elite investment, and that all Olympic and Paralympic 
athletes should have the ability to realise their potential (ESM, 2017). According to 
interviewee CEOEH:  
‘[Handball] has worked with ten other sports on the Every Sport Matters programme. 
We knew we wouldn’t be able to do that on our own, but to work with a group, and 
that group has stayed together, which is good, the outcome would be an actual 
change.’ 
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The argument being that all Olympic and Paralympic sports should be provided with 
a certain level of elite funding, and that in the case of team sports, consideration 
should be given to the number of medallists/athletes who can act as inspirational role 
models. Thus, pointing towards the exploitation of commonsensical ‘deep-core’ 
beliefs, as described by Grix and Carmichael (2012), in an attempt to develop 
‘policy-core’ beliefs and influence policy change at an elite level, in line with ACF 
assumptions.  As explained by interviewee CEOEH:  
‘What we’re saying is spread the load … Recognise that, actually, and this is where 
team sports have suffered, what is it you want, medals … or … medallists.’  
Evidence indicates an element of success here, government having introduced a 
new ‘Aspirational Fund’27 to support more Summer Olympic and Paralympic sports 
and help inspire local communities (DCMS, 2018; UKS, 2018). Arguably though, 
funding has been directed towards those with the potential for podium success, 
handball being one sport not to receive funding, suggesting that this has been a 
strategy of government/UKS to quieten the dissident voices of unfunded SMNGBs, 
thus providing an illustration of Lukes’ second dimension of power – maintaining 
control over the policy agenda.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 UKS awards for the ‘Aspirational Fund’. Available from: http://www.uksport.gov.uk/news/2018/12/07/new-sports-backed-by-
aspiration-fund-to-support-ambitions-for-tokyo-2020-olympics-and-paralympics 
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6.3) Operational impacts and approaches to changing sport policy  
6.3.1) Governance 
Modernisation and reform was a key component of EH’s 2013-17 WSP, particularly 
to establish ‘a segregation between strategic and operational management … [and] 
…a new level of professionalism’, and meet SE governance standards (EH, 2012, 
pp.16-17). According to EH’s Annual Report 2014-15 (EH, 2015a), good governance 
was crucial for long-term success, as seen by EH’s commitment to governance 
reform through the acceptance of the Voluntary Code of Good Governance (EH, 
2014b), and positive feedback from SE in relation to the strengthening and continued 
improvements to EH’s governance infrastructure (EH, 2013b; EHA, 2014c; EH, 
2015a; EH, 2016b; EH, 2016e). This illustrates shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs with 
government/SE, and EH’s willingness to comply with the regulatory nature of the SE-
led coalition, adherence to government/SE governance protocols emphasising 
characteristics of Lukes’ first and third dimensions of power.   
The increased focus on governance, however, has had a significant impact on 
SMNGBs, both from an organisational and operational perspective, as evidenced by 
the comments of interviewee CEOEH:   
‘[T]he governance stuff and the latter stages of that has undoubtedly changed the 
way that [NGBs] operate. The focus was on reducing the impact of the ‘Blazer 
Brigade.’ People who feel they’ve been in the sport for 50 years, and therefore know 
how to run it. Organisations now, even an organisation our size … we’re a small 
business, and therefore we should be run and operated as a small business, not an 
old boys club.’ 
The conditional expectation for all NGBs in receipt of public funding to achieve 
excellence in governance within a new Mandatory Code of Governance for Sport, 
(EH, 2016b, p.14), led to heightened tensions within EH, not only among Board 
members, but also between the Board, the Executive, and the membership, as 
evidenced by EH’s governance proposal to change the recruitment process for the 
position of Chair from an elected to an appointed process (a SE initiative), the main 
purpose of which was to highlight to SE ‘how seriously [EH] focuse[d] on the 
importance of governance’ (EH, 2016i p.6). From EH Board minutes (2016a, 2016d, 
138 
 
2016e), it is evident that much of the conflict at Board-level reflected the varying 
beliefs of Board members, particularly from those who held the belief that the 
position of Chair should be the domain of someone immersed in handball, in conflict 
with government/SE’s efforts to reassert control over NGBs through the removal of 
the so-called ‘Blazer Brigade.’ The influence of which can be seen in EH, as 
evidenced by the comments of one Board member who noted that ‘if the Chair 
addresses the AGM outlining his disagreement, the idea is unlikely to succeed’ (EH, 
2016e, p.2), which arguably reflects Lukes’ third dimension of power to shape 
members’ preferences. Further evidence also endorses the extent to which internal 
conflicts are a reflection of an observable dichotomy between those favouring 
compliance with SE’s governance protocols to preserve the NGB’s financial 
interests, and those firmly committed to the preservation of NGB autonomy and the 
protection of membership interests, as well as highlighting the potential implications 
for organisational-identity, as demonstrated by the comments of interviewee 
CEOEH: 
‘[NGBs] will always be a membership organisation and that’s one of the challenges in 
the new world, in that, those members are often always “die hards” of the sport, and 
therefore their only view; their only thought; their only concern is for the success of 
that sport, and the fact that the [NGB] is there to work for them. So, they get slightly 
peeved when they see the [NGB] going off and dealing with … all this governance 
stuff that they have to do.’ 
Arguably, the above evidence highlights the limitations in the ACF’s concept of 
shared-beliefs, through its neglect of tensions among coalition members. The impact 
of the dichotomy of beliefs within EH is demonstrated further by the rejection of the 
resolution to have an appointed rather than elected Chair (9 votes for and 10 votes 
against) (EH, 2016h, p.4), despite an awareness among EH members that non-
compliance with SE’s regulatory requirements would likely result in financial 
sanctions (EH, 2017e; EH, 2016g), again illustrating the compliance and punitive 
nature of the SE-led coalition.   
Notwithstanding the above, evidence suggests that governance reform within 
SMNGBs that are less established, emerging or developing, have a higher 
transformational capacity than their larger and longer established counterparts, in 
part due to the closeness of membership to the SMNGB administration:   
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‘[O]ur world was much smaller and so allowed voices in membership to be perhaps 
sometimes closer to the centre, than they would be in football or rugby, … We didn’t 
struggle to much with [governance], because we didn’t have to make too many 
changes to structure’ (Interviewee: CEOEH). 
‘[T]he smallest [NGBs] are the most transformational, their Boards are very skills- 
based, independent, and looking to drive a transformational agenda’ (Interviewee: 
SESLR).  
While EH has demonstrated a willingness to comply with SE governance criteria, it is 
evident that the potential risks for non-compliance have greater implications. For 
example, interviewee CEOEH remarked that by not having governance compliance 
in place within the specified time, ‘you risked your funding being turned off.’ Further 
evidence highlighted that compliance for some NGBs has simply been a necessity to 
secure funding, as interviewee SEC claimed, ‘there are some sports that are doing it 
because there told to do it.’ The acceptance of compliance illustrating how Lukes’ 
first dimension of power is operationalised, particularly as evidence shows that 
compliance with governance protocols has not been straightforward:   
‘[SE] want directors to have skills, knowledge and experience … Married against that 
you’ve got to have this diversity in terms of gender and minority ethnic 
representation. The struggle comes when you’re at a point where you don’t quite 
meet the gender bit, but you want to find the most skills, knowledge and experience 
that you can, and if they all come along and don’t fit into the minority ethnic or gender 
that you require, how do you reconcile the two’ (Interviewee: CEOEH). 
Even so, EH claimed within its Annual Report 2017-18 (EH, 2018a, p.14) that it was 
‘one of the first mixed-gender [NGBs] to have a majority of female members on its 
board of directors’, and achieved full compliance within the specified timeframe. 
While this reflects EH’s resource-dependency and its commitment to maintain its 
membership of the SE-led coalition, it also represents EH’s notion of self-
preservation, compliance having ‘put [EH] in a strong position to maintain its ability to 
access public funding’ (EH, 2018a, p.14).   
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6.3.2) Funding 
According to EH’s 2013-17 WSP (2012, pp.14-15), the funding received from SE for 
the 2009-13 funding cycle (£645,300), although weighted towards modernisation, 
positively impacted on EH’s ability to: i) develop the organisation and grow in stature; 
ii) deliver on outcomes where resources had been targeted; iii) benefit from inclusion 
within a number of schemes that accelerated the growth of handball (e.g. 
Change4Life [C4L] and PremierLeague4Sport [PL4S]); and iv) establish initial 
benchmarks to test demand for handball in England. While the above evidence 
demonstrates EH’s willingness to align with and commit to the ‘policy-core’ beliefs 
and objectives of government/SE, it also highlights the mutually beneficial 
interdependencies of membership of the SE-led coalition (e.g. EH’s inclusion within 
SE initiatives).  
The strategic relevance of EH’s alliance to SE is demonstrated by EH’s attempts to 
maximise SE funding to achieve its objective to ‘establish handball as a major team 
sport for all’ (EH, 2012, p.13), through over-ambitious WSP submissions to SE to 
achieve desired funding outcomes from negotiations. An illustration of which is 
provided in Table 6.1, which shows the funding resource required by EH to operate 
and implement its 2013-17 WSP amounted to just over £2.5m, thus exceeding EH’s 
2009-13 funding award by almost 300%. Subsequent negotiations with SE proved 
successful with increased funding awards of £1.3m for the 2013-17 funding cycle 
(EH, 2013b, pp.5-6), and £1.4m for the 2017-21 funding cycle (EH, 2017f, SE, 
2017b), the latter also related to a funding application to SE for £2.5m (EH, 2016h, 
p.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
Table 6.1: Funding resource requirements for England Handball’s 2013-17 
WSP 
Operational Costs Sport England 
Funding  
(£) 
NGB  
Funding 
(£) 
Partner Funding 
(£) 
Total  
Cost  
(£) 
Clubs and community 
 
230,780 - - 230,780 
Competition 
 
80,661 - - 80,661 
Talent pathway and player 
development 
 
447,157 - - 447,157 
Coaching and workforce 
development 
 
53,577 - - 53,577 
Infrastructure 
 
657,589 22,203 198,651 878,443 
Projects 
 
120,000   120,000 
Core Costs 
 
530,275 16,853 153,754 700,882 
 
Totals 
 
 
2,120,039 
 
39,056 
 
352,405 
 
2,511,500 
Source adapted from: EH (2012) 
From Table 6.1, EH’s financial contribution to its own 2013-17 WSP appeared 
negligible, adding to the debate on the ability or reluctance of NGBs to be self-
sustainable, particularly as evidence indicates that EH’s self-generated income has 
not matched the level of government/SE funding, which has led to a high 
dependency on public subsidies, as seen from EH’s income/revenue financial data in 
Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2: England Handball income/revenue for the period 2014-15 to 2017-18 
Year 2014-15  
(£) 
2015-16 
(£) 
2016-17 
(£) 
2017-18 
(£) 
Self-generated Income 
 
269,885 281,205 360,271 323,878 
Other Income (Sport 
Councils Grants) 
 
 
458,440 
 
486,118 
 
639,951 
 
436,711 
Total Revenue 
 
728,325 767,323 1,000,222 760,589 
Resource-Dependency % 63% 63% 64% 57% 
Source: EH (2016c, 2017d, 2018a) 
Despite a key objective to ‘foster a commercially aware culture’ (EH, 2016b, p.12), it 
is evident that EH’s weakness as a sport in England has limited its ability to grow 
commercial revenues: 
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‘[O]ur ability is minimal. Minimal to the extent that we don’t have the media profile, we 
don’t have the numbers, the volume that would be attractive to a bigger investor’ 
(Interviewee: CEOEH). 
However, evidence has revealed reluctance on the part of EH to enhance its 
financial self-reliance through what is arguably its most fluid of income streams, 
membership fees. While EH has seen an increase in player registrations and 
affiliations, there has been no desire to increase membership fees (EH, 2017a), the 
cost of membership having remained ‘unchanged’ since 2013 (EH, 2018a, p.15). 
This is related to a perceived paradox between increasing member numbers and 
increasing membership fees, whereby increased memberships fees are likely to 
reduce membership numbers, and that any increase in membership fees is also 
likely to increase the level of expectation among membership for improved services:   
‘[W]hen someone comes along and says, “why don’t you increase your membership 
fees, put an extra £15-20 on membership fees and generate loads [of income]?” [I 
would say] “no, it might just bring me less members.” We’re already an expensive 
sport. If I suddenly say to people, you know your membership fees were £20 per 
year; they’re now £40 per year. Not only might they [leave], they’re also more likely to 
start [saying] what do I get for that, and there’s only so many times you can say to 
them, “well you get insurance”’ (Interviewee: CEOEH). 
Funding for EH, has not only been the most challenging issue faced, it has been 
explicit in shaping the SMNGB through increased levels of resource-dependency on 
public funds, and a lessening of autonomy. As one Board member claimed, ‘the 
consequence of not allowing [EH] to grow actually makes the [NGB] less 
independent’ (EH, 2016h, p.6), which resonates with interviewee CEOEH’s remarks 
that SE retains influence over EH’s operational and financial activities, ‘no matter 
what level of resource-dependency’, again highlighting Lukes’ first dimension of 
power. Arguably, the comment regarding the limitations to growth is arguably 
connected to the extent to which EH is tied into the SE-led coalition, and not a 
reflection of EH’s development as an emerging sport and its evident progress since 
the formation of the SMNGB, particularly as a conditional part of EH’s 2017-21 
funding agreement with SE is an obligation to regulate for self-sustainability, through 
the provision of information and analyses on income streams, back office costs, 
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business efficiency and scenario plans for dealing with changes in funding (EH, 
2018b, p.7).  
Evidence also suggests that EH has altered its beliefs and shifted away from the 
original emphasis placed on its relationship with SE, as a ‘development partner’, and 
now view SE as merely a ‘financial partner’ or stakeholder with reducing influence on 
the autonomy of EH, as clearly indicated by interviewee CEOEH:  
‘SE [is] a partner … who provides investment into [our] business … [We’ve] chosen 
to take their money, so they don’t figuratively or literally have a seat at the table, but 
they have an interest.’    
Moreover, SE’s 2016-21 strategy for sport and the shift away from an NGB-focused 
approach to participation, in line Sporting Future, not only exposed the high levels of 
resource-dependency of many SMNGBs, but also the apparent lack of 
understanding of the expectations that came with access to public funds, particularly 
among SMNGBs, and the speed and size of funding allocations that, for SMNGBs 
such as EH, prompted a rapid and impromptu rags to riches scenario, with a 
potential caveat of back to rags again:     
‘[T]he challenge was that [NGBs] hadn’t realised that the increase [in public funds] for 
some of them was so great, some just weren’t ready for it. Suddenly, you had all this 
money and didn’t really know what to do with it apart from spend it. And that doesn’t 
always work if you’re not understanding where you need to spend and why you need 
to spend it, and it’s not about the short-term but about the long-term. I think handball 
was guilty of that and one of those thrown a big bundle of cash, told to get on with 
it, … and then it all fell down like a house of cards’ (Interviewee: CEOEH). 
Interviewee CEOEH commented further that:   
‘with a move away from participation to inactivity, [NGBs] are suddenly saying, “hold 
on we’re on the periphery now, the funding has suddenly almost halved, but we want 
to be the same size we were, as we weren’t really set up correctly.” So, I think that 
reliance on public funding was (sic) just exposed.’ 
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For EH, the reliance on public funds has not just been exposed, it remains a critical 
mechanism to maintain operations at current levels, and to avoid a regressive 
organisational shift from ‘boardroom’ back to a ‘kitchen table’ organisation, as  noted 
by interviewee CEOEH:    
‘There’s always going to be a need for a certain level of [public] funding to deliver a 
certain level of operation. So, if that funding isn’t there, we’re going to have [to] … 
recognise we’ll go back to where we were pre-2005.’ 
 
6.3.3) Capacity Building: workforce and facilities 
A key part of EH’s modernisation plan was the development of a suitably trained and 
professional workforce, designed to reduce the operational control from Board 
members (SE, 2010b; EH, 2012), in line with government/SE’s governance reforms. 
Evidence suggests the adoption of a pragmatic approach to workforce development 
on the part of EH, through volunteers and partnerships to provide an acceptable 
level of organisational-sustainability against government/SE investment. An 
illustration of which, as noted in EH’s 2012-13 Annual Report, was a workforce 
development design to provide ‘a suitably trained and deployed workforce … able to 
deliver handball without draining resources from the organisation’, to achieve ‘the 
best possible return’ against investment, rather than have ‘a large centrally paid 
workforce that [was] ultimately unsustainable without public funding’ (EH, 2013b, 
p.7). This demonstrates a willingness of EH to align with the ‘policy-core’ beliefs and 
‘secondary-aspects’ of the SE-led coalition, while also emphasising the overlap of 
shared-beliefs, particularly in terms of capacity building, strengthening accountability, 
and increasing efficiency. Additionally, the use of EH’s volunteer infrastructure and 
partnership-working to meet government and SE-objectives, clearly identifies 
resource-interdependencies as constituent part of the SE-led coalition.  
Partnership-working was a key element of EH’s commitment to workforce 
development (EH, 2012, pp.32-33; EH, 2015a, p.26), primarily aimed at sustainability 
and the utilisation of resources from others to deliver handball in hard to reach areas, 
which again demonstrates the significance of interdependencies within the SE-led 
coalition. As noted by CEOEH within EH Board minutes (2016e, p.4):  
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‘It is a waste of time, resources and money to repeat what partners are already 
successfully involved in. The aim is to have formal agreements in place with key 
strategic partners, to show that [EH] can deliver in all areas.’ 
When interviewed, CEOEH stated further that:  
‘In our own sport and in many other sports, there will be people who are better placed 
to deliver our sport than us. We shouldn’t try and do it all. We don’t need to do it all, 
and that’s the whole point of trying to utilise the funding that we have, at whatever 
level, and as it decreases, even more importantly, not to try and double up.’  
As an example, EH had increased its handball development officer capacity, 
primarily through investment from other coalition partners, including, County Sports 
Partnerships (CSPs), leisure trusts, Local Authorities (LAs), universities and 
StreetGames, particularly to build the profile of the handball in new areas (EH, 
2015a, p.20). Here, the introduction and further development of handball activators 
was seen as critical and essential to (EH, 2012, pp.21-24): i) ‘support capacity 
building and hands-on delivery at local level’; ii) ‘develop initiatives stemming from 
relationships and demand within their respective areas’; and iii) use as ‘leverage to 
secure match funding.’  
Coach education was also seen as essential to resolve issues of retention and 
ineffective deployment of resources within handball (EH, 2012), particularly in the 
educational sector. This suggests a shared-belief with government/SE at a ‘policy-
core’ level, where ‘effective coaching’ was viewed as a serious policy issue and a 
key part of the Playground to Podium ideology for sport development (DCMS, 2002b, 
p.45). It is evident that the continued development and enhancement of EH’s coach 
education programmes was recognised by SE, resulting in additional public funds to 
provide EH with a dedicated coaching and leadership officer (EH, 2012).  
However, further evidence indicates that the compliance-contractual obligations of 
the SE-led coalition, placed a strain on operational resources of EH, for example, 
capacity issues within the development of the schools competition had a detrimental 
effect on ‘key audiences’ (children and young people) (EH, 2014b, p.7). Interviewee 
CEOEH elaborated further on this point by stating:   
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‘[W]e ran the whole [school] competition from start to finish, at local level right 
through. We got to the point where we had about 250 teams in it, but it was killing us. 
We didn’t have the structure to organise a local level competition.’ 
Comments from interviewee CEOEH also illuminated the negative impact that 
changes in funding for LA leisure services have had on the provision and delivery of 
sport at community-grassroots levels, and the sporting landscape as a whole over 
the past 10 to 15 years: 
‘[T]he growing changes to [LA] leisure funding, [impacted on the sporting landscape] 
both in terms of provision and delivery at a development level, but also in terms of 
facilities that so many [NGBs] are reliant on. Whether it’s playing fields, whether its 
sports centres, whatever it might be, a majority of those have either been shut down, 
[or] moved into private sector hands.’ 
It could be argued that the vast changes in LA contracts and provisions for sport 
acted as an external perturbation, where changes within a different policy subsystem 
has impacted on the ‘policy-core’ beliefs and ‘secondary-aspects’ of the sport policy 
subsystem, the extent of the shockwave determined by the degree of government 
intervention within subsystems external the sport policy domain. To illustrate, it is 
noted within EH Board minutes that the limited access to suitable facilities had been 
‘a huge factor in hindering the expansion of [h]andball’ (EH, 2016i, p.2), and 
undoubtedly affected its ability to meet government policy outcomes. Evidence also 
suggests that the significance of changes in LA provisions and its impact on the 
sport policy subsystem, has not received a satisfactory level of attention within the 
policy environment. As claimed by interviewee SEC, the disconnect between local 
government and sport has been ‘overlooked’, and more so when reductions in LA 
funding (in England) from ‘£1.5bn to around £0.8bn’ since 2014 are taken into 
consideration.  
According to EH (2013b, p.7), ‘the availability of suitably sized and accessible 
venues is a challenge … faced by many indoor sports, especially handball’, and 
continues to be the ‘biggest obstacle facing members, clubs, schools, and …the 
biggest influence on participation’ (EH, 2016g, p.7). A fundamental issue with 
facilities for handball is the size of the court, as explained by the CEO of EH when 
interviewed in July 2013:  
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‘We have this infrastructure problem with [SE], designating that halls are based 
around badminton courts. [T]he standard design is a four badminton court hall, which 
wall to wall gives you approximately 33m by maybe 19m. Bearing in mind a handball 
court is 40m by 20m, you can’t get the full width. The width is a problem, because if 
you don’t have the full width the wing play is severely curtailed.’  
EH/handball do not have the resources or influence to control the availability or 
construction of facilities, thus reflecting their position as weaker sport in England, 
and in this case, a position of ‘policy taker.’ As noted by interviewee CEOEH:  
‘[EH/handball are] not the football foundation, we don’t have the money to invest and 
influence you to build your hall bigger or to encourage you to put the lines down. 
We’ve got to ride on the coattails of others and hope that one of the outcomes will be 
that we get some access.’   
Further evidence suggests additional facility issues, such as early closures of 
facilities, increased costs, the failure to open up educational sites, and competition 
between coalition partners, have also significantly impacted on handball as an indoor 
sport:  
‘[It’s] a challenge to get hold of facilities, get access to facilities, and as an indoor 
sport, we’re fighting with several other sports all for the same space in the sports hall. 
But at the same time, [LAs] closing facilities, the rising cost of access … [and] 
education sites, whether that’s schools, colleges or universities. A lot of them will get 
locked at 3.00, 3.30 or 4.00. That’s it, won’t be open at the weekends, standing 
empty. Facilities that indoor sports could use’ (Interviewee: CEOEH). 
These factors have limited the ability of EH to achieve government objectives and to 
develop their sport, thus demonstrating the impact of other policy subsystems, such 
as Education and Local Government on the sport policy subsystem. That said, 
evidence has shown an ability of EH to adapt to the operational challenges 
emanating from the lack of suitable facilities, through the introduction of various 
adaptations to the sport, including, mini-handball, street-handball, and beach- 
handball (EH, 2012), to make handball ‘accessible to more people’ (EH, 2015a, p.7). 
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6.3.4) Participation 
The focus of EH’s participative strategies has been to develop handball through the 
educational system, as clearly indicated by interviewee CEOEH: 
‘Our focus as an organisation has been on the education sector, growing it in 
schools. Getting young kids playing … is a far more important area for us than trying 
to get more adults to play.’ 
This demonstrates a shared-belief with government/SE, especially as sport in 
education has been a prominent feature of sport policy since Raising the Game 
(1995). The close alignment between SE and EH objectives is clearly reflected in 
EH’s WSP 2013-17 (2012), which emphasised: i) getting more young people into 
handball, through a focus on the educational sector; ii) facilitating a thriving and 
robust handball club infrastructure; and iii) providing increased opportunities for 
competition. Evidence also suggests that handball’s offering of an inclusive, 
adaptable, and flexible sporting solution at every educational setting, aligned very 
closely with Creating a Sporting Habit for Life (2012) and the ‘policy-core beliefs of 
the SE-led coalition. In particular, improving the physical literacy of children at 
primary level, the availability of competition and coaching opportunities at secondary 
and tertiary levels, flexible adaptations of the sport to meet a diverse range of 
facilities, and inclusivity in terms of diversity. This highlights a level of willingness to 
accept the compliance-contractual obligations of government and SE, largely based 
on complementary participation strategies.   
The flexible nature of handball is demonstrated by its ‘Try Handball’ product, which 
was seen as a ‘transportable … fun and engaging version of the sport, without the 
technicalities’, with market appeal (EH, 2016d, p.2), although evidence suggests that 
the level of appeal was less than expected due in the most part to a lack of insight 
and understanding of market demand-led strategies (EH, 2018a), which highlights to 
some extent the difficulties experienced by SMNGBs to interpret sport policy 
expectations and outcomes. Other ‘handball derivatives’ utilised by EH to increase 
less formal participation, included: drop-in-handball; multi-sport activity; mixed- 
gender activity, and beach-, street- and park-handball, all of which were considered 
pragmatic and adaptable approaches to increasing participation within a limited 
facility infrastructure (EH, 2012, pp.24-25).  
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However, EH’s adapted versions of handball, designed to meet government and SE 
stretching policy objectives, were met with criticism from membership, as evidenced 
by interviewee CEOEH’s remarks:  
‘Creating a small-sized version of the game … fits into the environment of schools, 
who have very small facilities. So, when you say to [members] “we’ve got this version 
you can play on a smaller court”, they say “that’s not handball.” [We say] “no, but it’s 
a way in which we can introduce people to the sport that we couldn’t otherwise do”’ 
(Interviewee: CEOEH). 
While this highlights the compliance/autonomy tensions internal to EH and the 
challenges of managing those different interests and expectations, it is possible to 
argue that the use of adapted versions of the sport to increase participation, 
resonates with a degree of enforced alignment with government/SE to meet 
government policy outcomes, since it is unlikely that such a strategy would be 
considered if EH’s concerns were explicitly those of its members. In contrast, EH’s 
club and community programmes underpinned its overall strategic plan for 2013-17, 
by ‘providing and supporting an avenue for participation within the community game 
from initial engagement through to integration into a club environment and, 
ultimately, access to the talent pathway for handball in the England’ (EH, 2012, 
p.24), demonstrating a clear and complementary alignment with the Playground to 
Podium ‘policy-core’ beliefs and objectives of government/SE.   
Furthermore, although the predominant focus of EH is the development of 
community-grassroots sport, into which ‘all [SE funding would] go’ (Meli, CEO of EH, 
cited in HLSCOPL, 2013a, p.205), evidence suggests a growing tension between 
elite and community sport, and a disconnect along the pathway from talent 
development to elite performance, which has the potential to limit the development of 
the elite side of sports such as handball, and hamper any attempts to regain 
membership of the UKS-led coalition. This is best illustrated by EH’s efforts to 
develop its talent pathway through involvement in the National School Games 
competition. Evidence shows a year on year growth for EH within the school 
competition, for example, 25 competing schools in 2010 compared to 1,422 
competing in 2016 (EH, 2016b, 2017b), hence EH’s claim that handball is 
considered a ‘fast-growing sport in schools’ (EH, 2016, p.7). However, the sport’s 
absence from the National School Games is reflective of its status as a non-medal 
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winning sport, rather than its status as a participation sport within the School Games 
competition, which points towards a sport policy subsystem still dominated by elite 
sport and medal priorities, as evidenced by interviewee CEOEH’s statement that:   
‘[EH] made submissions to get into the National School Games, but [SE and UKS] 
are part of that decision-making, [and] suddenly the No Compromise perspective of 
[UKS] rears its head, and we didn’t get in because we’re not a medal potential sport. 
What the heck has that got to do with school games? That’s my question. Why 
should that stop a sport like handball that has seen such a growth in schools be 
prevented from having a seat at the National School Games finals?’  
Arguably, the lack EH/handball’s influence in this regard is also a reflection of the 
means by which it was measured against SE agreed outcomes, where insufficient 
sample sizes for once a month participation figures prevented the use of APS, and  
satellite clubs were not considered formal community clubs, and were therefore not 
included within EH participation figures (EH, 2015d). Thus, signposting the ill-defined 
nature of WSP monitoring system and the means by which participation was 
measured, especially when evidence shows that EH had ‘10 times more clubs in 
education’, yet these were excluded from its membership figures (EH, 2017a, p.4).  
On the other hand, EH’s expansion of its competition structure (see EH, 2016b, 
2017b) aligned closely with the ‘policy-core’ beliefs and ‘secondary-aspects’ of the 
SE-led coalition, in the provision of accessible, modern, sports club structures to 
drive up participation (SE, 2008). However, evidence indicates that SE’s criteria for 
club accreditation (EH, 2016h) impacted negatively on membership and club 
development, creating further tensions between EH and its membership, as 
interviewee CEOEH explained: 
‘[H]aving to put on [clubs] things like safeguarding, governance, financial standing, 
and the governance code goes down to that level as well, they don’t get it. We’ve had 
some people walk away, [and] there are some people within our membership who 
feel purely that the [NGB] should just be giving them money to function.’  
Illustrating further the observable compliance versus autonomy dichotomy within EH, 
and the challenges associated with managing the differing needs of government/SE 
and members, particularly in the face of an enforced alignment with ‘policy-core’ 
beliefs, in this case the requirement for SE club accreditations.  
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6.3.5) Partnerships 
The strategic approach of EH to increasing participation and sport development has 
been partnership-based, primarily with coalition partners, which demonstrates a 
shared-belief with the government/SE on the merits of collaboration as a tool for 
achieving policy outcomes on the basis of mutually beneficial interdependencies. 
Indeed, evidence suggests that partnership-working is of greater importance to 
smaller, less well-resourced NGBs, where partners are not just viewed as deliverers 
of the sport, but also advocates for the sport and a means of gaining a competitive 
advantage, as purported within EH Board minutes:    
‘[a partnership approach is] more problematic [for other NGBs], especially those with 
a big inflexible infrastructure. This would be less of a challenge for [EH] … , 
[particularly as it had] started that transition, working with local partners, and 
developing more delivery arms with leisure providers, local authorities, … in 
comparison with many other [NGBs]’ (EH, 2016d, p.2). 
According to EH’s Annual Report 2016-17 (EH, 2017b, p.2), partnership-working 
offered a myriad of opportunities for achieving more than they can could otherwise 
do in isolation, for example, building capacity to support handball ‘delivery on the 
ground’, individual club growth, and fostering and strengthening of local relationships 
to entice greater investment (EH, 2013b; EH, 2015a). It is also claimed within EH’s 
2017-21 Strategic Plan (2017g, p.2) that partnership-working is ‘the most effective 
route to achieve success’, and that collaboration with specialised partners has 
allowed EH to identify pockets of interest and demand, examples of which are 
StreetGames, Livewire (providing handball as extra-curriculum activity for after-
school clubs) (EH, 2015d), and the Corporate Games (EH, 2015c; EH, 2015b). The 
idea, as explained by interviewee CEOEH, being to ‘shoehorn yourself in’ to new 
partners and niche markets by offering and delivering ‘something simple.’  
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As illustrated above the key coalition partners of EH have been predominantly 
community-social-centric organisations, and also include CSPs, and educational 
establishments, largely based on the shared-belief on the power of sport for ‘social 
good’ (e.g. CSPs and StreetGames), thus demonstrating a fundamental assumption 
of the ACF that policy actors seek out other actors with matching beliefs28. While  
evidence suggests that CSPs have had less scope for influencing policy as their own 
activities have been ‘constrained by the micro-management’ of SE (Phillpots et al., 
2011, p.279), StreetGames’ capacity to influence has been strengthened through the 
proactive use of political resources to seize every opportunity to promote their belief 
of Doorstep Sport in the policy-making process (e.g. submission of papers to 
consultations, provision of written and spoken evidence to Parliamentary Inquires, 
and attendance on working parties or scrutiny committees within local authorities). 
Similar political resources have been utilised by EH (e.g. consultations, 
Parliamentary Inquiries, and working parties), although there has clearly been less 
impact, which arguably reflects their constrained capacity to influence policy resulting 
from the degree to which the SMNGB is tied to SE policy, similar to CSPs.  
By contrast, StreetGames’ advocacy is not limited to sports policy, as can be seen 
by its involvement in health policy initiatives, thus demonstrating the potential for 
sports organisations to cross the boundaries of different policy subsystems. 
StreetGames (n.d.) also consider NGBs to be ‘important social institutions’, a role 
that EH has some repertoire towards, but as a facilitator, rather than a deliverer:  
‘We are a social institution, but actually partners like StreetGames, provide our social 
institution, on our behalf. We’re an education institution, but actually it’s our working 
partnerships with schools, colleges and universities that make us an educational 
institution. Not solely us, but the partners that we work with provide that element’ 
(Interviewee: CEOEH). 
This does, however, draw attention to a potential issue for SMNGBs in terms of 
organisational-identity, particularly as they have clearly been shaped by 
government/SE to have far broader responsibilities than their traditionalist roots, yet 
as it evident with EH, the belief remains that they are and always will be a 
membership-body, whose purpose is to serve its members. 
                                                          
28
 See Appendix XII for examples of coalition partner beliefs, alignment and advocacy. 
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6.4) Conclusion 
The case of EH/handball has provided a number of significant findings in relation to 
the aims and objectives of this research. Evidence suggests that the UK sport policy 
subsystem has experienced three significant external shocks, which have impacted 
on the sport policy domain, and shaped the sporting landscape over the past 20 
years, namely: i) the increase and subsequent decrease in Lottery funding; ii) 
London’s successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games, which acted as a catalyst 
for a NGB-focused approach to delivering government aims and objectives; and iii) 
changes to LA leisure services, particularly in terms of reduced availability of sports 
facilities and the limited capacity of LAs to provide delivery services at the 
developmental level, which have restricted the impact of NGBs as deliverers of sport.  
It is evident that changes in sport policy have impacted on NGBs, such as EH, 
through high levels of resource-dependency, compliance requirements, performance 
regimes, and fear of financial sanctions. The result of which has been a loss of 
autonomy owing to the increasing level of governmental influence over operational 
and financial activities, and the emergence of an observable compliance versus 
autonomy tension. In short, EH has accepted compliance and financial rewards over 
membership interests, and resource-dependency over autonomy. The vulnerability of 
EH to resource-dependency has been exacerbated further by its limited ability to 
generate income, partly due to the concern that increasing membership fees would 
decrease membership and increase membership expectations, and partly due to the 
difficulty in attracting sponsors without an elite level national team.  
Organisationally, EH has been progressive, arguably the result of its willingness to 
take advantage of opportunities provided by SE and its status as an evolving NGB. 
With no long established and national regional structure, the NGB has had fewer 
problems in adapting to change. Evidence suggests that EH’s strategic alignment 
and compliance with government/SE policy is largely attributable to complementary 
‘core’ beliefs, underpinned by a culture of opportunism, pragmatism, and facilitation 
through partnerships, to develop handball and meet government/SE aims and 
objectives. Indeed, partnership-working has greater significance to smaller, less-
resourced NGBs, where partners are seen not just as deliverers, but also advocates 
of the sport, providing SMNGBs with a potential competitive advantage. Evidence 
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also suggests that EH has demonstrated a willingness to align itself with 
government/SE to maintain its membership of the SE-led coalition, which has 
arguably resulted from skillful leadership on the part of EH’s CEO, formerly 
employed by SE, and willingness on the part of EH to accept the compliance-
contractual nature of the SE-led coalition. The clearest example of this alignment is 
EH’s focus on the community-grassroots sport in the educational sector, rather than 
the elite end of the sporting spectrum, where policy objectives overlap and are seen 
as complementary.       
Evidence also shows that governmental relationships, more so with SE than UKS, 
have shaped the very nature of a modern NGBs, despite the fact that EH views SE 
as a financial partner and still regards itself as an autonomous membership 
organisation. However, this has created organisational-identity issues and less clarity 
of purpose. The shift away from a NGB-centric approach to increasing participation, 
has also exposed NGBs’ reliance on public subsidies and a possible lack of 
understanding of the policy environment. Arguably, this has resulted not only from 
NGBs’ concerns for development and self-preservation, but also from misguided 
sport policies that gave greater emphasis to inter-NGB competition than to collective 
action, as a means to achieve policy aims and objectives.  
EH is identifiable as primarily a ‘policy taker’, there being no significant evidence of 
influencing sport policy, but rather an unopposed acceptance of policy change and 
willingness to adapt to change, to preserve its membership of the SE-led coalition. 
However, it is also argued that while SMNGBs operating within the sport policy 
domain are considered to be predominantly ‘policy takers’ rather than ‘policy 
shapers’, the absence of opposition to policy change or lobbying of government/SE 
to influence policy, is attributable to either: a) a high level of content with the trade-off 
between autonomy and funding, and a willingness among SMNGBs to accept 
compliance over autonomy in return for financial resources, to ensure self-
preservation and support self-development; or b) the existence of complementary 
‘core’ beliefs and objectives.  
Evidence also highlighted EH’s potential use of political resources to raise the 
awareness and profile of handball, as characterised by the ACF, which could 
arguably be considered a strategic attempt to influence the ‘secondary-aspects’ of 
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the sport policy subsystem, such as the allocation of funds (e.g. the Parliamentary 
Fellowship scheme, skillful leadership and lobbying via the HLSCOPL). Of potential 
significance is EH’s membership of the NGBCEOF, which could arguably be 
described as a ‘professional fora’ in line with ACF assumptions, whose aim is to 
translate NGB shared-beliefs into authoritative policy decisions through collective 
action, thus highlighting the emergence of a coalition of SMNGBs. Equally, evidence 
suggests the emergence of a minority coalition of competitive but not elite NGBs (the 
‘have-nots’), nested within the UKS-led coalition, within which EH is a member, the 
aim being to influence sport policy at an elite level through collective action, by 
exploiting potential ‘deep-core beliefs’, such as the ‘role model’ effect, to influence 
changes in ‘policy-core’ beliefs of government/UKS-led coalition. However, at the 
time of writing both these initiatives offered potential rather than evidence of any 
meaningful external influence on policy. 
With regard to the utility of the ACF, evidence shows that within the UK sport policy 
subsystem, agency-led coalitions are shaped, to a larger extent, by shared-beliefs, 
however, contract-compliance, financial incentives and sanctions, shared-interests, 
interdependencies, and symbiotic relationships, have also been identified as 
constituent parts of coalition membership. Evidence also highlights the potential for 
agency-led coalitions and coalition members to overlap with different coalitions and 
policy subsystems. In particular, evidence shows an increasing interest from NGBs 
to cross subsystem boundaries, since there are few policy areas in which sport 
would not have an impact. While evidence has shown that the ACF assumptions of 
external shocks provide a valid theoretical explanation of major policy change (e.g. 
the successful bid to host the 2012 Olympics and the Lottery), it is also argued that 
external perturbations can occur at the ‘touch points’ where policy subsystems 
overlap, for example, educational and LA policies. Evidence also demonstrates a 
fundamental assumption of the ACF that policy actors seek out other actors with 
shared-beliefs, as seen by the collaboration between EH and coalition partners, as 
well as highlighting the existence of differing beliefs within agency-led coalitions, and 
actionable policy consequences through shared-interests, particularly the financial 
incentives and sanctions linked to the contractual obligations of agency-led coalition 
membership and policy outcomes. The complexity and nature of coalitions is further 
characterised by internal conflicts, for example, the dichotomies that exist within 
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NGBs such as the compliance/autonomy and elite/community sport, which impact on 
the NGBs’ overriding purpose to safeguard self-preservation, yet this appears to be 
overlooked by the ACF. Such evidence highlights a potential weakness in the ACF’s 
concept of shared-beliefs, and also the potential for ‘interior coalitions’ (e.g. 
compliance coalitions and autonomy coalitions) to exist. This is illustrated by 
evidence of the presence of powerful groups within the sport of handball (the ‘Blazer 
Brigade’), which is likely to be the case in other sports. This would suggest that not 
only do agency-led coalitions have many layers, but can also have coalitions nested 
within them, and as such illuminates the potential ambiguity of the concept of 
coalitions within the ACF.  
The notion of power and its operationalisation within the sport policy subsystem has 
a strong association with Lukes’ three dimensions of power. Adherence to 
government/SE governance protocols (Mandatory Code of Governance for Sport), 
where compliance is often contrary to beliefs, and the use of financial inducements 
and sanctions to ensure compliance illustrates the first dimension. The No 
Compromise principle as a notable restriction to membership of the UKS-led 
coalition, is illustrative of characteristics of the second dimension of power, 
particularly the erection of barriers to limit agency debate on elite sport policy. The 
provision of additional funding resources to some SMNGBs to develop their elite 
potential elite level divided the SMNGB group, and thus enabled UKS to retain 
control of the elite sport policy agenda and, as such, is an example of Lukes’ second 
dimension of power. The shaping of preferences of NGBs by government/SE, reform 
and modernisation, a lessening of autonomy, and conflicting SMNGB interests are 
arguably characteristics of Lukes’ third dimension. The use of self-assessments 
would also suggest power through self-disciplining, associated with Foucault’s 
panoptical surveillance, and the automation of power through self-disciplining, as will 
be the case for all publicly funded NGBs.  
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Chapter Seven 
Volleyball England 
 
7.1) Introduction 
This chapter represents the empirical findings in relation to the case of Volleyball 
England (VE), the NGB of volleyball in England, in line with the research aims and 
objectives of this study, which have also guided the structure of this chapter. 
Following an introductory contextual profile of VE, a detailed analysis and discussion 
is provided on the development of VE’s governmental relationships, and the 
operational impacts and approaches to changing sport policy, aligned to the specific 
themes identified within the methodology chapter as mechanisms for delivering 
desired sport policy outcomes and determinants relevant to policy shaping or taking.  
Threaded throughout this empirical chapter are relevant links and discussions that 
reflect the nature of power and the utility of the ACF. The concluding section 
summarises the key findings of this case study on VE, in particular, VE’s resistance 
to change, misplaced exuberance and confidence, and the prioritisation of elite over 
community-participation objectives, the use of sport policy largely to self-develop, 
enforced realignments with the ‘core beliefs’ of government and the resultant 
acceptance of its contractual obligations, and its positioning as primarily a ‘policy 
taker’, but due to imposition of policy rather than shared beliefs or complementary 
alignments. 
VE was established as a result of the disbanding in 1968 of its predecessor, the 
Amateur Volleyball Association of Great Britain and Ireland, essentially a ‘one-man, 
top-down creation’ that had not resulted from a ‘club-driven, bottom-up drive for 
unification’ (Girginov and Hills, 2008, p.2104). It is evident that during the 1990s, VE 
had faced a number of difficult challenges, whereby the organisation was ‘virtually 
insolvent, declared by [SE] as being not [fit-for-purpose], and riven with discord … 
misplaced exuberance …and … profligacy’ (Ojasoo, outgoing CEO of VE, cited in 
Volleyball England [VE], 2008a, p.6). Evidence suggests that over the past decade, 
VE/volleyball has seen a steady decline in its development, arguably the result of a 
high level of inertia and conservatism. As noted by one Board member at the 2014 
AGM (VE, 2014d): 
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‘I’ve been in the game since 1966 and we still have the same structure. A club and a 
region, and a HQ national body. We haven’t moved to make it work holistically. 
We’ve done the structure of the board, the structure of HQ, but we haven’t done 
anything about the structure of the game.’  
The lack of development can be seen by the decrease in SE funding from £5.1m 
(2013-17) to £421,520 (2017-21) (SE, 2017b; see Appendix IV), the significant 
decline in affiliated clubs from 1,366 in 2008 (Girginov and Hills, 2008, p.2104) to 
449 in 2017 (VE, 2017a, p.9), and decreasing levels of participation as indicated by 
the reduction in APS participation figures from 68,500 in APS1 (2006) to 59,200 in 
APS10 (2016) (see Appendix V). The impact of the spiralling decline of volleyball 
precipitating a period of organisational chaos for VE, as seen from the comments 
made by interviewee CEOVE29:  
‘there was an implosion within volleyball, the senior management team all left en 
masse, … half the board left, [and] the whole business was days, weeks, months 
from being declared bankrupt and going into liquidation.’  
According to VE’s Annual Report 2017-18 (2018), the current landscape of volleyball 
in England, includes inter alia: 
 406 affiliated clubs, 583 coaches, 647 referees; 
 79 satellite clubs - 3632 young participants; 
 75 Higher Education Volleyball Officers (HEVOs);  
 60 Universities engaged in the HEVO Programme – over 6,000 student 
participants; 
 PE curriculum delivery within multi-sports offerings to 15,000 primary schools; 
 Regional structure incorporating 9 regions. 
 
Volleyball was awarded elite funding from UKS to the value of £7.6m across the 
Beijing 2008 and London 2012 Olympic funding cycles30, to perform credibly at the 
London 2012 Olympic Games, while specifically targeting a medal in beach 
volleyball (British Volleyball Federation31 [BVF], 2009, p.2). However, UKS funding 
                                                          
29
 References to interviewee CEOVE relate to an interview dated 14
th
 August 2018. 
30
 UKS’s historical funding data is available online from: http://www.uksport.gov.uk/our-work/investing-in-sport/historical-
funding-figures 
31
 British Volleyball Federation (BVF), established in 2008, is the responsible governing body for elite performance in volleyball. 
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was dramatically reduced to £400,000 following a less than credible performance at 
the Home Olympics (BBC Sport, 2012), and funding withdrawn in full in December 
2013 (UKS, 2014), due to athlete retirements (VE, 2013d), the latter primarily due to 
the sports financial situation (BBC Sport, 2013). 
 
7.2) Development of governmental relationships 
It is evident that during the 1980s and early 1990s, SC viewed volleyball as an 
emerging sport, whose vision aligned with Sport for All’s twin focus on mass 
participation and high performance, the result of which was volleyball’s inclusion as 
one of the few sports within SC’s 1988 strategy of a ‘Concentration of Resources’ to 
meet SC-led policy objectives (Sports Council, 1988). This indicates an early 
commitment from VE to collaborate with SC on the basis of shared-interests, and 
interdependencies in terms of resources.  
Following the restructure of SC in 1997, volleyball/VE was seen as a developing 
sport/SMNGB (SE, 2004a), whose initial 2005-09 WSP, according to VE’s Annual 
Report 2008-09 (2009a, p.vi), was considered by SE to be ‘very robust, [and] 
evidence based.’ VE shared the ‘policy-core’ beliefs of government and SE within the 
Playing to Win (2008) policy for sport, whereby sport should be the domain of 
sporting experts, and that policy objectives to increase participation should be 
embedded within a NGB-focused approach to achieving policy outcomes. As noted 
within VE’s Annual Report 2007-08 (VE, 2008a, p.8), NGBs ‘[had taken] their rightful 
place as the major driving force for sport in England’, and that VE could play a 
‘significant’ supporting role in the delivery of SE’s strategy for increasing 
participation, within an operational environment that offered ‘greater autonomy’ for 
NGBs (VE, 2008a, pp.7-8). While this suggests a continuation of the exuberance 
referred to above, and arguably an ‘air of cockiness’, considering VE/volleyball’s 
development status, it also points towards a degree of naivety in the understanding 
of the potential implications for VE in partnering government/SE, which would 
inevitably be a lessening of their autonomy through a process of modernisation and 
reform, the latter having laid the foundations for VE’s WSP for the 2005-09 SE 
funding cycle. 
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Modernisation for VE included the development of ‘a professional infrastructure, 
good corporate governance, [and] opportunities for new resources’, and the 
appointment of the former Head of Sport at SE (2006-2008) as CEO (from 2008-
2016) (VE, 2008a, pp.14-16). Arguably, the appointed CEO could be considered a 
strategic decision on the part of VE to benefit from the knowledge, experience and 
potential influence of a previous authoritative member of a governmental agency, 
particularly to provide evidence of VE’s commitment to SE beliefs and policies. An 
illustration of the connection between the CEO of VE and SE can be seen by VE’s 
increased SE investment award of £5.6m for the 2009-13 funding cycle (an increase 
of 161%) (VE, 2009a, p.vi), and it’s prioritisation of the player pathway, and 
development and integration of infrastructure to maximise the potential of the 
‘beginner’ to ‘Olympic representation’ (VE, 2009b, p.8). This indicates a clear and 
complementary alignment with government and SE’s Playground to Podium ‘policy-
core’ belief, and the unopposed acceptance of the contractual-compliance 
obligations of the SE-led coalition, VE having acknowledged that, organisationally, it 
was ‘driven’ by its WSP and shared government’s ambition ‘to become a truly world 
leading sporting nation capitalising on the 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic 
Games’ (VE, 2008a, pp.4-5). Thus, signposting the significance of shared-beliefs, 
interests and objectives as instruments of coalition membership, as well as 
identifying VE as a ‘policy taker’, either on the basis of an unopposed willingness to 
accept policy change for the purpose of self-preservation and development, or the 
existence of overlapping ‘core’ beliefs and complementary objectives.  
Further evidence also revealed that while London’s winning bid to host the 2012 
Olympics acted as an external perturbation to stimulate policy change in 2008, the 
implications of policy change for NGBs were less understood, where enthusiasm 
outweighed any notion of what would be required of them, as observed by 
interviewee CEOVE: 
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‘What engaged the government was 2012. I can remember that day when they 
announced that we’d got the London 2012. I was at Bisham Abbey, and the England 
rowing team were training, and a lot of champagne flowed on that day. But I don’t 
think people understood the implications of that, and the resource that we’d need to 
be able to deliver on that.’ 
The exuberance and over-optimism of VE is further demonstrated within VE’s Annual 
Report 2007-08 (2008a, p.8), the SMNGB having claimed that the focus, beliefs, 
products and resources of volleyball placed them in a ‘position of strength’ above 
those sports focused on the ‘pursuit of high profile events and big money 
sponsorship.’  
In contrast, however, VE’s 2013-17 WSP was more realistic than over-optimistic, 
there being a greater focus towards more manageable key areas and specific target 
groups, such as women and girls, which was now considered a ‘fundamental step’ 
forward to increasing participation’ (VE, 2013e, p.6), and thus provides an illustration 
of the impact of policy compliance to government’s shifting priorities in 2012. 
However, while VE’s 2013-17 investment strategy also targeted the early stages of 
the talent pathway within an intended ‘bottom-up’ approach (VE, 2013e, pp.4-5), and 
closely aligned to SE-objectives to increase 14-plus participation32, which also 
mirrored VE’s core market of 12 to 27 (Girginov and Hills, 2008), the SMNGB’s 
ultimate aim was to build ‘strong foundations on which to construct a World class 
system capable of delivering future World class players’ (VE, 2013e, pp.4-5).  
More significantly, VE had developed its own distinct vision for volleyball within its 
Strategy 2024 document (published in 2014), to run alongside its 2013-17 WSP for 
SE. Evidence has revealed that this resulted from VE’s re-assessment of its 
relationship with government and SE, owing to the increasing ‘loss of autonomy’, and 
the inability to develop volleyball outside of the government/SE policy framework, the 
latter resonating with Lukes’ third dimension of power by shaping preferences. As 
noted by one Board member at the 2014 AGM:  
                                                          
32
 See SE’s NGB National Priorities online data for 2013-17 WSPs for further information on volleyball’s alignment with SE 
policy and objectives: Available online from: https://www.sportengland.org/media/10084/20130920-ngb-priorities-spreadsheet-
final.xls 
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‘We are driven by [SE] and the [WSP], as we were in previous plans. It’s understandable. 
They are paying. But if we were to have a free choice, with the same amount of money, 
“how would we spend it?” Probably not in that way’ (VE, 2014d). 
A key aim of Strategy 2024 (VE, 2014b, p.38) was ‘less reliance on [SE] funding so 
that volleyball was ‘more in control of its own destiny.’ Furthermore, despite a 
request from SE to focus on the five outcomes of Sporting Future, the belief within 
VE was to ‘stay true’ to its own strategic plan (Wainwright, CEO of VE, cited in VE, 
2016b, p.2), thus signalling a degree of tension between VE and SE, as well as 
drawing attention to the problematic management of differing interests within 
SMNGBs. The strain on relationships arguably stemmed from VE’s greater focus on 
the talent pathway and elite performance, rather than on increasing participation, as 
noted by Nicholls (2017) in an online news article, ‘[i]n the past, [VE] has focused on 
the elite end of the volleyball market.’ This suggests a greater alignment towards the 
UKS-led coalition, from which it had been ejected, rather than the SE-led coalition 
from whom it received its funding. It is therefore not surprising that VE’s pursuit of its 
own vision for volleyball, its focus on the elite rather than community-grassroots 
sport, and by implication, VE’s refusal to play by the rules of game as expected of 
SE-led coalition members, elicited a critical response from SE in the form of punitive 
financial sanctions against VE, and a huge reduction in funding for the 2017-21 
funding cycle. In support of this claim, it is evident from VE Board minutes (VE, 
2017d, p.5) that to maintain its relationship with SE and membership of the SE-led 
coalition, VE would need to put ‘mechanisms in place to fulfil all [SE] requirements to 
become an organisation worth investing funding in’, emphasising further the 
compliance-contractual and punitive nature of the SE-led coalition. 
Given the beliefs of VE regarding greater independence from government/SE, VE’s 
participation in the NGBCEOF to articulate ‘a collective view of the value of NGBs of 
Sport to the Government’ (VE, 2014c, p.3), while seemingly out of place, is arguably 
related to its peripheral status within the SE-led coalition, and its weakness as sport 
in gaining access to policy venues on its own. Although, VE’s involvement in 
collective action to promote SMNGB shared-beliefs, supports the claim for the 
potential emergence of a coalition of SMNGBs, nested within the SE-led coalition. 
However, the level of collective influence will be dependent on whether their voices 
are strong enough to encourage policy change, as noted by interviewee CEOVE: 
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‘You have to be honest we’re bit players really, in the bigger picture. If you looked at 
us, lacrosse, badminton, individually, you’d go so what, but collectively there’s 18 
sports. … We definitely make a difference. But whether [government/UKS/SE] care 
enough about us to do anything, I don’t know.’  
Of significance here, however, is further evidence illustrating the extent of 
government control within the sport policy subsystem, and the impact of pressure to 
meet shifting government objectives (VE, 2018a), moving from government, to SE 
and on to the NGBs, down the spine of accountability, as explained by interviewee 
CEOVE:   
‘I don’t think people realise [SE] have the same pressure on them as we have on 
us … [SE] are dictated to by the government, by DCMS, in that this is the direction of 
travel for you. … It’s about control; it’s about who does what and who has the 
authority to do what.’  
This supports the claim that the UK sport policy subsystem and agency-led sporting 
coalitions have been constructed and substantially shaped by government to 
implement policy and deliver on shifting policy agendas, priorities and outcomes, 
predominantly through compliance, financial inducements and sanctions. Thus, 
highlighting power as visible and measured in line with Lukes’ first dimension.  
Evidence also indicates that sport and physical activity has the potential to sit across 
a whole raft of political agendas, highlighting the potential for the sport policy 
subsystem and policy actors to cross the boundaries of different policy subsystems, 
the extent to which is predominantly government-driven: 
‘The word active sits across all sorts of agendas. So, it’s about social isolation, it’s 
about obesity, all sorts of things … More and more that’s the direction sport’s taking. 
We’re being driven because of the funding; we’re being driven down that path’ 
(Interviewee: CEOVE). 
This suggests that the resource-dependency of SMNGBs enforces policy 
acceptance and denies policy opposition, as evidenced by VE’s acceptance of policy 
change within Sporting Future (2015), which validates VE’s position as primarily a 
‘policy taker’, although for reasons of self-preservation rather than complementary 
‘core’ beliefs or policy objectives:   
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‘Our funding is about our core market. [SE] want us to maintain our 22,000 people 
that we know are playing volleyball … We don’t have to get anymore, but we have to 
maintain what we’ve got … So, if that’s all they want us to do then that’s fine’ 
(Interviewee: CEOVE). 
Arguably, resource-dependency also acts as a barrier to limit the scope for policy 
change, and the closer involvement of policy actors, such as SMNGBs, in policy 
decision-making, which is characteristic of Lukes’ second dimension of power.     
As clearly demonstrated above, VE has consistently placed elite aspirations and 
development above those of participation, and unsurprisingly, volleyball has 
‘collectively lobb[ied] the government promoting the importance of team sports for 
society’, under the banner of Every Sport Matters, in order to ‘influence their funding 
policy for the performance aspect of team sports’ (BVF, 2014, pp.2-3). This has 
drawn attention to the funding gap that exists between the talent pathway and elite 
performance within SMNGBs, which has the potential to not only undermine SMNGB 
development and progress onto the international stage, but also their very existence. 
As noted by Richard Callicot, Board member for both BVF and VE, within his 
evidence to the HLSCOPL in 2013 (cited in HLSCOPL, 2013a, p.57):     
‘there is a major problem with the no-compromise approach … There is a disconnect 
between the home countries’ sports councils’ investment strategies of increasing 
participation and identifying talent, and [UKS] funding from this level. There is a 
gap …, because there is nowhere to go and there is nobody prepared to fund it, … 
[and] unless investment is put into that funding gap … a lot of sports will not exist.’  
The above evidence supports the emergence of a coalition of unfunded/elitist-
competitive sports (the ‘have nots’), nested within the UKS-led coalition, wherein 
there has been some progress towards the promotion of unfunded-SMNGB beliefs at 
a governmental level, to influence the ‘policy-core’ beliefs of the UKS-led coalition. 
Evidence indicates that government has recognised the concerns over the 
disconnect between the talent pathway and elite performance, which has prompted a 
minor change in the ‘secondary-aspects’ of elite sport policy by way of a new 
‘Aspirational Fund’, aligned to the Tokyo 2020 funding cycle:  
  
165 
 
‘[T]here’s this new Aspirational Fund for sports to bid into for Tokyo 2020 cycle … 
that haven’t been able to access World Class programme funding … There is a 
recognition there that a number of sports have lost out …, and [although only] 
modest amounts of funding … [it] still allows them an opportunity to get something 
together’ (Interviewee: DCMSb).    
Volleyball has subsequently been a beneficiary of the new ‘Aspirational Fund’, albeit 
a relatively small award of £68,750 for beach volleyball (UKS, 2018). Arguably 
though, funding is still weighted heavily towards those sports or sporting disciplines 
with medal potential, indoor volleyball having been excluded. This would suggest a 
continuation of the No Compromise principle and the use of the ‘Aspirational Fund’ 
as a means to remove the threat of a potential minority coalition from being formed 
and challenging the dominance of the UKS-led coalition. 
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7.3) Operational impacts and approaches to changing sport policy 
7.3.1) Governance 
According to VE’s Annual Report 2010-11 (2011a), appropriate high standards of 
governance were essential, to meet the increasing levels of scrutiny and challenge 
upon those NGBs in receipt of public funding (VE, 2010), VE’s initial compliance with 
governance reform reflected in its acceptance of the Voluntary Code of Good 
Governance (VE, 2011b). While this suggests a shared-belief with government/SE, 
VE’s compliance with governance protocols points towards an enforced alignment, 
rather than a complementary alignment of ‘policy-core’ beliefs, signalling VE as a 
SMNGB accepting compliance with government/SE’s modernising agenda out of 
necessity, as opposed to having a genuine regard for organisational development 
and improved professionalism.  
Of particular note, is VE’s assertion that its governance principles were ‘solid and … 
ahead of many other sports’ (VE, 2011b, p.5), which further illustrates VE’s overly 
confident view of itself, particularly as there is clear evidence of conflict between 
VE’s Board and Senior Management Team (SMT), which emanated from various 
internal issues, including the submission of VE’s 2013-17 WSP by the SMT without 
prior Board approval (VE, 2012b). According to VE Board minutes (VE, 2012b, p.4), 
there was ‘a lack of consultation and a feeling that the professional staff do not value 
the Directors.’ To elaborate further on this point, interviewee CEOVE commented:   
‘It’s always this kind of dilemma with people who are volunteers within structures, but 
[the Board] felt they knew the direction the sport should be going in, and from the 
Chief Exec and the [SMT], they felt they had the knowledge and the understanding of 
where the sport should be going, and it didn’t quite run parallel.’  
This highlights the difficulties experienced by SMNGBs to ‘transition from volunteer-
delivered amateur sport to professionally managed and delivered sport supported by 
volunteers’, as described by Shilbury et al. (2013, p. 353). Evidence also revealed a 
growing tension between compliance/economic interests and autonomy/membership 
interests, illustrating the extent to which SMNGBs are pulled in different directions, 
and the challenges faced in managing the needs of VE’s most prominent 
stakeholders, SE and members, which reflects the critique of the ACF’s concept of 
shared-beliefs and its neglect of internal tensions within coalition members:     
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‘[it is difficult] to balance the requirements in NGBs of providing a professional 
approach to funding partners, in providing assurances on the use of public funds, 
whilst also balancing this with the requirements of members’ (Wainwright, CEO of 
VE, cited in VE, 2015d, p.3). 
According to Clarkson (1995), organisations that fail to sufficiently satisfy the needs 
of those stakeholders whose continued participation is essential for survival, are 
unlikely to succeed in the long-term. In this respect, evidence suggests that VE’s 
approach to balancing the divergent and conflicting interests of government/SE and 
its members, was aspirational rather than attainable and added to, rather than 
lessened, the high level of discord and organisational chaos within VE. As noted by 
interviewee CEOVE:  
‘What the previous administration [was] doing [was] pandering to people’s ideals 
rather than saying that’s not a reality, we can’t do that.’  
Internal tension within VE is exemplified further by the issue of individual 
membership, and the proposed mandatory registration for regular regional and local 
league players. From VE Board minutes, evidence indicated that concerns were 
raised over reports that the SMT ‘had actively canvassed against the Individual 
Registration proposals when as a collective it had been agreed to support them’ (VE, 
2014c, p.3), the resolution having been rejected by membership (53 votes for and 73 
votes against) (VE, 2014d), as had been the case on two previous occasions 
(Interviewee: CEOVE). The above evidence provides a strong illustration of the 
tenuous relationship and disparity in beliefs between the SMT and VE membership, 
and the infighting and lack of collaboration between the Board and the SMT, 
influenced, in the most part, by VE’s inertia and ultimately its relationship with SE. As 
Nicholls (2017), Acting President of VE, asserted:  
‘[The Board] allowed the [SMT] to dictate strategy and to frustrate [the Board’s] 
attempts to check and challenge the administration … When we parted company with 
the former SMT, [SE] put us in special measures. Urgent action needed to be taken 
by the Board to enable them to continue funding us.’  
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VE’s weakened position was also the result of a less than transparent Executive 
administration, particularly in terms of its financial management of the SMNGB and 
the greater emphasis placed on elite sport, which elicited further trigger points for the 
organisational collapse and the removal of VE’s Board and SMT, as evidenced by 
the candid remarks of interviewee CEOVE:    
‘The previous administration weren’t open and transparent about what they did with 
the funding that we were getting. [It] wasn’t listening to its membership … The 
direction it was heading in was about elite sport, … and what our members really 
wanted was more grassroots development, and support for clubs. [But] we were 
throwing money at our national teams … [even though] we’d never qualify for the 
Olympics. It just didn’t make any sense, and I think that was the final part that caused 
the members to rally against the management and the Board.’ 
Arguably, the growing disconnect between VE and its members is reflective of VE’s 
preference to be a central rather than devolved SMNGB, particularly as further 
evidence suggests that VE had lost sight of its purpose to serve and support the 
membership, as amply explained by the Acting President of VE within VE’s Annual 
Report 2016-17: 
‘There is no doubt this has been a challenging time for [VE] … In recent times, it 
became clear to us that [VE] needed a new culture; one that could see it working in 
partnership with members rather than trying to control the sport from the centre … 
We lost touch with our members and became remote by centralising much of the 
decision-making and resources’ (cited in VE, 2017a, p.2). 
It is clear from the above discussions that organisationally, VE’s progression has 
been limited by long periods of inertia and conservatism, which is further 
demonstrated by VE’s self-proclamation to adopt ‘long overdue reforms’ to 
organisational governance (VE, 2017e), and that a ‘considerable amount’ of work 
was required to comply with the new mandatory code of sports governance (VE, 
2016c, p.4). However, evidence also indicates the continuing existence of actors 
within VE coalescing around the belief that the future of volleyball was in the ‘hands 
of the membership’ (Nicholls, 2017), and those of the firm belief that ‘if your 
governance doesn’t meet the standards [SE] require, you shouldn’t get funded’ 
(Interviewee: CEOVE). Again, this emphasises the dichotomy that exists between 
those favouring compliance with SE’s governance protocols to preserve the NGB’s 
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economic interests, and those firmly committed to the preservation of NGB 
autonomy and the protection of membership interests, as well as highlighting the 
continued struggles within SMNGBs to manage such tensions.  
However, evidence has shown that VE placed greater importance on SE funding and 
governance compliance, although clearly limited to self-preservation, VE having 
admitted to SE in 2016 that the organisation was experiencing significant problems, 
the result of which was enforced intervention from SE and a conditional directive to 
invoke immediate changes to the Board, as seen from interviewee CEOVE’s open 
account of the problems:  
‘We whistle-blew on this organisation to [SE], which is why we’re in this special 
measure position. For us to get into the position we were in, the Board weren’t paying 
enough due diligence to what was going on in the organisation. It was the Board’s 
fault that it all collapsed …The first thing [SE] said to me when I came in, was get rid 
of the Chairman. We’re not going to fund you unless your Chairman’s gone’ 
(Interviewee: CEOVE). 
On the one hand, the forceful intervention by SE and VE’s willingness to comply is 
an example of Lukes’ first dimension of power; while on the other hand, the 
regulatory nature of compliance with the mandatory code of governance is illustrative 
of Lukes’ third dimension of power, particularly by redefining the parameters of 
debate. Indeed, evidence indicates that governance legislation has required VE 
(2018a, p.4) to ‘totally redefine and reshape’ how it operates as an organisation, and 
that while being ‘so dependent on [SE] funding, [VE] will be in a cycle of change, 
depending on [SE] priorities and political direction of travel’ (VE, 2018a, p.5). This 
statement illuminates the extent to which government and SE have shaped VE, 
minimised its manoeuvrability, and constructed its position as primarily a ‘policy 
taker’ to satisfy government preferences and delivery outcomes. Yet, evidence 
suggests that VE still aspires to become the master of its own destiny, but have 
acknowledged that this will only be achieved by being responsive to change: 
‘[VE] is committed to listening to members and making sure that their priorities are 
delivered. It is the goal for volleyball to develop commercially and be more self-
sustaining, but … [w]e need to understand that to build a sustainable organisation we 
must take control of our own destiny, we need to keep evolving’ (CEOVE, cited in 
VE, 2018a, pp.6-7). 
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7.3.2) Funding 
VE has been the recipient of government grant-aid since the 1980s, including 
funding awards of £1.4m between 1998 and 200533 (predominantly for development 
and elite performance), and a further £1.32m for the 2005-0934 SE funding cycle, 
weighted towards modernisation and reform to ensure a ‘fit-for-purpose’ status to 
receive public funds. As noted by VE (2010, p.5), ‘the comprehensive and robust 
procedures … implemented during the last few years, [has provided funding] 
partners with the added confidence of working with [VE] and seeing us [as fit-for-
purpose] to continue to receive public funds.’ Again, this illustrates the compliance 
nature of the SE-led coalition and a willingness of VE to comply.   
According to a VE online news article (VE, 2008b), the successful delivery of VE’s 
WSP 2005-09, alongside a strong, evidence-based strategic plan for volleyball, 
resulted in an increased award of £5.6m from SE for the 2009-13 funding cycle, and 
placed the sport in a ‘much better position to finally prove to [SE] … that Volleyball is 
a sport for everyone’ (VE, 2010, p.4). Evidence suggests that the significant financial 
backing from government acted as an ‘enabler’ for volleyball through resource 
provision, ‘to deliver more quality opportunities for people to experience volleyball, 
and … contribute to [SE’s] aim of creating a world leading community sport system’ 
(Wainwright, CEO of VE, cited in VE, 2008b). This clearly demonstrates the 
prominence of contractual-compliance and shared-interests/objectives, reinforced by 
interdependencies and financial inducements that characterises the SE-led coalition 
membership. As acknowledged by VE (2012a, p.3), ‘future funding will depend on 
achieving results in increasing the number of young people and adults actually 
playing volleyball’, since VE was ‘contractually obliged to achieve APS targets’ (VE, 
2014c, p.3). The above evidence illuminating the potential for government-
constructed agency-led coalitions, to be effective implementers of government policy 
priorities.   
 
 
                                                          
33 SE/UKS Annual Reports 1998 to 2005. 
34
 NGB funding for the 2005-2009 funding cycle received from SE via personal communication. 
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Further evidence suggests that VE’s alignment to government/SE-objectives was 
strategic, to maximise the level of funding from SE to achieve VE’s own ambitions, 
for example, VE’s 2013-17 WSP submission to SE requested £10m (VE, 2012b, p.4) 
for operational and implementation costs, while the agreed sum from SE represented 
slightly more than 50% of the requested sum with an award of £5.1m (VE, 2013a, 
p.31). This points towards the potential use of overstated WSP submissions as a 
pre-determined strategy to influence the ‘secondary-aspects’ of the policy subsystem 
and the allocation of funding, to achieve desired outcomes from negotiations. It could 
be also argued that skillful leadership led to an appropriate funding agreement from 
SE, particularly as VE claimed that the CEO had presented ‘a robust, well-argued 
case for investment’, and that VE’s reduction was ‘far less than other sports’ (VE, 
2013a, p.31).  
Of greater significance, however, is the high level of VE’s resource-dependency on 
public funds, as seen from the selected financial data on income/revenue in Table 
7.1, covering the past two decades. The extent to which public funding has impacted 
on VE is clearly visible, with a six fold increase in income between 1999 and 2012 by 
virtue of greater levels of public subsidies, and consistent levels of resource-
dependency in excess of 60% since 2010. This highlights the speed at which 
SMNGBs, such as VE, received vast sums of public funds that prompted a rapid and 
impromptu ‘rags to riches’ scenario, without there being a clear understanding of 
what was expected from them or how to effectively use the funding. As 
demonstrated by VE’s operation of a less than cautious financial policy of matching 
income to expenditure, and acknowledgement of a ‘lack of [financial] control … 
based on a lack of accurate reporting’ (VE, 2017c, p.3).  
Table 7.1: Volleyball England income/revenue for the period 1998-99 to 2017-18  
Year 1998-99  
 
£’000 
2009- 
10 
£’000 
2010-11 
 
£’000 
2011-12 
 
£’000 
2012-13 
 
£’000 
2013-14 
 
£’000 
2014-15 
 
£’000 
2015-16 
 
£’000  
2017-18 
 
£’000 
Turnover 483  1,981 2,442 2,695 2,339 2,221 2,061 2,167 1,252 
 
Other Income 
(Sports Council 
Grants) 
215  1,334 1,687 1,742 1,318 1,511 1,281 1,320 728 
 
Resource- 
Dependency % 
47 67 69 65 56 68 62 62 58 
 
Source adapted from: VE Financial Statements (1999 to 2016); VE Annual Reports (2003 to 2018) 
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VE’s lack of financial control clearly informed SE’s decision-making to significantly 
reduce the level public funds awarded to VE, thus prompting VE’s acceptance ‘to 
maintain tighter control of the finance to ensure the organisation has a stronger 
future position’ (VE, 2017b, p.7). While this emphasises the expectations of 
compliance and punitive sanctions to which VE had been subjected to as a member 
of the SE-led coalition, it also highlights VE’s vulnerability to resource-dependency 
and changes to government policy, and its weaknesses as a financially self-
sustaining SMNGB. As noted within a VE online news article (VE, 2017f), ‘the budget 
reduction [of 34%] means that VE will now restructure its head office operations … to 
better align itself with [SE’s] strategy.’ This also supports VE’s claim that SE funding 
was not only an ‘enabler’ for sport development, but also a ‘disabler’, when ‘tied to 
the delivery of certain outcomes’ (VE, 2015a), suggesting a less than content 
commitment to governmental policy requirements/compliance on the part of VE, 
rather acceptance was on the basis of self-preservation and the benefits from public 
subsidies, hence the muted response to policy change. A claim supported further by 
interviewee CEOVE’s comments that VE was not ‘a deliverer for [SE]’, but an 
organisation that ‘delivers to its membership and delivers to their needs’, but ‘it 
doesn’t matter how much SE [fund] you, it controls all of the money coming through 
your system.’ Again, this demonstrates the level of control by government and SE 
within the sport policy subsystem, and a less than arm’s length approach to sport, 
particularly as VE has had little choice but to do government/SE’s bidding in return 
for self-preservation, while under the constant threat of financial sanctions and 
reductions, which equally incites fears of regressing back to a ‘kitchen table’ 
organisation: 
‘[F]ootball gets [SE] funding, so for them [it’s] probably less than 1%. If they lost it, it 
would make no difference. For us its 60% funding, … [and] because the funding for 
sports for sports sake will be reduced and reduced and reduced, I can see volleyball, 
and some of the other minor sports being back where it was 25 years ago, when a 
volunteer ran it out of the back of their bedroom’ (Interviewee: CEOVE).   
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The above discussions also raise questions on VE’s capacity or desire to seek 
alternative sources of income, especially when evidence suggests VE’s other 
sources of self-generated income (see Table 7.2) have seen no significant upward 
movement or matched the increasing levels of government/SE funding (see Table 
7.1), which has inevitably led to VE’s heightened dependency on public subsidies.  
Table 7.2: Selected sources of Volleyball England self-generated income for 
the period 2014-15 to 2017-18  
Year 
 
2014-15  
£’000 
2015-16  
£’000 
2017-18 
£’000 
Competitions & Events 
 
203 184 201 
Membership & Marketing 
 
55 62 67 
Workforce 
 
149 108 51 
Participation 
 
83 106 3 
Performance Income (Talent) 
 
152 148 81 
Commercial 
 
32 101 89 
Source adapted from: VE (2015c, 2016a, 2018). 
However, VE’s experience of reduced SE funding has illuminated the high degree of 
resilience of the SMNGB in the face of adversity, evidence suggesting that VE has 
emerged in a much stronger position, as noted by interviewee CEOVE, ‘it was a 
rocky time, but it’s left us with a stronger business … [We] are far more resilient and 
flexible.’ Moreover, VE are intent on reducing their resource-dependency further, 
with a view to becoming financially self-sustaining through its membership, and more 
importantly, reducing government/SE’s control over its operational activities:   
‘Our target is to get down to about 30% funded by [SE]. We’re positioning ourselves 
not to be dependent on government funding, because whichever way they twist or 
turn, you have to twist and turn as well. Actually, what we want to be able to do is 
deliver a product to our membership. Not to be told by [SE] that it needs to be this or 
that … [T]he resource from government will decline, … so we have to find a way to 
build a sustainable organisation, … and the only way to do that is through 
membership’ (Interviewee: CEOVE). 
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Of particular note, is evidence that SE considered VE/volleyball’s impact on 
participation for the inactive to be negligible, and as NGBs overall are no longer the 
drivers of mass participation to meet government objectives, VE can expect to 
receive further reductions in funding, which might reduce the level of resource- 
dependency, but increases the need to drive financial self-sustainability. As noted 
within VE Board minutes (VE, 2018b, pp.7-8):   
‘As a sport, volleyball [is] seen by SE as having little impact on SE target numbers of 
encouraging inactive people and therefore the level of funding, as for all NGBs would 
be reduced in Years 3 and 4 of this current cycle. Going forward, the focus would be 
to make [VE] a long-term sustainable organisation, less dependent on grant funding 
from government. SE stated that NGBs were no longer the main conduit to drive 
mass participation in sport.’  
 
7.3.3) Capacity Building: workforce and facilities 
Evidence suggests that prior to 2009, VE’s volunteer base was ‘very limited’ 
(Girginov and Hill, 2008, p.2104), which provides a strong indicator for the alignment 
of VE with government and SE-objectives in order to build capacity, with a particular 
focus on club and workforce development to establish links to schools and sports 
colleges, as this ‘reflected the areas [SE] were driving forward’ (VE, 2009a, p. vii). A 
key strategy of VE (2009b, p.4) was to reduce the back office bureaucracy and 
release more funding for frontline delivery, through ‘a modernised and expanded 
staffing/key volunteer structure, aligned to the planned programmes.’ The 
deployment of frontline expert coaches was also seen as critical to the successful 
delivery of government/SE policy outcomes, especially as it was VE’s belief that 
‘[p]articipation rates for volleyball were directly related to the deployment of coaches’ 
(VE, 2009b, p.3). Furthermore, VE specifically focused on the development of 
HEVOs to ‘drive more people, particularly young people and students, to volunteer in 
volleyball to ensure … sustainability for the sport’ (VE, 2009b, p.3). This suggests a 
clear and content alignment with the ‘policy-core’ beliefs of government/SE in terms 
of the value of volunteers, coach education (DCMS, 2002b), and VE’s delivery of 
shared government/SE priorities, thus emphasising the importance of overlapping 
shared-beliefs and resource-interdependencies within the SE-led coalition.   
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However, delivering on policy outcomes and the increasing regard given to 
modernisation and reform, challenged VE’s workforce capacity, largely in terms of 
‘unmanageable workloads’ for Executives (VE, 2011c, p.3), difficulties in ‘nurturing 
and growing local volunteers in an increasingly professional system’ (VE, 2013e, 
p.5); and the management of conflict, mistrust and miscommunication between the 
volunteering expertise and professional expertise at Board level, and with 
membership (VE, 2012b; VE, 2013b). These tensions illustrate the 
compliance/autonomy dichotomy debate within VE, as well as the challenges 
involved in the organisational transition from volunteerism to professionalism. To 
counter some of the above issues was the strategic appointment of full-time 
volleyball relationship managers, whose remit was to ‘[build] a sustainable local 
volleyball infrastructure (VE, 2013e, p.6). In addition, volleyball activators were 
recruited with clear objectives to get more people playing ‘informal’ volleyball, to 
work in clubs, schools, colleges, universities, satellite clubs and the wider community 
to develop the sport (VE, 2015c, p.22), again highlighting a close alignment to SE 
strategies and government priorities, where complementary policy objectives have 
invariably prompted a sufficient satisfaction with policy change, nullifying the need for 
opposition.   
Despite a willingness of VE to comply with the policies of the government/SE-led 
coalition, and develop its workforce capacity to meet government objectives, further 
evidence indicates the negligible impact on participation levels:    
‘We had a programme five or six years ago, where we had community sports 
coaches working, and we had 28 working across the country. … The impact of that in 
clubs was nothing. Half a dozen people came from the school environment to the 
club environment’ (Interviewee: CEOVE).   
Arguably, the lack of impact resulted from the disconnect between VE and 
grassroots development, the isolation of its workforce, and a lack of understanding of 
how to deliver on government and SE outcomes, as evidenced by the comments 
from interviewee CEOVE: 
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‘There was no connectivity. The people we employed to do the delivery were people 
who worked in isolation, and they weren’t connected to a club locally. So, they would 
go in, deliver their six week sessions, and then go onto the next school. That’s all 
they were being paid to do. What they weren’t being paid to do was that out of that 
school, 30-50 children they saw, 10 of them went to the local club. That wasn’t a 
target for them. So, they didn’t push that agenda, and because there was no 
connectivity between the club and the coach, and the club and the sport, it never 
really worked.’  
Interviewee CEOVE elaborated further by stating: 
‘The problem we’ve got as a [NGB], and the problem that other [NGBs] have got, is 
that we are not local, and to get people to step onto that first stage of workforce 
development is about how you connect down at a local level, … because we’ve got 
some really good volunteers out there that have been ostracised from the sport’ 
(Interviewee: CEOVE). 
Facilities have also been problematic for VE, as with other indoor sports, despite VE 
efforts to seek major revisions in the size and layout of sports halls, and encourage a 
move away from the four-badminton-court philosophy, although evidence suggests 
an absence of VE influence over government/SE’s facility investment plans (e.g. 
New Labour’s 2004 ‘Building Schools for the Future’ programme), further 
emphasising the weakness of VE/volleyball within the policy environment: 
‘The challenge for volleyball has always been to take these four court badminton 
halls, which is what they built. You have to take the whole damn thing. We know that 
if they’d have built them 2 metres wider, we could have played across two badminton 
courts, and two courts of badminton could have been played, but nobody listened to 
us when we made our suggestion to them’ (Interviewee: CEOVE). 
Furthermore, a lack of accessible school facilities35 has impacted on volleyball/VE’s 
ability to develop and meet government targets, despite government interventions 
(e.g. ‘Chance to Share’ programme), to encourage head teachers to open their 
schools to communities. Evidently, issues surrounding accessibility are largely to do 
with inflated rental changes for facilities, and a lack of enthusiasm from schools to 
                                                          
35
 According to DCMSb, the number of educational facilities inaccessible, and effectively closed to the public, is in the region of 
40% 
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provide access to facilities to avoid additional operational costs. As explained by 
interviewee CEOVE: 
‘What the document Chance to Share kind of says is that head teachers set their own 
rental amounts. So, I’m a head teacher, I’ve a brand new sports hall, but I’m going to 
set my rental income so high that no-one can afford it, because I don’t want to be 
paying my caretaker to come in and open and close, and I don’t want to be paying 
the cleaning team to come in after a group of people have messed it up. So, they 
weren’t open to the public. The accessibility was just too difficult.’ 
Evidence has also highlighted particular challenges working with external partners, 
such as LAs, due in the most part to financial constraints and inability to deliver (VE, 
2011b), the shift towards commercially-led operational strategies for leisure facilities;  
and the subsequent rationalisation of accessibility, the extent to which was clearly 
indicated by interviewee CEOVE: 
‘Leisure centres were owned by [LAs], they had sports development teams working 
out of those in local communities. All that’s gone and sports halls are now owned by 
[LAs], but run by these one-life leisure connections. They have been given a remit to 
make sure that those facilities generate income … [T]he focus has gone from 
supporting people to be active and take part in sport, to being … business-led … GLL 
who manage most of the facilities in London, close them at 6pm on a Saturday night, 
and I’ve people saying to me “that’s four hours we could’ve have played volleyball.” 
But they won’t open their facilities up and you cannot persuade them. I’ve written to 
them; other people have written to them. They will not change.’ 
This supports the argument that changes in LA contracts and provisions for sport 
acted as an external perturbation to the sport policy subsystem, where changes 
within a different policy subsystem has impacted on the sport policy domain, 
especially in relation to the ability of coalition members to deliver on government and 
SE objectives/outcomes. 
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7.3.4) Participation  
It is evident that VE’s participation strategies have demonstrated a willingness to 
align with government and SE ‘policy-core’ beliefs, particularly in connection with the 
Playground to Podium ideology, a modern club infrastructure, and modified games. 
As noted by VE (2009b, p.3), it aimed to provide a ‘seamless pathway from school to 
community to elite’ – including variations of volleyball such as mini-volleyball and the 
UK School Games, the latter directly linked to elite performance through the player 
development pathway. A modern network of sports clubs provided the centrepiece of 
the sporting experience, incorporating the Volley123 club accreditation scheme, 
seen as the ‘linchpin to gel a complex network of local providers’, all focused around 
sustainability. In addition, ‘Let’s Play Volleyball’ and National PESSYP Volleyball 
programmes (VE, 2009b), and school-club links (VE, 2009a), were focused on 
increasing grassroots and mass participation to meet government and SE targets. 
Again, this demonstrates the significance of shared-beliefs with government and SE, 
and VE’s willingness to align with ‘policy-core’ beliefs, particularly where alignment to 
policy is considered mutually beneficial.  
Further evidence highlighted volleyball/VE’s capacity to engage with policy outcomes 
for hard to reach groups, such as, girls, ethnic minorities and young people from 
urban areas. For example, VE’s 2009-13 Strategic Plan (2009b, pp.3-17) reported 
that: 18% of volleyball participants were from ethnic minority communities, compared 
to an average of 9% for all sports participants; 43% of volleyball participants were 
aged 16-24, of which 30% were in the Further Education (FE) and Higher Education 
(HE) sectors (above the average of 11% across all sports); and that volleyball 
provided a solution to an ‘inevitable and unsolvable issue’ of ‘drop out’ from major 
school sports, such as football, rugby and netball, where resources were limited to 
cater for continued mass participation, particularly within FE and HE Institutions. This 
undoubtedly led to VE’s claim that it had a ‘potential market reach that [was] the 
envy of many other sports’ (VE, 2014a, p.1), which emphasises further the 
seemingly over-confident characteristic of a sport that has been at a declining 
developmental-level for over two decades. Arguably though, VE/volleyball’s 
‘cockiness’ as sport could be a representation of an ill-defined ‘one-size-fits-all’ NGB-
centric policy design and flawed performance monitoring system, particularly as the 
conclusions drawn by VE regarding its contribution towards government and SE- 
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objectives came from government sources (e.g. APS), and thus exaggerated the 
extent of VE’s success and market reach. A claim supported by previous evidence 
highlighting the inconsistencies of the APS (e.g. the exclusion of children play sport), 
and the limitations of VE’s data in relation to its own levels of participants and 
members (VE, 2012c). For example, Girginov and Hills (2008, p.2104) noted that 
APS1 (2006) indicated 68,000 regular volleyball players, but according to VE the 
figure was around 17,000, such a significant discrepancy having serious implications 
for a sustainable legacy. Further support is provided by VE’s (2010, p.5) reported 
decline in adult participation, with APS4 (2010) figures suggesting 37,500 adults (16-
plus) playing volleyball regularly, which is a significant drop from APS1. 
As discussed earlier, VE’s strategic plans were seen as unrealistic, unattainable and 
skewed towards the elite talent pathway, the latter being the central aim of an 
‘overriding 4-8-12 year strategy designed to deliver future Olympic and Paralympic 
representation’ (VE, 2013e, p.21). To a larger extent, this provides some insight for 
VE’s strategic bias towards talent, and its potential misalignment with the 
participation priorities of the SE-led coalition, within whose membership VE was 
clearly positioned. Of further significance is the belief among VE’s membership that 
school and community sport was more important than a focus on the talent pathway, 
insomuch as, ‘activity in youth, schools, clubs and local competitions [were] the most 
critical to both increasing and sustaining participation in the sport going forward’ (VE, 
2009b, p.11). This would suggest not only a clear tension between community/elite 
sport within VE, but also the potential for similar tensions between different internal 
coalitions, within the SE-led coalition. To support this claim, it is evident that VE’s 
competition delivery reflected a clear focus on the elite and HE/FE sectors. However, 
regional and sub-regional associations had responsibility for delivering club 
competition at all other levels, prompting the emergence of differentiated beliefs and 
alignments with VE strategies and those of the SE-led coalition. Evidence from 
VE/regional association reports between 2008 and 2013, identified a ‘common 
ground’ between VE and regional associations/clubs based on shared-beliefs such 
as: development plans guided by VE; encouragement of club accreditation; a 
commitment to diversity and reaching down to government priority areas; and an 
orientation towards the Playground to Podium policy. Further beliefs shared by the 
regional/sub-regional associations included: a lack of public funding at grassroot 
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levels; the undervaluing of the contributions made at the regional level; the bias of 
VE towards talent; and the lack of initiatives to promote participation. The above 
evidence supporting the existence of competing coalitions within volleyball founded 
on tensions between compliance/economic interests and autonomy/membership 
interests, where the impact and management of such tensions within SMNGBs 
should not be underestimated or undermined within the assumptions of the ACF.  
Evidence has also shown that VE’s focus on the outdoor element of the sport, 
particularly through its ‘VolleyFest’ and ‘BeachFest’ initiatives, conflicted with SE’s 
measurable set of delivery outcomes against Excel, Grow, and Sustain priorities, 
despite their original acceptance by SE as key 2009-13 WSP programmes. 
According to VE Board minutes (VE, 2011e, p.4), the aforementioned programmes 
were withdrawn as they were deemed by SE to fall under the ‘umbrella of Outdoor 
Activities.’ It could be argued that this reflected a tactical move on behalf of SE to 
refocus VE, as the SMNGB was considered an organisation ‘failing to increase adult 
participation’ (VE, 2011e, p.3). An argument supported by the creation of VE’s 
innovative ‘Go Spike’ campaign in response to SE concerns, aimed at inspiring and 
retaining participants (VE, 2011e). The lack of criticism from VE towards SE’s 
decision-making and VE’s willingness to redesign participation programmes to 
undertake SE’s bidding, clearly identifies VE as a ‘policy taker’, but equally  
demonstrates that unopposed policy acceptance can be enforced through 
compulsory realignments to government and SE ‘policy-core’ beliefs, where 
compliance-dependency is on the basis of self-preservation and the protection of 
financial interests, as opposed to a complementary acceptance of policy, the former 
illustrating Luke’s first dimension of power.  
Arguably, VE’s waning ability to increase levels of participation was hampered 
further by the setting of unrealistic and unattainable objectives, even within its own 
strategy for volleyball (Strategy 2024), as seen from the comments made by 
interviewee CEOVE:  
‘[Strategy 2024] had things like 70% of primary schools would have volleyball in, 50% 
of secondary schools would have volleyball in, that we’d be the most highly 
recognised sport on TV. They just were totally unrealistic objectives’ (Interviewee: 
CEOVE).  
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Evidence also shows that VE placed a greater emphasis on clubs to increase 
participation and attract new members, but equally acknowledged that volleyball 
clubs and members were ‘actively engaged in steering their own destiny’ (VE, 
2013e, p.5), rather than be driven by government priorities. This supports Fahlén et 
al.’s (2015) argument that while NGBs have shown a willingness to align with and 
accept government’s modernisation and pro-social agendas, responsibility for 
meeting government objectives is often driven downwards to sports clubs, a 
responsibility they have neither accepted nor understand. For VE, the ability to 
deliver on policy outcomes was been made more difficult due to a steadily declining 
club network, resulting not only in a challenging operational environment for VE’s 
‘core market’, but also substantially less investment from public funds:   
‘[T]he club network is dying ... , but the task for [VE] is to maintain the club 
structure … We’re not being funded to run Club Mark anymore, we’re using Club 
Matters now, because it’s a resource that we don’t have to put anything into. All the 
things that [SE] used to do to support clubs have gone, so it’s down to us to find the 
resource to do that’ (Interviewee: CEOVE). 
In addition, evidence suggests that a limiting factor for volleyball to achieve 
government/SE objectives, which could also be the case for most other 
SMNGB/sports, has been changes in the educational system, primarily from the 
pressure applied by government to achieve school academic targets, which has 
effectively altered the UK sporting landscape through declining levels of PE and 
school sport:   
‘The education system has changed in the last 10 years. We used to have a higher 
priority for sport and physical activity in schools, [but] … the amount of PE and sports 
being delivered is declining … It’s the pressure government put on schools on league 
tables. Head teachers want more bums on seats, more money, so to do that they 
have to bump up their position in the league tables’ (Interviewee: CEOVE). 
Changes in the educational policy subsystem, thus provides a further illustration of 
the impact of external perturbations from other policy subsystems on the sport policy 
subsystem, which has limited the ability of SMNGBs to meet government and SE 
targets.   
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7.4.6) Partnerships 
According to VE’s 2007-08 Annual Report (VE, 2008a, p.8), collaboration with other 
organisations to develop volleyball was considered a key aspect to raise awareness 
of the sport and participation. However, while evidence shows engagement with SE-
led initiatives (e.g. PL4S and C4L), it could be argued that VE’s preference for self-
development demonstrates a limited understanding of partnership-working to 
achieve government and SE-objectives, which has negatively impacted on the 
SMNGB. An illustration of which is VE’s assertion that their partners were ‘absolutely 
committed to contributing to [VE] ambitions of building a sustainable long-term future 
for volleyball in England’ (VE, 2015b). This suggests a belief that it was not what VE 
could do for coalition partners, rather what coalition partners could do for VE.  
A lack of engagement in partnership-working is highlighted further by the difficulties 
faced by VE in adapting to government/SE’s increasing emphasis on a mixed 
economy model, and the changing tides of government priorities:   
‘[T]his bit about mixed economy has been something that we’re aspiring to, we just 
haven’t had the band width to actually start to look at that’ (Interviewee: CEOVE). 
From VE’s Strategy 2024 (2014b) and VE Annual Reports (2007-2017), it is evident 
that partnership engagement has largely involved CSPs and the YST36, which would 
suggest an alignment with SE ‘policy-core’ beliefs and objectives, certainly in terms 
of increasing participation in young people. However, VE’s partnering with 
StreetGames, has been positioned at the upper end of the age range, specifically 
men and women over the age of 18. This suggests a misalignment with SE 
participation strategies and demonstrates a tension in shared- beliefs, whereby VE 
was less committed to promoting sport as a ‘social good’, despite its proclamation to 
further it’s ‘contribution to an active and healthy society’ (VE, 2014b, p.4). Rather, 
increasing participation has served to widen the talent pool for elite performance.  
 
 
                                                          
36 See Appendix XII for examples of coalition partner beliefs, alignment and advocacy. 
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Further evidence of VE’s focus on the elite pathway can be seen by its changing 
relationship with YST. Close working relations had existed between VE and YST 
since volleyball’s inclusion within the UK School Games, for example, YST endorsed 
VE’s early youth participation strategies, suggesting VE ‘consistently demonstrated 
an innovative and robust approach to engaging young people’ (VE, 2009a, p. iii), and 
showed a ‘commitment and delivery in, and through, PE and school sport’ (VE, 2010, 
p.3). However, it is evident that VE withdrew from the 2018 UK School Games to 
focus on an alternative event specifically for volleyball (VE, 2017b), thus 
demonstrating a clear bias towards elite volleyball, particularly as the changing face 
of the School Games exhibited a physical activity theme: 
‘[The School Games is] more of a festival of activity rather than an elite 
programme … [and] it doesn’t fit in with our player pathways’ (Interviewee: CEOVE). 
Evidence also suggests that the changing focus of the UK School Games is 
reflective of a lessening of YST influence on and funding from government, as well 
as the strengthening of government beliefs that school sport should remain within the 
domain of the DfE:   
‘Whereas before … everything to do with school sport was going through YST, I think 
that’s changed. I think Sue Campbell has been part of why [YST was] so big and so 
influential, and her being Labour and it being a Conservative government didn’t help. 
I hate this politics stuff, but I think the current government felt she had too much 
influence over what was going on in schools, whereas the government felt … the 
[DfE] should be [doing] that’ (Interviewee: CEOVE). 
Not only does this point towards continued political infighting within government and 
Whitehall on where the responsibility for school sport should be located, it also 
highlights differing beliefs within the sports policy subsystem, and the impact of 
internal shocks from government interference restricting the development of the 
sport policy subsystem, as well as external shocks from other policy subsystems.   
Further evidence indicates that partnerships are more likely to be bound by symbiotic 
relationships, rather than shared-beliefs, where mutual benefits are of greater value, 
as purported by interviewee CEOVE:   
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‘Why would you do something if you didn’t get some sort of benefit from it?   
Partnership-working has got to be that there’s a symbiotic relationship between the 
two of you, there’s got to be benefit for both organisations.’  
In this respect, it is evident that VE’s approach to collaborative partnerships has 
focused on commercial activities rather than social activities. For example, VE have 
developed commercial partnerships with the National Trust (VE, 2014a, p.16), the 
Forestry Commission, (VE, 2015c, pp.6-7), and the Ministry of Defence, to increase 
levels of volleyball participation and new recreational clubs (VE, 2016a, p.5). 
Arguably, VE’s partnership strategies aligned with system-wide ‘policy-core’ beliefs, 
such as self-sufficiency and reduced resource-dependency, but have misaligned with 
those linked to government/SE’s pro-social agenda.  
 
7.4) Conclusion 
The case of VE/volleyball has provided a number of significant findings in relation to 
the aims and objectives of this research. Evidence has indicated that the sport policy 
domain has been subject to a series of external and internal shocks over a decade 
or more, suggesting a less than stable policy subsystem. External perturbations have 
not only included the consequences of varying levels of Lottery funding and 
government engagement with the 2012 Home Olympics, but also changes within 
other policy subsystems, which have impacted on the ability of agency-led coalition 
members to deliver on government outcomes. As previously argued, changes to LA 
leisure services have negatively impacted on sport provision in terms development 
and facilities. In addition, changes to the educational system have also altered the 
sporting landscape and the reduced the opportunities at the school level, due to 
pressure by government to meet school academic targets, a lessening of YST 
influence, and a strengthening of government beliefs that school sport should 
continue to be the domain of the DfE. Indeed, the extent of government control and 
pressure within the sport policy subsystem is observable, suggesting a less than 
arm’s length approach and a rolling out of the state, as seen by government 
influence over the SE-led coalition. In addition, changing attitudes towards health 
has acted as an external perturbation, prompting major policy change and a greater 
focus on physical activity to address government’s social and health agendas, 
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through a more intensive mixed economy funding model to implement and deliver on 
policy outcomes. Furthermore, the inconsistencies of the APS mechanism prompted 
an internal shock to the subsystem, not only in response to its competitive rather 
than collective impact, but also its utilisation to exaggerate policy outcomes, as seen 
by the use of inflated WSP submissions as means to secure increased public 
subsidies. In this regard, evidence also suggests that SMNGBs neglected to 
recognise the full implications of delivering on policy outcomes, where misplaced 
exuberance outweighed an understanding of what would be required of them.          
It is evident that, organisationally, VE has suffered from many years of turbulence, 
including high levels of internal discord, organisational inertia, conservatism, 
resistance to change, financial mismanagement and misguided policies, which have 
all contributed to VE/volleyball’s steady decline. The impact of this history has been 
not only a conflict of beliefs between VE’s Board, Executive and membership, but 
also between VE and SE.  
VE’s weakened position in relation to SE resulted from its inability to meet 
participation outcomes, an aspirational rather than pragmatic approach to 
development, and a skewed focus towards elite performance, resulting in heavy 
financial sanctions from SE. It is argued here that VE’s strategies were aligned more 
strongly to the UKS-led coalition, from which it had been ejected, rather than to the 
SE-led coalition from whom it received its funding. That said, evidence has 
demonstrated the willingness of VE to align to with some extent at least with SE 
‘policy-core’ beliefs, where acceptance of contractual-compliance obligations to 
achieve shared-objectives with government/SE against strategic priorities has been 
complementary where policy objectives have matched, but also largely enforced due 
to policy misalignments and VE’s aspirations to limit government/SE’s control over its 
operational and financial activities. This clearly identifies VE as a ‘policy taker’ rather 
than a ‘policy shaper’, which is further endorsed by VE’s lack of open opposition to 
policy change, such muted response reflecting VE’s continued reliance on public 
subsidies and self-preservation. However, there is some evidence to suggest VE’s 
interest in lobbying government and especially SE more effectively, by joining the 
emerging coalition of SMNGBs, nested within the SE-led coalition, and its 
membership of a potential coalition of unfunded-elite/competitive SMNGBs, nested 
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within the UKS-led coalition. Both groups of SMNGBs appeared to be coalescing 
around shared-interests and possibly shared-beliefs focused on self-preservation.  
The evidence from the analysis also suggests that VE was not wholly subservient to 
government/SE directives, as seen by VE’s proclamation that they were delivering 
on the needs of their membership rather than those of SE, and the clear intent to 
utilise SE funding to develop the sport, as opposed to fulfilling the government’s 
social agenda. In summary, VE has had a difficult relationship with government 
policy and with SE as the government’s lead agency for participation. On the one 
hand, VE accepted governance reforms specified by SE largely because it needed 
SE funding. On the other hand, VE has found it difficult to align itself closely with 
SE’s (shifting) objectives for four reasons. First, throughout recent years the tension 
between members/clubs and the NGB has remained an impediment to whole-
hearted compliance with SE-objectives. Second, the SMNGB has not been able to 
resolve the tension between its elite performance operations with the community 
focus of SE policy. Third, the tension between VE and SE was exacerbated by SE’s 
recent prioritisation of physical activity over ‘sports for sports sake.’ Fourth, VE’s 
reliance on a network of parties (local authorities and schools in particular), has not 
helped the organisation achieve its participation targets due to policy changes in 
relation to LA funding and educational policy.  
Evidence in relation to the utility of the ACF has endorsed the significance of shared- 
beliefs in shaping agency-led coalitions, but also the extent to which agency-led 
coalitions can also be constructed or substantially shaped by contract-compliance, 
financial incentives and sanctions, shared-interests, interdependencies, and 
symbiotic relationships. Evidence also signposts the potential for agency-led 
coalitions and coalition members to overlap with different coalitions and cross 
subsystem boundaries, a consequence of which can be external perturbations at the 
points of intersection between different policy subsystems. Furthermore, there is 
evidence to suggest that policy agendas, priorities and outcomes, can be supported, 
implemented, and delivered through the construction of government influenced 
agency-led coalitions, whereby such coalitions act as facilitators and deliverers of 
government policy and objectives, as an outsourcing mechanism in receipt of public 
funds to achieve desired government outcomes, rather than be solely framed by 
shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs. Evidence also supports the claim that the complexity and 
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ambiguity of agency-led coalitions and the existence of interior or internal coalitions, 
result from internal conflicts within and among coalition members, the prominence of 
which the ACF struggles to recognise. For example, emerging dichotomies within 
NGBs centred on community/elite sport, and compliance/autonomy, formed on the 
basis of differing beliefs among coalition actors within the SE-led coalition. This also 
highlights the extent to which SMNGBs, as coalition members, are pulled in different 
directions. Such evidence raises doubt over the strength of the ACF’s concept of 
shared-beliefs as the only binding factor for coalitions, supporting the claim that the 
ACF finds difficulty in accounting for the many guises of subsystem actors owing to 
the ‘height’ of the lens through which the ACF is views policy change and policy 
subsystems. Yet, the observable disconnect in sport policy and policy subsystem 
could arguably be an effect of the heterogeneous nature of policy actors, the 
existence and emergence of multi-foci, overlapping advocacy coalitions within the 
sport policy subsystem, and the capacity of coalitions and policy actors to cross the 
boundaries of different coalitions and policy subsystems. 
The operationalisation of power has a strong connection to Lukes’ three dimensions 
of power. The first dimension is illustrated by tangible, visible and measurable 
decision-making, in terms of enforcing compliance with shifting policy agendas 
through financial inducements and sanctions. The second dimension arguably sits 
with resource-dependency, seen as a barrier to limit the scope of the political 
process, particularly in relation to agenda-setting. The appeasement of policy actors 
(unfunded elitist/competitive sports) through the allocation of modest funding 
resources to selected SMNGBs, also resonates with Lukes’ second dimension, to 
undermine the potential threat of the formation of an effective minority coalition. 
Lukes’ third dimension is illustrated by the increasing loss of autonomy, and the 
shaping of NGBs’ beliefs to align with those of SE. However, the evidence from this 
case study shows that the degree of ideological manipulation by SE was only 
partially successful.  
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Chapter Eight 
Table Tennis England 
 
8.1) Introduction 
This chapter represents the empirical findings in relation to the case of Table Tennis 
England (TTE), the NGB of table tennis in England, in line with the research aims 
and objectives of this study, which have also guided the structure of this chapter. 
Following an introductory contextual profile of TTE, a detailed analysis and 
discussion is provided on the development of TTE’s governmental relationships, and 
the operational impacts and approaches to changing sport policy, aligned to the 
specific themes identified within the methodology chapter as mechanisms for 
delivering desired sport policy outcomes and determinants relevant to policy shaping 
or taking. Threaded throughout this empirical chapter are relevant links and 
discussions that reflect the nature of power and the utility of the ACF. The concluding 
section summarises the key findings of this case study on TTE, in particular, TTE’s 
slower progress towards change, although its eventual acceptance of contractual 
obligations has strengthened its relationship with SE, especially the potential of the 
sport’s broader pro-social capabilities, where opportunism, pragmatism, 
partnerships, and complementary alignments to the ‘core beliefs’ have benefitted 
TTE, and identified the SMNGB as primarily a ‘policy taker’, on the basis of shared 
beliefs and self-preservation, content to be subjected of policy and increased 
resource dependency rather than shape policy.  
Founded in 1926, TTE (formerly the English Table Tennis Association [ETTA]37), had 
almost 200,000 affiliated members by 1960 (Table Tennis News [TTN]38, 1960a, 
p.5); had produced three world champions, with England winning the World Team 
Championships in 1953, considered to be the greatest achievement in British table 
tennis history (Moore, 2011); and arguably had an ‘active national organisation in 
county, league and club … envied as a model’ (TTN, 1952, p.1). Yet, a series of 
                                                          
37
 For the avoidance of error, references to TTE will also include those of the ETTA 
38
 Table Tennis News was the official magazine produced Table Tennis England from 1935-2010. When the magazine first 
started in November 1935 it was called ‘Table Tennis’ until it was renamed ‘Table Tennis News’ in November 1966. It was 
discontinued in July 2010. A comprehensive archive of all the magazines is available from: https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/our-
sport/news/archives/table-tennis-news-archive/ 
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exogenous and endogenous factors led to table tennis/TTE’s gradual decline. 
According to Woodward (of the News Chronicle), exogenous factors that accounted 
for the decline included the impact of television, decreased attendance at sporting 
events, and the rise of the discriminating spectator (cited in TTN, 1955, p.8). While 
endogenous factors included, for example, sustained levels of turbulence within and 
between TTE and members (see TTN, 1964, p.3; TTN, 1965a, p.3; TTN, 1970, p.9; 
TTN, 1991, p3; TTN, 2003a, pp.7-8, 12-14). Other contributory factors for the decline 
in membership resulted from the cultural and economic changes within Thatcher’s 
Britain (e.g. loss of playing facilities due to the closure of industrial premises, 
financial constraints of participants, and increasing sports facility costs) (Blunn, 
former Chair of TTE, cited in TTN, 1983, p.14). Affiliated team membership had 
reduced from 21,489 in 1978/79 to 9,281 in 1996/97, while club numbers fell from 
8,119 to 3,117 over the same period (TTN, 1997b, p.11). 
However, evidence indicates that TTE has shown resilience during this turbulent 
period from 1995, and by 2013 was employing 70 people with an annual turnover 
exceeding £5m (Table Tennis England [TTE], 2013, p.4). According to TTE’s Annual 
Report 2017-18 (TTE, 2018), the current landscape of table tennis in England, 
includes inter alia: 
 181 Affiliated Premier Clubs;  
 185 Satellite Clubs (159 in 2017); 
 Growth of Ping (24 partner locations) and Loop (596 venues) initiatives; 
 603 licensed and active coaches; 
 41,941 members, weighted heavily towards an older age demographic 
(veteran membership 74%) – a sizeable overall increase in membership since 
2014 (28,250). 
 
Table tennis39 was awarded elite funding from UKS to the value of £3.7m across 
Beijing 2008 and London 2012 Olympic funding cycles40, to deliver medals at the 
London 2012 Olympiad (TTE, 2006). The reduction of elite funding, and ultimately its 
full withdrawal, stemmed from UKS’s belief that table tennis was incapable of 
                                                          
39
 The British Table Tennis Federation (BTTF), formed in 2006, is the responsible governing body for elite performance in table 
tennis 
40
 UKS’s historical funding data is available online from: http://www.uksport.gov.uk/our-work/investing-in-sport/historical-
funding-figures 
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challenging China’s dominance to secure a podium place (TTE, 2009a, p.5). 
Furthermore, despite table tennis’ UKS-unfunded success at the Rio 2016 Olympiad 
(the men’s team qualified but none progressed beyond the last 16), and recognition 
from UKS as having ‘future Olympic medal potential’, UKS funding did not stretch 
down to ‘future potential’ sports for the Tokyo 2020 Olympiad (TTE, 2017, p.4).    
 
8.2) Development of governmental relationships 
Evidence indicated an early recognition from TTE of the potential benefits from 
developing governmental relationships, which became more significant following the 
decline of table tennis in England during the 1970s, having been ‘adversely affected 
by the nation's ills and beset with internal difficulties’ (from a published letter to TTN, 
1985a, p.53). For example, it is evident that TTE supported the findings of the 
Wolfenden Report (TTN, 1960b, p.3); was an active member of an emerging CCPR-
led coalition; developed a Plan for Table Tennis that positioned the sport to benefit 
from any potential government investment, for which TTE received governmental 
approval ‘as a model for other sports bodies to follow’ (TTN, 1965b, p.3); and 
arguably actively sought a close and dependent relationship with government and 
governmental agencies, in the pursuit of public subsidies. Indeed, consistent grant-
aid from SC made the Council the ‘largest single supporter of table tennis’ in 
England (Shipley and Prean, cited in TTN, 1987, p.8), TTE having viewed annual SC 
grants as ‘a permanent form of income for the foreseeable future’ (Blunn, former 
Treasurer of TTE, cited in TTN, 1974, p.28).  
The extent of SC dependency becomes more evident towards the latter part of the 
1980s, when grant-aid represented almost 50% of the TTE’s total income (TTN, 
1990, p.10), although arguably this reflected SC support of those NGBs, such as 
TTE, ‘with little or no chance of obtaining major TV fees or corporate sponsorship’ 
(Sports Council, 1988, p.7). However, this does point towards NGB resource- 
dependency being an intrinsic feature of the sporting landscape, long before the 
advent of the Lottery in 1995. Furthermore, TTE had progressively strengthened its 
regional structure along the same geographical boundaries as SC (TTN, 1994b, p.6), 
and were one of the few sports to fully commit to collaborating with SC to meet policy 
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objectives, through inclusion within the Concentration of Resources programme 
(Sports Council, 1982; Sports Council, 1988).  
The restructuring of the SC in 1997 and the government’s sport policy, Raising the 
Game (1995), were seen as opportunities for TTE/table tennis to enjoy on-going 
benefits from its governmental relationships, from which it would take ‘full advantage’ 
(TTN, 1995, p.6). For example, in order to meet SE’s (1997, p.15) strategic targets, 
SE recognised that table tennis required assistance with achieving excellence, thus 
raising TTE’s expectations for greater access to Lottery funds (TTN, 1996, p.5). 
Moreover, according to an editorial in TTN (2000a, Editorial, p.13), TTE claimed to 
be ‘entirely in accord’ with the principles and objectives of equity and inclusion as 
advocated by SE and DCMS, whereby sport should be ‘equally accessible to 
everyone’ (SE, 1997, p.6). According to interviewee CEOTTE41:  
‘[table tennis is] one of those very few sports where you get that genuine multi-
generational mix, male and female, abled and disabled, and you really can put that 
whole mix together.’  
Arguably, this illustrates shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs with government/SE, particularly 
as table tennis considered itself to be ‘a truly classless, raceless, non-sectarian, 
active sport’ (McDonnel, former Senior Manager, cited in TTN, 1985b, p.7). Yet, 
evidence also indicates a pragmatic approach by TTE to develop its sport through 
the utilisation of both the belief system of government/SE and specific government 
policies. For example, a TTN editorial (2001b, Editorial, p.1) showed TTE had 
encouraged clubs to focus on government concerns such as social inclusion, health 
and education issues related to sport, in the pursuit of political and financial support. 
Evidence suggests that table tennis was ‘one of leading sports to take advantage of 
the [SE] Lottery Fund’, with 330 successful applications for the ‘Awards for All’ 
programme valued at £1.12m (TTN, 2002a, p.5). An analysis of SE Lottery awards42 
also identified 265 successful table tennis applications between 2009 and 2018 
valued at £2.65m, suggesting that TTE was either content to be a ‘policy taker’ rather 
than a ‘policy shaper’, or that the SMNGB’s ‘core’ beliefs complemented those of 
government and SE. TTE acknowledged that it was ‘influenced by decisions made 
                                                          
41
 References to interviewee CEOTTE relate to an interview dated 24
th
 September 2018. 
42
 SE Lottery Awards Apr 2009 – Sep 2018. Available online at: https://www.sportengland.org/our-work/open-data/ 
192 
 
by the government in respect of their policies and direction’ (Murdoch, former Chair 
of TTE, cited in TTN, 2006a, p.14), and that the intended outcome of the close 
working relationship with SE was to ensure table tennis was ‘in tune with national 
trends’, and that ‘policy makers [were] aware of the priorities’ of TTE/table tennis 
(TTE, 2006, p.17). However, TTE was aware of the level of competition between 
NGBs within SE-led coalition when it stated that it would be ‘fighting for a share of 
the funding and opportunities’ (Murdoch, former Chair of TTE, cited in TTN, 2006d, 
p.4).  
TTE’s willingness to closely align with government/SE43 and accept its contractual-
compliance obligation, is further evident from TTE’s acknowledgement that ‘in return 
for … unprecedented levels of investment … it is committed to delivering a range of 
agreed outcomes, in line with government policy’ (TTE, 2011, p.4). For example, the 
synchronicity between TTE’s strategic plans and that of government/SE can be seen 
though table tennis’ inclusion within many of government/SE’s initiatives (e.g. 
Playground to Podium, PL4S and PESSYP programmes) (TTE, 2009a, p.2), one 
consequence of which was increasing levels of government/SE influence over the 
NGB, and heightened tensions within TTE, particularly between the Executive and 
membership, as highlighted by interviewee CEOTTE:   
‘I’ve had people stand up at the AGM and accuse me of being a civil servant, and 
that we’re just a division of [SE] … and that the Board allowed us to lose the 
heartbeat of the sport by following commands from above.’ 
It is also evident that government’s shifting emphasis towards increasing adult 
participation within Creating a Sporting Habit for Life, together with SE’s changed 
remit to include 14-plus participation, impacted on NGBs by shaping the way sport 
was delivered, and in doing so affected the relationship between the Board and the 
clubs and members:  
 
  
                                                          
43 See SE’s NGB National Priorities online data for 2013-17 WSPs for further information on table tennis’ alignment with SE 
policy and objectives: Available online from: https://www.sportengland.org/media/10084/20130920-ngb-priorities-spreadsheet-
final.xls 
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‘We had to change the way in which we delivered. If we were going to increase our 
overall participants from 150,000 to 180,000, then we couldn’t do that through our 
clubs, because they were not big enough to do that. So, the organisation had to 
make a decision to look at a different way of working, and that way was the mass 
[participation] side of things’ (Interviewee: SMTTE44).  
However, the consequences of the contractual-compliance relationship between TTE 
and government/SE became apparent as a result of the failure to achieve agreed 
outcomes, when TTE faced clear financial sanctions (SE, 2014a). The imposition of 
sanctions highlighted the punitive element of SE-led coalition membership, and an 
example of Lukes’ first dimension of power. In this regard, TTE only received a one 
year award (£2.3m) for its WSP 2013-17, and was subjected to special conditions 
(SE, 2012g, p.6), primarily due to the non-achievement of participation targets (SE, 
2015a, p.10). Conversely, in recognition of the ‘organisational transformation’ of 
TTE, the SMNGB was rewarded with a further conditional award of £4.2m, subject to 
continued and proactive collaboration with SE to enhance TTE’s participation 
strategy (SE, 2015a, p.10).  
An important consideration in meeting changing government/SE policy objectives is 
evidence that draws attention to the relatively short window of opportunity available 
for NGBs, to implement policy change and meet policy objectives. As interviewee 
SMTTE noted:  
‘[SE] funds and directs you to deliver changes every four years, you lose a minimum 
of 18 months of really strong delivery time, because you’ve got at least 6 to 12 
months of developing all that new programme or new way of working, and … often 
lose 6 months at the back end as well, because you’re having to hold the fort as 
such. You can carry on delivering, but it probably affects the speed of your delivery, 
because there’s a bit of uncertainty. When you look at it across so many sports, it 
does have an impact.’      
Interestingly, it is evident that the most significant change for TTE, which was part of 
the government’s switch from ‘sport for sport’s sake’ to a greater emphasis on 
inactivity within Sporting Future in 2015, has been the demise of the WSP: 
                                                          
44
 References to interviewee SMTTE relate to an interview dated 5
th
 October 2018. 
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‘[T]he big change that’s happened was the death of the [WSP], and moving into 
where we are now. Table tennis was one of the few sports that could actually deal 
with the [WSP] a bit better, because we definitely have the breadth and variety, from 
young to old, abled, disabled, ethnic minorities. We could do the social bit [and] the 
regulator bit’ (Interviewee: CEOTTE).    
This suggests that TTE were not only content to be a ‘policy taker’, but ‘core’ beliefs 
were also complementary. However, despite the CEO of TTE’s belief that WSPs 
gave the SMNGB a competitive advantage, she considered the move away from 
WSPs to be ‘a good thing’, as on the whole the system was flawed. The fostering of 
competition rather than collective working among NGBs to meet SE target driven 
policies, with a focus on numbers rather than creating a sporting habit for life, largely 
undermined NGBs in their attempts to increase participation. To add weight to this 
argument, interviewee CEOTTE provided further clarification:  
‘I do think there were a lot of [NGBs] who did get distracted, and we probably did. 
[T]here was too much time and energy being put into growing participation numbers, 
purely for participation numbers, just to meet targets. Than necessarily working out 
how that created a sporting habit, or a lifestyle. It was very target driven. You needed 
numbers and it was driving the wrong behaviours.’ 
While the above evidence indicates an acceptance of the significant change in policy 
direction, rather than opposition, and TTE’s position as primarily a ‘policy taker’, 
TTE’s membership of the NGBCEOF demonstrates a concern to collectively lobby 
government/SE more effectively than in the past, although there is little evidence of 
impact on SE and government policy. Nevertheless, the CEO of TTE valued:  
‘the fact the Minister does come to meet with us. CEOs of [SE] and [UKS] do come to 
meet with us … I think there is a genuine and general feeling that we are better and 
stronger together’ (Interviewee: CEOTTE).  
The importance of effective lobbying was endorsed by John Major (2006), who 
argued that ‘sport should lobby harder, more frequently and use national icons to 
highlight their case. Governments respond to stimuli. Sport should provide that 
stimuli.’  
However, the extent to which SE would welcome a more effective SMNGB lobby is 
unclear, especially when it is possible to argue that TTE/table tennis has less need 
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to lobby as its policies and strategic goals are so closely aligned to SE, and that TTE 
considers itself to be a social sport, school sport, participation sport and an elite 
sport, which highlights the willingness of the NGB to cross subsystem and coalition 
boundaries, and a willingness to accept the policy requirements of the SE-led 
coalition. It is also evident that TTE sees itself as more than just a membership 
organisation, rather a business involved in the promotion of sport, where 
membership is just part of its business model:  
‘We’re in the business of promoting sport … Membership is a strand of it. Our vision 
is about everybody’s talking about table tennis, that doesn’t talk about membership, it 
doesn’t talk about people playing it. Actually, it talks about more people involved in it, 
whether they’re coaching, volunteering, parents taking their kids and helping run the 
local club, or playing it in their local park … It’s much bigger than just being a 
membership organisation’ (Interviewee: CEOTTE). 
The perspective outlined by the CEO of TTE clearly meets with SE’s approval, TTE 
having been awarded a substantial sum from SE (in excess of £8m) for the 2017-21 
funding cycle (SE, 2017), strengthening TTE’s integration into the SE-led coalition.  
However, TTE is not uncritical of its relationship with SE. Differences have emerged 
partly centred around SE’s changed remit to include sport and physical activity down 
to 5-year olds:   
‘[SE] has a remit down to 5, but actually don’t seem to be doing anything with that, 
and even then, it’s only outside of school hours, it’s extra-curricular. In-curricular 
sporting activity sits with the [DfE], but they have no connections with governing 
bodies. All the evidence tells you that if you embed a sporting or an active lifestyle in 
children from school, you’ve got a much better chance of making them active adults. 
Yet, we’re blocking off school sport to the [DfE], [and] outside of school sport to 
somebody else’ (Interviewee: CEOTTE). 
Evidence has also highlighted a level ambiguity and confusion within TTE that 
results from the interpretation of policy shifts, which provides a possible explanation 
for NGBs’ misunderstanding of policy requirements:  
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‘there’s still a bit of ambiguity in terms of that age group, because it is five-plus, but 
there’s still a bit of hang on from the 14-plus era, in that there’s still not a 100% shift 
from [SE] in that sense, which sometimes can be a bit confusing. Our [SE] funding 
can’t fund our activities in schools or activities connected to schools …, [and] we’re 
not allowed to bid for any funding to work in schools … In theory that’s the [DfE], and 
the [YST’s] domain’ (Interviewee: SMTTE). 
Such evidence points towards a lack of coordination between DCMS, SE, and DfE, 
particularly as interviewee DCMSa commented that SE’s remit opening up to 5-year 
olds ‘must be heartening’ for NGBs, yet was unaware that NGBs had no route to 
market for that age group. Furthermore, evidence indicates that SE has yet to 
determine its level of interaction with NGBs in relation to its changed remit, which 
emphasises further the ambiguity and confusion stemming from another policy shift:     
‘I think they are still going through a huge amount of understanding what their role 
should be, and how they interact with NGBs at that sort of level, because for years 
and years and years, they’ve been 16 plus. So, I think we’re in a weird sort of 
hinterland at the moment, where … [SE] is still upskilling itself, to understand the 
behaviours and attitudes of children’ (Interviewee: DCMSb).            
At an elite level, TTE joined forces with other disenfranchised sports to challenge the 
No Compromise approach to elite funding, against a backdrop of media criticism that 
argued the UKS No Compromise principle was ‘divisive’, ‘self-defeating’, and 
‘designed to create fear that there will be a total collapse of the UK medal tally 
should the current funding model be meddled with’ (MacInnes, 2018). TTE’s 
collaboration with other unfunded Olympic sports demonstrates a collective attempt 
by NGBs to influence or shape the ‘policy-core’ beliefs of the UKS-led coalition. The 
impact of this collective action was positive to a limited extent and benefitted from 
support from some funded sports who added their voices to the campaign for at least 
a level of baseline funding to be granted to unfunded sports, as can be seen from 
interviewee CEOTTE’s comments:  
‘I do think there is enough noise out there, and even from funded [NGBs] as well, in 
support of the concept of baseline funding so that you can hold a programme 
together. I certainly know, just from personal conversations with, rowing, hockey, and 
gymnastics, there is a degree of sympathy. You only have to go back 10 years, and 
they were not in the right place, and without that ability to have some baseline 
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funding to … allow them to build again from the bottom, they wouldn’t be where they 
are now.’  
Evidence also suggests a degree of success in this regard as table tennis have 
benefitted from government/UKS’s new ‘Aspirational Fund’, with an award of the 
modest sum of £275,000 (UKS, 2018), which is more than some of TTE’s 
counterparts, and is arguably attributable to table tennis’ greater potential for podium 
success at the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games. 
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8.3) Operational impacts and approaches to changing sport policy  
8.3.1) Governance 
Evidence suggests that TTE’s initial efforts in the 1980s to modernise and adhere to 
governance requirements, were financially-driven and self-benefitting, for example, 
TTE’s first CEO was ‘almost entirely funded by the Sports Council’ (Prean, former 
Chair of TTE cited in TTN, 1987, p.17). However, while modernisation was seen as 
essential for the development of TTE/table tennis (see TTN, 2004, p.5; TTN, 2005, 
p.5; TTN, 2007a, p.4), TTE’s appetite for change has been slow to develop, having 
acknowledged that the SMNGB was still ‘well behind the majority of other sports in 
terms of corporate governance’ (Murdoch, former Chair of TTE, cited in TTN, 2007c, 
p.4). The inertia and conservatism within TTE evidently stemmed from political 
tensions, fashioned by an apparent ‘Westminster Model’ of organisational 
democracy: 
‘When I arrived here, you could feel that political tension – that chairman and his 
band of supporters, and that former chairman and his band of supporters. It was 
almost built on a Westminster Model of party affiliation, and one chairman would 
come in undo all [the] policies, then 8 years later would be defeated, and someone 
else would come in and spend the first few years undoing all [the] policies’ 
(Interviewee: CEOTTE). 
An example of the conflicts within the Board relates to the reoccurring issue of 
individual membership, and the perceived disparity between affiliation fees and 
benefits of membership (TTN, 2003b, p.6). The issue of individual membership was 
a priority due to changes to government policy and the operational environment of 
NGBs, particularly changes to SE funding policy and the increased requirement of 
evidenced-based monitoring (SE, 2003, p.2). As noted by TTE, ‘[individual 
membership] has become much more relevant in recent years as the way we have 
to report to our funding partners has changed’ (Murdoch, former Chair of TTE, cited 
in TTN, 2007d, p.5), and necessitates a ‘convincing argument’ to funding partners for 
continued investment (TTE, 2006, p.7). While the evidence here shows a willingness 
of TTE to comply with SE, it also draws attention to the challenges of managing the 
tension between members’ interests and the needs of SE. According to the Chair of 
TTE, as noted in the Chair’s report within TTN (2007b, p.5), TTE’s overall strategy 
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needed to ‘align … with the new funding strategies [of SE]’, but also ‘ensure the 
needs of our members … are fully encompassed.’ The implementation of individual 
membership as opposed to membership of clubs was clearly part of TTE’s 
conditional funding agreement with SE, in line with Game Plan (DCMS, 2002, p.122), 
to ‘drive reform’ in those who were slow or resisted modernisation, TTE having been 
‘strongly urged to put this right or suffer potential reduced funding’ (Murdoch, former 
Chair of TTE, cited in TTN, 2006e, p.4), emphasising the compliance pressure within 
the SE-led coalition. Indeed, TTE acknowledged its weaknesses in governance and 
expressed a willingness to comply with SE governance requirements by accepting 
the need ‘to radically overhaul the organisation and create a world class governing 
body [fit-for-purpose]’ (TTE, 2009b, p.20), as recommended by Cunningham (2001, 
p.5; UKS, 2002; DCMS, 2002).  
It is evident that by 2013, TTE had met many of the challenges of governance 
improvements, SE having acknowledged that TTE ‘appeared to be turning the 
organisation around, having appointed a new Chairman and Chief Executive. 
Governance was improving’ (SE, 2013, p.6). Interviewee CEOTTE elaborated further 
on this point:  
‘[M]y predecessor retired, before he was probably required to retire. So, I came into 
an initial interim position. A lot of change management was needed. In the first nine 
months we had restructured, rebranded, relocated, new Board. [The previous] 
Chairman … was right person to make that step change initially, he was one of them, 
he was part of the National Council … But he would have struggled to take us into 
the next phase. So, we got another new Chair.’ 
Arguably, SE was influential in TTE’s decision to replace its existing management 
team, but it was also a strategic decision on the part of TTE to ensure continued 
financial support. The evidence also provides an illustration of tension between 
volunteers and professionals within NGBs, and the difficulty of the removal of the 
‘Blazer Brigade’ from positions of authority, which was arguably necessary for 
government to exert greater control over the operational and financial activities of 
NGBs. This exercise of power resonates with Lukes’ first and third dimensions of 
power, particularly in respect of shaping preferences of NGBs, to downplay the 
interests of membership and give priority to those of government and SE. The 
significance of which can be seen by the new Board’s remit to undertake a ‘root and 
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branch reform of … governance’, with particular emphasis on changing the form of 
the National Council from a policy-making body to an advisory and communications 
role (TTE, 2014, p.3).  
The tensions between NGB administrations and members, and the difficulties for 
NGBs operating as both a membership and a contractor organisation (with SE as the 
client), is demonstrated further by repercussions of the new Code of Governance for 
Sport. For example, TTE’s Annual Report 2016-17 (2017, p.6) reported to members 
that ‘[a]ny failure to comply with or meet the Code [would] result in a loss of funding’, 
illustrating Lukes’ first dimension of power. However, members rejected the 
proposals to meet UKS/SE’s new rules on governance, prompted by the perceived 
view among some opponents that leadership within the sport could be handed to 
those ‘with little table tennis experience or knowledge’ (BBC Sport, 2017). To 
elaborate on this further, interviewee CEOTTE commented that: 
‘It was six people, who wouldn’t normally even talk to each other at times, and it was 
sort of a marriage of convenience, and there were different motivations. One was 
motivated just by bitterness, because he got voted out, and he was part of the 
previous regime. Another one was … motivated by the thought of seeing himself as 
Chairman, and he’s on an empire-build mission.’ 
The result of which was ‘a suspended state of business [(a funding freeze on the 
TTE’s award of £9m), with table tennis becoming ‘the first sport to fail to deliver on 
the government's requirements for funding’ (BBC Sport, 2017). The eventual 
acceptance by members of governance reforms (Morgan, 2017), demonstrated the 
conditional membership of the SE-led coalition, and TTE’s willingness to modernise 
and accept compliance over autonomy, albeit enforced, on the basis of self-
preservation. 
Clearly, the governance code has resulted in increased levels of professionalism 
across the sporting sector, although arguably through enforced change for certain 
NGBs, if not most of them. However, evidence indicates that the increasing levels 
professionalism required of NGBs by government/SE, has nourished the underlying 
tensions between NGBs and their members. It could also be argued that such 
tensions exist along a fault-line where the machinery of government meets the 
traditional, voluntarist, organic nature of sport membership-only-bodies; in other 
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words, where the engineering of government meets society head on. As noted by 
interviewee CEOTTE: 
‘[T]oo many governing bodies became too professionally-based [too quickly] … It has 
taken a sense of purpose away from the volunteer group, where … suddenly, they’re 
being slightly pushed to the side, where there’s no route to the Board anymore, and 
they’re feeling slightly alienated, and it does create constant tension. With reduced 
funding [we] are having to go back into the volunteer structure, and finding that the 
volunteer structure either isn’t there or isn’t interested.’ 
 
8.3.2) Funding 
Evidence suggests that in the 1980s, TTE’s potential to meet Sport for All objectives, 
in return for financial support, outweighed any potential fractures within the 
organisation, having been adjudged by SC to be in a ‘state of preparedness’ to 
deliver on government priorities (Sports Council, 1982, p.35). It is also evident that 
further opportunities existed to obtain additional funds by those sports ‘showing 
initiative and a desire to progress’, such as table tennis (Blunn, former Chair of TTE, 
cited in TTN, 1981, p.15). This highlights the competition for limited financial 
resources, the potential for which was arguably more prevalent where cash injection 
from the SC was seen as a necessity, and often ‘the only means of survival’ (Gray, 
former Senior Manager, cited in TTN, 1990, p.10). This would appear to be the case 
for TTE, since a return to financial stability was undoubtedly secured by increasing 
levels of resource-dependency from the SC during the 1980s. The increasing levels 
of resource-dependence outweighed member interests, as evidenced by TTE Chair, 
Alan Ransome’s intervention in urging members not to vote for a decrease in 
affiliation fees, as this countered SC’s explicit requirements for member 
subscriptions to at least keep step with inflation (cited in TTN, 1993, p.5; also see 
Sports Council, 1988).  
The introduction of the Lottery in 1994 provided TTE with more opportunities to 
harvest additional financial support, to the extent that it would be ‘working very hard 
towards table tennis being at the front of the queue when funds are distributed’ 
(Gray, former Senior Manager, cited in TTN, 1994a, p.25). Indeed, SE Annual 
Reports indicated that TTE Lottery and Exchequer awards amounted to £9.9m 
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between 1998 and 2005. Significant levels of public subsidies were granted to TTE 
for the 2009-13 (£9.8m) and 2013-17 (£11.7m) funding cycles (see Appendix IX), 
linked to WSPs, participation initiatives (PL4S, Ping), and NGB support (capacity 
building, governance, restructuring). From TTE’s perspective the substantial awards 
reflected government/SE’s belief that table tennis could meet government’s social 
agenda, as noted by TTE (2009a, p.4), ‘table tennis is … recognised as being able to 
support wider government agendas like health, crime reduction and social inclusion.’ 
This highlights the level at which government/SE’s ‘policy-core’ beliefs influenced 
TTE's policy direction, and that TTE’s engagement at a policy-environmental level 
was contractual, and constituted not only on the basis of compliance, but also 
complementary core beliefs and mutually beneficial interdependencies. This is 
exemplified further by TTE’s acknowledgement that many of its activities and 
programmes were ‘driven and funded by money from the Exchequer and the 
Lottery’, in return for which TTE ‘agreed to deliver a range of outcomes and [KPIs]’ 
(TTE, 2010, p.4), which had ‘to be achieved in order for the funding to be continued’ 
(TTE, 2015a, p.35).  
Despite SE’s concerns that NGBs should be more financially self-reliant, the levels of 
income generated by TTE have not matched the increasing levels of government/SE 
funding, which has inevitably led to greater resource-dependency. Table 8.1 
provides financial data on TTE’s income for the period 2006 to 2016. 
Table 8.1: Table Tennis England income/revenue for the period 2005-06 to 
2015-06  
Year 2005-
06 
£’000 
2006-
07 
£’000 
2007-
08 
£’000 
2008-
09 
£’000 
2009-
10 
£’000 
2010-
11 
£’000 
2011-
12 
£’000 
2012-
13 
£’000 
2013-
14 
£’000 
2014-
15 
£’000 
2015-
16 
£’000 
Turnover 1,884 2,189 2,555 2,849 4,505 4,867 5,218 5,345 3,989 4,037 4,801 
 
Other Income 
(Sports Council 
Grants) 
 
1,361 1,739 2,167 2,161 3,516 4,084 3,978 4,107 3,212 2,933 3,719 
Resource-
Dependency % 
 
72 79 85 76 78 84 76 77 80 73 77 
Source adapted from: TTE Annual Reports (2006 to 2016) 
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The excessively high dependence on public funds clearly demonstrates TTE’s 
vulnerability to volatile changes in government and agency support. For example, the 
13% reduction in TTE’s funding award for the 2017-21 funding cycle (TTE, 2017, 
p.4), necessitated immediate action to restructure and reduce costs (TTE, 2017). 
Previous reductions in funding required similar interventions, including relocation to 
alternative premises (TTE, 2014, p.26), albeit subsidised by SE (2014, p.6). 
Arguably, resource-dependency emphasises the weakness of TTE, and its limited 
capacity to challenge the overriding influence of government/SE. A position 
acknowledged and accepted by TTE, on the basis that ‘[SE] is a related party45 as it 
has significant influence over [TTE’s] financial and operating policies’ (TTE, 2006, 
p.10). Evidence also signposts the concerns of TTE that without the substantial 
support from public subsidies the organisation is likely to revert back to a 
membership-only body:  
‘We’re over 70% reliant on [SE] funding. If we lost it, there’s a lot of people that would 
lose their jobs, and programmes that we would just have to stop. We wouldn’t be 
able to deliver them. You’d go back to being basically a membership body. I don’t 
know what you would do’ (Interviewee: CEOTTE).  
Interestingly, TTE (2018, p.28) stated within its 2017-18 Annual Report that SE 
continued to be the largest contributor representing 51% of total income, with 
affiliation fees at 8%. While this shows the minimal revenue generated from 
membership fees, it also raises some doubt over the exact level of resource- 
dependency, although this could be linked to the size and timing of SE funding 
awards or a different basis of calculation compared to Table 8.1.  
It is also evident that the high levels of resource-dependency and reduced self-
reliance, resulted from the speed at which substantial sums of government funding 
were obtained by NGBs, without there being any real understanding of the 
expectations that came with access to public funds, or how to use them effectively: 
                                                          
45 Accounting standards - FRS 8 defines related parties as: a party related to an entity if: 
(a) directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, the party: i) controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the 
entity; ii) has an interest in the entity that gives it significant influence over the entity; or iii) has joint control over the entity. Significant 
influence is the power to participate in the operating and financial policy decisions of an entity. Available online from: 
http://www.accaglobal.com/uk/en/member/discover/cpd-articles/audit-ssurance/related-parties15.html 
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‘[T]oo much money came in too quickly [and] too many pots of money were thrown at 
[NGBs], and rightly they lapped them up, but didn’t quite know how to use it 
sustainably’ (Interviewee: CEOTTE).  
For TTE, financial self-sufficiency is likely to be an illusion for the foreseeable future, 
due to the inadequacy of alternative sources of income, and evidence that suggests 
cost increases across the spectrum of sport services will inevitably impact on the   
sustainability of incrementally increased membership fees:   
‘a lot the membership would say that table tennis is becoming more and more 
expensive and it never used to be that way. We’ve had to take membership fees from 
about £6 per year to £16 per year, over the last five years, and we’ve very openly 
said that this will continue and go to £20. [But] they’re paying their club fee, they’re 
buying new equipment, they’re paying their league fee, and we’ve become the straw 
that broke the camel’s back, as everything else is going up’ (Interviewee: CEOTTE). 
However, further evidence indicates a willingness of TTE to accept greater resource- 
dependency by tapping into funding channels at points where different policy sectors 
overlap, which not only demonstrates the existence of intersecting policy domains 
and the potential for NGBs to engage across policy sectors, but also the financial pull 
of coalition membership and TTE’s content to be a ‘policy taker’: 
‘[Sport/NGBs have] definitely got the potential to overlap with different policy sectors, 
and I think, actually, where there could be more flexibility within the [SE] funding 
system, policy system, is recognising a bit more of that … Where they have a mental 
health pot, or a youth volunteering pot, for example, which they open out to partners, 
… 95% of those pots were given to non-NGB partners … NGBs could potentially deal 
with those groups, where we have skills and where sports have got experience of 
and good case studies of doing it … We do have a strong recent history of working 
within the mental health sector’ (Interviewee: SMTTE). 
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8.4.3) Capacity Building: workforce and facilities 
According to Ken Muhr, in a published letter to TTN, a lack of an effective workforce 
had stymied the development of table tennis during the 1990s, where for example, 
the influx of new participants had not been matched by appropriate levels of 
volunteers (cited in TTN, 1997c, p.5). TTE’s inclusion within the SC’s 1991 Focus 
Sport initiative provided an opportunity to introduce table tennis development officers 
(TTDOs) to deliver sport into the community (TTN, 1996, p.5), the success of which 
was seen as an important influencing factor in TTE’s relationship with SE (Ransome, 
former Chair of TTE, cited in TTN, 2000a, p.6). Arguably, such influence was not 
exercised to change policy, but to maximise the financial benefits from available 
funding opportunities. For example, in recognition of the value, role and decline of 
volunteers in sport, government/SE introduced the ‘Step into Sport’ programme 
(valued at £7m), to encourage volunteering among young people (DCMS, 2002, 
p.166). Table tennis was one of eight sports included in the scheme, which was to be 
used to the ‘maximum benefit’ of table tennis (TTN, 2002b, p.5).  
The restructure of SC in 1997 provided TTE with further opportunities to enhance its 
capacity building through strategic alignments with government/SE policies for sport. 
For example, TTE acknowledged that to develop its own coaching structure it would 
‘support and work with the government agencies for the longer term benefit of our 
sport’ (TTE, 2006, p.2), particularly as coaching was seen as a key element for 
delivery of the government’s Playground to Podium strategy (DNH, 1995; DCMS, 
2002a, 2002b). Indeed, TTE’s partnership with the United Kingdom Coaching 
Certificate was considered an essential part in ‘driving [table tennis] forward via a 
national programme recognised by the government’ (Murdoch, former Chair of TTE, 
cited in TTN, 2007a, p.4), thus signposting TTE’s willingness to align with the ‘policy-
core’ beliefs of government/SE on the basis of shared-interests, and importance of 
shared-beliefs within agency-led coalitions. This close relationship with SE beliefs 
and objectives is exemplified further by TTE’s assertion that its volunteer workforce 
would focus on ‘developing programmes and projects in line with … [TTE’s WSP] 
and policy agreed with [SE]’ (TTE, 2006, p.22). It is also evident that SE provided 
major financial support to fund TTE’s professional development team (TTE, 2006), to 
‘drive development forward within the guidelines of set work programmes and 
specific targets that emanate from the [TTE’s] policies (TTE, 2007, p.25), and 
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thereby help deliver SE’s programmes and objectives. However, evidence suggests 
that TTDO’s were less proactive at a local league level, and more focused at club 
level (particularly Premier Clubs) (TTE, 2007, p.25), owing to a ‘stretched’ ‘volunteer 
infrastructure (TTE, 2008, p.25). On the one hand, this highlights a level of resource- 
interdependency through the use of TTE’s volunteer infrastructure to meet 
government/SE-objectives. On the other hand, the evidence points towards a 
separation between TTE’s administration and grassroots table tennis, with a stronger 
emphasis by the former on the elite end of the sporting spectrum.  
Further evidence of TTE’s centrality to the SE-led coalition was the involvement in a 
‘series of high level government ministerial meetings’ between eight sports (table 
tennis, tennis, rugby union and league, swimming, athletics, cricket and football), 
chosen to help government ‘reverse the decline in competitive sport’ through a 
government-backed ‘Competition Managers’ initiative (TTE, 2008, p.13; DCMS, 
2008, pp.10-11). According to the CEO of TTE, Richard Yule, table tennis’ inclusion 
within large, government backed schemes in the early 2000s, meant the sport was 
‘taken seriously’, particularly as TTE was working with influential partners, and 
‘sitting down at the table with representatives from the major sports' (cited in TTN, 
2008, p.20). Such evidence draws attention to the potential of TTE/table tennis as a 
key policy actor within the SE-led coalition, and its strategic use political resources to 
raise the awareness and profile of table tennis.  
However, the pattern of funding linked to initiatives that were of three to five year 
duration, impacted negatively upon workforce stability, resulting in persistent 
organisational re-structuring and re-shaping to meet changing government priorities 
and programmes:   
‘the challenge that policy change has on us, is that you get a specific group of people 
in to perhaps deliver against a programme for four years, the right type of people to 
deliver against that policy. But then when the policy changes, you need a different 
skillset to deliver what we need to deliver against. So, there’s a lack of continuity in 
staff, because they know that policy change might mean we have to deliver in a 
different way, or worry that they’re role doesn’t fit with this new policy’ (Interviewee: 
SMTTE). 
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It is evident that the introduction of the Lottery in 1994 provided TTE/table tennis with 
an opportunity to improve its facility infrastructure, for example, as part of SE’s ‘More 
Places’ strategy (SE, 1999), funding of £11m for table tennis facilities was approved,  
of which £7.6m was contributed from the Lottery (TTN, 1997b, p.3). This success in 
attracting funding, challenged the beliefs held in parts of the table tennis community 
that the sport did ‘not pull [its] numerical weight in obtaining Lottery Sports Fund 
capital support’, or was ‘generally too dispersed, fragmented, [and] played in too 
small units to have power’ (TTN, 1999b, Editorial, p.1).  
Evidence indicates a proactive TTE in securing of funds for facilities, whether directly 
through engagement with government/SE, or indirectly by endorsement and 
recommendation of individual projects to assist clubs. For example, the Foundation 
for the Sports and the Arts had issued grants in excess of £500,000 during the 1990s 
to upgrade table tennis facilities, based on applications submitted via the TTE 
development department, although the programme was primarily aimed at Premier 
Clubs (TTN, 2001c, p.5). The sources of funding indicated that TTE’s facility strategy 
was clearly geared towards meeting government/SE participation objectives, 
particularly as TTE’s Premier Club programme was ‘totally in line’ with that of 
government (TTN, 2003a, p.5), as evidenced by TTE/table tennis’ inclusion within 
the DCMS ‘Community Club Development Programme’ (SE, 2004, p.15; TTE, 2006, 
p.17; 2008, p.2). Furthermore, TTE’s 2009 revised national facilities strategy was 
developed in partnership with SE, and formed an ‘integral element’ of the Premier 
Club programme (TTE, 2009b, p.5) to support a key objective of SE to increase 
participation in NGB accredited clubs (SE, 2008, p.24). Again, this highlights a high 
level of shared interest between TTE and SE.   
Part of the explanation for TTE’s success in obtaining funding was its 
acknowledgement that innovation was necessary to ‘meet [the] strategic 
outcomes … agreed with [SE] and the government’ (TTE, 2010, p.27, 2011). 
Innovation is exemplified by TTE’s ‘Ping’ initiative, aimed at introducing new 
participation opportunities through the location of permanent outdoor table tennis 
tables in parks and open spaces (Mackintosh, 2013; Mackintosh et al., 2014). ‘Ping’, 
not only provided TTE with ‘recreational activity, raise[d] awareness and profile 
and … additional informal recruitment entry points into table tennis’ (TTE, 2009b, 
p.5), but also assisted SE to meet its own participation targets (SE, 2012).  
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However, success in attracting SE funding needed to be set against changes in LA 
funding that impacted negatively on the provision and development of table tennis, 
as noted by interviewee CEOTTE: 
‘The demise of well-funded [LA] facilities [have impacted on clubs that are] having to 
move facilities because they can’t afford to stay where they’re staying, because the 
rent of their hall has gone up so much, [or] … because the half of the hall has been 
let out to Zumba at the same time, [and] everyone’s noise is conflicting with each 
other, so everybody’s experience is poor.’ 
Again, this supports the argument that changes in LA contracts and provision for 
sport has acted as an external perturbation, where other policy subsystems have 
impacted on the sport policy domain, at the point where subsystems overlap. 
 
8.4.4) Participation 
It is evident that community sport, club development and competition are important 
elements of TTE’s participation strategies, focused on a competition structure that 
has remained unchanged for decades, albeit with a few alterations to revitalise ailing 
open tournaments and increase junior participation (TTN, 1999b, p.6). Rather than 
long term stability indicating conservatism within table tennis, TTE claimed that its 
competition structure was ‘amongst the most comprehensive of any [NGB]’ (TTE, 
2007, p.4), and highly regarded by the National Competition Review Panel (TTE, 
2010). However, there have been some innovations and the discussion in this 
section is centred on two key participation initiatives, namely, Premier Club, and 
‘Ping’, which have had a major impact on TTE/table tennis. 
TTE’s Premier Club initiative, introduced in 1999, was considered a significant ‘step 
change’ for grassroots table tennis in England (Gray, former Senior Manager, cited 
in TTN, 1999a, Editorial, p.6), focused on a ‘player-centred’ approach that endorsed 
and recognised clubs’ integration of a range of activities, from volunteering and 
coaching to tournament organisation and development work (TTN, 2000c, p.5). The 
aim of the programme was to create ‘a strong sustainable club structure, at four 
levels, setting high national standards’, which would provide table tennis with ‘a solid 
platform enabling full participation in the government agenda’ (TTE, 2006, p.14). 
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Indeed, the former Chair of TTE noted in his regular column within TTN that the 
initiative aligned with government/SE-objectives at all Premier Club levels 
(introductory, participation, advanced and excellence), and was ‘totally in tune with 
Government and [SE] thinking on sports development and on increasing 
membership of sports organisations’ (e.g. the introductory level included objectives 
for school-club links) (Ransome, cited in TTN, 2001a, p.5). Further alignment is 
evident between TTE’s sport development agenda and government/SE’s policy on 
health and fitness, and social inclusion. As noted by TTE, development programmes, 
including Premier Club, were ‘absolutely in line with the policy of the government in 
tackling the fitness and health of children at school and with the Government's 
inclusion and community policies’ (TTN, 2003a, p.5 ), and were driven by 
‘responding to the initiatives created through [SE], the [YST] and other national 
agencies’, in order to contribute to SE’s aim ‘to make England the most active and 
successful sporting nation in the world’ (TTE, 2006, pp.14-15; 2008, p.25; SE, 1997; 
SE, 2008). The above evidence illustrates an opportunistic approach towards 
contributing to government/SE’s objectives, and increasing TTE’s own membership, 
as well as highlighting the complementary nature of TTE’s relationship with SE.  
However, evidence suggests TTE had difficulty sustaining the contractual-
compliance requirements of the SE-led coalition membership. For example, TTE 
observed a drop-off in Premier Clubs (TTE, 2007), and non-compliance with SE’s 
Club Mark KPIs (TTE, 2006). It could be argued that this resulted from strained 
resources to meet stretching SE-objectives, and TTE’s endeavours to seek out more 
opportunities to benefit table tennis, engaging with the ever-increasing initiatives 
from various government agencies to ultimately chase the money. As noted by TTE 
(2008, p.25), ‘responding to and taking up an ever increasing number of initiatives is 
a challenge (albeit positive!) to the less well-resourced sports such as table tennis.’ It 
is also evident that the downward pressure of SE’s ‘fit-for-purpose’ criteria to club 
level, through Club Mark, heightened the compliance versus autonomy debate within 
TTE membership/clubs. For example, the value of accreditation for some clubs had 
‘stimulated development and been thoroughly worthwhile’, while others believed it to 
be ‘a chore’, and conversely, didn’t share TTE’s ambitions and policy beliefs (TTE, 
2008, p.26), or those of government/SE.  
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Despite the challenges in engaging with SE’s changing initiatives, evidence suggests 
that TTE had met agreed participation outcomes for table tennis. For example, 
according to TTE (2010, p.10), APS figures for 2009 showed table tennis as being 
the ‘only one of the 31 funded Olympic sports to show a statistically significant 
increase in young people taking part in sport’, and was among only ‘five other sports 
meeting their growth targets’ (TTE, 2010, p.12). Evidence also shows that talent 
development had not been neglected in preparation for the 2012 London Olympiad. 
As noted by TTE (2006, p.27), ‘[w]ith the London Olympics 2012 in mind, talent 
identification and talent development have recently moved up the agenda for table 
tennis’, although it is clear that the talent pathway required improvement, particularly 
as the talent pool was smaller than its major competitors, and the gap between 
performance levels too large (TTE, 2008). However, despite the importance of talent 
development to TTE, particularly to gain re-entry to the UKS-led coalition, it is 
evident that increasing participative opportunities across all platforms has been its 
primary purpose, as noted by TTE (2016, p.3):  
‘It was always part of our plan over the next 10 years to return to the top of the world 
game … [but it] is only one part of our remit as [a NGB]. Our primary purpose is to 
create an increasing number of … opportunities for everyone to enjoy and achieve in 
table tennis.’ 
The innovative ‘Ping’ strategy, introduced in 2010, provided both SE and TTE with 
new opportunities to encourage mass participation, via ‘self-organised’ social and 
competitive table tennis (TTE, 2010, p.13), and reflected SE aims to ‘nurture genuine 
breakthroughs that will transform the way grassroots sport looks and feels’ (SE, 
2011, p.9). The aim of which was to place permanent outdoor table tennis tables in 
cities, parks and open spaces, to raise awareness of and improve access to table 
tennis, and ‘stimulate new players to take up our sport whilst creating new playing 
opportunities’ (TTE, 2010, p.28). According to Mackintosh et al. (2014, p.130), ‘Ping’ 
exemplified: 
‘a NGB attempting to work with … social change rather than against it, and 
understanding the success or failure, challenges and opportunities of the initiative 
may offer critical insights for other NGBs. [It exemplifies] the paradigm shift occurring 
in sports development delivery away from the traditional pathway from the club to 
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elite participation, and towards more organic and “alternative” modes of sports 
delivery.’    
 
 
However, evidence suggests ‘Ping’ was manufactured out of necessity to meet SE- 
objectives to increase participation numbers, and developed in line with policy shifts, 
which changed TTE’s delivery methods from traditional club-driven based activity to 
mass participation product-based activity:   
‘[to] hit big numbers, which our clubs just hadn’t got the capacity to do, fundamentally 
changed the relationship that sport had in terms of how it delivered … because it had 
to deliver against [SE targets], [and] for most NGBs the biggest funder is [SE]’ 
(Interviewee: SMTTE). 
For Mackintosh et al. (2014, p.136), ‘Ping’ stood in juxtaposition to other 
NGBs/sports that experienced a declining or stable trend in participation leading up 
to London 2012 Olympics. In addition, Mackintosh (2013, pp.235-236) signposted 
Ping’s potential impact on the sporting landscape, particularly in relation to the 
‘management, implementation and evaluation of self-organising formats of sporting 
and physical activity programmes.’ It is also evident that ‘Ping’ enabled TTE to 
develop ‘advocacy documents’ (TTE, 2011, p.25), which were arguably utilised as an 
effective tool for influencing government/SE decision-making, particularly in the 
allocation of resources. As evidenced by SE’s (2014c, p.6; TTE, 2017) decision to 
award TTE/table tennis a further £2m, inclusive of contributions towards the 
continuation of the ‘Ping’ and latterly the Loop initiatives (workplace and 
communities). Both programmes aimed at ‘taking table tennis to where people are in 
their everyday lives such as workplaces and community centres’ (TTE, 2017, p5). 
Furthermore, SE (2017b) awarded table tennis ‘mass market’ funding in 2017 to 
meet SE-objectives of increasing adult participation in outdoor exercise (SE, 2016e, 
p.25). According to interviewee CEOTTE, the ‘Ping’ initiative remains high on SE’s 
agenda, as its relevance to mass market objectives is what SE ‘want to talk about 
most’, such innovation reinforcing TTE’s position within the SE-led coalition, as a 
sport/NGB capable of supporting government/SE to achieve their own 
objectives/outcomes. 
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Interestingly, Mackintosh et al. (2014) expressed the idea of TTE as a social 
institution, and well placed to influence participation, particularly through versions of 
the sport that respond to social issues, as in the case of ‘Ping’. Indeed, as a proviso 
to receiving further investment for ‘Ping’, SE directed TTE to integrate the 
programme into a social and recreational strategy for table tennis (SE, 2014c), as 
seen in TTE’s Mission 2025 Strategy (2015b). TTE’s acquiescence provided further 
evidence of not only the SE’s influence over shaping TTE and TTE’s willingness to 
accept compliance over autonomy, but also of the extent to which TTE’s ambitions 
complemented those of SE. In addition, Mackintosh et al. (2014, p.136), highlighted 
the potential of table tennis to work ‘across sports development boundaries in the 
public sector realm of physical activity and health promotion’, a view firmly held by 
TTE, in the belief that table tennis is ‘a powerful tool to get people involved in sport 
and active lifestyles’ (TTE, 2009b, p.2; TTE, 2015a, p.4). TTE’s inclusion within the 
All Party Parliamentary Group for Mental Health, and TTE’s mental health action 
plan (TTE, 2016, p.11)46, provided further evidence of the commitment of TTE to 
SE’s physical activity and health policy objectives, and highlights the mobility of 
SMNGBs between policy subsystems, although inevitably this comes with the 
accompanying risk of directional conflict.  
Senior officers within TTE were aware of the tensions that could arise from trying to 
fulfill ambitions of SE and protect the interest of members. According to interviewee 
SMTTE, this is ‘probably the biggest debate’ within the higher echelons of TTE, and 
balancing the needs between the social objectives and core aspects of operational 
activity, is often a source of friction. Evidence suggests that:   
‘in terms of the clubs [this] affected the relationship in a negative way. It enabled less 
interaction with those clubs, because [TTE] were having to focus on the bigger 
numbers around [APS], and then clubs felt they were less supported, and developed 
more frictions as a result …[There] was a danger that in 15 years’ time, the club 
structure could become so far removed from the traditional sports sector, and that 
those relationships with NGBs might be so far removed that … [clubs] wouldn’t be 
connected with their [NGBs]’ (Interviewee: SMTTE). 
                                                          
46
 Linked to the Lottery funded project ‘Get Set to Go’, in partnership with Mind and SE, as noted in a TTE’s online news article: 
Available from: https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/news/archived/were-backing-sports-mental-health-charter/ 
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However, it was also clear that TTE senior staff recognised that clubs and 
volunteers, naturally engaged with many of the government’s social and health 
priorities, yet this has not been fully acknowledged by TTE (or indeed other 
SMNGBs), thus putting at risk the sustainability and continued existence of the club 
structure:  
‘[Sport] doesn’t have a clear enough view of what it can do across the board at a 
tradition level, and what it does achieve. These hundreds of thousands of clubs up 
and down the country, and hundreds of thousands of people volunteering and giving 
their time, the mental health benefits, loneliness benefits of volunteering. Because it’s 
always been there, you probably don’t recognise that until it’s taken away. It gets 
taken for granted that our sports clubs will always be there’ (Interviewee: SMTTE). 
It can be argued that conformity to government/SE-objectives has blurred the vision 
of what traditional NGB involvement looks like or what could be achieved through 
closer interaction with clubs/members. 
 
8.4.5) Partnerships 
It is evident that TTE’s close alignment to government/SE policy prompted a high 
degree of partnership-working with various other coalition partners, not only to meet 
government objectives, but also as an opportunistic strategy in the development of 
table tennis. As stated by TTE (2006, p.20), ‘[w]orking in partnership with 
government agencies and organisations, it is essential to ensure that table tennis is 
able to gain access to the ever increasing range of opportunities available to sport.’ 
For example, TTE worked in partnership with YST on a wide range of initiatives such 
as School Sport Co-ordinators, competition managers, Step into Sport (Young 
Leaders), and the UK School Games, not only to ‘support the development of table 
tennis’, but also to contribute to Sport England’s aims (TTE, 2007, p.25). In addition, 
collaboration with YST helped ‘to devise a competition matrix of traditional, modified 
and adapted formats of simple, attractive intra-school competitive games (TTE, 
2009a, p.25). TTE also supported YST within a joint NGB response to the 
government’s ‘Sport Premium’ funding for PE and School sport, stating that it would 
‘continue to work with the YST to help influence and encourage the inclusion of table 
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tennis in primary schools in targeted areas’ (TTE, 2013, p.35). TTE’s cooperation 
with influential policy actors did not position TTE/table tennis as a ‘policy shaper’, but 
although the sport remained a ‘policy taker’, it was able to use collaborations to 
maximise the benefits, especially financial support from the government. 
Further evidence of collaborative engagement and close working relationships with 
key coalition partners can be seen with CSPs, StreetGames, and Greenhouse 
Sports. According to TTE 2009-13 WSP (2009b), CSPs provided support to TTE’s 
operational activities, such as club development, facilities and adult participation. 
Partnership with StreetGames has been contractually formulated, not only to 
increase participation of young people in deprived areas, but also to support and 
influence the mainstream policies and practices of TTE that address disadvantage 
and excluded communities. Such engagement would suggest an alignment with SE 
‘policy-core’ beliefs and objectives. It also highlights TTE’s strategic use of 
knowledge transfer between coalition partners to strengthen its membership of the 
SE-led coalition. 
Evidence suggests that TTE strategies became more partnership-driven, particularly 
as TTE acknowledged that ‘partnerships are the key to the whole ethos of the 
organisation’ (TTE, 2016, p.3). An example of which is TTE’s close ties to 
Greenhouse Sports (TTE, 2014, p.4), a ‘London-based charity committed to using 
sport to help young people living in the inner city to realise their full potential’ (DCMS, 
2015, p.17; also see Downward et al., 2017). According to TTE, table tennis is an 
‘ideal tool’ to assist Greenhouse Sports achieve its own ambitions (TTN, 2006, p.18), 
although the primary purpose of TTE partnerships is to ‘create an increasing number 
of outstanding and exciting opportunities for everyone to enjoy and achieve in table 
tennis’ (TTE, 2016, p.3). Such evidence indicates a pattern of mutually beneficial 
interdependencies within coalition partnerships, which ties TTE more securely into 
the SE-led coalition. 
It is clear that Greenhouse Sports47 have close alignment with both ‘deep-core’ and 
‘policy-core’ beliefs, which have been endorsed by government/SE through the 
allocation of public funds (SE, 2008, p.17), again demonstrating the value of shared- 
                                                          
47
 See Appendix XII for examples of coalition partner beliefs, alignment and advocacy. 
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beliefs among coalition partners. ‘Deep-core’ beliefs include the belief that sport has 
the power to change lives (Greenhouse Sports, 2017), and ‘policy-core’ beliefs 
include the assumptions that the provision of ‘sports programmes … nurture social, 
thinking, emotional and physical skills that equip young people for life’ (DCMS, 2015, 
p.17; Greenhouse Sports, 2016, p.2). In addition, TTE’s close working with coalition 
partners has served to increase levels in participation, capacity, and targeted 
demographics (TTE, 2009b), as required by its contractual obligations to the SE-led 
coalition. This would suggest that partnership-working is a useful and mutually 
beneficial tool for achieving shared-interests and reinforces membership of the SE-
led coalition.  
According to interviewee SMTTE, the greater emphasis given to physical activity 
over sports for sports sake, has changed the dynamics of partnership-working, and 
fashioned a reversal of roles, where NGBs have potentially transitioned from 
supplicant to benefactor: 
‘a little back it was NGBs trying to lead the work with partners, and trying to get them 
on board to introduce sporting activities … The difference in policy and the research 
and evidence around physical activity is a lot more prevalent now that those 
organisations want to come to governing bodies, and look at how they can tap into 
[our] bank of resources, as opposed to be the other way round.’ 
 
8.5) Conclusion 
The case of TTE/table tennis has provided a number of significant findings in relation 
to the aims and objectives of this research. Evidence suggests that the Lottery was a 
game changer for the sport policy subsystem within the UK, and changes to LA 
leisure services have impacted on sport provision at a developmental level, 
restricting the delivery of sport. While it has been argued previously that ‘social 
actors’ prompted an internal shock to the sport policy subsystem, by increasing 
doubt in the ability of NGBs to meet policy objectives, it is also evident that flaws in 
government/SE’s WSP monitoring systems also delivered an internal shockwave 
within the system. The ethos of WSPs encouraged silo-working and competition 
rather than collective working among NGBs to meet SE target driven policies, which 
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resulted in behaviour in NGBs that was detrimental towards increasing participation, 
and prompted the major policy change incorporated within Sporting Future. Evidence 
also indicates that the rapid increase in public funding allocated to NGBs, was not 
always effectively used due to lack of management capacity, with the consequence 
that the targets set by SE were not always met.  
Organisationally, evidence suggests that government, internal discord, 
organisational inertia, conservatism, and resistance to change, contributed to 
TTE/table tennis’ decline from a position of strength to one of weakness and 
dependency between the 1970s and early 2000s. Indeed, it is evident that TTE’s 
conservativism and it’s less than nimble adaptation to change, have been the result 
of constant political tensions based on an almost ‘Westminster Model’ of 
confrontational democracy, where party affiliations and elections have stymied its 
development, the result of which has been an increasingly close and resource- 
dependent relationship with government and its agencies. Such reliance on public 
subsidies evidently a characteristic of the sporting landscape long before the advent 
of the Lottery.  
However, TTE have adapted to the changing government/SE policy values through 
strategic alignment of priorities with those of government/SE, underpinned by a 
culture of opportunism and pragmatism. While it could be argued that not maximising 
opportunities and income to protect the autonomy of the sport could be considered a 
dereliction of the duty on the part of TTE, membership of the SE-led coalition has led 
to an often dynamic operational environment engineered on the basis of high 
resource-dependency, compliance, performance regimes, and financial sanctions. 
The result of the alignment with SE has been a loss of autonomy owing to the 
increasing level of governmental influence over TTE’s operational and financial 
activities, and the emergence of observable tensions between compliance and 
autonomy. This is particularly evident with regard to modernisation and reform of 
TTE’s governance arrangements, where changes to governance have been driven 
by governmental influence and compliance, and the fear of financial sanctions for 
non-compliance. This has highlighted the weakness of TTE/table tennis and verified 
its resource-dependency, and limited capacity for TTE to operate on a self-sufficient 
basis for the foreseeable future, since membership income is the only viable option 
and potentially unsustainable due to the overall increase participation costs.  
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While SE’s influence over TTE is clear, there are indications that TTE has potential 
to exert a degree of influence within the government/SE policy-making process, but 
for the benefit (usually financial) of table tennis rather than to provoke policy change, 
confirming TTE as a ‘policy taker’ rather than a ‘policy shaper.’ However, there is 
some evidence of TTE’s use of political resources to raise the awareness and profile 
within a an emerging coalition of SMNGBs, and its membership of the NGBCEOF; 
and equally, membership of a coalition of competitive but not elite NGBs, nested 
within the UKS-led coalition, both of which are intended to achieve positive outcomes 
at the ‘policy-core’ levels of the sport policy subsystem. However, to date there is no 
evidence that suggests any major impact on SE or government policy.  
From a theoretical perspective, it is evident that there is a high degree of overlap 
between TTE and government/SE ‘policy-core’ beliefs, which accentuates further the 
utility of the ACF’s assumptions of coalition boundedness through shared-beliefs. 
However, evidence also suggests that coalition membership moves beyond the 
boundaries of shared-beliefs, and that coalitions can be engineered by government 
on the basis of shared-interests, financial incentives, and sanctions. In addition, 
competition is not just between coalitions, but also within coalitions, whereby 
coalition partners within the SE-led coalition invariably compete for opportunities and 
funding for self-preservation. Coalition members also seek to serve their own 
interests through various levels of strategic interdependence, thus creating coalitions 
nested within the SE-led coalition rather through collective action to realise shared- 
beliefs, thus highlighting a weakness in the ACF’s conceptualisation of belief-
bounded coalitions. That said, it is evident that TTE have endorsed and 
operationalised a strategy of partnership-working aligned to government/SE policy, 
and has engaged with coalition partners, primarily to reaffirm its coalition 
membership and acceptance of SE’s ‘policy-core’ beliefs and objectives, again 
demonstrating the omnipotence of shared-beliefs. Furthermore, the diversity of 
coalition partners reinforces the argument of the existence of overlapping advocacy 
coalitions within the sport policy subsystem, and the ability of coalition partners to 
cross coalition boundaries and policy subsystems, driven by shared preferences, 
self-interest and interdependencies. Evidence also supports the claim that external 
shocks can occur at ‘touch points’ where policy subsystems overlap, such as the 
retention of school sport within the DfE. It is also evident that internal conflicts added 
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a layer of complexity to the nature of coalitions, highlighting the potential for interior 
or internal coalitions and potential ambiguity regarding coalition membership. Again, 
evidence suggests that the ACF finds difficulty in accounting for the many guises of 
subsystem actors owing to the ‘height’ from which the ACF is purported to view 
policy change.  
The operationalisation of power has a strong association with the first two of Lukes’ 
three dimensions of power. The first dimension is representative of the contractual-
compliance relationship between TTE and government/SE, where observable and 
measured decision-making are deployed, for example, financial sanctions for non-
compliance. With regard to Lukes’ second dimension, agenda control, it is clear that 
the resources available to SE have enabled a degree of domination of the policy 
agenda, which was more redolent of Lukes’ first dimension of power. However, over 
time opposition to SE policy from NGBs became more muted, to the extent that 
challenges (e.g. regarding the marginalisation of members’ interests), were confined 
to debate within NGBs rather than between NGBs, such as TTE, and SE.  
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Chapter Nine 
Theoretical and Empirical 
Evaluations and Research Implications 
 
9.1) Introduction 
The emphasis for this chapter is the collation of data across all empirical chapters, 
drawing particular attention to the similarities and differences between the selected 
SMNGBs, to allow for theoretical and empirical evaluations of the research findings. 
The structure of this chapter is in line with the research objectives as outlined in 
Chapters 1 and 5. Included within this chapter are the implications of this study for 
UK sport policy, SMNGBs and the ACF.  
 
9.2) Understanding the historical context of contemporary UK 
sport policy 
Evidence suggests that a CCPR-led advocacy coalition, formed around the beliefs 
that sport had an important role to play in society and should receive greater political 
debate and government involvement, stimulated the emergence of a ‘nascent’ sport 
policy subsystem. Evidence also indicates that the sport policy subsystem remained 
in a ‘nascent’ state prior to 1995, due in the most part to: i) sport remaining on the 
periphery of political interest, as seen by government’s limited involvement and 
resistance from Whitehall, emanating from disruptive ministerial changes and 
attitudinal fluctuations from individual PMs; ii) continued deference towards sport, as 
seen by the lack of involvement and unclear roles and responsibilities for sports’ 
NGBs, despite the semi-autonomous nature of many of them; and iii) enduring 
conflicts among policy actors (e.g. between NGBs, CCPR, SC and the BOA), which 
weakened SC’s influence.     
However, evidence has shown that since 1995 a series of external and internal 
perturbations or shocks prompted changes in the trajectory of UK sport policy, 
altering the structure of the sport policy subsystem and the sporting landscape, as 
demonstrated by the key findings presented in Table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1: External and Internal perturbations/shocks to the UK sport policy 
subsystem 
Sport Policy 
Documents 
External perturbation or 
shock 
Internal perturbation or 
shock 
 
Changes in Policy 
Raising the 
Game (1995) 
 
 
Prime Ministerial change 
from Thatcher to Major in 
the early 1990s. 
 
Introduction of the Lottery 
in 1994. 
 
Public criticisms 
concerning failure at the 
Atlanta 1996 Olympiad. 
 
 Shift in government priorities from mass 
participation to twin track of elite performance 
and school sport - sport seen as an instrument 
of government. 
 
Restructure of the Sports Council – an 
advocacy role. 
 
Use of Lottery funds as a policy instrument to 
facilitate government intervention in sport 
policy and achieve policy outcomes by 
providing NGB/SMNGBs access to vast 
financial resources. 
 
Sporting Future 
for All (2000) 
 
Game Plan 
(2002) 
 
 
Change in government: 
Conservative to New 
Labour (1997) – Best 
Value political ideology 
 
 
 
 
 
 From passive to contractual subsystem politics 
– sport seen as a ‘social tool.’ 
 
Modernising Partnership with NGB/SMNGBs 
as delivers of sport to achieve shared 
government objectives, e.g. increased 
participation through target-setting; improved 
co-ordination; and professionalism of sports’ 
management. 
 
Playing to Win 
(2008) 
 
 
London’s successful bid in 
2005 to host the 2012 
Olympic Games. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sharper sense of direction and purpose for 
policy, through the construction of distinct 
advocacy coalitions for elite, community and 
school sport, substantially shaped by 
government.  
 
NGB/SMNGBs elevated to a frontline delivery 
mechanism capable of achieving government 
aims and objectives - focused on WSP 
outcomes, and a return to ‘sport for sport’s 
sake.’ 
 
Creating a 
sporting habit 
for Life (2012) 
 
 
Change in government: 
New Labour to 
Conservative-led Coalition 
(2010). 
 
 
 
Influential ‘social actors’ in 
sport (e.g. StreetGames) 
through more effective 
lobbying of government - 
increased doubt in the 
ability of NGB/SMNGBs to 
meet policy objectives. 
More rigorous, targeted and results-orientated 
way of thinking about grassroots, youth sport 
(14-25) and community/social sport – Olympic 
Legacy from the Home Games. 
 
Active ‘mixed economy’ approach to funding 
and achieving policy objectives - significant 
shift in focus for NGB/SMNGBs to increase 
participation for young people under-16.  
 
Sporting Future 
(2015) 
 
 
Change in government: 
Coalition to Conservative 
(2015). 
 
Changes to LA leisure 
services, negatively 
impacting on sport 
provision in terms 
development and facilities. 
 
Changing attitudes 
towards health - a greater 
focus on physical activity 
to address government’s 
social/health agendas. 
HLSCOPL’s criticism of 
government’s Olympic 
legacy plans and policies. 
 
Government/SE’s flawed 
WSP/APS monitoring 
systems (2005-2016) - 
encouraged silo-working 
and competition rather 
than collective working 
among NGBs to meet 
government/SE target 
driven policies. 
 
Shift in priorities from ‘sports for sport’s sake’ 
to ‘sport for social good’ - altered the structure 
of the policy subsystem by way of a clearer 
focus on physical activity for the inactive.  
 
NGB-centric approach to delivery replaced by 
organisational-neutrality to meet government 
policy outcomes. 
 
Change in emphasis for NGB/SMNGBs – now 
focused on ‘core-market’ (those who regularly 
play sport). 
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Evidence indicates the existence of three competing advocacy coalitions within the 
sport policy subsystem, two of which are led by state agencies, UKS and SE; the 
UKS-led coalition for elite sport, the SE-led coalition for community/social/grassroots 
sport, and the YST-led coalition for school sport, constructed by government on the 
basis of shared-beliefs, but also substantially shaped by shared-objectives, financial 
incentives and sanctions, which are also considered co-determinants of coalition 
membership. Interaction between government, agency-led coalitions and 
NGB/SMNGBs, as coalition members, demonstrates a high degree of coordinated 
activity to meet shared goals and points towards an alliance that benefits from 
resources, such as public funding. While Green and Houlihan (2004) alluded to the 
limited potential for a community sport advocacy coalition, evidence has clearly 
illuminated the presence of an SE-led community sport coalition, endogenously 
derived from a drive towards mass participation powerfully reinforced by SE 
(particularly for health benefits), on the one hand, and through the modernisation and 
increasing dependency of NGB/SMNGBs on public funding arising from the greater 
access to opportunities and Lottery funds on the other; and exogenously derived 
from government’s pro-social agenda. Evidence indicates that agency-led coalitions 
can be bound together by shared-interests and interdependencies, rather than 
simply on the basis of shared values/beliefs, as seen within the case studies. 
Coalition members can also be subjected to enforced collective action, resulting from 
government intervention and policy subsystem design, as illustrated by the degree to 
which agency-led coalitions within the UK sport policy subsystem have been 
engineered by government, to act as a mechanism for realising government 
objectives, linked to changes in government priorities and political agendas. As 
noted by interviewee SESLR, ‘[SE’s] strategy is completely embedded or consumed 
within the broader government strategy.’ 
The composition of the agency-led coalitions include a definable, yet complex, 
multiplicity of actors or coalition partners (see Figure 5.1), as seen in the SE-led 
coalition, and have the potential to overlap between different coalitions and policy 
subsystems, particularly as sport is an extremely malleable resource to help achieve 
the objectives of various government departments (e.g. health and education). 
However, the level of engagement and overlap among policy actors across different 
coalitions and policy subsystems is primarily government-led, which can lead to both 
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subsystem expansion or contraction primarily from external perturbations and 
varying degrees of resource allocation from the government purse, as seen by the 
impact of the educational policy subsystem on the sport policy subsystem, and the 
strengthening of government beliefs that school sport should continue to be the 
domain of the DfE. A key finding has been the degree to which changes in LA 
contracts for leisure services have also impacted on the sport policy subsystem and 
sporting landscape, the extent to which has not received a satisfactory level of 
attention within the policy environment. As seen from the case studies, not only has 
this hindered the development of sport, but also significantly affected 
sport/NGB/SMNGB’s ability to meet government outcomes, which has arguably 
inhibited the progress of the sport policy subsystem to a new stage of maturity.  
Arguably, policy subsystems advance through various stages of maturity, dependent 
on the levels of government intervention and public consciousness of particular 
subsystems, which can equally restrict subsystem development. Evidence suggests 
the UK sport policy subsystem has not reached the levels of maturity attained by 
long-standing policy subsystems (e.g. health and education), as a consequence of 
sports’ perpetual fragmentation and a disjointed political system. For example, 
changes to the educational policy subsystem have been explicit in narrowing the 
sporting landscape through the demise of school sport, prompted by government 
influence and downward pressure to meet school academic targets, and continued 
departmental infighting on the location of school sport within the corridors of 
Whitehall. The extent of government control and downward pressure within the sport 
policy subsystem is also clearly observable, suggesting a less than arm’s length 
approach and a rolling out of state, as seen by government’s influence over the SE-
led coalition, and the instability of community sport policy objectives over the past 
two decades, thus pointing towards a less than dominant SE-led coalition. By 
contrast, the extension of policy continuity for elite sport indicates a more dominant 
UKS-led coalition, particularly as UKS’s targeted approach to elite performance as a 
‘policy-core’ belief has proved difficult to change, along with government’s 
reaffirmation of UKS’s strategy and the decision not to merge UKS and SE. 
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Critically though, it could be argued that the sporting sector policy actors have 
demonstrated a reluctance to utilise their significant influence to shape policy, in 
contrast to the sports sector’s size and strong economic and social value to 
government and society. Evidence suggests that sport policy actors’ preferences 
have been framed by a fear of ‘rocking the boat’, a reluctance to promote their 
valuable contribution to society, an acceptance of sustained levels of conservatism 
and compliance, and a willingness to be subjected to policy rather than shape it, 
there being little evidence of sport proactively shaping policy at the government level. 
On the other hand, it is argued that sport has remained on the periphery of political 
agendas, seen as a ‘bolt-on’ mechanism for government to use as and when it sees 
fit, in disregard of the importance and benefits of sport and physical activity to 
society. A claim supported by SE and the case studies, where interviewee 
CEOTTE’s comments provide a concise reference to the openness of the sport 
policy subsystem to policy shifts as a reflection of government’s lack of a clear 
understanding of the benefits and importance of sport and physical activity, which is 
likely to have had a significant bearing across most if not all NGBs:  
‘I’m not sure [government] do know what quite to do [with sport and activity], and I 
don’t think they give it as much importance as they should. The fact that sport 
continues to be tapped into a department of culture, media, digital and sport. The fact 
is that sport is not seen as being important enough to have its own directorate, where 
it can then influence education, health, society. It’s a little bolt onto someone else’s 
directorate, rather than being able to really influence all these other areas.’ 
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9.3)  Development of governmental relationships 
NGBs’ potential contribution to government policy on sport was acknowledged in 
Raising the Game (1995), but there still existed a culture of deference towards them, 
although there was also a sense of uncertainty in their ability to partner government 
and the Sports Councils. NGBs had no clear role or responsibilities within the Sports 
Council’s strategies for sport (pre-1995), despite the resource-dependency of some 
on government grant-aid, TTE/table tennis being a case in point. It is also evident 
that NGBs were generally passive in their early discussions with 
government/SE/UKS in determining their role, and the relationship with and 
expectations of government, despite being critical on a number of aspects of sport 
policy, such as: concern over the multiplicity of strategic documents and priorities, 
which lacked clarity and created confusion; the perceived inefficiencies in funding 
arrangements, operational costs, monitoring and evaluation; and use of rewards or 
sanctions (DCMS, 2002a, pp.163-166). 
The creation of the Lottery elevated sport to a much more significant instrument of 
government, and signalled the emergence of a new relationship between NGBs, 
government and the Sports Councils, as seen in the sport policy documents Sporting 
Future for All (2000), Game Plan (2002) and Playing to Win (2008). However, the 
transition of NGBs to a higher level of involvement in the policy environment and 
greater responsibility and empowerment over the control of public funding, was less 
to do with their aggressive lobbying, as purported by Keech (2011), but an 
opportunistic strategy on the part of the government, as no alternative delivery 
mechanism existed to deliver on policy outcomes leading up to the 2012 Home 
Olympics. A claim supported by evidence from the case studies, SE and DCMS, and 
sufficiently illustrated by the comments of interviewee CEOEH:  
‘I don’t think [NGBs] were organised enough to be influencing policy. I think they 
were the natural recipients once government decided we’ve got this pot of money, 
we’re going to utilise our nominated outlets, [UKS and SE]. [NGBs] were an 
established group. They were already doing development stuff, should already have 
the links in place, oversaw the club structure, the competition structure, [and] dealt 
with all the elite side of things … It was a bit like where else could [the government] 
have gone.’ 
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More importantly, NGBs’ elevation and transition from a ‘key delivery platform for 
high performance’ (DCMS, 2002, p.138) to a ‘front line’ mechanism for enhancing 
both the elite and community levels of sport’ (SE, 2009, p.10), required them to 
navigate through a number of difficult challenges, attributable to: i) changing political 
and operational environments resulting from a series of policy shifts over a decade or 
more, due to varying external and internal perturbations or shocks to the sport policy 
subsystem; ii) a shift from a traditional model of NGB autonomy to that of conditional 
earned autonomy, the evolution of which has been from a privileged position of 
equality to a position of dependence on government; and iii) an acceptance to comply 
and deliver on shifting government pro-social priorities and objectives, in return for 
public funding, through a ‘fit-for-purpose’ programme of reform and modernisation, 
complex performance regimes, and the threat of financial sanctions for non-
compliance. The result of which has been heightened levels of resource-dependency 
for SMNGBs, and increasing tensions within SMNGBs between those favouring 
compliance with government/SE’s governance protocols to preserve NGB financial 
interests, and those firmly committed to the preservation of NGB autonomy and the 
protection of membership interests, the latter concerned with the increasing influence 
of government and its agencies over NGB activities. Arguably though, the existence 
of ‘competing factions’ within NGBs, as noted by a UKS board member, were 
‘perversely, often a product of democratic systems of governance’ (UKS, 2002b, 
p.16).  
Indeed, the impact of increased dependency on public funding and NGBs’ changing 
role, and relationship with government and governmental agencies, challenged the 
traditional model of NGB autonomy, particularly in regard to organisational operations 
and managerial capacity. A clear example of which was government’s £7m 
investment into a NGB modernisation programme, designed ‘to aid NGBs with 
differing capacities to become more efficient and effective in their operations, [and] 
mitigate the temptation of the Sports Councils to micro-manage NGBs’ (DCMS, 
2002a, p.138). Modernisation and reform was reinforced further by greater selectivity 
in the distribution of funding, as seen by UKS’s changed programme of funding of 
Olympic sports to a more ‘risk-based approach’, and the implementation of the No 
Compromise principle (UKS, 2006b, p.32). The aim of which was to reinforce the 
best, support those developing, and provoke change in the under-performing (UKS, 
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2004, p.4), to meet government objectives for elite performance. According to 
interviewee SEC, the narrowing of elite policy focus towards winning medals 
impacted heavily on NGBs, where funding was removed from ‘those sports … who 
weren’t able to contribute to the medal targets.’ It is also evident that the introduction 
of WSPs signified a major shift for NGBs from a traditional role to greater 
engagement within the wider social agenda of government. However, WSPs had 
progressively moved from being a ‘tool’ to engage partners (SE, 2004a, p.11), to a 
mechanism for monitoring and evaluating NGBs on the basis of earned autonomy, 
the level of which was dependent on NGBs’ ability to meet government objectives, 
thus demonstrating performance management through WSPs as being central to the 
new modernised relationship between government and NGBs, whereby governance 
and performance were classified as co-determinants for both continued and 
increased conditional public funding (DCMS, 2008, p.13). 
Consequently, SMNGBs have had to utilise a variety of strategies to develop 
governmental relationships, as illustrated in Table 9.2. Similarities in strategic 
approaches included: opportunistic and pragmatic alignments to government/SE 
policies; acceptance of policy change and contractual-compliance obligations of the 
SE-led coalition, as a means of self-preservation; the use of political resources and 
compliance as a means of increasing awareness and scope for influencing 
policymakers; and high levels of partnership engagement, as seen in the case of EH 
and TTE. In contrast, VE demonstrated a more defiant attitude towards 
government/SE directives, as seen by its preference for self-development and 
delivering on membership needs, as opposed to the development of sport through 
government/SE pro-social agendas, emphasising a resistance to adapt to change 
and a misalignment with SE-led coalition ‘policy-core’ beliefs and contractual 
obligations. This resulted in intervention from SE and an enforced realignment of VE 
in line with government priorities and lower levels resourcing by way of financial 
sanctions, thus illuminating the extent to which resource-dependency on public 
funding elicits futile resistance in the face of self-preservation. Indeed, the harsher 
performance regimes and SE’s heightened punitive measures, especially financial 
sanctions, for those not delivering or failing to meet contracted obligations (DCMS, 
2012), has elevated SE’s authority from that of the policeman of sport (Houlihan, 
1997) to that of judge and jury.   
227 
 
Table 9.2: Strategies utilised by SMNGBs in the development governmental 
relationships   
EH/handball VE/volleyball TTE/table tennis 
Development through opportunities 
provided by SE. 
 
Strategic use of parliamentarians, as 
a political resource to raise 
awareness of the sport, e.g. 
Parliamentary Sports Fellow; and 
HLSCOPL.  
 
Strategic use of compliance as a 
resource for sport development e.g. 
the appointed CEO of EH as a former 
senior manager of SE. 
 
Strategic alignment with 
government/SE policy and an 
acceptance of contractual-compliance 
obligations of the SE-led coalition 
membership, e.g. a greater focus on 
community/grassroots sport than at 
the elite level. 
 
Partnership-driven strategic approach 
to increasing participation 
(particularly coalition partners). 
 
Multi-institutional, but as a facilitator, 
rather than a deliverer e.g. social, 
educational.   
 
Policy Change - acceptance as 
opposed to opposition, although not 
uncritical. 
 
Member of the NGBCEOF. 
 
 
 
Strategic use of compliance as a 
resource for sport development, e.g. the 
appointed CEO of VE as a former senior 
manager of SE. 
 
Organisationally driven by SE’s ‘policy- 
core’ beliefs, in particular, an alignment 
with government and SE’s Playground to 
Podium ideology. 
 
Participative strategies skewed towards 
the talent pathway and elite 
performance, rather than on increasing 
participation. 
 
Preference for self-development - 
demonstrating limited understanding of 
policy environment and requirements of 
government and SE. 
 
Limited engagement in partnership-
working to achieve government and SE- 
objectives. 
 
Policy Change – not fully subservient, 
e.g. critical of loss of autonomy and 
policy interventions to increase 
participation; elements of willing 
acceptance and enforced acceptance 
(e.g. governance and participative 
strategies). 
 
Member of the NGBCEOF. 
 
Regional structure in parallel to 
geographical boundaries of SC - 
commitment to collaborating with SC to 
meet policy objectives, pre-1995. 
 
Pragmatic approach to development 
through the strategic utilisation of both 
the belief system of government/SE and 
specific government policies. 
 
Multi-institutional, as a promoter and 
deliverer of social sport, school sport, 
participation sport and elite sport, which 
highlights a willingness to cross 
subsystem and coalition boundaries. 
 
Close and strategic alignment with 
government/SE and an acceptance of 
contractual-compliance obligations of 
SE-led coalition membership – e.g. 
commitment to delivering a range of 
outcomes, in line with government 
policy. 
 
High degree of opportunistic 
partnership-working with various other 
coalition partners, to meet government 
objectives, and self-develop.  
 
Policy Change - acceptance as opposed 
to opposition, although not uncritical; 
elements of enforced acceptance (e.g. 
governance). 
 
Member of the NGBCEOF. 
 
 
Evidence suggests that SE had begun to lessen the NGB-focused investment 
strategy, having significantly progressed from being ‘interested in developing’ (SE, 
2013a, p.5) to ‘actively developing’ a mixed economy within the community sport 
sector (SE, 2014a, p.6). In support of this claim, evidence suggests that SE’s 
heightened focus on a ‘mixed economy’ approach to increasing participation 
provoked huge concern among NGBs, and criticism of the way in which they were 
measured against government/SE objectives:    
‘Among [NGBs] there are fears that the baby could be thrown out with the bathwater. 
There is also long-standing frustration that their efforts [to deliver on the 
government’s legacy ambitions] are being measured by a blunt instrument [the APS] 
... You can’t take [NGBs] out of the picture, because if you do the system will 
crumble’ (Gibson, 2015). 
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However, evidence provided to the HLSCOPL illustrated the level of frustration with 
SE and NGB/SMNGBs, with criticisms including (HLSCOPL, 2013a); i) a tribal 
regime within NGBs preventing collective action in the best interests of the sport; ii) a 
lack of skill and capacity to drive participation upwards; iii) the limitations of the APS 
that excluded school sport from statistics, and therein potential funding requirements 
from early-specialisation sport; iv) a disconnect between school sport and SE, and 
talent development and elite programmes; v) resentment in terms of funding for elite 
sport/NGBs against the struggles of those at grassroots level; and vi) poor sporting 
infrastructures at community and grassroots levels. SE claimed that the adoption of a 
‘mixed economy’ approach to investment and reduced dependency on NGBs in 
terms of delivery, was partly in recognition of NGBs’ resource risks and skill gaps in 
relation to participation (SE, 2014a, p.49), and the challenges highlighted by poor 
APS participation figures (SE, 2014c, p.2). It is also evident that funding bids and 
strategies were ‘often [made] in isolation’, and many lacked a joined-up pathway 
from ‘pupil to podium’ (HLSCOPL, 2013a, p.58), suggesting NGBs had continued to 
work within artificial silos. It could be argued that this was also a reflection of SE’s 
self-proclaimed departmental ‘silo-working’, accredited to their own organisation’s 
cultural and structural problems (SE, 2016c, p.2). Further evidence confirms an 
elite/grassroots dichotomy among NGBs, and an apparent level of disdain and 
competition between UKS and SE. For example, SE believed it had not received the 
public acknowledgement it deserved (SE, 2014b, p.9), unlike UKS, and questioned 
whether it should financially support those sport/NGBs that had been subjected to 
UKS funding withdrawals. As noted by SE (2014d, pp.5-6), the organisation’s 
contribution towards ‘the support of a performance and international competition 
programme … would be above and beyond the talent pathway already funded by 
[SE].’ 
Contrasting evidence also suggests that NGBs did not consider themselves as 
‘deliverers of social outcomes’, and SE funding was merely a means to ‘deliver 
numbers of people playing [their] sport’ (HLSCOPL, 2013a, p.213). On the other 
hand, SE believed that NGBs’ exaggerated their significance in the sport market: 
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‘If you go back to 2008, certainly going forward to 2010, 2011, [NGBs] thought of SE 
as a bank, and it should just give them the money, do an audit making sure the 
money was spent properly, and that was it …That came from this belief that they 
controlled the market in sport, and actually as we know, they controlled very, very 
little of the market in sport’ (Interviewee: SEC). 
However, criticisms of government’s ineffective 2012 Olympic legacy plans were 
directed, in the most part, towards NGBs, the consequence of which was the 
redistribution of critical political resources, particularly financial support, away from 
NGBs and ‘sports for sport’s sake’, to ‘sport for social good.’ This altered the 
structure of the sport policy subsystem by way of: i) a clearer focus on physical 
activity for the inactive; ii) the expansion of SE’s ‘mixed economy’ approach to public 
funding for grassroots sport; and iii) a lessening of responsibility for NGBs with a 
renewed focus on their own audience and ‘core activities’, with the caveat to at least 
maintain their current levels of participation.  
The changed remit for NGBs has centred on their ‘core’ market, represented by 
those with ‘a strong and resilient relationship with sport and activity’, where NGBs 
are considered to be closest to their audience (SE, 2017a, p.20). While a narrower 
focus has lessened the pressure on NGBs to deliver participation increases, there is 
an expectation to ‘at least maintain the numbers of regular players or participants 
they influence’ (SE, 2017a, p.20). More importantly, the shift in focus for NGBs and 
the drive for greater sustainability, has significantly reduced NGB income from public 
funds to the extent that funding awards were valued 33% lower in the 2017-21 
funding cycle than in 2013-17 (SE, 2017a, p.22). The ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
funding (SE, 2016, p.4) has been replaced by NGB-defined plans and targets in 
consideration of the role and influence of each NGB in their sport (SE, 2016, p.9), 
and their varying sizes and capabilities (SE, 2016b, p.4). While this indicates a 
continuance of shared interest and interdependencies within the SE-led coalition, 
evidence suggests that a substantial burden has been placed on NGBs to adapt to 
their new policy environment, and deal with the financial pressures of reduced public 
funding, and government’s drive for operational cost efficiency savings and income 
diversification (DCMS, 2015, p.53):  
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‘[T]he transition that [NGBs are] being asked to undertake is quite a challenging one, 
and again it’s not necessarily happening with an awful lot of help and support, and 
clarity from the centre’ (Interviewee: SRA). 
Of further significance to NGBs has been the greater importance placed on 
governance, particularly to strengthen the sports sector’s resilience and reduce 
dependency on public funding (DCMS, 2015b, p.11), as reflected by the multiple 
references to governance in Sporting Future. Governance terminology has shifted 
from good governance to excellent governance and from a voluntary code to a 
mandatory code (DCMS, 2015b, p.11 – emphasis added), the aim being to provide a 
‘transformative influence’ on those NGB/organisations that ‘rely on public funding for 
survival, and thus increasingly at risk and less able to plan and deliver over the 
longer term’ (DCMS, 2015b, p.52). For NGBs, this has included closer scrutiny and 
the disregard of previous improvements in governance (UKS, 2016a, pp.16-17; SE, 
2016d, p.20). The manifestation of which has been agreed, bespoke, and timely 
compliance with the new Governance code for each NGB, to ensure continued 
receipt of government and Lottery funding (UKS, 2017, p.2), based on organisational 
size and the level of public investment (SE, 2017a, p.29).  
Equally significant, is evidence that government/SE’s shifting priorities towards the 
inactive, prompted the implementation of organisational-neutrality (i.e. an end to the 
privileged status of NGBs within the sport subsystem) as the method of delivery to 
achieve agreed outcomes, and the requirement of NGBs to compete on a level 
playing field, as explained by Interviewee SLRDP:  
‘[SE] can’t achieve all of those strategy requests, and broader strategy outcomes 
through [NGBs] alone. Our strategy was more about how are we going to reach this 
broader consumer group, how are we going to drive these broader outcomes … 
Essentially, we made the decision that we needed more of a partner-neutral 
approach, where it’s not about who you are, but what you can deliver, which again 
was a big shift for [NGBs].’  
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Critically though, it can be argued that NGBs’ attempts to execute policy 
requirements were hampered by a number of issues, directly related to how 
governmental relationships, more so with SE than UKS, have shaped the very nature 
of modern NGBs, the key issues identified from the case studies relating to the:  
i) swiftness of the significant levels of public funding allocated to NGBs, and 
requirements to professionalise through modernisation (e.g. internal 
tensions and discord at the point where the worlds of amateurism and 
professionalism collide); 
ii) ill-defined and flawed policies giving greater emphasis to inter-NGB 
competition than to collective action, as a means to achieve policy aims 
and objectives, for example, the inconsistencies of the APS mechanism, 
which prompted unconstructive behaviours among NGB/SMNGBs (e.g. 
the use of inflated WSP submissions to ensure self-preservation through 
increased public subsidies);  
iii) limited understanding and expertise of policy environments, despite its 
increasing significance and relevance to operational and financial 
sustainability (e.g. neglecting to recognise the full implications of delivering 
on policy outcomes, confusion and ambiguity stemming from policy shifts, 
and disregard of members natural engagement with government 
priorities); 
iv) challenges of organisational-identity (e.g. tensions emanating from a 
dichotomy between observable compliance and autonomy); and 
v) lack of support for CEOs of NGBs when arguably their responsibilities 
necessitated substantial support, which prompted the creation of the 
NGBCEO forum. 
 
To elaborate further on some of the above points, it could be argued that there has 
been an existential misconception among NGBs, in respect of who they are and who 
and what they represent, which has impacted on their ability to interpret policy and 
deliver on government strategies. Evidence suggests NGBs are still rooted to the 
traditional beliefs of a membership organisation, despite being shaped by 
government and SE to undertake far greater responsibilities than their traditional 
roles, as exemplified by the comments below:   
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‘[SE] transitioned and transformed [NGBs] from that membership-led mind-set, to a 
broader participation mind-set’ (Interviewee: SESLR).  
‘I think we have to examine what is a [NGB], and what is its role. Its core role is rules, 
standards, and membership services, because they are membership organisations. 
But where in there is the general, wider policy, about promoting the sport for others 
who don’t do the sport, and why are [NGBs] not doing that’ (Interviewee: SEC).  
A further critique is that not only NGBs, but the sporting sector itself, invariably have 
little or no expertise in understanding the policy environment, despite its operational 
relevance, which has arguably limited the capacity for policy-oriented learning and 
policy influence:   
‘[In] a sector that is very dependent on its relationship with government, and in many 
cases dependent on money from government, to invest so little time and money into 
nurturing and protecting those relationships, and understanding the policy 
environment, is remarkable. It’s a frustration that we spend quite a lot of time having 
to explain in fairly basic terms, certainly to the small to medium-sized [NGBs], why 
any of this stuff is important’ (Interviewee: SRADP). 
The above statement is supported by key findings of this study, which has illuminated 
the unopposed acceptance of policy change from those SMNGBs selected as case 
studies, and overall willingness to adapt to change to preserve membership of the 
SE-led coalition and levels of resource-dependency, thus demonstrating an overriding 
weakness and vulnerability within SMNGBs, and clearly identifies them as primarily 
‘policy takers’ rather than ‘policy shapers.’ An alternative argument is that the 
willingness of SMNGBs to align with government and SE policies and accept the 
contractual-compliance obligations of the SE-led coalition, is reflective of a 
combination of: i) shared ‘core’ beliefs; ii) complementary participative and 
development strategies; and iii) a general willingness to be a ‘policy taker’ rather than 
a ‘policy shaper,’ as acceptance is mutually beneficial and self-preserving, as is 
evident across the three case studies.   
Arguably though, the inclusion of all three case studies as members of the 
NGBCEOF, which is best described as a ‘professional fora’, is an attempt by NGBs, 
in particular SMNGBs, to collaborate in reaffirming to government and its agencies 
the shared-beliefs/values/interests and strategic importance of NGB/SMNGBs to the 
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sport policy subsystem. This highlights the emergence of a less prominent advocacy 
coalition consisting of a cluster of SMNGB/sports, nested within the SE-led coalition 
and actively engaged in attempting to influence sport policy. However, the capacity 
to influence the policy environment will be dependent on whether their collective 
voice is strong enough to interact with government at a policy level, there being no 
current evidence to indicate any impact on SE or government policy. That said, 
evidence has shown that the conversation and relationship between government and 
NGB/SMNGBs has changed from a ‘modernising partnership’ to that of a ‘critical 
friend’, as described by interviewee DCMSa, whereas for SE there has been a 
‘maturing’ of their mutual relationship with NGBs (SE, 2017a, p.22) that, according to 
interviewee SEC, is still ‘evolving.’ 
Similarly, a cluster of competitive SMNGBs (the ‘have-nots’) has emerged as a 
minority coalition, nested within the UKS-led coalition, the aim being to actively 
engage in collective action to influence elite sport policy, by exploiting specific 
subsystem ‘deep-core beliefs’, such as the athlete inspirational ‘role model’ effect, to 
influence changes in ‘policy-core’ beliefs of government and the UKS-led coalition. 
Evidence indicates some impact in this regard by virtue of the government’s new 
‘Aspirational Fund’, although arguably funding has been directed towards those 
Olympic sports/NGBs with a potential for podium success. This suggests a strategic 
approach by government and UKS to quieten the dissident voices of unfunded 
SMNGBs, and remove the threat of an emerging minority coalition, as well as 
demonstrating the dominance of elite sport and medal priorities within the sport 
policy subsystem.  
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9.4) Operational impacts and approaches to changing sport policy 
This section provides a cross-case analysis and evaluation of the key findings in 
relation to the analytical themes identified to achieve the research aims and 
objectives.   
 
9.4.1) Governance 
The key findings of the cross-case analysis on the analytical theme of governance 
are presented in Table 9.3.   
Table 9.3: Governance: key findings 
 EH/handball VE/volleyball TTE/table tennis 
Beliefs Good governance crucial for the 
long-term success of 
EH/handball; unproblematic 
acceptance to comply with 
government/SE.  
High standards of governance 
essential to meet increasing 
levels of scrutiny and challenge 
as beneficiaries of public funding; 
pragmatic acceptance to comply 
with government/SE 
  
Modernisation essential for self-
development. 
Impact of 
Policy 
 
Significant - organisationally and operationally. 
 
Adaptation to 
Change 
Willingness to comply with 
government and SE policy 
requirements.  
 
Progressive and transformational, 
though not uncritical. 
 
Willingness to comply with 
government and SE policy 
requirements, but acceptance 
constrained by internal conflicts.  
 
Organisational inertia and 
conservatism;  
 
Enforced compliance from SE in 
2016. 
 
Willingness to comply with 
government and SE policy 
requirements, but acceptance 
constrained by internal conflicts.  
 
Organisational inertia and 
conservatism fashioned by an 
apparent ‘Westminster Model’ of 
organisational democracy; 
 
Enforced compliance from SE in 
2017. 
 
Internal 
Tensions  
 
Heightened – observable conflict at Board, Executive and membership Levels - influence of the ‘Blazer 
Brigade.’ 
Compliance vs autonomy 
dichotomy. 
 
Wedded to notion that it is an 
autonomous membership 
organisation. 
 
Compliance vs autonomy and 
volunteerism vs professionalism 
tensions.  
 
Wedded to notion that it is a 
membership organisation 
 
Compliance vs autonomy and 
volunteerism vs professionalism 
tensions. 
 
Membership as a strand of a 
potential multi-institutional 
business model. 
 
Strategies 
Utilised 
Compliance and self-preservation: 
commitment to maintain its 
membership of the SE-led 
coalition. 
 
Aspirational and over-ambitious 
approach to balancing competing 
needs of SE and membership; 
central rather than devolved 
SMNGB. 
 
Whistle-blowing on previous VE 
administrative team to secure 
financial self-preservation and 
commit to the SE-led coalition.  
Compliance and self-preservation: 
commitment to maintain its 
membership of the SE-led 
coalition. 
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Governance is clearly important to SMNGBs, however, adherence to government/SE 
governance protocols has significantly shaped SMNGBs both organisationally and 
operationally and lessened their autonomy, particularly through the removal of the 
‘Blazer Brigade’ from positions of authority, arguably to enable government to exert 
greater control over operational and financial activities, certainly in respect of the 
SMNGBs within this study. Although not uncritical, the unopposed acceptance from 
SMNGBs of policy change from a governance perspective, and the willingness to 
accept compliance and self-preservation over autonomy and membership interests, 
through a commitment to maintain membership of the SE-led coalition and benefit 
from the allocation of public funding, clearly identifies SMNGBs as ‘policy takers.’  
However, compliance with SE governance criteria has not been straightforward, 
evidence clearly demonstrating the existence of heightened levels of tension and 
conflicts within SMNGBs, between those favouring compliance with preserve the 
SMNGB’s financial interests and those committed to the preservation of SMNGB 
autonomy and the protection of membership interests. This reflects the extent to 
which SMNGBs are pulled in different directions and highlights the challenges faced 
by them in managing and balancing the needs of membership and those of 
government and the SE-led coalition. This has impacted on SMNGBs’ progress from 
a privileged position of equality to dependence on government, as evidenced by 
varying levels of inertia and conservatism within VE and TTE, which affected their 
willingness to adapt to change, and the difficulties experienced in transitioning from a 
voluntarist to a professionally-managed organisation. In contrast, governance reform 
for EH has been less problematic, which suggests that emerging SMNGBs that are 
less hidebound by years of tradition have higher transformational capacities than 
larger, and longer established SMNGBs.  
The findings also highlighted a potential challenge for SMNGBs in terms of 
organisational-identity, whereby the influence of government and SE has shaped 
modern NGBs to have a greater role and responsibility to society as a whole, yet 
some are still wedded to the notion that their purpose is to serve their membership 
only, thus indicating divergent and conflicting interests within SMNGBs, as endorsed 
by the remarks of interviewee SRADP, ‘[NGBs remain transfixed by the question] of 
what are they here to do? In an environment that is much more diverse in terms of 
the delivery of sport.’ 
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9.4.2) Funding 
The key findings of the cross-case analysis on the analytical theme of funding are 
presented in Table 9.4.   
Table 9.4: Funding: key findings 
 EH/handball VE/volleyball TTE/table tennis 
Beliefs SE viewed as financial partner – 
funding provides specific and 
mutual benefits. 
 
SE funding viewed as an ‘enabler’ 
for self-development, and 
‘disabler’ when tied policy 
outcomes. 
 
SE funding reflects governmental 
belief in table tennis as a deliverer 
of government’s social agenda 
objectives/priorities. 
 
Impact of 
Policy 
 
Resource-dependent; loss of autonomy; vulnerability to volatile changes in government and agency support. 
 
SE significant influence over financial and operating policies. 
 
 SE-enforced reduction in 
resource-dependency - evidence 
of resilience and flexibility. 
 
 
Adaptation to 
Change 
Closely aligned to ‘policy-core’ 
beliefs and objectives of 
government/SE.  
 
 
Partly aligned to ‘policy-core’ 
beliefs and objectives of 
government/SE.  
Closely aligned to ‘policy-core’ 
beliefs and objectives of 
government/SE. 
 
Internal 
Tensions  
 
Not financially self-sustaining: self-generated income has not matched the level of government/SE funding. 
 
Limited ability to grow commercial revenues. 
Reluctance to enhance financial 
self-reliance through membership 
fees – relating to a perceived 
paradox that an increase in fees 
will reduce membership numbers 
and increase expectations.  
 
Uncertainty - organisational shift 
from ‘boardroom’ back to ‘kitchen 
table.’ 
Increasing need to drive financial 
self-sustainability through 
membership fees.  
 
Uncertainty - organisational shift 
from ‘boardroom’ back to ‘kitchen 
table.’  
 
Self-reliance through membership 
fees unsustainable due to 
inadequate alternative sources of 
income, and increasing costs 
across the spectrum of sport 
services. 
 
Uncertainty – revert back to a 
membership-only body. 
 
Strategies 
Utilised 
Pragmatism and self-preservation 
- alignment to government/SE. 
Contractual self-preservation – 
alignment to government/SE on 
the basis of contractual 
obligations. 
 
Opportunism and self-
preservation – willingness to 
accept greater resource-
dependency by tapping into 
funding channels at points where 
different policy sectors overlap.  
 
 
The willingness of SMNGBs to align with the ‘policy-core’ beliefs of government and 
SE and undertake government/SE’s bidding in return for self-preservation, by virtue 
of the receipt of public funds and constant threat of financial sanctions, and accept 
compliance and resource-dependency over autonomy and the interests of members, 
signifies the significant influence of SE over their financial and operational activities, 
and clearly identifies all three case studies as ‘policy takers.’ This provides a strong 
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indication that all SMNGBs in receipt of public funding are predominantly ‘policy 
takers’, content to accept rather than oppose policy change to maximise the flow of 
government subsidies on the basis of self-preservation.  
However, evidence also highlighted the existence of differing beliefs, an example of 
which is VE’s inference that its relationship with SE is merely contractual and that SE 
funding can constrict sport development when linked to government agendas and 
policy outcomes, although arguably this is a reflection of a lack of understanding on 
the part of VE of the expectations and requirements that came with access to public 
funds. In contrast, TTE’s perception is one of a symmetrical relationship with SE, 
where ‘core’ beliefs and policies are considered complementary. The above 
observations provide some validation of SE criticism that certain NGBs reneged on 
their commitments as ‘deliverers’ of sport policy social outcomes, where the utility of 
SE funding was seen as a mechanism for self-development, rather than to meet the 
compliance-contractual obligations of government/SE, drawing attention to the 
apparent lack of understanding among NGB/SMNGBs of the policy environment.     
Furthermore, SMNGBs have a significant vulnerability to volatile changes in 
government and agency support and resource-dependency (e.g. the punitive 
connotations of the SE-led coalition for non-compliance with government and SE 
policy requirements), as seen in the case of VE. The reliance on resource- 
dependency is exacerbated further not only by the limited ability of SMNGBs to 
generate alternative sources of self-sustaining income, but also a reluctance to 
utilise increases in their most fluid of income streams, membership fees, as a means 
to progress towards financial self-sustainability. The identifiable concerns of 
SMNGBs included: i) increasing membership fees has the potential to decrease 
membership numbers, and increase membership expectations; ii) increasing costs 
across the spectrum of sport services impact on the sustainability of incrementally 
increased membership fees; and iii) difficulties in attracting sponsors without an elite 
level national team. Houlihan and Zheng (2015) argued that a narrow resource base, 
limited domestic market or national participation levels, and the unavailability of elite 
resources are likely to be contributory factors to vulnerability rather than resilience. 
While the findings of this research are generally supportive of Houlihan and Zheng’s 
claims, evidence has shown that it is possible for SMNGBs to draw strength from 
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financial and organisational adversity, despite a position of vulnerability, and can 
demonstrate resilience and flexibility, as evidenced by the experiences of VE.  
While the shift away from a NGB-centric approach to increasing participation to a 
greater focus on physical activity, and the inactive, has exposed the heavy reliance 
of SMNGBs on public subsidies and likelihood of reductions in funding and levels of 
resource-dependency; the latter remains a critical mechanism to maintain operations 
at current levels and avoid regressive organisational shifts, for example, from 
‘boardroom’ back to ‘kitchen table’ organisations, the uncertainty of which is clearly 
displayed across all case studies. Yet, there is also a sense that greater levels of 
resource-dependency would be preferable to some SMNGBs, as seen within TTE, 
clearly demonstrating the strength of the gravitational pull of membership of the SE-
led coalition.   
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9.4.3) Capacity Building: workforce and facilities 
The key findings of the cross-case analysis on the analytical theme of capacity 
building are presented in Table 9.5.   
Table 9.5: Capacity Building: workforce and facilities - key findings 
 EH/handball VE/volleyball TTE/table tennis 
Beliefs Partnership-based: utilisation of 
resources from others to deliver 
handball; coach education 
essential. 
 
Volunteer-based; coaching critical 
to the successful delivery of 
government/SE policy outcomes;  
Capacity building an important 
influencing factor in relationships 
with SE – partnership and 
volunteer- based. 
  
Impact of 
Policy 
 
Resource-interdependencies - use of volunteer infrastructure to meet government/SE-objectives. 
Professional and suitably trained 
workforce.  
 
 
Modernised and expanded 
workforce (staff/volunteers) 
aligned to SE/VE planned 
programmes. 
 
 
Cyclical pattern of SE funding to 
meet compliance-contractual 
obligations of SE-led coalition 
membership – negatively 
impacted on workforce stability.  
 
Persistent organisational re-
structuring and re-shaping to 
meet shifting policy priorities. 
 
 
Strained operational resources to meet the compliance-contractual obligations of SE-led coalition 
membership. 
 
Adaptation to 
Change 
 
Willingness and acceptance to comply with government and SE policy requirements. 
  
  
Internal 
Tensions 
Inaccessible and unsuitable 
facilities – lack of resources or 
influence to control the availability 
or construction of facilities. 
Heightened – observable conflict 
at Board, Executive and 
membership Levels 
 
Volunteerism vs professionalism 
tensions. 
 
Inaccessible and unsuitable 
facilities – lack of resources or 
influence to control the availability 
or construction of facilities. 
 
Disconnect between 
administration and grassroots. 
Strategies 
Utilised 
Pragmatic and opportunistic 
approach – partnership-based 
(predominantly coalition partners). 
 
Self-development approach – 
limited partnership-working with 
coalition partners. 
 
Opportunistic and innovative 
through strategic alignments with 
government and SE policies, and 
coalition partners.  
 
 
In terms of capacity building, the continued willingness for all three SMNGBs to align 
with government and SE-objectives and the ‘policy-core’ beliefs of the SE-led 
coalition, endorses their position as ‘policy takers’ rather than ‘policy shapers’, and 
reflects an absence of resources or influence over the availability or construction of 
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facilities, contributing to a largely passive acceptance of policy change to preserve 
membership of the SE-led coalition.  
The importance of resource-interdependencies as a constituent part of the SE-led 
coalition was clearly signposted by all case studies, through the use of SMNGB 
infrastructures to meet government and SE-objectives, in return for financial 
resources. However, adherence to the compliance-contractual obligations of the SE-
led coalition created its own set of challenges for SMNGBs, particularly the strain 
placed on operational resources to meet agreed and stretching participation 
outcomes. A key issue being the negative impact on workforce stability caused by 
persistent organisational re-structuring and re-shaping to meet shifting government 
priorities and programmes.   
Findings also identified the extent to which restrictive access to facilities, such as 
those provided by the educational and LA sectors, has limited the ability of SMNGBs 
to achieve government objectives, thus demonstrating the impact of external 
perturbations from other policy subsystems on the sport policy subsystem. Evidence 
indicates a clear divergence between sport policy goals and sport provision within 
other policy subsystems, which can attributed to a lack of understanding of the 
societal benefits of sport (e.g. the use of school sport as a means to an end in the 
educational sector), and an increasing disconnection between local government and 
sport, arguably resulting from the former’s financial constraints, differing beliefs, and 
a lack of understanding of the utility of sport. As noted by interviewee SEC:  
‘[LAs] don’t understand the power of sport. For them, sport is all about what goes on 
in the four walls of the sports centre that they may own, or they may have outsourced 
to a trust.’ 
Further evidence highlighted a lack of understanding of how to deliver on 
government and SE outcomes, as seen by VE’s self-development approach to 
increasing participation and resulting negligible impact on participation levels, 
despite the SMNGB’s willingness to comply with the contractual obligations of SE-led 
coalition, and develop workforce capacity to meet government objectives. On the 
other hand, the pragmatic, opportunistic and innovative strategies utilised by EH and 
TTE achieved more success in terms of increasing participation. However, the 
provision of acceptable levels of organisational sustainability against government/SE 
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investment has proved challenging for SMNGBs, and heightened the levels of 
internal tensions and conflict in relation to both the compliance versus autonomy and 
volunteerism versus professionalism debates, exemplified by the disparity in beliefs 
within both VE and TTE and the disconnection from their volunteer infrastructure.  
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9.4.4) Participation 
The key findings of the cross-case analysis on the analytical theme of participation 
are presented in Table 9.6.   
Table 9.6: Participation: key findings  
 EH/handball VE/volleyball TTE/table tennis 
Beliefs Prioritisation of the educational 
sector - primary purpose to 
increase participation levels and 
grassroots. 
Focused on the Playground to 
Podium sporting continuum. 
 
Not a deliverer for SE, but an 
organisation that delivers to its 
membership and their needs. 
 
Prioritisation of community sport, 
club development and competition 
- primary purpose to increase 
participative opportunities across 
all platforms.  
  
Impact of 
Policy 
Provision of inclusive, adaptable, 
and flexible sporting solutions, 
predominantly focused on 
increasing participation. 
 
 
Development of SMNGB-defined 
strategy - systematic of increasing 
concerns with a declining 
autonomy, and growing political 
pressures to increase 
participation by interventions not 
equally shared. 
 
WSPs complemented TTE’s 
strategies. 
 
 
 
Inconsistencies and ambiguity within the APS system of measurement. 
 
 
Adaptation to 
Change 
Closely aligned with 
government/SE-objectives and 
‘policy-core’ beliefs. 
Willingness to align with 
government/SE-objectives and 
‘policy-core’ beliefs – but lacked 
coherence: misalignment with the 
participation priorities due to 
strategic bias towards talent.    
 
Enforced redesign of participation 
programmes to undertake SE’s 
bidding. 
 
Close and complementary 
alignment with government/SE- 
objectives and ‘policy-core’ 
beliefs.  
 
Internal 
Tensions 
Compliance vs autonomy 
tensions, e.g. criticism of adapted 
versions of handball, designed to 
meet government and SE policy 
objectives, and negative impact of 
SE’s Club Mark on membership 
and club development. 
 
Community vs elite sport, e.g. 
sport’s absence from National 
School Games reflective a non-
medal winning status. 
 
Community vs elite sport, and  
Compliance vs autonomy 
tensions 
 
Declining club network and 
substantially less investment from 
public funds. 
 
Compliance vs autonomy 
tensions, e.g. close alignment to 
the SE-led coalition has led to the 
isolation of clubs. 
 
 
Strategies 
Utilised 
Pragmatic, opportunistic and 
adaptable approaches to 
increasing participation. 
 
Aspirational approach focused on  
the elite talent pathway;  
 
Strategic realignment to 
government/SE ‘policy-core’ 
beliefs to ensure self-
preservation. 
 
Pragmatic, opportunistic, 
innovative and complementary 
approach to increasing 
participation. 
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As alluded to in the empirical chapters, the decision by government/SE to elevate 
NGBs to a front-line mechanism for delivering government aims and objectives was 
not strategic but opportunistic, as no alternative delivery method existed. However, 
robust evidence clearly shows the direction of policy for NGBs by government and 
SE was ill-defined and policy outcomes largely unachievable, due to SE’s: i) 
disregard of the heterogeneity of NGBs by treating them all the same within a ‘one-
size-fits’ all panacea; ii) endorsement of competitive over collective action as a 
means to deliver government outcomes; and iii) utilisation of a performance 
monitoring system (the APS) that was ambiguous and flawed. The extent of the 
problem was succinctly communicated by interviewee SEC:   
‘[SE] treated all [NGBs] the same, and they’re not … The mistake was to think that all 
[NGBs] could do the same job, and fund them in the same way. The other problem 
that then arose was we set [NGBs] to compete against each other. That was one of 
the problems with the policy …, because you were taking a person active in one 
sport and making them active in a different sport. But that is exactly what we, as a 
policy organisation, had been setting up NGBs to do.’ 
From a SMNGB perspective, the focus on increasing numbers of participants, either 
directly or through partnerships, was seen as counter-productive, since NGBs often 
competed for the same participant, where the action of one NGB potentially 
impacted on the other’s abilities to achieve their own goals, as evidenced by 
interviewee SMTTE’s comments: 
‘[NGBs] were on a hunt for the same people, so table tennis, badminton and squash 
were all trying to make partnerships with the same groups potentially, and after the 
same people, just to try and … get their numbers up essentially.’  
In support of the above claims, evidence shows a high degree of differentiation 
between participative strategies used by SMNGBs linked to the various stages of the 
Playground to Podium sporting continuum, which arguably resulted from diversity in 
‘core’ beliefs and interpretations of government/SE policy requirements to meet 
policy outcomes. The shifting priorities of government and SE impacted further on 
SMNGBs by shaping the way sport was delivered, and in doing so heightened the 
level of internal conflict between Boards and memberships. Sufficient illustrations of 
which are table tennis’ decision to focus on mass participation through its ‘Ping’ 
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strategy, and enforced rather than complementary alignment to ‘policy-core’ beliefs, 
such as adaptive versions of the sport, as seen in EH and VE. The above  
highlighting further the tensions within SMNGBs resulting from the pursuit of agreed 
policy objectives and targets with government, as opposed to meeting the differing 
and conflicting needs of members.  
Nonetheless, the willingness of SMNGBs to align with the objectives and ‘policy-
core’ beliefs of government and SE, an acceptance of the contractual obligations to 
increase participation in return for public funding, and willingness to realign 
participative strategies and ‘core beliefs’, to comply with government and SE 
requirements and shifting priorities to maintain membership of the SE-led coalition, 
without opposition, clearly characterising all case study SMNGBs as ‘policy takers’ 
rather than policy ‘shapers.’  
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9.4.5) Partnerships 
The key findings of the cross-case analysis on the analytical theme of partnerships 
are presented in Table 9.7.   
Table 9.7: Partnerships: key findings 
 EH/handball VE/volleyball TTE/table tennis 
Beliefs Partnership-working - effective 
route to achieve success and gain 
a competitive advantage. 
 
Collaboration a key aspect to 
increase awareness and 
participation. 
Partnerships working - key to the 
whole ethos of the organisation. 
Impact of 
Policy 
Collaboration with specialised 
partners seen as an ‘enabler’ to 
identify pockets of interest and 
demand. 
 
 
Partnership-working utilised as a 
tool for self-development rather 
than working to achieve 
government and SE-objectives. 
Prominent partnership-working 
with various coalition partners 
seen as an ‘enabler’ to meet 
government objectives and self-
development. 
 
Mutually beneficial interdependencies. 
 
Adaptation 
to Change 
Partnership-driven, though seen 
as a natural fit. 
Limited partnerships: aspirational 
only and limited understanding - 
misalignment with SE participation 
strategies.  
  
Partnership-driven - aligned with 
SE ‘policy-core’ beliefs and 
objectives.  
 
Knowledge transference between 
coalition partners to strengthen 
membership of the SE-led 
coalition. 
 
Internal 
Tensions 
Organisational-identity – 
membership body vs multi-
institutional (as a facilitator, rather 
than a deliverer). 
 
Tensions in shared-beliefs - less 
committed to promoting sport as a 
‘social good’, and more committed 
to widening the talent pool for elite 
performance. 
 
Organisational-identity – 
membership body vs multi-
institutional (as a promoter of 
sport). 
Strategies 
Utilised 
Opportunistic and partnership-
based.  
Self-development – focused on 
commercial activities rather than 
social activities. 
 
Opportunistic and partnership-
driven;  
 
Arguably, partnership-working has been an aspirational ‘policy-core’ belief for 
government/SE, rather than a constituent part of the compliance-contractual 
obligations and membership of the SE-led coalition, particularly as interviewee 
CEOEH claimed that ‘[t]here is no government policy promoting partnerships directly, 
[but] there’s … encouragement [to work in partnership].’ Similarly, SE claimed that 
NGB ‘joined-up working’ was still in its ‘infancy’ (SE, 2012b, p.4), and cross-sport 
working was not as prevalent as anticipated (SE, 2012c, p.2). According to 
Mackintosh and Liddle (2015) a reliance on partnership-working has potential fragility 
and incongruence issues for delivering on policy outcomes. However, evidence 
suggests that for those SMNGBs with partnership-driven strategies, such as EH and 
TTE, collaboration with coalition partners acted as an ‘enabler’ to: i) meet 
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government objectives; ii) identify pockets of interest and demand; iii) target hard to 
reach groups in line with SE requirements; and iv) develop the sport. Partnership- 
working also has greater significance for smaller, less well-resourced NGBs, where 
partners are seen not just as deliverers, but also advocates for the sport, and 
providers of potential competitive advantages, as in the case of EH and TTE. In 
contrast, however, VE has not engaged fully in partnership-working and showed little 
understanding of the potentially mutually beneficial interdependencies available, 
which arguably results from VE’s commitment to elitism rather than sport for social 
good, and self-development rather than joined-up working to achieve shared 
government/SE-objectives. The effective use of partnership-working within the SE-
led coalition was succinctly explained by interviewee SESLR, which again provides 
an alternative argument to that of Mackintosh and Liddle (2015): 
‘Where the relationships work really well is where there is a clear strategic alignment. 
Both organisations are very clear on what [they’re] working towards … [SE] isn’t a 
delivery organisation, so we need partners to reach the particular audiences that we 
are prioritising. Whether that be handball meeting a particular part of the population, 
or other organisations reaching particular audiences, whether that be a low socio-
economic group, disabled participants, or whatever focus or outcome [SE] are 
driving, we need those partners to reach those parts of the population.’ 
Furthermore, SMNGBs have utilised similar political resources to social actors (e.g. 
consultations, Parliamentary Inquiries, and working parties), although clearly there 
has been less impact, which arguably reflects a constrained capacity to influence 
policy resulting from the degree to which SMNGBs are tied to SE policy, again 
clarifying SMNGBs as primarily ‘policy takers.’  
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9.5) Research implications for UK sport policy and SMNGBs 
This study has demonstrated that community sport matters to society, to government 
and sports’ governing bodies, and should neither be overlooked, under-estimated or 
under-valued. However, policy is something that happens to sport rather than 
something that’s shaped by sport, and imposed and implemented by way of 
command and control from the centre within a policy environment, designed and 
engineered by government to act as a mechanism for realising sport policy outcomes 
linked to changes in priorities and political agendas, through agency-led coalitions 
that predominantly implement policy rather than serve to influence policy. Yet, it is 
also argued that policy shaping or policy taking occurs at opposite ends of a 
spectrum, whereby some policy outcomes are clearly allocated to each end and 
movement along the spectrum is somewhat blurred, for example, the No 
Compromise principle of UK sport-led elite sport policy is an observable policy 
outcome at the policy taking end of the spectrum, which if changed significantly 
would become policy making/shaping rather than policy taking. Whereas, the minor 
change in elite policy through the ‘Aspirational Fund’ is likely to have a blurred 
position towards the policy taking end of the spectrum, there being no hard or fast 
dividing line to differentiate between policy shaping or taking.      
The UK sport-led elite sport policy encourages policy stability by offering a simplistic 
solution to achieving policy outcomes, by way of resources for medal contenders 
only, which requires less policy intervention, although this does have potential 
implications grassroots/school sport. Sport England-led community sport policy, on 
the other hand, is complex, multi-layered and suffers from perpetual instability, not 
helped by the level of engagement and overlap among policy actors across different 
coalitions and policy subsystems that is primarily government-led (e.g. education, 
health and local authorities). The openness of the sport policy subsystem to policy 
shifts in community sport, as seen by the pendulum swing between sports for sport’s 
sake to sport for social good, being a reflection of government’s apparent lack of a 
clear understanding of the benefits and importance of sport and physical activity to 
society, and a consequence of sports’ perpetual fragmentation and multiplicity of 
policy actors within disunited political system, where sport itself is bounced around 
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the spaces between priority and peripheral political concerns, and viewed as a ‘bolt-
on’ mechanism for government to use as and when it sees fit.  
The research has shown the limited utility of NGBs to government and the increasing 
use of non-sport organisations to get people not just to play sport but also to be 
active, intimating that NGBs might have reached the limits of their usefulness. While 
NGBs have been good for doing a narrow range of policy objectives amid ever 
decreasing levels of public funding, and have had to dance to a variety of different 
tunes, orchestrated by government and its agencies, there being little in the way of 
negotiation or manoeuvrability, many have done so mainly to survive, as seen within 
the case studies and their positioning as primarily policy ‘takers’ rather than policy 
‘shapers.’ The heightened levels of resource-dependency and its gravitational pull 
eliciting futile resistance in the face of self-preservation. Moreover, NGBs involved in 
community sport haven’t done everything that government has wanted them to do or 
done it well enough, which has prompted government and Sport England to look 
elsewhere to achieve their policy objectives, pointing towards the beginning of a 
trend away from NGBs, in contrast to UK sport, where NGBs have been doing what 
their told and have received substantial funding to do so.  
However, while this study has raised questions on sport/NGBs’ continuity in or 
suitability for the sport policy environment and a role within government, government 
and its agencies have significantly shaped SMNGBs both organisationally and 
operationally and lessened their autonomy, particularly through the removal of the 
‘Blazer Brigade’ from positions of authority, arguably to enable government to exert 
greater control over operational and financial activities, and have produced entities 
that are capable of having a greater role and responsibilities within the policy 
environment. This has important implications for SMNGBs, particularly the 
contribution they can make to society as a whole, whether they are sports that are 
emerging, developing or declining, they too matter and should not overlooked or 
under-valued. Indeed, this research has shown the emergence of a cluster of 
SMNGB/sports, actively engaged in attempts to influence community sport policy in 
areas where sport can have an impact. Equally, a cluster of competitive SMNGBs 
(the ‘have-nots’) has emerged, actively engaged in collective action to influence elite 
sport policy, the key being the degree and ability of NGBs to work collectively to 
bring about major change within the UK sport policy subsystem. The extent to which 
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this would be possible is sensitised further by the implications of this research in 
relation to SMNGBs’ apparent limited understanding and expertise of policy 
environments, and their ability to manage the tripartite of dichotomies that exist 
within SMNGBs, relating to compliance versus autonomy, volunteerism versus 
professionalism, and elite versus community sport. The former suggesting that if 
there is logic for a triple hermeneutic by way of policymakers synthesising and acting 
upon research findings, then logic would infer the existence of a fourth hermeneutic 
by way of the interpretation and understanding of policy from those policy actors that 
implement policy or those upon which policy is imposed. The implications of 
managing the needs of the different stakeholders of SMNGBs, is strongly linked to 
challenges of organisational-identity among not only SMNGBs, but also Sport 
England, and the degree of resilience and flexibility of heavily resource-dependent 
SMNGBs to maintain operations at current levels and avoid regressive 
organisational shifts from ‘boardroom’ back to ‘kitchen table’ organisations.   
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9.6) Evaluating the utility of the ACF 
Evidence from the empirical chapters has illuminated a number of key points 
relevant to the fundamental assumptions of the ACF, particularly in relation to the 
formation, composition, and delimiting boundaries of advocacy coalitions and policy 
subsystems, the ACF’s hierarchical belief system, and the ACF’s capacity to explain 
both policy change and stability.   
Fundamental to the ACF is the assumption that policy actors seek out other actors 
with shared-beliefs or potential beneficial resources, and coalesce into discrete 
coalitions to influence the policy process around a particular policy issue, through 
coordinated and collective action and the utilisation of various strategies (Jenkins-
Smith and Sabatier, 1993a; Sabatier, 1999; Green and Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007; Pierce and Weible, 2016; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). The ACF’s 
explanation of coalition formation enabled the identification of a CCPR-led advocacy 
coalition, whereby policy actors coalesced around the belief that sport’s societal 
value should be an important concern of government,  from which sports’ ‘nascent’  
policy subsystem originates. Arguably though, coalition and subsystem formation as a 
stimulant to government interest, where none previously existed, is not explicitly 
theorised within the ACF, although there is an acknowledgment that government is 
the primary focus of coalition activity, and that policy subsystems could be the 
product of a sizeable specialist coalition forming its own subsystem (Sabatier, 1988), 
which resonates with the CCPR-led coalition whose knowledge and expertise would 
become relied upon by government (Houlihan, 1991).   
ACF assumptions on coalition formation are supported by the identification of distinct 
agency-led advocacy coalitions for elite sport, community/social sport and school 
sport, as occupants of the UK sport policy subsystem. While Green and Houlihan 
(2004) previously identified advocacy in elite sport, for them the potential for an 
advocacy coalition in social and community sport was remote due to limited 
resources. However, evidence has demonstrated the presence of a SE-led 
community/social sport advocacy coalition, on the basis of an endogenous drive 
towards mass participation, powerfully reinforced by SE (particularly for health 
benefits), through modernisation, reform, and the engineered increasing dependency 
of NGBs on public funding, particularly Lottery funds; and exogenously driven by the 
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government’s increasingly pro-social agenda. The interaction between government 
and SE, and policy actors (e.g. NGBs), demonstrates a high degree of engagement 
and coordinated activity over time to meet shared goals, which arguably meets ACF 
assumptions regarding the structuring of advocacy coalitions through shared ‘policy-
core’ beliefs, and sets them apart from advocacy communities (Stritch, 2015) or 
coalitions of convenience (Fenger and Klok, 2001).    
While the ACF has been useful in defining the formation of advocacy coalitions 
within the UK sport policy subsystem, the distinctiveness of the three sporting 
coalitions as agency-led coalitions, challenges the assumptions of the ACF 
particularly as the coalitions have been constructed or substantially shaped by 
government to act as a mechanism for realising government policy outcomes, that is, 
as ‘implementation’ coalitions rather than primarily policy-influencing coalitions. 
Furthermore, while agency-led coalitions are considered to be a product of shared 
‘policy-core’ beliefs, evidence has shown that they can also be engineered on the 
basis of contractual-compliance, shared-interests, financial incentives and sanctions, 
and interdependencies, as seen by the relationship between government/SE and 
NGB/SMNGBs acting as policy actors and coalitions partners. This suggests that the 
ACF exaggerates the strength of shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs as a binding agent, 
particularly as the contractual-compliance element of agency-led coalition 
membership also acts as a co-determinant for inclusion and expulsion, an example 
of which is the No Compromise principle, seen as a notable restriction to 
membership of the UKS-led coalition. 
Of particular significance is the contribution of interdependency within the SE and 
UKS agency-led coalitions, as an explanation for the behaviour of policy actors, 
where, according to Fenger and Klok (2001), interdependency is related to the role 
scarce resources play in enabling actors to perform their actions, and viewed as an 
important aspect of coalition formation and coordination. The ACF offers little insight 
into the concept of interdependency (symbiotic, independent or competitive) or its 
potential impact on behaviour among coalition actors, whereas evidence from this 
study has highlighted the impact of competitive interdependencies on the ability to 
achieve shared-objectives of ‘policy-core’ beliefs. For example, shifting policy 
priorities and external perturbations within the UK sport policy subsystem (e.g. the 
Lottery), intensified conflict within and among NGBs (e.g. internal tensions relating to 
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compliance/autonomy and elite/community dichotomies), and endorsed competitive 
over collective action as a means to deliver government outcomes.  
According to critics of the ACF (Schlager, 1995; Schlager and Blomquist, 1996; 
Fenger and Klok, 2001), the framework finds difficulty in accounting for self-interest, 
shared-interests and interdependencies among policy actors, which points towards a 
degree of exaggeration on the ‘glue’ that binds coalitions together. The role of self-
interest among policy actors and competing pressures (such as responsibilities of 
NGBs to their own membership), are seen as factors that mitigate against the 
establishment of strong coalitions (Schlager 1995; Schlager and Blomquist 1996). An 
argument endorsed further by Fenger and Klok’s ( 2001) claim that the autonomous 
nature of many actors (i.e. self-interest), such as NGBs, would point towards the 
non-development of coalitions, according to ACF assumptions, since there would be 
no compelling reason for interaction or the coordination of activities among such 
actors. The ACF’s assumption that policy actors work towards collective goals, 
arguably overrides the self-interest aspect of policy actors, otherwise, they would not 
be considered a collective group (Yilmaz, 201848). Nonetheless, self-interest among 
policy actors has important implications for the ACF. As Schlager and Blomquist 
(1996, pp.661-664) argued, the ACF neglects the concerns of policy actors’ and 
members’ interests/conflicts within coalitions, when balancing organisational needs 
(self-preservation) with transforming the organisation’s belief system into 
governmental policy, and the subsequent needs and objectives of government 
policy. As seen by internal conflicts within NGBs compounded by the existence of, 
for example, compliance/autonomy and elite/grassroots dichotomies. Furthermore, 
evidence suggests that policy actors within advocacy coalitions can be subject to 
enforced collective action, resulting from government intervention and subsystem 
design, drawing attention to the argument that coalitions are not simply bound 
together by shared values/beliefs, as noted by interviewee SRADP:    
‘[O]rganisations [within the UK sports policy domain] work together because they 
have to, because they are in a system which has been designed in that way.’ 
 
                                                          
48
 Personal email correspondence from Serhat Yilmaz dated 21/02/2018 following an internal review.  
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However, the ACF’s underplay of  also underplay self-interest, shared-interests and 
interdependencies, is arguably attributable to the ‘height’ from which the ACF views 
policy subsystems, where the closer the lens the greater the potential to see visible 
fault lines between coalition members, and the degree of separation and isolation 
rather than homogeneity among policy actors, as in the case of NGBs. While this 
points towards self-advocacy rather than collective advocacy, highlighting the 
potential for NGBs to be part of an ‘advocacy community’ rather than an ‘advocacy 
coalition’, as Stritch (2015, p.438) would claim, the interaction between 
government/SE/UKS and NGBs demonstrates a high degree of coordinated activity 
to meet shared goals, an alliance that benefits from resources, such as public 
funding. This arguably meets ACF assumptions of the composition of advocacy 
coalitions, that is, shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs and significant engagement in 
coordinated activity over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999).  
The ACF purports that a policy subsystem is comprised of all relevant policy actors 
seeking to influence policy within a particular policy domain (Jenkins-Smith et al., 
2014), the boundaries of which are based on the frequency of dialectical interplay 
and the transitivity of influence (Sabatier, 1988), the level of which also distinguishes 
subsystems between those that are ‘nascent’ from those that have matured 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Green and Houlihan, 2005). The assumptions of 
the ACF were particularly useful in identifying the origins of the ‘nascent’ UK sport 
policy subsystem during the 1960s, where the legitimacy of sport as a government 
concern emerged on the public agenda, having previously received limited little or no 
serious consideration in public decision-making forums, and where advocates had 
only recently become active through the emergence of a CCPR-led coalition. This 
supports Stritch’s (2015) definition of a ‘nascent’ policy subsystem and ACF 
assumptions that ‘nascent’ policy subsystems can be the product of a sizeable 
specialist coalition forming its own subsystem (Sabatier, 1988). However, evidence 
also illuminated the emergence of the UK sport policy subsystem from a set of beliefs 
supportive of government intervention and involvement, the potential for which is not 
readily identifiable within the ACF.  
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According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), ‘mature’ policy subsystems are 
characterised by a set of participants who regard themselves as a semi-autonomous 
community, share expertise in a policy domain, and have sought to influence public 
policy in that domain for an extended period of time (over a decade or more). 
However, the utility of ACF in determining the maturity for the UK sport policy 
subsystem proved less convincing, which draws attention to the potential vagueness 
of the ACF’s defining characteristics of a mature policy subsystem. In line with ACF 
assumptions, the sport policy subsystem consists of participants, such as the Sports 
Councils and NGBs, who are semi-autonomous through their resource-dependence 
on government, and through their shared expertise on sport participation within policy 
initiatives over an extended period of time, thus pointing towards a maturing of the 
subsystem rather than a fully mature subsystem. Paradoxically, however, the 
perpetual fragmentation of sport and varying levels of the salience of sport to 
government, suggests a policy subsystem that is, in theory, still ‘nascent.’ Arguably 
though, this is not the case, as evidence clearly indicates a maturing of the sport 
policy subsystem, as demonstrated by: i) government’s involvement in the policy 
subsystem since 1995; ii) the complexity and multiplicity of subsystem policy actors 
and agency-led coalition partners that potentially seek to influence sport policy, and 
iii) the existence of symbiotic interdependencies and transference of knowledge and 
expertise among coalition partners. What can be said is that the sport policy 
subsystem is at an earlier stage of maturity relative to the older established policy 
subsystems (e.g. health and education). This suggests that subsystems move 
through various phases of maturity consistent with the levels of government 
intervention in and public awareness of particular subsystems, the extent to which 
can also constrict transitions between stages of maturity, as seen by government’s 
indecision on the location of sport within Whitehall, and its eventual attachment to 
DCMS, itself regarded as a ‘bit player’ among the heavyweights such as health, 
education, and defence (Burrell, 2016). However, it is also possible to argue that 
some policy subsystems remain at an undeveloped stage because of the 
characteristics of components of the subsystem, such as rivalry between actors for 
resources, shallow belief systems, and a deliberate strategy by government to 
undermine subsystem cohesions, as is evidently the case in sport, and where 
disjointed government is the natural order of things, as in the UK. As noted by 
interviewee SRADP:  
255 
 
‘[Government is] not joined-up, is not coordinated, there’s rivalries between and in 
departments, [and] people … won’t talk to each other.’ 
Evidence also supports the ACF’s self-diagnosis that the delimitation of subsystem 
boundaries is complicated by the existence of overlapping subsystems and coalitions 
(policy actors as subsets of different subsystems and coalitions) (Zafonte and 
Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier and Weible, 2007), 
although Stritch (2015, p.440) argued that there is ‘no single template for policy 
subsystems in terms of their size or scope, and an attempt to impose one would 
probably be too constricting.’  Within the UK sport policy subsystem there is a clear 
indication for the potential of overlapping policy subsystems dependent on the 
varying levels of sports relevance to the shifting priorities of government. For 
example, the increasing use of sport and physical activity as an instrument of 
government for ‘social good’ and its contribution across ten different government 
departments, as seen in Sporting Future (DCMS, 2015b), and the involvement of 
NGBs across the different agency-led coalitions. Paradoxically, evidence suggests 
that overlap between subsystems and government intervention within policy 
subsystems, can also potentially impact on those subsystems that interact 
frequently, by restricting subsystem development to higher stages of maturity and 
the ability of government-constructed agency-led subsystems to deliver on policy 
outcomes (e.g. changes to educational and local government policy impacting on 
sport policy).  
In terms of the hierarchical belief system of the ACF, evidence offered generally 
strong support for the role of shared-beliefs and technical information in policy 
change, and the extent to which ‘policy-core’ beliefs act as a binding agent for 
coalitions (Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). As advocated by 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1994; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014), mapping the beliefs 
and policies on the same canvas, in this case government, SE and SMNGBs, 
identified a high degree of alignment and overlap at all levels of the ACF’s belief 
system. For example, the extent to which modernisation and reform through New 
Labour’s ‘Third Way’ ideology, the use of NGBs as a delivery mechanism to increase 
participation in sport, and the increased salience to government of health-related 
issues, have influenced policy change.  
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However, mapping beliefs and policies on the same canvas also highlighted a 
potential issue with the dividing lines between the three levels of ACF’s belief 
system, and ACF assumptions concerning the location of beliefs, which is arguably a 
consequence of the ‘height’ from which the ACF views policy subsystems. Evidence 
suggests that within the UK sport policy subsystem, fundamental ‘deep-core’ beliefs 
are philosophical in terms of government’s role in a civilised society to support sport 
and the arts, commonsensical in relation to sports’ societal value, for example, a 
feel-good-factor, cultural or societal in respect of the historical importance of sport 
and the extent to which sport matters to all and has become woven into the very 
fabric of communities and society. Indeed, Grix and Carmichael (2012, p.73) argued 
that in relation to sport, the UK espouses ‘commonsensical propositions’ or beliefs, 
which are ‘not always based on wide, existing research or evidence’, for example, 
international prestige or ‘a feel-good factor’, which are identifiable as governmental 
‘deep-core’ beliefs. The ACF appears to disregard such cultural or societal ‘deep-
core’ beliefs, which maybe subsystem specific but equally span society as a whole, 
and by implication, all policy subsystems. While evidence identified empirically 
ascertained ‘deep-core’ beliefs, such as the health benefits of sport, empirical 
evidence within the UK sport policy subsystem appears to have greater prominence 
at the ‘policy-core’ and ‘secondary-aspects’ levels of the ACF, for example, 
evidenced-based monitoring as a key determinant for the allocation and distribution 
of public funding, particularly as policy is dictated by the Treasury and data and 
insight are seen as key factors for the distribution of resources. As interviewee 
DCMSa asserted, ‘the Treasury insist nowadays much more than ever, on evidence 
that things work.’ However, this could arguably be a function of subsystem design as 
a means to implement delivery and achievement of policy objectives and outcomes.  
Of particular significance has been the use of the ACF to explain policy change and 
stability. In support of Houlihan’s (2005, p.173) conjecture that the ACF ‘offers 
valuable insights into policy stability, where stability is explained in terms of dominant 
coalitions and the persistence of deep core and policy core beliefs’, evidence has 
shown the relative stability of both elite sports policy and the UKS-led coalition, with 
the UK sport policy subsystem. The extension of policy continuity for elite sport 
policy signposting the UKS-led coalition as the dominant coalition within the sport 
policy subsystem, where UKS’s No Compromise approach to elite performance and 
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government’s decision-making to maintain UKS as the lead-agency for elite sport 
have persisted as ‘policy-core’ beliefs, as has the power of elite sport to provide 
international prestige and inspirational effects, as ‘deep-core’ beliefs. Arguably, the 
‘policy-core’ beliefs offer government a simple but effective means to achieve policy 
outcomes, thus constituting a lesser degree of policy intervention.  
However, the use of the ACF to explain policy change and stability in community 
sport policy proved more challenging, although it offered some explanation in relation 
to policy change, where persistent external and internal perturbations or shocks to 
the policy subsystem have resulted in a community sport policy environment in 
constant flux, there being little evidence of policy stability over the medium term. 
According to Sabatier and Weible (2007) external perturbations or shocks to a policy 
subsystem, and internal shocks from within, have the potential to shift policy 
agendas, focus public attention, and attract the attention of key decision-makers, the 
effect of which is likely to be the redistribution of resources or opening and closing 
venues within the policy subsystem. As demonstrated in Table 9.1, evidence shows 
a series of external and internal perturbations or shocks that prompted changes in 
the trajectory of UK sport policy, and altered the structure of the sport policy 
subsystem, an example of which was the creation of the Lottery, which facilitated 
government intervention in sport policy by providing a policy instrument for 
government priorities, while opening a policy venue for the distribution of resources 
to sport/NGBs. Arguably though, there is an apparent disregard within the ACF of 
government-led initiatives, such as the Lottery, acting as external shocks to stimulate 
policy subsystem development and as an ‘enabler’ for major policy change. It is also 
possible to argue that policy change resulted not only from external perturbations to 
the sport policy subsystem (e.g. change in government), but also from a change in 
the relatively stable parameters in terms of the ‘deep-core’ beliefs of political 
ideology. For example, the requirement for NGBs to earn the right to have a 
partnership with government, and the drive for NGB modernisation reinforced by 
KPIs and the threat of withdrawal of funding, in line with New Labour’s Best Value 
ethos.  
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The ACF also associates major policy change with policy-oriented learning by way of 
new problem definitions, policy solutions, or strategies for influencing the policy 
decision-making process (e.g. professional ‘fora’) (Sabatier and Weible, 2007; 
Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014), for example, the identification of learning among or 
between coalitions, policy brokers or belief change (Pierce et al., 2017). This is less 
convincing in relation to the UK sport policy subsystem, there being little evidence of 
policy-oriented learning, which could reflect the cyclical nature of funding and policy 
monitoring for government and agency-led coalitions. The effect of which has, for 
example, limited the time-specific learning of SMNGBs within policy and agency-led 
funding cycles to develop strategies to meet policy objectives, limited their scope to 
influence policy, and as such are considered primarily ‘policy takers’ rather than 
‘policy shapers’, as opposed to other policy actors such as social actors, who have 
benefitted from a long tradition of political lobbying in the sports policy domain. 
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9.7) Research implications for the ACF 
This study has demonstrated the usefulness of the ACF as the theoretical framework 
for analysing sport policy, in particular, coalition and subsystem formation with 
evidence supporting the existence of an agency-led (Sport England) advocacy 
coalitions in community sport which had not been previously identified, and the 
potential for nested and overlapping coalitions and subsystems, which is a 
phenomena that clearly exists within the UK sport policy subsystem. This research 
also strongly supports the role of shared-beliefs and technical information in policy 
change, whereby external and internal shocks to the policy subsystem have changed 
the direction of sport policy and altered the structure of policy subsystem. The ACF 
also offered valuable insights in the explanation of policy stability by way of the 
perseverance of a dominant coalitions and the persistence of ‘deep-core’ and ‘policy-
core beliefs’, as seen in elite sport policy and the UKS-led coalition. However, the 
ACF has been less convincing for community sport policy, which is invariably linked 
to a fundamental issue with the ‘height’ from which the ACF views policy 
subsystems, and also reflective of the cyclical nature of funding and policy 
monitoring for government and agency-led coalitions. The effect of which has, for 
example, limited the time-specific policy-oriented learning of SMNGBs within policy 
and agency-led funding cycles to develop strategies to meet policy objectives, limited 
their scope to influence policy, and as such SMNGBs are considered primarily ‘policy 
takers’ rather than ‘policy shapers’, as opposed to other policy actors such as social 
actors, who have benefitted from a long tradition of political lobbying in the sports 
policy domain. That said, the value of the ACF can be found in providing some sense 
to the blurred concept of policy shaping and policy taking, by differentiating the 
position on policy shaping/taking spectrum through the use of its tripartite belief 
system, although still mindful of the extent to which the dividing lines between the 
three levels of the ACF’s belief system are also blurred, and arguably a further 
consequence of the ‘height’ of the lens from which the ACF views policy. 
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The implications of the ‘height issue’ also resonate with the ACF’s neglect of self-
interest, shared-interests, interdependencies, and heterogeneity among policy 
actors, where the closer the lens the greater the potential to see visible fault lines 
between coalition members, and the degree of separation and isolation rather than 
homogeneity among policy actors, as in the case of UK sport policy. This study has 
highlighted the potential impact of interdependency on behaviour among coalition 
actors, for example, the impact of competitive interdependencies on the ability to 
achieve shared-objectives of ‘policy-core’ beliefs. This research has also 
demonstrated that self-interest among policy actors has important implications for 
the ACF, where it is argued that internal tensions and concerns among policy actors 
and coalition members, particularly in relation to balancing organisational needs 
(self-preservation) with the belief system, and needs and objectives of government, 
adds a further layer of complexity to the composition of coalitions and highlights the 
potential for competing internal coalitions, resulting from the heterogeneous rather 
than homogenous nature of policy actors. Indeed, it is important not to assume a 
high degree of homogeneity among policy actors, as seen within this study on 
SMNGBs, and thus underemphasise what separates them from one another (e.g. 
elite versus grassroots, Olympic versus non-Olympic or even funded versus 
unfunded). This is clearly the case within the UK sport policy subsystem and agency-
led coalitions, which draws attention to the implications of further research into the 
nature of agency-led coalitions and the ACF’s concept of coalition formation and 
shared-beliefs. The existence of agency-led coalitions challenges the assumptions of 
the ACF, particularly coalitions that have been constructed or substantially shaped 
by government to act as a mechanism for realising government policy outcomes, that 
is, as ‘implementation’ coalitions rather than primarily policy-influencing coalitions, 
which have been engineered on the basis of contractual-compliance, shared-
interests, financial incentives and sanctions, and interdependencies, which suggests 
that the ACF exaggerates the strength of shared ‘policy-core’ beliefs as a binding 
agent. This emphasises further the extent to which agency-led coalitions have been 
overlooked within the assumptions of the ACF, particularly as this could provide 
potential contributions for the ACF to satisfy a critique that it should consider the 
process of implementation more accurately (Skille, 2008). 
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Similarly, this research has drawn attention to the potential vagueness of the ACF’s 
defining characteristics of a mature policy subsystem, and argues that subsystems 
move through various phases of maturity consistent with the levels of government 
intervention in and public awareness of particular subsystems, the extent to which 
can also constrict transitions between stages of maturity. It is further argued that 
some policy subsystems remain at an undeveloped stage because of the 
characteristics of components of the subsystem, such as rivalry between actors for 
resources, shallow belief systems, and a deliberate strategy by government to 
undermine subsystem cohesions, as is evidently the case in sport, and where 
disjointed government is the natural order of things. Further implications of this 
research is the degree to which overlap between subsystems and government 
intervention within policy subsystems, potentially impacts on those subsystems that 
interact frequently, by restricting subsystem development to higher stages of maturity 
and the ability of government-constructed agency-led subsystems to deliver on 
policy outcomes. Again, this is a phenomenon that exists within the UK sport policy 
subsystem, where changes in the educational and local government policy 
subsystems have negatively impacted on contractual obligations of coalition 
members, such as SMNGBs, to meet government and agency-led coalition policy 
objectives and outcomes. The fragmentation and specialisation of the policy process 
resulting in subsystems of varying dimensions, and potentially the overlapping of 
policy subsystems, as is clearly evident within sport, are factors that need to be 
borne in mind when applying the ACF, although it could be argued that government-
constructed subsystems have a greater susceptibility to the delimiting challenges 
and complications of weak subsystem boundaries, which requires further academic 
enquiry and greater acknowledgement within the ACF. 
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9.8) Conclusion 
The evaluation of empirical data revealed a sport policy subsystem constructed or 
substantially shaped by government and agency-led coalitions, notably, the UKS-led 
elite sport coalition and the SE-led community sport coalition, engineered on the 
basis of shared-beliefs (which are partly common to SMNGBs and SE/UKS and 
partly imposed by SE/UKS), and a culture of contract-compliance, shared-interests, 
financial inducements/sanctions and organisational interdependencies, to deliver on 
the shifting priorities of government’s pro-social agenda. Evidence has shown that 
both contemporary UK sport policy within which SMNGBs operate and policy 
change, can be explained by the occurrence of external and internal perturbations or 
shocks to the policy subsystem, where policy shifts are a dual reflection of 
government’s lack of a clear understanding of the benefits and importance of sport 
and physical activity, and sports’ reluctance to utilise their significant influence to 
shape policy. Government-led engagement and overlap among policy actors across 
different coalitions and policy subsystems also viewed as being significant 
contributor to the expansion and contraction of the sport policy subsystem, leavening 
its ability to reach higher stages of maturity. 
In evaluating and analysing the development of governmental relationships, the 
empirical data from the case studies revealed the utilisation of various strategic 
approaches strengthen relationships, such as opportunistic and pragmatic 
alignments to government/SE policies; acceptance of policy change and contractual-
compliance obligations of the SE-led coalition; the use of political resources and 
compliance as a means of increasing awareness and scope for influencing 
policymakers; and high levels of partnership engagement; as well as imposed 
interventions from SE. The changing relationship between SMNGBs and 
government/SE, and the trend away from NGB/SMNGBs as implementers of 
community sport policy, partly a reflection of: i) ill-defined community sport policies; 
ii) a limited understanding of the policy environment and issues of organisational 
identity among NGB/SMNGBs; and iii) the continued existence of a fragmented and 
policy-naïve sporting sector. The result of which has been the unopposed 
acceptance of policy change from those SMNGBs selected as case studies, and 
overall willingness to adapt to change to preserve membership of the SE-led 
coalition and levels of resource-dependency, and their clear identification as 
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primarily ‘policy takers’ rather than ‘policy shapers’, arguably on the basis self-
preservation, although there is evidence to suggest a willingness among SMNGBs to 
influence policy as a collective, moving forward. 
The evaluation and analysis of the themes clearly identified them as dimensions of 
operational activities linked to mechanisms for delivering desired policy outcomes, 
and determinants of policy ‘shaping’ or policy ‘taking.’ Governance is seen as 
imposed policy, which has significantly shaped SMNGBs both organisationally and 
operationally and lessened their autonomy, where compliance and self-preservation 
have been privileged over autonomy and membership interests, resulting in 
heightened levels of internal tensions and conflicts within SMNGBs, and illuminated 
issues with organisational-identity. Funding in respect of the allocation public funds 
and the threat of financial sanctions, has demonstrated significant influence of SE 
over the financial and operational activities of SMNGBs, and confirms their position 
as predominantly ‘policy takers’, content to accept rather than oppose policy change 
to maximise the flow of government subsidies on the basis of self-preservation. The 
exposure of SMNGBs to resource-dependency and their limited ability or reluctance 
to generate alternative sources of self-sustaining income, has not only emphasised 
their vulnerability and weaknesses as sport/NGBs, but also highlighted future 
challenges from reduced public funding and levels of resource-dependency.   
While capacity building (workforce and facilities), demonstrated further the 
importance of resource-interdependencies as a constituent part of the SE-led 
coalition and endorsed SMNGBs’ position as ‘policy takers’, evidence has shown the 
challenges faced by SMNGBs to meet to government and SE-objectives, in return for 
financial resources (e.g. workforce instability/overstretch and internal conflicts), as 
well as illuminating the impact of restricted access to LA and educational facilities, 
which has impacted on levels of organisational sustainability against government/SE 
investment and participation targets. The thematic analysis of participation also 
revealed a high degree of differentiation between participative strategies used by 
SMNGBs, largely resulting from: i) shifting priorities of government/SE and policy 
endorsement of competitive over collective action; and ii) differentiation in ‘core’ 
beliefs and interpretations of government/SE policy requirements. The willingness of 
SMNGBs to align and realign their strategies to those of government/SE and 
unopposed acceptance contractual obligations to increase participation in return for 
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public funding, adding further support to the characterisation of SMNGBs as primarily  
‘policy takers.’ Partnerships, on the other hand, were viewed as an aspirational 
‘policy-core’ belief for government/SE, rather than a constituent part of the 
compliance-contractual obligations, and as such resulted in varying degrees of 
partnership working among the selected SMNGBs, although those with partnership-
driven strategies tended to have a stronger relationship with SE. However, evidence 
also illuminated that SMNGBs have had less impact on policy decision-making than 
their social actor partner counterparts, which arguably reflects a constrained capacity 
to influence policy resulting from the degree to which SMNGBs are tied to SE policy, 
again clarifying SMNGBs as primarily ‘policy takers.’   
The implications of this research for UK sport policy and SMNGBs points towards 
policy imposed on sport rather than shaped by it, and implemented through agency- 
led coalitions, although arguably policy shaping or policy taking occurs along a 
spectrum which is somewhat blurred, particularly within community sport, where 
complexity, openness, and the swinging pendulum of sport as a political concern, 
have fashioned a policy environment in constant flux, and a current trend towards 
the limited involvement of NGBs within the sport policy domain. Yet, the collective 
contribution that NGBs, in particular SMNGBs, can bring to community sport and 
society as whole should not be overlooked or underestimated, especially as 
SMNGBs have been shaped themselves to be more than just membership 
organisations, and evidence points towards a cluster of SMNGB/sports with the 
potential to be influential in shaping policy in areas where sport can have an impact. 
However, the capacity of SMNGBs to influence sport policy will also be determined 
by their ability to address the challenges of organisational identity, balancing the 
needs of critical stakeholders, acquiring expertise within the policy environment, and 
maintaining financial sustainability.  
The application of the ACF illuminated a number of key points relevant to the 
fundamental assumptions of the framework, particularly in relation to the formation, 
composition, and boundaries of advocacy coalitions and policy subsystems, the 
ACF’s hierarchical belief system, and the ACF’s capacity to explain both policy 
change and stability, which contribute to debates on the utility of the ACF as an 
analytical framework. The evaluation of the ACF highlighted its usefulness as an 
analytical framework, but also potential weaknesses, particularly in regard to the 
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limited insight given to government-constructed agency-led coalitions, as primarily 
implementation coalitions, and the height from which the ACF views policy 
subsystems.  
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusions 
 
10.1) Introduction 
The focus of this thesis has been an evaluation of three small to mid-sized national 
governing bodies of Olympic sports in England, to determine their position as ‘policy 
shapers’ or ‘policy takers’ within the UK sport policy subsystem. The purpose of this 
final chapter is to present a summary of the key findings and conclusions drawn from 
each chapter that directly address the aims and objectives of this study, which were 
to:  
Research aims: 
1) Evaluate the extent to which changes in sport policy have impacted on small 
to mid-sized NGBs, and the strategies utilised to adapt to changing policy and 
operational environments; and 
2) Determine whether small to mid-sized NGBs are primarily ‘policy shapers’ or 
‘policy takers.’  
Research objectives: 
(a) Understand the historical context of contemporary sport policy within which 
SMNGBs operate;  
(b) Examine the development of governmental relationships with SMNGBs; 
(c) Investigate the impact of changing sport policy on SMNGBs, by means of a 
thematic analysis of operational activities; 
(d) Ascertain the strategies utilised by SMNGBs to adapt to, and operate within, a 
changing policy and operational environment; and 
(e) Evaluate the utility of the ACF. 
The aims and objectives of this study were achieved, as demonstrated within the 
summary of chapters that follow, this research identifying small to mid-sized national 
governing bodies of Olympic sports in England, as primarily ‘policy takers.’  
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10.2) Summary of Chapters 
Chapter one of this thesis provided details of the above research aims and 
objectives that underpinned this study, and a rationale for investigating sport policy 
and NGBs, in particular SMNGBs, considered competitive-community-grassroots 
sports rather than elite, by virtue of their loss of elite funding from UK, where there 
has been limited academic interest in relation to the impact of changing sport policy 
and governmental relationships on SMNGBs, the mechanisms adopted to adapt to 
change, and their capacity to influence or at least shape sport policy. Similarly, this 
study aimed to contribute further towards debates on the analysis of UK sport policy, 
with particular regard given to community sport and the pendulum swing between 
from ‘sports for sport’s sake’ back to ‘sport for social good’; and the utility of the ACF 
as an analytical framework, where previous research had suggested the potential for 
a less prominent advocacy coalition consisting of a ‘cluster of competitive, but not 
high performance sports’, to actively engage in shaping sport policy, and the limited 
attention given by the ACF to state agency-led advocacy coalitions within policy 
subsystems.  
Chapter two, Sport Policy and NGBs, focused on the historical context of UK sport 
policy. The chapter provided a chronological review and analysis of the development 
of sport policy within which NGB/SMNGBs have operated, and examined how 
changing policy since the early 1960s has altered governments’ expectations of and 
relationships with NGBs, and affected the functional and operational environments 
within which they work. The review of literature showed the increasing prominence of 
professionalism as a constituent of community sport policy involvement; a directional 
shift away from a passive phase of governmental intervention to a complex 
contractual phase, the emergence of conditional funding in support of and delivery 
on government social objectives/outcomes, and the widening of an already complex 
web of deliverers of sport. The literature review highlighted the lack of academic 
research focused on NGB/SMNGBs and community sport, and identified five 
overarching themes that reflected the aims and objectives of this study, including: 
NGB/SMNGBs’ changing relationship with government and its sporting agencies (SE 
and UKS); increased centrality to a range of government strategies; the requirement 
to reform and modernise; the complexity of the performance management regimes; 
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and increased willingness of SE to use alternative participation delivery partners 
unaffiliated to NGBs.  
Chapter 3, Theorising Policy at the Meso-level, reviewed the theoretical literature 
that underpinned this study, in particular, an understanding and assessment of three 
analytical frameworks, namely, new institutionalism, the multiple streams framework 
(MSF), and the ACF, since the principal level of analysis in this research is at the 
meso-level. While the evaluation identified the ability of all three frameworks to cast 
some light, in different ways, on the analysis of sport policy, the ACF offered a richer, 
more complete and satisfying framework to use. The analysis of the ACF provided a 
balanced argument on strengths and weaknesses of the framework, its potential 
contribution to this study, and how it logically linked together with the aims/objectives 
and critical realist philosophical position adopted for this research. The consideration 
given to macro-level assumptions and the nature of power relations served to 
sensitise the researcher to particular relationships and different aspects of the policy 
process.   
Chapter four, Methodology and Research Design, outlined the philosophical position, 
methodology and choice of instruments that informed and guided the research 
design of this study, and demonstrated how the constituent parts of the research 
strategy logically linked together. A detailed explanation and justification was 
provided for the critical realist research paradigm adopted for this study, together 
with discussions of how critical realism linked to the qualitative multiple case-study 
approach to this study and choice of document analysis, semi-structured interviews 
and thematic analysis as research instruments, for example, how the multiple case-
study design utilised for this research linked to critical realism’s notion of 
retroduction, and the use of theoretical propositions to make analytical 
generalisations. Rationales were provided for the selection of the case studies, 
namely, England Handball, Volleyball England, Table Tennis England, and the 
interview participants viewed as key informants. The themes of governance, funding, 
capacity building (workforce and facilities), participation, and partnerships, were 
identified as dimensions of operational activities linked to mechanisms for delivering 
desired policy outcomes, and determinants of policy ‘shaping’ or policy ‘taking’, and 
utilised to guide and inform the case-study research to achieve the research aims 
and objectives. Discussions on data triangulation and the precise documentation of 
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the data base and maintenance of a chain of evidence provided a demonstrable and 
attainable degree of validity and reliability for the reconstruction of the study from 
research question to conclusions. 
Chapter 5, The UK Sport Policy Subsystem, provided a more in-depth theoretical 
conceptualisation of the UK sport policy using the ACF than had been undertaken in 
previous studies, and provided context for the case-study empirical chapters, 
particularly with regard to the identification and definition of sport policy subsystem 
and policy actors, advocacy coalitions, and factors that have influenced policy 
stability and change over a decade or more. The findings highlighted the usefulness 
of the ACF in terms of coalition and subsystem formation, the role of shared beliefs 
and technical information in policy change, and the determinants of policy change 
and stability, but also pointed towards potential issues with the ACF’s characteristics 
of mature subsystems, the ACF’s belief system, delimitation boundaries of coalitions 
and subsystem boundaries, and the height from which the ACF observes policy 
subsystems. Operational aspects of power were also embedded within discussions, 
which demonstrated strong linked to all three of Lukes’ dimensions of power.   
Chapter Six and the case of England Handball, showed handball to be an emerging 
Olympic sport in England, with a transformational SMNGB that has utilised the sport 
policy environment as an ‘enabler’ for development, particularly through the use of 
mutually beneficial interdependencies, and has displayed a less problematic 
recognition and an acceptance of compliance-dependency over autonomy-equality, 
which has strengthened its membership of the SE-led coalition. Adapting to policy 
change and shifting political priorities has been flexible through the use of pragmatic 
and partnership-driven strategies and complementary alignments to the ‘core beliefs’ 
of government and SE, in unopposed acceptance of its contractual obligations, 
despite the apparent ill-defined nature of the NGB-centric approach to increasing 
participation. This has led to the identification of EH as primarily a ‘policy taker’, on 
the basis of shared beliefs and self-preservation, content to be subjected to policy 
rather than shape policy, although there is an increasing interest in influencing policy 
across all areas where sport can have an impact on policy outcomes. 
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Chapter Seven and the case of Volleyball England, showed volleyball to be a 
developing Olympic sport in England, with a SMNGB characterised by a resistance 
to change, misplaced exuberance and confidence, and the prioritisation of elite over 
community-participation objectives. VE has utilised the sport policy environment 
largely as a means to self-develop, which has generally been to its own detriment, 
whereby its slow progress in recognition of the dominance of the compliance-
dependency culture of the sport policy subsystem over autonomy-equality, and the 
enforced acceptance of the dominant ‘policy-core’ beliefs through SE intervention, 
has weakened its membership of the SE-led coalition. Adapting to policy change has 
been slow and strategies have predominantly focused on self-development and elite 
sport, or have been in response to enforced realignments with the ‘core beliefs’ of 
government, and the resultant acceptance of its contractual obligations, but on the 
basis of self-preservation. This has led to the identification of VE as primarily a 
‘policy taker’, but due to imposition of policy rather than shared beliefs or 
complementary alignments. 
Chapter Eight and the case of Table Tennis England, showed table tennis to be an 
historically popular Olympic sport in England that has emerged from years of decline, 
discord, and long periods of inertia to a position of strength, with a SMNGB that 
rapidly realised the benefits of the developing sport policy environment as an 
‘enabler’ for development. TTE has displayed a more problematic and slower 
progress towards recognition and acceptance of the culture of compliance-
dependency over autonomy-equality, but its eventual acceptance has strengthened 
its position within the SE-led coalition, as has the potential of the sport’s broader pro-
social capabilities. Adapting to policy change has been variable but generally 
effective, and strategies utilised have been underpinned by a culture of opportunism, 
pragmatism, partnerships, and complementary alignments to the ‘core beliefs’ of 
government and SE, in largely unopposed acceptance of its contractual obligations. 
This has led to the identification of TTE as primarily a ‘policy taker’, on the basis of 
shared beliefs and self-preservation, content to be subjected of policy and increased 
resource dependency rather than shape policy, although there is an increasing 
interest in influencing policy across all areas where sport can have an impact on 
policy outcomes. 
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Chapter Nine, Theoretical and Empirical Evaluations and Research Implications, 
collated the data across all empirical chapters, drawing particular attention to the 
similarities and differences between the selected SMNGBs to allow for theoretical 
and empirical evaluations of the research findings, in line with the research aims and 
objectives. In sum, the evaluation and analysis of empirical data identified SMNGBs 
as primarily ‘policy takers’, based on: i) a largely unopposed acceptance of policy 
change by SMNGBs; ii) a willingness to adapt to change and comply with contractual 
obligations; and iii) the utilisation of various opportunistic and pragmatic strategies to 
align with the ‘core beliefs’ of government and SE, achieve policy outcomes, and 
maintain membership of the SE-led coalition. The impact of which has significantly 
shaped SMNGBs, both organisationally and operationally, heightened levels of 
resource-dependency and tensions within SMNGBs, predominantly attributable to a 
compliance versus autonomy dichotomy, and exposed their weakness and 
vulnerability to policy change, as well as a lack of understanding of the policy 
environment. The implications of this research for UK sport policy and SMNGBs 
draws attention to imposition of UK sport policy on sport, a blurred concept of policy 
taking or shaping, the fluidity of community sport policy, and a trend away from 
SMNGBs, the latter having to navigate the future challenges of organisational 
identity, stakeholder needs, policy environment expertise, and financial sustainability.  
Application of the ACF illuminated a number of key points relevant to the 
fundamental assumptions of the framework, particularly in relation to the formation, 
composition, and boundaries of advocacy coalitions and policy subsystems, the 
ACF’s hierarchical belief system, and the ACF’s capacity to explain both policy 
change and stability, which contribute to debates on the utility of the ACF as an 
analytical framework. The evaluation of the ACF highlighted its usefulness as an 
analytical framework, but also potential weaknesses, particularly in regard to the 
limited insight given to government-constructed agency-led coalitions,  as primarily 
implementation coalitions, and the height from which the ACF views policy 
subsystems.  
   
 
 
272 
 
10.3) Limitations and Future Research 
The focus of this thesis was an evaluation of the extent to which changes in UK sport 
policy impacted on small to mid-sized national governing bodies of Olympic sports in 
England, considered competitive-community-grassroots sports rather than elite, and 
the strategies utilised by them to adapt to changing policy and operational 
environments, to determine their position as primarily ‘policy shapers’ or ‘policy 
takers.’ In this regard, there was an early recognition of the small number of potential 
case studies, as well as an awareness of the NGBCEOF. On reflection, greater 
consideration should have been given to engagement with the selected case studies 
at an earlier point within the research process, which would have benefitted the 
identification of themes and the involvement of additional key informants. Similarly, 
an introduction to the NGBCEOF via the selected case studies, could have provided 
a focus group among CEO’s of various NGBs, not just Olympic sports, thus 
strengthening the methodological approach to this study and the accumulation of 
differentiated critical perspectives of UK sport policy and policy influence, and theme 
identification, which could have guided the research along a different path, for 
example, including an elite Olympic sport/SMNGB and a non-Olympic sport/SMNGB 
as case studies, which may have provided a different perspectives, although 
arguably, the findings of this study are likely to be generalisable across all SMNGBs 
in receipt of public funding for community sport.     
In addition, no account of European trends has been provided within this study, for 
example, whether policy change in the UK differs from or follows that of Western 
Europe, particularly in respect of identifying policy-oriented learning as a major 
attribute of policy change within ACF assumptions. While, this can be seen at the 
elite level of sport, for example, policy change at the elite level linked to elite sport in 
East Germany and Australia, this study uncovered no significant evidence to suggest   
policy-oriented learning from European trends at the community sport-level, 
particularly as community sport reflects local conditions, so there is potentially less 
scope for European influence. 
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However, this study has highlighted some areas of interest that would significantly 
benefit from further academic enquiry, including: i) the Implications of agency-led 
coalitions or implementation coalitions for the ACF, particularly in terms of the policy 
process, coalition composition and the ACF’s belief system; ii) the disconnect 
between local government and sport, and its impact on sport provision; iii) school 
sport and the impact of overlapping government responsibilities on sport provision 
and sport development; iv) the shaping of modern NGBs and issues of 
organisational-identity; v) sports’ future role and position within government; and vi) 
SMNGBs as a collective to actively collaborate as a means to enhance sustainability 
and change the shape of community sport policy. 
 
10.4) Reflections of the research process 
The qualitative and multiple case study approach to this study provided a rich set of 
data from which cross-case conclusions were drawn that identified both similarities, 
and distinct variations between the selected cases, as advocated by (Yin, 1994). The 
selection of cases were centred on their relevance to the research aims and 
objectives (Mason, 1996), having received prior screening through pre-selection 
criteria (Yin, 2003b). The choice of research methods and sources were deemed 
most appropriate for this study, and included document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews. The collection of data from interviews provided a greater understanding 
and explanation of SMNGBs’ position as primarily ‘policy takers’ rather than ‘policy 
shapers’, which would have been difficult to measure through the use of quantitative 
methods of data collection. That said, quantitative data was a useful source of 
secondary data to support the research process, particularly financial data used to 
select case studies, and analyse levels of resource-dependency, operational costs 
and alternative sources of income. 
Within this study, documents investigated and analysed derived from the state and 
government agencies (e.g. DCMS/SE/UKS policy-related/strategic documents, and 
Board meeting minutes), private sources (e.g. SMNGB annual reports, strategic 
documents, WSPs, and Board meeting minutes), and virtual documents (e.g. 
SMNGB official magazines). Official SMNGB magazines were a potent source of 
information, the extent to which is clearly demonstrated within the chapter on 
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TTE/table tennis, the SMNGB providing online availability of all copies of its official 
magazine from 1935 until its final edition in 2010. There were no significant problems 
with the document analysis process, and no access problems to relevant documents 
published within the past decade, many of which were available online, thus 
endorsing the internet as a means of accessing published documents from within the 
public domain. In this regard, online access to the minutes of Board meetings across 
all case studies provided an extremely rich source of data.  
The use of semi-structured interviews within this study allowed for a thick and rich 
(Smith and Caddick, 2012) understanding of the complex and contextual nature 
(Veal, 1997) of the policy and operational environment of SMNGBs, and the impact 
of policy across the analytical themes that guided this research. In support of Green 
and Houlihan (2005), interviews with senior officials across the case studies, and 
with SE, DCMS and the Sport and Recreation Alliance, allowed: i) a more (actor-
agent) informed understanding of historically-developed processes and 
developments relating to sport policy and SMNGBs; ii) distinctions to be made 
between the ‘rhetoric’ in public policy and case study documents, and the ‘realism’ 
from SMNGBs, government and government-agency insights into their perspectives 
on particular issues or policy; and iii) the normative values and belief systems 
underlying SMNGBs, government and government-agency perspectives, as well as 
their perceptions of the constraining/facilitating structural context within which they 
operate. There were no issues in gaining access to the selected interview 
participants, each having been contacted by email in the first instance, followed by 
an agreement on interview dates and then completion of the actual interviews. 
Moreover, all interviewees provided candid responses to interview questions, with no 
restrictions caused by time constraints, despite the elite and authoritative nature of 
their positions within their respective organisations, which suggested a genuine 
interest in the aims and objectives of this research. 
 
 
 
 
275 
 
List of References 
Andrew, A., 1985. In pursuit of the past: some problems in the collection, analysis 
and use of historical documentary evidence. In: R. Burgess, ed. Strategies of 
Educational Research: Qualitative Methods. London: Falmer, pp.153-178. 
Bachrach, P., and Baratz, M. S., 1962. The two faces of power. American Political 
Science Review, 56 (4), 947-952. 
Baert, P., 2005. Philosophy of the Social Sciences: towards pragmatism. Cambridge: 
Policy Press. 
Bailey, R., and Talbot, M., 2015. Elite Sport and Sport-for-All. Eds. London: 
Routledge. 
Bates, S. R., and Jenkins, L., 2007. Teaching and learning ontology and 
epistemology in political science. Politics, 27 (1), 55-63. 
Baumgartner, F., and Jones, B., 1993. Agendas and instability in American politics. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Bazerly, P., 2007. Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo. London: SAGE 
BBC Sport, 2012. Olympic sport funding: Winners and losers, sport by sport. [online]. 
BBC Sport, 19 December. [last viewed 07/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/olympics/20780450 
BBC Sport, 2013. Olympic volleyball player's struggle. [online]. BBC Sport, 30 
January. [last viewed 07/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/av/volleyball/21256662 
BBC Sport, 2017. Table Tennis England funding frozen as proposals are not voted 
through. [online]. BBC Sport, 10 July. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/table-tennis/40562277 
Bendor, J., Moe, T.M., and Shott, K.W., 2001. Recycling the Garbage Can: An 
Assessment of the Research Program. American Political Science Review, 95, 
169-190. 
Berry, R., and Manoli, A.E., 2018. Alternative revenue streams for centrally funded 
sport governing bodies. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 1-22. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19406940.2017.1387587 
Bhaskar, R., 1978. A Realist Theory of Science. 2nd ed. Brighton: Harvestor. 
Bhaskar, R., 1989. Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary 
Philosophy. London: Verso. 
276 
 
Biddle, S., Markland, D., Gilbourne, D., Chatzisarantis, N., and Sparkes, A., 2001. 
Research Methods in Sport and Exercise Psychology. Journal of Sport 
Sciences, 19, 777-809. 
Binfield, J.C., and Stevenson, J., 1993. Sport, Culture and Politics. Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press.  
Birkland, T.A., 1997. After Disaster: Agenda-Setting, Public Policy and Focusing 
Events. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Birkland, T.A., 2005. An introduction to the policy process: Theories, concepts and 
models of public policy making. New York: ME Sharpe. 
Birley, D., 1996. Playing the Game: Sport and British Society 1914-1945. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Blaikie, N., 1993. Approaches to social enquiry. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Blaikie, N., 2000. Designing social research: The logical of application. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Blaikie, N., 2003. Analyzing Quantitative Data: From Description to Explanation. 
London: Sage. 
Blaikie, N., 2004. ‘Retroduction’. In: M.S. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman and T.F. Liao, eds. 
The Sage Encyclopaedia of Social Science Research Methods. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Blair, T., 2000. Tony Blair’s speech, Labour Party Conference, held on 26th 
September 2000 in Brighton. [online]. British Political Speech Archive. [last 
viewed 28/11/2018]. Available from: 
http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=206 
Borret, N., 1991. Leisure Services UK. London: Macmillan. 
Boyatzis, R. E., 1998. Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and 
Code Development. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc. 
Bramham, P., and Henry, I.P., 1991. Explanations of the organisation of sport in 
British society. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 26 (3), 139-153. 
Braun, V., and Clarke, V., 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3, 77-101. 
Bryman, A., 2001. Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A., 2004. Social Research Methods. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
277 
 
Bryman, A., 2012. Social Research Methods. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Bulkeley, H., 2000. Discourse coalitions and the Australian climate change policy 
network. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 18, 727-748. 
Burrell, I., 2016. The Ministry of Fun has serious challenges ahead. [online]. 
Independent, 17 Jan. [last viewed 03/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-ministry-of-fun-has-serious-
challenges-ahead-a6818071.html 
BVF, 2006. BVF response to article in the Times. [online]. Volleyball England, 21 
February. [last viewed 07/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.volleyballengland.org/news/article/2227/bvf-response-to-article 
BVF, 2009. Financial Statements 31 March 2009. Sheffield: Hebblethwaites. 
BVF, 2014. Annual Report 2013-2014. Loughborough: British Volleyball Federation. 
BVF, 2016. BVF Statement on UK Sport Funding Announcement. [online]. Volleyball 
England, 9 December. [last viewed 07/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.volleyballengland.org/news/article/5460/bvf-statement-on-uk-sport 
Cairney, P., 2012. Understanding public policy: Theories and Issues. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Campbell, J., 1989. Institutional Analysis and the role of ideas in political economy. 
In: J. March and J. Olsen. Rediscovering Institutions: the Organisational Basis 
of Politics. New York: Free. 
Carrington, B., and McDonald, I., 2000. Race, Sport and British Society. London: 
Routledge.  
Chalip, L., 1995. Policy analysis in sport management. Journal of Sport 
Management, 9 (11), 1-13. 
Chalip, L., 1996. Critical policy analysis in sport: the illustrative case of New Zealand 
sport policy development. Journal of Sport Management, 10 (3), 310-324. 
Clarkson, M.B.E., 1995. A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating 
corporate social performance. Academy of Management Review, 20 (1), 92-
117.  
Clough, P, and Nutbrown, C., 2002. A Student’s Guide to Methodology. London: 
Sage. 
Coalter, F., 2004. “Stuck in the blocks? A sustainable sporting legacy”. In: A. Vigor 
and M. Mean, ed. After the gold rush: a sustainable Olympics for London. 
London: Demos/IPPR publications. 
278 
 
Coalter, F., Long, J., and Duffield, B., 1988. Recreational Welfare. Aldershot: Gower. 
Coghlan, J.F., and Webb, I., 1990. Sport and British Politics since 1960. 
Basingstoke: The Falmer Press. 
Collier, A., 1994. Critical Realism: An introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy. 
London: Verso. 
Compton, S., 2013. Funding farce puts handball's Olympic legacy at risk. [online]. 
The Telegraph, 13 February. [last viewed 05/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/9866059/Funding-farce-puts-
handballs-Olympic-legacy-at-risk.html 
Crotty, M., 1998. The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and perspective in 
the research process. St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin. 
Culf, A., 2007. Grassroots participation is the loser as Sport England props up the 
Games. [online]. The Guardian, March 23. [last viewed 28/11/2018]. Available 
from:   http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2007/mar/22/Olympics2012.politics   
Cunningham J., 2001. ELITE SPORTS FUNDING REVIEW - Report to the Prime 
Minister and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. London:  
Department for Culture Media and Sport. 
d’Ancona, M., 2010. General Election 2010: The day that changed politics forever. 
[online]. The Telegraph, 8 May. [last viewed 28/11/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/election-2010/7696216/General-Election-
2010-The-day-that-changed-politics-forever.html 
Dahl, R. A., 1957. The concept of power. Behavioural Science, 2 (3), 201-215. 
Dahl, R. A., 1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.   
DCMS, 2000. A Sporting Future for All. London: Department for Culture Media and 
Sport.  
DCMS, 2002a. Game Plan: A strategy for delivering Government sport and physical 
activity objectives. London: Department for Culture Media and Sport/Strategy 
Unit.   
DCMS, 2002b. The Coaching Task Force – Final Report. London: Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport. Available from: 
http://www.sportdevelopment.org.uk/index.php/component/attachments/downlo
ad/41 
DCMS, 2008. Playing to win: A New Era for Sport. London: Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport.  
279 
 
DCMS, 2012. Creating a Sporting Habit for Life: A new youth sport strategy. London: 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport. 
DCMS, 2014. Government and Mayor of London Response to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Olympic and Paralympic Legacy Report of Session 2013-
14: ‘Keeping the Flame Alive: The Olympic and Paralympic Legacy. London: 
Department of Media, Culture and Sport. Available from: 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/olympic-paralympic-
legacy/Govt-response-legacy-report.pdf 
DCMS, 2015a. Triennial Review of UK Sport and Sport England Report. London: 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport. 
DCMS, 2015b. Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation. London: 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport. 
DCMS, 2018. £3m Aspiration Fund to help boost sports in the Tokyo Games. 
[online]. Government, 12 October. [viewed 11/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/3m-aspiration-fund-to-help-boost-sports-
in-the-tokyo-games 
Dean, R., and Whyte, W., 1978. How do you Know if the Informant is Telling the 
Truth? In: J. Bynner and K. Stribley, eds. Social Research: Principles and 
Procedures. Harlow: Longman, pp.179-88. 
Deloitte and Touche, 2003. Investing in change — High level review of the 
modernisation programme for governing bodies of sport. London: UK Sport. 
Denzin, N., and Lincoln, Y., 2000. Handbook of Qualitative Research. 2nd ed. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Dery, D., 1999. Policy by the Way: When Policy is Incidental to making other 
Policies. Journal of Public Policy, 18 (2), 163-176. 
Devine, F., 2002. ‘Qualitative Methods.’ In: D. Marsh, and S. Stoker, eds. Theory and 
Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp.197-215. 
Dey, I., 1993. Creating Categories: Qualitative Data Analysis. London: Routledge. 
Digeser, P., 1992. The fourth face of power. The Journal of Politics, 54 (4), 977-
1007. 
DNH, 1995. Sport: Raising the Game. London: Department of National Heritage. 
Downward, P., 2005. Critical (Realist) Reflection on Policy and Management 
Research in Sport, Tourism and Sports Tourism. European Sport Management 
Quarterly, 5 (3), 303-320. 
280 
 
Downward, P., Mason, C., and Steenekamp, T., 2017. Examining the Impact of 
Greenhouse Sports Programmes in Schools. London: Greenhouse Sports. 
Driver, S., and Martell, L., 2002. New Labour, work and the family. Social Policy & 
Administration, 36 (1), 46-61. 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-9515.00269 
Dryzek, J.S., and Dunleavy, P., 2009. Theories of the Democratic State. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dunleavy, P., and O’Leary, B., 1987. Theories of the state: The politics of liberal 
democracy: London: Macmillan. 
Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., and Tinkler, J., 2006. New Public 
Management is Dead. Long Live Digital era Governance. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 16, 467-494. 
Dutton, T., 2006. Report of the Inquiry into the World Class Payments Bureau - for 
Sport England. [online]. Karatesite. [last viewed 03/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://karate-
site.co.uk/karate_issues/sport_england_and_the_dutton_enquiry.php 
Easton, G., 2010. Critical Realism in case study research. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 39, 118-128. 
EH, 2012. England Handball Whole Sport Plan 2013-2017 - Submission to Sport 
England. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2013a. Annual General Meeting minutes, held on 29th June 2016 at Sporthouse, 
Barking. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2013b. Annual Report 2012-2013. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2013c. The future is bright …the future is Handball: A Four Year Strategy for 
Handball. Warrington: England Handball Association.  
EH, 2014a. EHA takes handball to the seat of government. [online]. England 
Handball, 6 July. [viewed 07/04/2016]. Available from:  
https://www.englandhandball.com/search?query=EHA+takes+handball+to+the+
seat+of+government. 
EH, 2014b. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 10th May 2014 
at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2014c. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 26th November 
2014 at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2015a. Annual Report 2014-2015. Warrington: England Handball Association.  
281 
 
EH, 2015b. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 19th September 
2015 at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2015c. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 18th July 2015 
at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2015d. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 21st November 
2015 at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2015e. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 21st March 2015 
at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2015f. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 9th May 2015 at 
Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2016a. Annual General Meeting minutes, held on 18th June 2016 at Crown Hills 
Academy, Leicester. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2016b. Annual Report 2015-2016. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2016c. Directors’ Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31st 
March 2016. Blackburn: PM+M Solutions for Business LLP. 
EH, 2016d. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 19th May 2016 
at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2016e. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 19th March 
2016 at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2016g. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 12th November 
2016 at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2016f. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 24th September 
2016 at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2016g. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 12th November 
2016 at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2016h. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 23rd July 2016 
at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2016i. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 30th January 
2016 at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2017a. National Executive Committee meeting minutes, held on 18th March 
2017 at Loughborough University. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2017b. Annual Report 2016-2017. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
282 
 
EH, 2017c. Club survey shows growth in handball. [online]. England Handball, 8 
November. [last viewed 04/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.englandhandball.com/news/club-survey-shows-growth-in-handball 
EH, 2017d. Directors’ Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31st 
March 2017. Blackburn: PM+M Solutions for Business LLP.  
EH, 2017e. England Handball Association issue statement following EGM. [online]. 
England Handball Association, 20 March. [last viewed 05/12/2018]. Available 
from: https://www.englandhandball.com/news/england-handball-association-
issue-statement-following-egm 
EH, 2017f. England Handball delighted with Sport England Funding Award. [online]. 
England Handball Association, 6th February. [last viewed 05/12/2018]. Available 
from: https://www.englandhandball.com/news/england-handball-delighted-with-
sport-england-funding-award 
EH, 2017g. Strategic Plan 2017-2021. [online]. England Handball Association. [last 
viewed 04/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.englandhandball.com/uploads/England%20Handball%20Strategic
%20Plan%202017-21.pdf 
EH, 2018a. Annual Report 2017-2018. Warrington: England Handball Association. 
EH, 2018b. Monthly Report for CEO March/April 2018. Warrington: England 
Handball.  
Enroth, H., 2014. Governance: The art of governing after governmentality. European 
Journal of Social Theory, 17 (1) 60-76. 
ESM, 2017. Every Sport Matters Manifesto. [online]. British Handball Association. 
[last viewed 05/12/2018]. Available from:  
https://www.britishhandball.com/news/british-handball-supports-every-sport-
matters-manifesto 
Fahlén, J., Eliasson, I., and Wickman, K., 2015. Resisting self-regulation: an analysis 
of sport policy programme making and implementation in Sweden. International 
Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 7 (3), 391-406. DOI: 
10.1080/19406940.2014.925954 
Faubion, J.D., 2000. Essential Works of Michel Foucault. Volume 3: Power. New 
York: The New Press. 
Fenger, M., and Klok, P., 2001. Interdependency, beliefs, and coalition behaviour: A 
contribution to the advocacy coalition framework. Policy Sciences, 34, 157-170. 
Finer, S.E., 1966. Anonymous Empire. London: Pall Mall Press. 
283 
 
Fischer, F., 2003. Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Fischer, F., and Forester, J., 1993. The Augmentative Turn in Policy Analysis and 
Planning. eds. London: UCL Press. 
Fontana, A., and Frey, J., 1998. ‘Interviewing: The Art of Science. In: N. Denzin and 
Y. Lincoln, eds. Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage, 47-78. 
Forster, N., 1994. The Analysis of Company Documentation. In: C. Cassell and G. 
Symon, eds. Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. London: Sage. 
Foster, A., 2004. Moving on: A review of the need for change in athletics in the UK. 
London: UK Sport/Sport England. 
Foucault, M., 1977. Discipline and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Foucault, M., 1986. ‘Disciplinary Power and Subjection’. In: S. Lukes, ed. Power 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.229-242. 
Foucault, M., 1994. Governmentality. In: J. Faubion, ed. Michel Foucault: Power, 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 3. London: Penguin, pp.201-
222.   
Friedman, M., and Friedman, R., 1962. Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Furlong, P., and Marsh, D., 2010. ‘A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology 
in Political Science’. In: D. Marsh and G. Stoker, 3rd ed. Theory and Method in 
Political Science. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.184-211. 
Gall, M., Borg, W., and Gall, J. (1996). Educational Research: An Introduction. 6th 
ed. White Plains, NY: Longman. 
Geertz, C., 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Gerring, J., 2004. What is case study and what is it good for. American Political 
Science Review, 98(2), 341-354. 
Gibson, O., 2015. Olympic legacy failure: sporting numbers plummet amid confusion 
and blame. [online]. The Guardian, 5 July. [last viewed 29/11/2018]. Available 
from:  https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/jul/05/olympic-legacy-failure-
sporting-numbers-plummet 
Girginov, V., 2013. UK National Governing Bodies of Sport leveraging of the London 
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games for organisational capacity building. 
London: Sport England. 
284 
 
Girginov, V., and Hills, L., 2008. A Sustainable Sports Legacy: Creating a Link 
between the London Olympics and Sports Participation. International Journal of 
the History of Sport 25 (14), 2091-2116. 
Gratton, C., and Jones, I., 2010. Research Methods for Sport Studies. 2nd ed. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Green, M., 2003. An Analysis of Elite Sport Policy Change in Three Sports in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. Doctoral Thesis, Loughborough University. 
Green, M., 2004a. ‘Changing policy priorities for sport in England: the emergence of 
elite sport development as a key policy concern.’ Leisure Studies, 23 (4), 365-
385. 
Green, M., 2004b. Power, Policy, and Political Priorities: Elite Sport Development in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. Sociology of Sport Journal, 21, 376-396. 
Green, M., 2006. ‘From ‘Sport for All’ to Not About ‘Sport’ at All? Interrogating Sport 
Policy Interventions in the United Kingdom.’ European Sport Management 
Quarterly, 6 (3), 217-238. 
Green, M., 2009. Podium or participation? Analysing policy priorities under changing 
modes of sport governance in the United Kingdom. International Journal of 
Sport Policy, 1 (2), 121-144. 
Green, M., and Houlihan, B., 2004. Advocacy coalitions and elite sport policy change 
in Canada and the UK. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 39 (4), 
387-403. 
Green, M., and Houlihan, B., 2005. Elite Sport Development: Policy learning and 
political priorities. London: Routledge. 
Green, M., and Houlihan, B., 2006. Governmentality, Modernisation and the 
“Disciplining” of national Sports Organizations: Athletics in Australia and the 
United Kingdom. Sociology of Sport Journal, 23, 47-71. 
Greener, I., 2005. The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies. Politics, 25 
(1), 62-72. 
Greenhouse Sports, 2016. Annual Review 2015-2016. London: Greenhouse Sports. 
Greenhouse Sports, 2017. Annual Review 2016-2017. London: Greenhouse Sports. 
Grix, J., 2002. Introducing students to the generic terminology of social research. 
Politics, 22 (3), 175-186. 
Grix, J., 2009. The impact of UK sport policy on the governance of athletics. 
International Journal of Sport Policy, 1 (1), 31-49. 
285 
 
Grix, J., 2010. The Foundations of Research. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Grix, J., and Carmichael, F., 2012. Why do governments invest in elite sport? A 
polemic. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 4 (1), 73–90. 
Grix, J., and Phillpots, J., 2014. New governance and Physical Education and School 
Sport policy: A case study of School to Club Links. Physical Education and 
Sport Pedagogy, 19 (1), 76-96. DOI: 10.1080/17408989.2012.726981 
Hakim, C., 2000. Research Design. London: Routledge. 
Hall, G., Shearer, D., Thomson, R., Roderique-Davies, G., Mayer, P., and Hall, R., 
2012. Conceptualizing commitment: A thematic analysis of fans of Welsh 
rugby. Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health, 4, 138-153. 
Hall, P.A., and Taylor, R.C.R., 1996. Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms. Political Studies, XLIV, 936-957. 
Hammersley, M., 1990. Reading Ethnographic Research: A Critical Guide. London: 
Longmans. 
Hammersley, M., 1992. What’s Wrong with Ethnography? Methodological 
Explorations. London: Routledge. 
Hansard, 2015a. Sport and the 2012 Olympics Legacy - debate held on 24th June 
2015. [online]. Parliament, Parliamentary Publications, Columns 964-1003. [last 
viewed 29/11/2018]. Available from: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150624/debtext/1
50624-0003.htm#15062462000002 
Hansard, 2015b. Sport – motion to take note of the Government’s consultation 
paper, A New Strategy for Sport, held on 15th October 2015. [online]. 
Parliament, Parliamentary Publications, Columns 380-436. [last viewed 
03/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151015-0003.htm 
Hargreaves, J., 1986. Sport, power and culture. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Hargreaves, J., 1994. Sporting Females: Critical Issues in the History and Sociology 
of Women’s Sport. London: Routledge. 
Haugaard, M., 2012. Rethinking the four dimensions of power: domination and 
empowerment. Journal of Political Power, 5 (1), 33-54. 
Hawkins, M., 2013. Handball progress hampered by lack of funding. [online]. BBC 
Sport, 26 July. [last viewed 05/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/handball/23451272 
286 
 
Hay, C., 1995. Structure and agency. In: D. Marsh and G. Stoker, eds. Theory and 
methods in political science. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp.189-206. 
Hay, C., 1997. State of the art: divided by a common language: political theory and 
the concept of power. Politics, 17 (1), 45-52. 
Hay, C., 2002. Political Analysis: A Critical Understanding. Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hay, C., 2007. Does ontology trump epistemology? Notes on the directional 
dependence of ontology and epistemology in political analysis. Politics, 27 (2), 
115-118. 
Henry, I.P., 1993. The politics of leisure policy. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Henry, I.P., 2001. The Politics of Leisure policy. 2nd ed. London and Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Hérubel, J.V.M., 2008. Historical Scholarship, Periodisation, Themes, and 
Specialisation Implications for Research and Publication. Journal of Scholarly 
Publishing, 39 (2), 144-145. 
Hill, M., 2009. The Public Policy Process. Harlow: Pearson. 
Hindess, B., 1996. Discourses of power – From Hobbes to Foucault. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Hindson, A., Gidlow, B., and Peebles, C., 1994. The trickle-down effect of top sport: 
myth or reality? A case-study of the Olympics. Australian Journal of Leisure and 
Recreation, 4, 16-24. 
HLSCOPL, 2013a. HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON OLYMPIC AND 
PARALYMPIC LEGACY – Evidence volume. London: House of Lords Select 
Committee. Available from: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/olympic-paralympic-legacy/olympicparalymicevidencevolume.pdf 
HLSCOPL, 2013b. HOUSE OF LORDS Select Committee on Olympic and 
Paralympic Legacy, Report of Session 2013–14 - Keeping the flame alive: the 
Olympic and Paralympic Legacy. London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
Available from: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldolympic/78/78.pdf 
Hobsbawn, E., 2000. The New Century. London: Little, Brown and Co. 
Hogan, K., and Norton, K., 2000. The Price of Olympic Gold. Journal of Science and 
Motivation in Sport, 3, 203-218. 
Hollis, M., and Smith, S.M., 1990. Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
287 
 
Holt, R., and Mason, T., 2000. Sport in Britain 1945-2000. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hood, C., 1991. A Public management for All Seasons. Public Administration, 69, 3-
19. 
Horne, J., 1986. “Enforced Leisure” and Compulsory Games in the 1930s: An 
Exploration of the Social Control of Spare Time. In: F. Coalter, ed. The Politics 
of Leisure. Eastbourne: Leisure Studies Association. 
Horne, J., Tomlinson, A., and Whannel, G., 1999. Understanding sport: An 
introduction to the Sociological and Cultural analysis of sport. London: E&FN 
Spon. 
Houlihan, B., 1991. The Government and Politics of Sport. London: Routledge. 
Houlihan, B., 1997. Sport, Policy and Politics: A Comparative Analysis. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Houlihan, B., 2000a. Sporting excellence, schools and sports development: The 
politics of crowded policy spaces. European Physical Education Review, 6 (2), 
171-193. 
Houlihan, B., 2000b. Theorising sport policy-making: problems of globalisation and 
marginalisation. In: M. Green and B. Houlihan. Elite Sport Development: Policy 
learning and political priorities. London: Routledge. 
Houlihan, B., 2005. Public Sector Sport Policy: Developing a Framework for 
Analysis. International Journal for the Sociology of Sport, 40 (2), 163-185. 
Houlihan, B., and Green, M., 2006. The changing status of school sport and physical 
education: Explaining policy change. Sport, Education and Society, 11 (1), 73-
92. 
Houlihan, B., and Green, M., 2008. Comparative Elite Sport Development: Systems, 
Structures and Public Policy. Eds. London: Routledge. 
Houlihan, B., and Green, M., 2009. Modernization and sport: The reform of Sport 
England and UK Sport. Public Administration, 87 (3), 678-698. 
Houlihan, B., and Groeneveld, M., 2011. Social capital, governance and sport. In: M. 
Groeneveld, B. Houlihan and F. Ohl, eds. Social capital and governance in 
Europe. New York: Routledge. 
Houlihan, B., and Lindsey I., 2013. Sport Policy in Britain. Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge. 
Houlihan, B., and White A., 2002. The Politics of Sports Development: Development 
of sport or development though sport?  London: Routledge. 
288 
 
Houlihan, B., and Zheng, J., 2013. The Olympics and Elite Sport Policy: Where Will It 
All End? The International Journal of the History of Sport, 30 (4) 338–355. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2013.765726 
Houlihan, B., Bloyce, D., and Smith, A., 2009. Developing the research agenda in 
sport policy. International Journal of Sport Policy, 1 (1), 1-12. 
Howlett, M., and Ramesh, R., 1995. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy 
Subsystems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Howlett, M., and Ramesh, R., 2003. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy 
Subsystems. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
Hoye, R., Nicholson, M., and Houlihan, B., 2010. Sport and policy: issues and 
analysis. London: Routledge. 
Hyland, J. L., 1995. Democratic theory: the philosophical foundations. New York: 
Manchester University Press. 
Jefferys, K., 2012. Sport and Politics in Modern Britain: The Road to 2012. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jefferys, K., 2016. The Thatcher governments and the British Sports Council, 1979–
1990. Sport in History, 36 (1), 73–97. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17460263.2015.1034166 
Jenkins-Smith, H., and Sabatier, P.A., 1993a. The study of public processes. In: P.A. 
Sabatier and H.C. Jenkins-Smith, eds. Policy Change and Learning: An 
Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.1-9. 
Jenkins-Smith, H., and Sabatier, P.A., 1993b. The dynamics of policy-oriented 
learning. In: P.A. Sabatier and H.C. Jenkins-Smith, eds. Policy Change and 
Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
pp.41-56. 
Jenkins-Smith, H., and Sabatier, P.A., 1994. Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework. Journal of Public Policy, 14, 175-203. 
Jenkins-Smith, H.C., Nohrstedt, D., Weible, C.M., and Sabatier, P.A., 2014. The 
Advocacy Coalition Framework: Foundations, Evolution, and Ongoing 
Research. In: P.A. Sabatier, and C.M. Weible, ed. Theories of the Policy 
Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.183-223. 
John, P., 1998. Analysing public policy. London: Pinter. 
Johnson, M., and Lakoff, G., 1997. Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
289 
 
Jones, B.D., 1994. Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, 
Choice and Public Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Katznelson, I., 1997. Reflections on history, method, and political science. Political 
Methodologist, 8, 11-14. 
Kay, A., 2006. The Dynamics of Public Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Keat, R., and Urry, J., 1975. Social theory as science. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Keech, M., 2011. Sport and adult mass participation in England. In: B. Houlihan and 
M. Green. Routledge Handbook of Sports Development. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Kickert, W., Klijn, E., and Koppenjan, J., 1997. Managing Complex Networks: 
Strategies for the Public Sector. London: Sage. 
King, G., Keohane, O., and Verba, S., 1994. Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
King, N., 2009. Sport Policy and Governance: local perspectives. Oxford: Elsevier 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Kingdon, J., 1984. Agendas, alternatives and public policies. New York, NY: Harper 
Collins. 
Kingdon, J.W., 1995. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. 2nd ed. New York: 
Harper Collins. 
Krane, V., Anderson, M., and Stean, W., 1997. Issues of Qualitative Research 
Methods and Presentations. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 19, 
213-218. 
Kristiansen, E., and Houlihan, B., 2017. Developing young athletes: the role of 
private sport schools in the Norwegian sport system. International Review of 
the Sociology of Sport, 52 (4), 447-469. 
Kvale, S., 1996. InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lawson, T., 1997. Economics and reality. London: Routledge. 
Lawson, T., 2003. Reorienting economics. London: Routledge. 
Layder, D., 1985. Power, Structure and Agency. Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 15 (2), 131-149. 
Layder, D., 1993. New Strategies in Social Research. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
290 
 
Lemke, T., 2002. Foucault, governmentality, and critique. Rethinking Marxism, 14 
(3), 49-64. 
Lieberman, E., 2001. Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis: A 
specification of periodisation strategies. Comparative Political Studies, 34 (3), 
1011-1035. 
Lieblich, A., Tuval-Mashlach, R., and Zliber, T., 1998. Narrative Research. London: 
Sage. 
Lilleker, D. G., 2003. ‘Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential 
Minefield.’ Politics, 23 (3), 207-214. 
Lincoln, Y., and Guba, E., 1985. Naturalistic inquiry. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G., 2000. ‘The only generalisation is there is no 
generalisation.’ In: R. Gomm, M. Hammersley, and P. Foster, eds. Case Study 
Method. London: Sage Publications Ltd, pp.27-44. 
Lindblom, C.E., 1977. Politics and markets: The world’s political-economic systems. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Lowndes, V., 2010. The Institutional Approach. In: D. Marsh and G. Stoker, 3rd ed. 
Theory and Methods in Political Science, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
pp.60-79. 
Lukes, S., 1974. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan. 
Lukes, S., 1986. Power. ed. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lukes, S., 2005. Power: A Radical View. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
MacDonald, K., 2008. Using Documents. In: N. Gilbert, 3rd ed. Researching Social 
Life. London: Sage, pp. 285-303. 
Macfarlane, N., 1986. Sport and Politics: A World Divided. London: Willow Books 
Collins. 
MacInnes, P., 2018. UK Sport urged to change funding model for Olympics and 
Paralympics. [online]. The Guardian, 14 June. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. 
Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/jun/14/uk-sport-
change-funding-olympic-paralympic-games 
Mackintosh, C., 2013. An evaluation of the outdoor table tennis initiative pilot 
programme in London: ‘ping pong in the fresh air how does that work?’ 
Managing Leisure, 18 (3), 226-238. DOI: 10.1080/13606719.2013.796176 
Mackintosh, C., and Liddle, J., 2015. Emerging School Sport Development Policy, 
Practice and Governance in England: Big Society, Autonomy and 
291 
 
Decentralisation. Education 3-13, 43 (6), 603-620. DOI: 
10.1080/03004279.2013.845237 
Mackintosh, C., Cookson, G., and Griggs, G., 2014. Reflections on the PING! table 
tennis initiative: Lessons and new directions for sports development? 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 27 (2), 128-139. DOI 
10.1108/IJPSM-05-2013-0078 
Major, J., 1999. John Major: The Autobiography. London: Harper Collins. 
Major, J., 2006. Sir John Major’s speech on “Sport and the Nation”, held on 24th April 
2006 at the Professional Cricketers’ Association Annual Business Conference, 
the Oval. [online]. John Major Archive. [last viewed 28/11/2018]. Available from:  
http://www.johnmajorarchive.org.uk/2001-2010/sir-john-majors-speech-on-
sport-and-the-nation-24-april-2006/ 
Markula, P., and Pringle, R., 2006. Foucault, sport and exercise: Power, knowledge 
and transforming the self. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Marsh, D., 1995. The convergence between theories of the state. In: D. Marsh and 
G. Stoker, eds. Theory and Method in Political Science. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Marsh, D., 1998. Comparing Policy Networks. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Marsh, D., and Smith, M., 2000. Understanding policy networks: towards a dialectical 
approach. Political Studies, 49, 4-21. 
Marsh, D., and Stoker, G., 2002. Theory and Methods in Political Science. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Marsh, D., and Stoker, G., 2010. Theory and Methods in Political Science. 3rd ed.  
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Marsh, D., Buller, J., Hay, C., Johnston, J., Kerr, P., McAnulla, S., and Watson, M., 
1999. Post-war British politics in perspective. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Mason, J., 1996. Qualitative Researching. London: Sage. 
Mason, J., 1998. Qualitative Researching. London: Sage. 
Mason, J., 2002. Qualitative Researching. 2nd ed. London: Sage 
May, T., 1997. Social Research: issues, methods and processes. Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
May, T., 2011. Social Research: Issues, methods and process. 4th ed., Buckingham: 
Open University Press. 
292 
 
McCulloch, G., 2004. Documentary Research in Education, History and the Social 
Sciences, London: Routledge Falmer. 
McIntosh, P., and Charlton, V., 1985. The Impact of Sport for All Policy 1966-1984: 
And A Way Forward. London: Sports Council. 
McSteen, A., 2013. The growing political importance of handball an invite to the 
Houses of Parliament. [online]. England Handball, 30 July. [viewed 
07/04/2016]. Available from: 
https://www.englandhandball.com/search?query=The+growing+political+import
ance+of+handball+an+invite+to+the+Houses+of+Parliament  
Melville, S.E., 2012. UK School Games and the competition structures of selected 
participating sports: A study of policy implementation. Doctoral Thesis. 
Loughborough University. 
Miles, M., and Huberman, A., 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Moisander, J., and Valtonen, A., 2006. Qualitative marketing research: A cultural 
approach. London: Sage. 
Moore, R., 2011. England’s Last World Champion! [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, 27 April. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/news/archived/englands-last-world-champion/ 
Morgan, L., 2017. Table Tennis England pass governance reforms to ease fears 
over sport's future. [online]. Insidethegames, 13 August. [last viewed 
09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1054040/table-tennis-england-pass-
governance-reforms-to-ease-fears-over-sports-future 
Mucciaroni, G., 1992. The garbage can Model and the Study of Policy Making: A 
Critique. Polity, 24, 459-482. 
NGBCEOF, 2015. The State of Play – Impact 2014. [online]. Table Tennis England. 
[last viewed 04/12/2018]. Available from:  
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/news/archived/forum-ready-to-bang-the-drum-
for-ngbs/ 
Nicholls, K., 2017. Wanting to be supportive, not instructive. [online]. Volleyball 
England, 26 May. [last viewed 06/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.volleyballengland.org/news/article/5554/wanting-to-be-supportive-
not 
Niskanen, W., 1971. Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine-
Atherton. 
293 
 
O’Farrell, C., 2005. Michel Foucault. London: Sage. 
Oakley, B., and Green, M.J., 2001. Still playing the game at arm's length? The 
selective re-investment in British sport, 1995-2000. Managing Leisure, 6 (2), 
74-94. 
Ostrom, E., 2007. Institutional Rational Choice: An assessment of the Institutional 
and Development Framework. In: P.A. Sabatier, 2nd ed. Theories of the Policy 
process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.21-64. 
Parker, G., 2015. Conservatives secure stunning victory. [online]. Financial Times, 8 
May. [last viewed 29/11/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.ft.com/content/7ec06b42-f4f1-11e4-abb5-00144feab7de 
Parrish, R., 2003. The politics of sports regulation in the European Union. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 10 (2), 246-262. 
Parsons, C., 2010. ‘Constructivism and Interpretive Theory in Political Science’. In: 
D. Marsh and G. Stoker, 3rd ed. Theory and Method in Political Science. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.80-98.   
Parsons, D.W., 1995. Public policy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Patton, M., 2002. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. 3rd ed. London: 
Sage. 
Payán, D.D., Lewis, L.B., Cousineau, M.R., and Nichol, M.B., 2017. Advocacy 
coalitions involved in California's menu labeling policy debate: Exploring 
coalition structure, policy beliefs, resources, and strategies. Social Science & 
Medicine, 177, 78-86.  
Peabody, R. L., Hammond, S. C., Torcom, J., Brown, L. P., Thompson, C. and 
Kolodny, R., 1990. ‘Interviewing Political Elites.’ Political Science and Politics, 
23 (3), 451-455. 
Peräkylä, A., 2004. ‘Reliability and validity in research based upon transcripts’. In: D. 
Silverman, 2nd ed. Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice. London: 
Sage, pp.282-303. 
Phillips, D., 2002. Comparative historical studies in education: problems of 
periodisation reconsidered. British Journal of Educational Studies, 50 (3), 363-
377. 
Phillpots, L., Grix, J., and Quarmby, T., 2010. Centralized grassroots sport policy and 
‘new governance’: a case study of County Sport partnerships in the UK –
packing the paradox. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 46 (3), 
265-281. 
294 
 
Pickup, D., 1996. Not another Messiah: An account of the Sports Council 1988-93. 
Edinburgh: Pentland Press. 
Pierce, J.J., Peterson, H.L., Jones, M.D., Garrard, S.P., and Vu, T., 2017. There and 
back Again: a Tale of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Policy Studies 
Journal, 45, 13-45.  
Pierre, J., and Peters, B.G., 2000. Governance and the state. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Pierson, P., 2000. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. 
The American Political Science Review, 94 (2), 251-267. 
Piggin, J., Jackson, S. J. and Lewis, M., 2009. ‘Knowledge, Power and Politics: 
Contesting ‘Evidence-based’ National Sport Policy.’ International Review for the 
Sociology of Sport, 44 (1), 87-101. 
Polley, M., 1998. Moving the Goalposts: a history of sport and society since 1945. 
London: Routledge. 
Punch, K.F., 2000a. Developing Effective Research Proposals. London: Sage. 
Punch, K.F., 2000b. Introduction to Social Research; Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches. London: Sage. 
Raco, M., and Imrie, R., 2000. Governmentality and rights and responsibilities in 
urban policy. Environment and Planning A, 32 (12), 2187-2204. 
Rhodes, R.A.W., 1994. The hollowing out of the state. Political Quarterly, 65, 138-
151. 
Rhodes, R.A.W., 1996. The New Governance: Governing without Government. 
Political Studies, XLIV, 652-667. 
Rhodes, R.A.W., 1997. Understanding governance. Buckingham and Philadelphia: 
Open University Press. 
Richards, D., 1996. ‘Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls.’ Politics, 16 (3), 
199-204. 
Ritchie, J., Spencer, L., and O’Connor, W., 2003. Carrying out Qualitative Analysis. 
In: J. Ritchie and J. Lewis, eds. Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for 
Social Science Students and Researchers. London: Sage. 
Robinson, L., 2004. Managing public sport and leisure services. London: Routledge. 
Roche, M., 1993. Sport and Community: Rhetoric and Reality in the Development of 
British Sport Policy. In: J.C. Binfield and J. Stevenson, eds. Sport, Culture and 
Politics. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. 
295 
 
Rose, N., 1990. Governing the soul: the shaping of the private self. London: 
Routledge. 
Rose, N., 1993. Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism. 
Economy and society, 22 (3), 283-299. 
Rose, N., 1999. Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought. Cambridge: 
University Press. 
Rose, N., and Miller, P., 1992. Political power beyond the state: problematics of 
government. British Journal of Sociology, 43 (2), 173-205. 
Ryan, G.W., and Bernard, H.R., 2003. Techniques to Identify Themes. Field 
Methods, 15, 85-109. 
Sabatier, P. A., and Jenkins-Smith, H., 1993. The advocacy coalition framework: 
Assessment, revisions, and implications for scholars and practitioners. In: P. A. 
Sabatier and H. C. Jenkins- Smith, eds. Policy change and learning: An 
advocacy coalition approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 211-235. 
Sabatier, P., and Weible, C., 2007. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
Assessment, Revisions and Implications for Scholars and Practitioners. In: P. 
Sabatier, 2nd ed. Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
press, pp.189-220. 
Sabatier, P.A., 1987. Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change. 
Knowledge, Creation, Diffusion, Utilization, 8 (4), 649-692.   
Sabatier, P.A., 1988. An Advocacy Coalition Model of Policy Change and the Role of 
Policy-Oriented Learning Therein. Policy Sciences, 21, 129-168. 
Sabatier, P.A., 1998. The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for 
Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 5 (1), 98-130. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501768880000051 
Sabatier, P.A., 1999. Theories of the Policy Process. Oxford: Westview. 
Sabatier, P.A., 2007. Fostering the Development of Policy Theory. In: P. Sabatier, 
2nd ed. Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.321-
336.   
Sabatier, P.A., 2007. Introduction - The Need for Better Theories. In: P. Sabatier, 2nd 
ed. Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.3-17.  
Sabatier, P.A., and Jenkins-Smith, H., 1999. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An 
Assessment. In: P. A. Sabatier, ed. Theories of the Policy process: Theoretical 
Lenses on Public Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.117-166. 
296 
 
Sabatier, P.A., and Weible, C.M., 2007. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
Innovations and Clarifications. In: P. A. Sabatier, 2nd ed. Theories of the Policy 
process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp.189-220. 
Sam, M.P., 2009. The Public management of Sport: Wicked problems, challenges 
and dilemmas. Public Management Review, 11 (4), 499-514. 
Sayer, A., 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2nd ed. London: 
Routledge. 
Sayer, A., 2000. Realism and social science. London: Sage. 
Schlager, E., 1995. Policy making and collective action: Defining coalitions within the 
advocacy coalition framework. Policy Sciences, 28, 242-270. 
Schlager, E., and Blomquist, W., 1996. A Comparison of Three Emerging Theories 
of the Policy Process. Political Research Quarterly, 49 (3), 651-672.  
Scott, J., 1990. A Matter of Record: Documentary sources in social research. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Scott, J., 2001. Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
SE, 1997. England, the sporting nation – a strategy. London: English Sports Council. 
SE, 1999. Annual Report 1998-99: More People, More Places, More Medals. 
London: Sport England. 
SE, 2001a. Annual Report 2000-2001: Part 1. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2001b. Annual Report 2000-2001: Part 2 Lottery Statistics. London: Sport 
England. 
SE, 2003. Annual Report 2002-2003. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2004a. Annual Report 2003-2004. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2004b. The Framework for Sport in England - Making England an Active and 
Successful Nation: A Vision for 2020. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2008. Grow, Sustain, Excel: Sport England’s Strategy for 2008-2011. London: 
Sport England. 
SE, 2009. Annual Report 2008-2009. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2010a. Annual Report 2009-2010. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2010b. England Handball Progress Report April 2010. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2011. Annual Report 2010-2011. London: Sport England. 
297 
 
SE, 2012a. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 17th January 2012 at Sport 
England. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2012b. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 20th June 2012 at Sport England. 
London: Sport England. 
SE, 2012c. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 20th November 2012 at Sport 
England. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2012d. Annual Report 2011-2012. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2012e. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 1st May 2012 at Sport England. 
London: Sport England. 
SE, 2012f. Sport England Strategy 2012-17. [online]. Sport England. [last viewed 
29/11/2018]. Available from: https://www.sportengland.org/media/3662/a-
sporting-habit-for-life-a4-1.pdf 
SE, 2012g. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 10 December 2012 at Sport 
England. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2013a. Annual Report 2012-2013. London: Sport England.   
SE, 2013b. No merger of Sport England and UK Sport. [online]. Sport England, 23 
January. [last viewed 05/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.sportengland.org/news-and-features/news/2013/january/23/no-
merger-of-sport-england-and-uk-sport/ 
SE, 2013c. Sport England 2013-17 Investment in 46 sports. [online]. Funding4sport, 
[viewed 01/12/2018]. Available from: https://www.funding4sport.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Sport-England-NGB-fundin-2013-17.pdf 
SE, 2014a. Annual Report 2013-2014. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2014b. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 19th March 2014 at Sport England. 
London: Sport England. 
SE, 2014c. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 21st January 2014 at Sport 
England. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2014d. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 24th June 2014 at Sport England. 
London: Sport England. 
SE, 2014e. Sport England continues tough approach to sport delivery. [online]. Sport 
England. [last viewed 29/11/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.sportengland.org/news-and-features/news/2014/march/26/sport-
england-continues-tough-approach-to-sport-delivery/ 
298 
 
SE, 2014f. New approach sees boost to community sport. [online]. Sport England. 
[last viewed 29/11/2018]. Available from: http://www.sportengland.org/media-
centre/news/2014/january/23/new-approach-sees-boost-to-community-sport/ 
SE, 2015a. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 17 March 2015 at Sport England. 
London: Sport England.  
SE, 2015b. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 28th April 2015 at Sport England. 
London: Sport England. 
SE, 2016a. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 15th June 2016 at Sport England. 
London: Sport England. 
SE, 2016b. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 26th April 2016 at Sport England. 
London: Sport England. 
SE, 2016c. Main Board Meeting Minutes, held on 26th January 2016 at Sport 
England. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2016d. Annual Report 2015-2016. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2016e. Towards An Active Nation – Strategy 2016-21. London: Sport England.  
SE, 2017a. Annual Report 2016-2017. London: Sport England. 
SE, 2017b. National governing bodies of sport funding – February 2017 Awards. 
[online]. Sport England. [last viewed 06/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.sportengland.org/media/11540/2017-21-national-governing-bodies-
of-sport-funding-feb-2017.pdf 
Shilbury, D., Ferkins, L., and Smythe, L., 2013. Sport governance encounters: 
insights from lived experiences. Sport management review, 16 (3), 349–363. 
doi:10.1016/j.smr.2012.12.001 
Silverman, D., 2000. Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook. London: 
Sage. 
Silverman, D., 2005. Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook. 2nd ed. 
London: Sage. 
Skille, E. A., 2008. Understanding Sport Clubs As Sport Policy Implementers: A 
Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of the Implementation of Central Sport 
Policy through Local and Voluntary Sport Organizations. International Review 
for the Sociology of Sport, 43 (2), 181-200. 
Slack, T. and Hinings, B., 1992. Understanding change in national sport 
organizations: an integration of theoretical perspectives. Journal of sport 
management, 6 (2), 114–132. doi:10.1123/jsm.6.2.114. 
299 
 
Slater, M., 2012. Handball chief calls for more flexible funding. [online]. BBC Sport, 1 
November. [last viewed 05/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/handball/20175370 
Smith, B., 2007, ‘Research quality and judgment criteria in qualitative research: 
Exploring problems and possibilities.’ In: Proceedings of the 12th European 
Congress of Sports Psychology. Greece. 
Smith, B., and Caddick, N., 2012. Qualitative methods in sport: a concise overview 
for guiding social scientific sport research. Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and 
Social Science, 1 (1), 60-73. 
Smith, M.J., 1990. Pluralism, Reformed Pluralism and Neo-Pluralism: the Role of 
Pressure Groups in Policy-Making. Political Studies, 38, 302-322. 
Sparkes, A., 1992. Research in physical education and sport: exploring alternative 
visions. Brighton: Falmer Press. 
Sports Council, 1982. ‘Sport in the Community - The Next Ten Years‘. London: 
Author. 
Sports Council, 1988. Sport in the Community – Into the 90s. A strategy for sport 
1988-1993. London: Author. 
Stake, R.E., 2005, ‘Qualitative Case Studies,’ In: N.K. Denzin, and Y.S. Lincoln, eds. 
The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research. London: Sage, pp.443-466.  
Stark, S., and Torrance, H., 2005. Case Study. In: B. Somekh and C. Lewin, eds. 
Research Methods in the Social Sciences. London: Sage, pp.33-55. 
Steinmo, S., 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Steinmo, S., 2001. ‘Institutionalism.’ In: N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes, ed. 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences. Oxford: 
Elsevier Science. 
StreetGames, n.d. The National Governing Bodies. [online]. StreetGames. [last 
viewed 18/12/2018]. Available from: https://network.streetgames.org/our-work-
changing-sport/national-governing-bodies 
Stritch. A, 2015. The Advocacy Coalition Framework And Nascent Subsystems: 
Trade Union Disclosure Policy in Canada. Policy Studies Journal, 43 (4), 437-
455. 
Struna, N. L., 1985. In “glorious disarray”: The literature of American sport history. 
Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 56 (2), 151-160. 
300 
 
Sugden J., and Bairner, A., 1993. Sport, Sectarianism and Society in a Divided 
Ireland. Leicester: Leicester University Press. 
Sutton, P., 2011. The concept of small states in the international political economy. 
The round table, 100 (413), 141-153. 
Tenenbaum, G. and Driscoll, M.P., 2005. Methods of Research in Sport Science. 
Oxford: Meyer and Meyer Sport (UK) Ltd. 
Thelen, K., and Steinmo, S., 1992. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. 
In: S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, eds. Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp.1-32. 
Theodoraki, E.I., and Henry, I.P., 1994. Organisational Structures and Contexts in 
British National Governing Bodies of Sport. International Review for the 
Sociology of Sport, 29 (3), 243-265. 
Thibault, L., Slack, T., and Hinings, B., 1991. Professionalism, structures and 
systems: The impact of professional staff on voluntary sport organizations. 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 26 (2), 83-98. 
Thomas, N., 2003. Sport and Disability. In: B. Houlihan, ed. Sport and Society: a 
Student Introduction. London: Sage, pp.105-124.   
Thompson, N., 2008. Hollowing Out the State: Public Choice theory and the Critique 
of Keynesian Social Democracy. Contemporary British History, 22 (3), 355-382. 
Thorhallsson, B., and Wivel, A., 2006. Small states in the European Union: what do 
we know and what would we like to know? Cambridge review of international 
affairs, 19 (4), 651-668. 
Thurston, A., 2017. An analysis of the implementation of Clubmark and two 
associated policies in Boxing, Swimming, and Rugby Union. Doctoral Thesis, 
Loughborough University. 
Trõnurist, P. ,2010. What is a ‘small state’ in a globalizing economy. Halduskultuur – 
administrative culture, 11 (1), 8-29. 
True, J.L., Jones, B.D., and Baumgartner, F.R., 2007. Punctuated-Equilibrium 
Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking. In: P.A. 
Sabatier, 2nd ed. Theories of the policy process. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
press, pp.155-187. 
TTE, 2006. Management Committee Report 2005-2006 and Statement of Accounts. 
Hastings: England Table Tennis Association. 
301 
 
TTE, 2007. Annual Review 2006-2007 and Statement of Accounts. Hastings: 
England Table Tennis Association. 
TTE, 2008. Annual Report 2007-2008 and Statement of Accounts. Hastings: 
England Table Tennis Association. 
TTE, 2009a. Annual Report 2008-2009 and Statement of Accounts. Hastings: 
England Table Tennis Association. 
TTE, 2009b. Shaping the future of table tennis: Summary of the Whole Sport Plan 
2009-2013. Hastings: England Table Tennis Association. 
TTE, 2010. Annual Report 2009-2010 and Statement of Accounts. Hastings: 
England Table Tennis Association.  
TTE, 2011. Annual Report 2010-2011 and Statement of Accounts. Hastings: 
England Table Tennis Association. 
TTE, 2012. Annual Report 2011-2012 and Statement of Accounts. Hastings: 
England Table Tennis Association. 
TTE, 2013. Annual Report 2012-2013 and Statement of Accounts. Hastings: Table 
Tennis England. 
TTE, 2014. Annual Report 2013-2014. Milton Keynes: Table Tennis England. 
TTE, 2015a. Annual Report 2014-2015. Milton Keynes: Table Tennis England. 
TTE, 2015b. Mission 2025: The 10-Year Plan. Milton Keynes: Table Tennis England. 
TTE, 2016. Annual Report 2015-2016. Milton Keynes: Table Tennis England. 
TTE, 2017. Annual Review 2016-2017. Milton Keynes: Table Tennis England. 
TTE, 2018. Annual Review 2017-18. Milton Keynes: Table Tennis England. 
TTN, 1952. Table Tennis News, Volume 10, Issue 8. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, April. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1951-
52/tt_issue84.pdf 
TTN, 1955. Table Tennis News, Volume 14, Issue 2. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1955-
56/tt_issue113.pdf 
TTN, 1960a. Table Tennis News, Volume 18, Issue 7. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, April. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1959-
60/tt_issue150.pdf 
302 
 
TTN, 1960b. Table Tennis News, Volume 19, Issue 2. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1960-
61/tt_issue153.pdf 
TTN, 1964. Table Tennis News, Volume 22, Issue 6. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1963-
64/tt_issue181.pdf 
TTN, 1965a. Table Tennis News, Volume 22, Issue 6. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, April. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from:  
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1964-
65/tt_issue190.pdf 
TTN, 1965b. Table Tennis News, Volume 24, Issue 2. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1965-
66/tt_issue193.pdf 
TTN, 1970. Table Tennis News, Issue 33. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, October. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1970-
71/tt_issue232.pdf 
TTN, 1974. Table Tennis News, Issue 64. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, May/June. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1973-
74/tt_issue263.pdf 
TTN, 1981. Table Tennis News, Issue 121. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, October. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1981-
82/tt_issue320.pdf 
TTN, 1983. Table Tennis News, Issue 132. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, January/February. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1982-
83/tt_issue331.pdf 
TTN, 1985a. Table Tennis News, Issue 148. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, January. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1984-
85/tt_issue347.pdf 
TTN, 1985b. Table Tennis News, Issue 154. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, December. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
303 
 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1985-
86/tt_issue353.pdf 
TTN, 1987. Table Tennis News, Issue 167. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, May/June. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1986-
87/tt_issue366.pdf 
TTN, 1990. Table Tennis News, Issue 193. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1990-
91/tt_issue392.pdf 
TTN, 1991. Table Tennis News, Issue 199. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, May/June. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1990-
91/tt_issue398.pdf 
TTN, 1993. Table Tennis News, Issue 214. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, April. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from:  
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1992-
93/tt_issue413.pdf 
TTN, 1994a. Table Tennis News, Issue 219. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, December 1993-January 1994. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available 
from: https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1993-
94/tt_issue418.pdf 
TTN, 1994b. Table Tennis News, Issue 224. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, September. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/etta_website/magazine-archive/1994-
95/tt_issue423.pdf 
TTN, 1995. Table Tennis News, Issue 232. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, September. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1995-
96/September1995.pdf 
TTN, 1996. Table Tennis News, Issue 239. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, June. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1995-
96/June1996.pdf 
TTN, 1997a. Table Tennis News, Issue 246. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, June. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1996-
97/June1997.pdf 
304 
 
TTN, 1997b. Table Tennis News, Issue 247. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, September. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1997-
98/September1997.pdf 
TTN, 1997c. Table Tennis News, Issue 248. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, October. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1997-
98/October1997.pdf 
TTN, 1999a. Table Tennis News, Issue 264. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1999-
2000/November1999.pdf 
TTN, 1999b. Table Tennis News, Issue 265. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, December. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1999-
2000/December1999.pdf 
TTN, 2000a. Table Tennis News, Issue 266. In Editorial - Table Tennis News Extra. 
[online]. England Table Tennis Association, January/February. [last viewed 
08/12/2018]. Available from: https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/TTN/1999-2000/Jan-Feb2000.pdf 
TTN, 2000b. Table Tennis News, Issue 267. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, March. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1999-
2000/March2000.pdf 
TTN, 2000c. Table Tennis News, Issue 268. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, April. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1999-
2000/April2000.pdf 
TTN, 2000d. Table Tennis News, Issue 269. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, May. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/1999-
2000/May2000.pdf 
TTN, 2000e. Table Tennis News, Issue 274. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, December. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2000-
01/December2000.pdf 
TTN, 2001a. Table Tennis News, Issue 277. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, April. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
305 
 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2000-
01/April2001.pdf 
TTN, 2001b. Table Tennis News, Issue 279. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, September. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2001-
02/September2001.pdf 
TTN, 2001c. Table Tennis News, Issue 281. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2001-
02/November2001.pdf 
TTN, 2002a. Table Tennis News, Issue 283. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, January/February. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2001-02/Jan-
Feb2002.pdf 
TTN, 2002b. Table Tennis News, Issue 288. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2002-
03/November2002.pdf 
TTN, 2003a. Table Tennis News, Issue 290. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, January/February. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2002-03/Jan-
Feb2003.pdf 
TTN, 2003b. Table Tennis News, Issue 297. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, December. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2003-
04/December2003.pdf 
TTN, 2004. Table Tennis News, Issue 301. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, May. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2003-04/May2004.pdf 
TTN, 2005. Table Tennis News, Issue 310. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, June/July. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2004-05/Jun-
Jul2005.pdf 
TTN, 2006a. Table Tennis News, Issue 315. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, March. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2005-
06/March2006.pdf 
306 
 
TTN, 2006b. Table Tennis News, Issue 316. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, May. [last viewed 10/12/2018]. Available from:  
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2005-06/May2006.pdf 
TTN, 2006c. Table Tennis News, Issue 319. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, October. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2006-
07/October2006.pdf 
TTN, 2006d. Table Tennis News, Issue 320. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2006-
07/November2006.pdf 
TTN, 2006e. Table Tennis News, Issue 321. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, December. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2006-
07/December2006.pdf 
TTN, 2007a. Table Tennis News, Issue 322. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, February. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2006-
07/February2007.pdf 
TTN, 2007b. Table Tennis News, Issue 324. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, May. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2006-07/May2007.pdf 
TTN, 2007c. Table Tennis News, Issue 327. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, October. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2007-
08/October2007.pdf 
TTN, 2007d. Table Tennis News, Issue 328. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, November. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2007-
08/November2007.pdf 
TTN, 2008. Table Tennis News, Issue 337. [online]. England Table Tennis 
Association, December. [last viewed 09/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://tabletennisengland.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/TTN/2008-
09/December2008.pdf 
UKS, 2002a. Annual Report 2001-2002. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2002b. Minutes of the UK Sport Board Meeting, held on 11th March 2002 at UK 
Sport. London: UK Sport. 
307 
 
UKS, 2003. Annual Report 2002-2003. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2004. Minutes of the UK Sport Board Meeting, held on 14th October 2004 at 
UK Sport. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2006a. Minutes of the UK Sport Board Meeting, held on 24th May 2006 at UK 
Sport. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2006b. Annual Report 2005-2006. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2007. Annual Report 2006-2007. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2010. Annual Report 2009-2010. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2011. Annual Report 2010-2011. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2012. Minutes of the UK Sport Board Meeting held on 11th/12th December 
2012, at UKS. London: UK Sport.  
UKS, 2014. Minutes of the UK Sport Board Meeting held on 31 January 2014, at 
UKS. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2016a. Annual Report 2015-2016. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2016b. Minutes of the UK Sport Board Meeting held on 22 September 2016, at 
UKS. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2016c. Minutes of the UK Sport Board Meeting held on 7 December 2016, at 
UKS. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2017. Annual Report 2016-2017. London: UK Sport. 
UKS, 2018. New sports backed by Aspiration Fund to support ambitions for Tokyo 
2020 Olympics and Paralympics. [online]. UK Sport, 7 December. [viewed 
11/12/2018]. Available from: http://www.uksport.gov.uk/news/2018/12/07/new-
sports-backed-by-aspiration-fund-to-support-ambitions-for-tokyo-2020-
olympics-and-paralympics 
Van den Berg., A., and Janoski, T., 2005. Conflict theories in political sociology. In: 
T. Janoski, R. Alford, M.A. Hicks and M.A. Schwartz, eds. The handbook of 
political sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vaughn, B.K., and Daniel, S.R., 2012. Conceptualising validity. In: G. Tenenbaum, 
R.C. Eklund, and A. Kamata, eds. Measurement in sport and exercise 
psychology. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.   
VE, 2008a. Annual Report 2007-2008. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
308 
 
VE, 2008b. Funding Boost for Volleyball England. [online]. Volleyball England, 16 
December. [last viewed 07/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.volleyballengland.org/news/article/3323/funding-boost-for-volleyball 
VE, 2009a. Annual Report 2008-2009. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2009b. Strategic Plan 2009-2013. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2010. Annual Report 2009-2010. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2011a. Annual Report 2010-2011. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2011b. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 21 May 2011 at National 
Volleyball Centre, Kettering. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2011c. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 9 July 2011 at National 
Volleyball Centre, Kettering. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2011d. Sport England to help improve sports hall provision. [online]. Volleyball 
England, 20 October. [last viewed 07/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.volleyballengland.org/news/article/4230/sport-england-to-help-
improve 
VE, 2011e. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 26 February 2011 at National 
Volleyball Centre, Kettering Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2012a. Annual Report 2011-2012. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2012b. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 19 May 2012 at Europa 
Gatwick Hotel, Maidenbower. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2012c. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 30 June 2012 at SportPark, 
Loughborough. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2013a. Annual Report 2012-2013. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2013b. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 11 May 2013 at SportPark, 
Loughborough University. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2013c. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 14 February 2013 at 
SportPark, Loughborough University. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2013d. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 9 November 2013 at 
SportPark, Loughborough University. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2013e. Strategic Plan 2013-2017. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2014a. Annual Report 2013-2014. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
309 
 
VE, 2014b. Building a sustainable long-term future for Volleyball in England - 
Strategy 2024. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2014c. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 19 September 2014 at 
SportPark, Loughborough. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2014d. Volleyball England AGM 26 July 2014. [youtube]. Volleyball England. 
[last accessed 06/12/2018] Available from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4dYVQKHOep8 
VE, 2015a. Volleyball England AGM 25 July 2015. [youtube]. Volleyball England. 
[last accessed 07/12/2018] Available from:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jFNqhY3eNpE&feature=youtu.be 
VE, 2015b. £500,000 raised for the volleyball community. [online]. Volleyball 
England, 10 December. [last viewed 08/12/2018]. Available from:  
https://www.volleyballengland.org/news/article/5228/500000-raised-for-the-
volleyball 
VE, 2015c. Annual Report 2014-2015. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2015d. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 25 July 2015 at SportPark, 
Loughborough University. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2016a. Annual Report 2015-2016. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2016b. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 26 February 2016 at 
SportPark, Loughborough. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2016c. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 26 November 2016 at 
Loughborough. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2017a. Annual Report 2016-2017. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2017b. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 17 September 2017 at Sport 
Park, Loughborough. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2017c. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 24 & 25 February 2017 at the 
Holiday Inn Express, East Midlands Airport, Donnington. Loughborough: 
Volleyball England. 
VE, 2017d. Executive Board Meeting Minutes, held on 25 November 2017 at 
SportPark, Loughborough. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2017e. Looking to the future. [online]. Volleyball England, 23 January. [last 
viewed 07/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.volleyballengland.org/news/article/5471/looking-to-the-future 
310 
 
VE, 2017f. Volleyball England announces 34% cut in its central funding. [online]. 
Volleyball England, 6 February. [last viewed 07/12/2018]. Available from: 
https://www.volleyballengland.org/news/article/5489/volleyball-england-
announces-34-cut 
VE, 2018a. Annual Report 2017-2018. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
VE, 2018b. Executive Board Meeting minutes, held on 29 September 2018 at 
SportPark, Loughborough. Loughborough: Volleyball England. 
Veal, A., 1997. Research Methods for leisure and Tourism. 2nd ed. London: Pitman. 
Veal, A.J., Toohey, K., and Frawley, S., 2006. “Sport for All” and the Legacy of the 
Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. In: Proceedings of the 13th Commonwealth 
International Sports Conference, March 2006. Melbourne, Australia. 
Veal, J., 2012. Future of British Handball after Olympics looking bright as public 
interest increases. [online]. Independent, 30 July. [last viewed 04/12/2018]. 
Available from: https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympics/other-
events/future-of-british-handball-after-olympics-looking-bright-as-public-interest-
increases-7987384.html 
Verschuren, P.J.M., 2003. Case study as a research strategy: Some ambiguities and 
opportunities. International Journal of Social Science Research Methodology, 6 
(2), 121-139. 
Vromen, A., 2010. Debating Methods: rediscovering qualitative approaches. In: D. 
Marsh and G. Stoker, eds. Theory and Methods in Political Science. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 249-266. 
Weiss, C.H., 1977. Research for policy’s sake: the enlightenment function of social 
research. Policy Analysis, 3 (Fall), 531-545. 
White, B., 2012. Handball feels like we're the member of the family everyone else 
hates. [online]. The Guardian, 18 December. [last viewed 05/12/2018]. 
Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/global/2012/dec/18/handball-
funding-uk-sport 
Wrong, D. H., 1995. Power. It’s forms, bases and uses. New Brunswick and London: 
Footnote. 
Yardley, L., 2000. Dilemmas in Qualitative Health Research. Psychology and Health, 
15, 215-228. 
Yin, R.K., 1994. Case study research: design and methods. 2nd ed. London: Sage. 
Yin, R.K., 2003a. Case study research: design and methods. Newbury Park: Sage 
311 
 
Yin, R.K., 2003b. Applications of case study research. London: Sage Publications 
Ltd. 
Yin, R.K., 2003c. Case study research: design and methods. London: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
Yin, R.K., 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 4th ed. London: Sage. 
Young, K., 1977. “Values” in the policy process. Policy and Politics, 5, 1-22. 
Zafonte. M., and Sabatier, P.A., 1998. Shared Beliefs and Imposed 
Interdependencies as Determinants of Ally Networks in Overlapping 
Subsystems. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (4), 473-505.  
Zahariadis, N., 1999. Ambiguity, time and multiple streams. In: P.A. Sabatier, ed. 
Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Zahariadis, N., 2003. Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy. Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press. 
Zahariadis, N., 2007. The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, 
Prospects. In: P. A. Sabatier, 2nd ed. Theories of the Policy process Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, pp.65-92. 
Zahariadis, N., and Allen, S.C., 1995. Ideas, networks, and Policy Streams: 
Privatization in Britain and Germany. Policy Studies Review, 14, 71-98. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
312 
 
Appendices 
Appendix I: Sports Council-led Political Strategies for Sport 1972-1993 
Appendix II: Triennial Review: key recommendations for UK Sport, Sport England 
and NGBs  
Appendix III: Selected macro-level theories: key dimensions  
Appendix IV: Sport England: Olympic sport investment 2013-17  
Appendix V: Active People Survey Statistical Data 2006-16  
Appendix VI: List of interview participants and short biographies  
Appendix VII: Interview Guide and Questions  
Appendix VIII: Example Interview Transcript  
Appendix IX: ‘Deep-Core’ Beliefs of government and Sport England   
Appendix X: ‘Policy-Core’ Beliefs of government and Sport England  
Appendix XI: ‘Secondary-Aspects’ of government and Sport England’s belief system  
Appendix XII: Examples of coalition partner beliefs, alignment and advocacy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
313 
 
Appendix I: Sports Council-led Political Strategies for Sport 1972-1993 
 Sport for All 
 (1972) 
Sport in the Community – The 
Next Ten Years (1982) 
Sport in the Community – Into 
the 90s. A strategy for sport 
1988-1993 (1988) 
Government Labour – Wilson/Callaghan. 
 
Conservative – Thatcher. Conservative – Thatcher/Major. 
Government 
Priorities 
Greater specificity towards 
general welfare provision (e.g.  
socialisation, ameliorating 
juvenile delinquency, violence 
and vandalism).   
General provision across-the-
board to help areas of special 
needs (e.g. deprived inner urban 
areas, youth sports, and older 
retired generation).   
 
Two broad objectives:  
i) improve the nation’s health; 
and ii) alleviate social 
deprivation. 
Government 
Provision / 
Commitment 
Arm’s length funding.  
 
Suspicious Whitehall. 
Arm’s length funding; 
 
Limited, partly due to financial 
restrictions, and Thatcher’s 
political ideology and distaste for 
sport.  
 
No Change. 
Primary Policy 
Theme 
Promoting Mass Participation.  Promoting Mass Participation – 
in particular age groups 13-24 
and 45-59, and deprived areas 
(inner cities). 
Reinforced SC philosophy of 
Sport for All – promotion of mass 
participation, in particular young 
people (13-24) and women. 
 
Secondary Policy 
Theme 
Encouraging elite sport 
development. 
Encouraging excellence in elite 
sport. 
Promoting performance and 
excellence in elite sport. 
 
Implications for 
NGBs 
Grant-aid to NGBs for 
administration, development, 
coaching, and international 
competition.  
 
Significant increase from £3.6m 
to £15.2m (1972-79) for elite 
sport. 
 
Increased participation and 
facility building. 
 
 
Grant-aid weighted toward 
elitism. Focus on quality sport 
experience/specific services 
required for participation/elite 
success. 
 
Selective priority setting – 
effective resource concentration 
for greatest social/economic 
return.  
 
SC increasingly directed by 
government to account for NGB 
funding, and demonstrate how 
NGB support impacted on 
sports’ social role. 
 
More selective in allocation of 
funds to NGBs based on criteria, 
e.g. ability to self-generate 
income, administrative 
efficiency, popularity of sport, 
and chances of success. 
 
Greater funding allocated to 
target group projects. 
 
Progressive switching of 
resources towards activities at 
the elite end of the sporting 
spectrum. 
 
 
Role of NGBs Limited involvement from NGBs 
– largely passive recipients of 
government policy/funding. 
 
Vague, but encouraged to assist 
with increased participation; 
strategic/coordinating role 
between government/SC and 
NGBs/voluntary organisations. 
 
Limited involvement from NGBs 
– largely passive recipients of 
government policy/funding. 
 
Still vague, but SC/NGB 
discussions on potential role to 
increase participation and 
resources available (advice, 
publicity, sponsorship and 
financial aid).  
 
 
Limited involvement from NGBs 
– largely passive recipients of 
government policy/funding. 
 
Encouraged to promote 
increased participation. Primary 
responsibility - developing 
performance and excellence.  
Source adapted from: Sports Council (1982); Sports Council (1988), McIntosh and Charlton’s (1985); 
Coghlan and Webb (1990); Houlihan (1991, 1997); Pickup (1996); Oakley and Green (2001); 
Houlihan and White (2002); Jeffreys (2012) 
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Appendix II: Triennial Review: key recommendations for UK Sport, Sport 
England and NGBs 
Theme Recommendation 
Participation SE’s new tool for measuring participation (Active Lives) should address previous weaknesses 
and incentivise overall increases in participation; and channel resources in support of those 
most likely to increase sport participation.  
Governance of NGBs UKS and SE should publish a joint set of governance guidelines for the next funding cycle, and 
provide joint support to improve NGB governance and set targets for NGB board 
representation. 
Improving effectiveness 
and efficiency of grant 
recipients 
UKS and SE should develop a shared vision with and encouragement of NGBs for future 
efficiencies, including, where desirable, the creation of clusters and ‘hub locations’ across the 
country to enable co-location and shared services. 
Communications UKS and SE should improve their transparency in terms of operations. 
Moving closer to 
government 
UKS and SE should remain politically impartial and decentralised, to avoid conflict within the 
sports sector and a detrimental impact to Lottery sales, in terms of potential impartiality in 
grant-making, and the principle of additionality in relation to Lottery funding. 
Source adapted from: DCMS (2015a) 
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Appendix III: Selected macro-level theories: key dimensions 
Dimension Neo-pluralism Public Choice (Market 
Liberalism) 
Governance 
Unit of analysis 
 
Interest Groups Markets and individuals Policy networks and subsystems 
Key features Focused on power of groups in 
policymaking – competition 
between groups create change. 
 
Acknowledges the unequal 
distribution of power and the 
generally privileged position of 
business.  
 
Dependent on resources 
(institutional and historical). 
  
Small government favouring 
privatisation. Prioritisation of 
economy, tax cuts, deregulation, 
and contracting-out. 
Decentralised power - control is 
constrained. Variegated levels of 
horizontal rather than hierarchical 
power within networks of groups. 
Groups can be insiders with 
positions of influence or 
outsiders. 
 
Criticisms Disregards power of individuals. Non-sustainable during economic 
uncertainty when greater 
government intervention is 
preferential 
Implies an absence of 
democratic legitimacy as 
decision-making is devolved - 
blurs the boundaries between the 
state, the economy, and civil 
society. 
 
Role of the state Active participant in making 
policy - mediates between rival 
groups, protecting and promoting 
own interests (especially in 
relation to problem definition and 
preferred solutions). Bias 
towards business interests. 
An ‘enabler’ for markets to 
operate effectively (limited 
regulations) - markets maximise 
social welfare and individuals are 
rational utility maximisers. Deep 
suspicion of the state, which 
should be limited to basic 
functions e.g. defence, property 
rights and basic infrastructure 
and services. 
 
Governments seek to act in 
partnership with civil society 
organisations, due to increasing 
complexity of social issues. Seen 
as either a hollowing out 
(Rhodes, 1994) or rolling out of 
the state (Rose, 1999). 
 
 
Dynamic for 
policy-making 
 
Interaction between groups of 
unequal influence. 
Market competition and the 
pursuit, by individuals, of 
personal interest. 
Accumulation of evidence and/or 
external events (e.g. financial 
crisis). 
 
Association to 
selected  
meso-level 
frameworks 
 
ACF, MSF, and new 
institutionalism (in part) 
New institutionalism (in part) New institutionalism, the MSF 
and ACF (in part). 
Primary focus 
for the study of 
sport policy 
Existence and influence of 
advocacy coalitions for interests 
such as elite, youth and 
community sport. Policy-making 
influenced by the capitalist 
system, with business holding a 
privileged position. Groups form 
networks of interest to gain 
power. 
 
Policies serve the interests of 
business. The regulatory role of 
the state. The relationship 
between the state, the market 
and the not-for-profit sector. 
Performance management 
systems influenced by new public 
management (NPM) principles. 
 
Sport policy networks/community 
and their membership, values 
and decision processes. Many 
groups (e.g. NGBs, BOA, YST), 
lack features of democratic 
responsibility involved in 
policymaking. 
Source adapted from: Friedman and Friedman (1962), Niskanen (1971), Lindblom (1977), Houlihan 
(1991), Parsons (1995), Rhodes (1994,1996), Rose (1999), Pierre and Peters (2000), Green and 
Houlihan (2004), Van den Berg and Janoski (2005), Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009), Houlihan and 
Groeneveld (2011), Houlihan and Lindsey (2013). 
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Appendix IV: Sport England: Olympic sport investment 2013-17  
 
 2013-17 funding decisions 2009-13 funding  
 Total Participation Talent Total 
 
£m £m £m £m 
     Cycling 32.0 25.6 6.4 24.7 
Football 
 
30.0 25.0 5.0 25.6 
Athletics 22.0 17.0 5.0 20.4 
Rugby Union 20.0 15.2 4.8 28.8 
Badminton 18.0 15.0 3.0 20.3 
Golf 13.0 9.7 3.3 12.5 
Hockey 12.0 9.9 2.1 11.2 
Gymnastics 11.8 10.8 1.0 11.0 
Canoeing 10.2 7.0 3.2 8.6 
Swimming - 1 year award 9.5 3.5 6.0 20.9 
Sailing 9.3 5.8 3.5 9.6 
Rowing 8.2 6.3 1.9 8.8 
Triathlon 7.5 5.3 2.2 4.7 
Tennis - 1 year award for participation 7.1 3.3 3.8 24.5 
Judo 6.1 4.6 1.5 9.9 
Equestrian 6.0 4.9 1.1 4.1 
Volleyball 5.1 4.3 0.8 5.5 
Boxing 5.8 4.6 1.2 4.5 
Basketball 3.6 2.1 1.5 7.3 
Table Tennis - 1 year award 2.5 2.2 0.3 9.2 
Archery 2.0 1.2 0.8 0.9 
Fencing - 1 year award 0.5 0.4 0.1 1.0 
Taekwondo 1.2 - 1.2 0.8 
Handball 1.2 1.1 0.1 0.6 
Shooting 1.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 
Weightlifting 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.6 
Modern Pentathlon 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.9 
Wrestling 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.4 
     Total of awards funding for Olympic Sports 
(excludes ring-fenced funding) 248.5 187.5 61.0 278.1 
     
Average funding across 27 Olympic Sports  9.2 
    
Source: SE (2013c); also available from:  https://www.funding4sport.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Sport-England-NGB-fundin-2013-17.pdf 
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Appendix V: Active People Survey Statistical Data 2006-16 
 
Available from: https://www.sportengland.org/research/about-our-research/active-people-survey/ 
 
Once a month participation
Sport England NGB 13-17 Funded sports
% n
Unweighted 
counts
% n
Statistically significant 
change from APS 1
Angling1 * * 2,384 1.69% 751,300 *
Archery2 0.11% 44,600        190 0.12% 54,700 No change
Athletics 5.05% 2,054,000   7,811 7.07% 3,125,300 Increase
Badminton 2.21% 900,300      2,043 1.63% 715,700 Decrease
Baseball and softball 0.05% 21,900        * * * *
Basketball 0.68% 275,000      318 0.54% 231,200 Decrease
Boccia* * * * * * *
Bowls 1.04% 423,800      1,830 0.63% 278,400 Decrease
Boxing 0.37% 148,600      404 0.48% 209,700 Increase
Canoeing and kayaking3 0.26% 106,400      390 0.33% 145,800 Increase
Cricket 0.93% 380,300      525 0.64% 278,600 Decrease
Cycling 8.73% 3,554,800   11,193 8.30% 3,675,000 Decrease
Equestrian 0.99% 401,900      1,245 0.77% 339,800 Decrease
Exercise, Movement and Dance10 * * 2,190 1.30% 578,200 *
Fencing 0.05% 21,800        * * * *
Football 7.15% 2,910,500   3,873 5.91% 2,591,200 Decrease
Goalball* * * * * * *
Golf 3.58% 1,457,300   4,496 2.54% 1,131,500 Decrease
Gymnastics and trampolining 0.31% 126,500      263 0.26% 113,400 Decrease
Handball* * * * * * *
Hockey 0.35% 141,300      293 0.33% 142,600 No change
Judo 0.05% 20,300        53 0.07% 28,600 Increase
Lacrosse* 0.02% 6,400         * * * *
Modern Pentathlon* * * * * * *
Mountaineering4 0.42% 171,300      600 0.65% 287,800 Increase
Netball 0.40% 163,500      486 0.51% 220,800 Increase
Orienteering 0.02% 8,300         31 0.02% 9,800 No change
Rounders 0.14% 56,800        97 0.11% 46,600 Decrease
Rowing5 * * 623 0.49% 214,500 Increase
Rugby League 0.27% 110,500      83 0.16% 67,300 Decrease
Rugby Union 0.66% 267,800      431 0.67% 290,200 No change
Sailing 0.34% 137,200      382 0.21% 93,400 Decrease
Shooting 0.27% 109,900      377 0.23% 100,300 Decrease
Snowsport 0.45% 184,800      431 0.32% 142,400 Decrease
Squash and racketball 1.23% 500,600      741 0.70% 312,800 Decrease
Swimming 13.84% 5,633,600   14,320 9.53% 4,228,300 Decrease
Table Tennis6 0.40% 162,900      757 0.50% 221,800 Increase
Taekwondo 0.05% 21,500        65 0.06% 26,100 No change
Tennis7 2.15% 874,000      2,296 1.64% 721,100 Decrease
Triathlon8 0.01% 4,800         31 0.03% 11,700 Increase
Volleyball 0.17% 68,500        114 0.14% 59,200 Decrease
Waterskiing9 0.05% 20,700        * * * *
Weightlifting * * 224 0.26% 114,900 *
Wheelchair basketball* * * * * * *
Wheelchair rugby* * * * * * *
Wrestling* 0.01% 4,600         * * * *
1 Figures for moderate intensity angling are not available for Active People Surveys 1 & 2. Since publication of the APS3 results in December 2009, 
angling figures have been recalculated to include wheelchair sports - fishing. The Active People Survey 5 result for angling includes respondents who reported angling
participation in response to the fishing check questions that were added to the survey. APS 1-4 data is not consistent with subsequent data points.
2 Since publication of the APS3 results in December 2009, archery figures have been recalculated to include wheelchair sports - archery.
3 Since publication of the January 2010 - January 2011 results in March 2011, canoeing figures have been recalculated to include rafting.
4 Since publication of the APS3 results in December 2009, mountaineering figures have been recalculated to exclude ice climbing but include bouldering and mountain walking.
5 Since the third quarter of APS4 indoor rowing has been included in overall rowing figures.  Data is only published from APS5 onwards for comparability.
6 Since publication of the APS3 results in December 2009, table tennis figures have been recalculated to include wheelchair sports - table tennis.
7 Since publication of the APS3 results in December 2009, tennis figures have been recalculated to include wheelchair sports - tennis.
8 Triathlon participants are unlikely to compete every week, however, built up from the three disciplines of running, swimming 
and cycling, triathlon contributes to the participation numbers for each of these activities.
9 Since publication of the APS4 Q1 results in March 2010, waterskiing figures have been recalculated to include wakeboarding.
10 Exercise, Movement and Dance was introduced in 2014.
*insufficient sample size for once a month participation 
Base sizes (number of respondents) are as follows:
APS1 (Oct 2005-Oct 2006): 363,722
APS2 (Oct 2007-Oct 2008): 191,324
APS3 (Oct 2008-Oct 2009): 193,947
APS4 (Oct 2009-Oct 2010): 188,354
APS5 (Oct 2010-Oct 2011): 166,805
APS6 (Oct 2011-Oct 2012): 163,420
APS7 (Oct 2012-Oct 2013): 163,099
APS8 (Oct 2013-Oct 2014): 164,096
APS9Q2 (Apr 2014-Mar 2015): 163,213
APS9 (Oct 2014-Sep 2015): 169,010
APS10Q2 (Apr 2015 - Mar 2016): 168,808
APS10 (Oct 2015 - Sep 2016): 163,108
Source: Sport England's Active People Survey
APS10 (Oct 2015 - Sep 2016)
APS1 (Oct 2005-Oct 
2006)
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Appendix VI: List of interview participants and short biographies 
Interview 
Code 
Interview 
Date 
 
Role/Position Organisation Short Biography 
CEOEH 15/08/2018 CEO SMNGB – 
England 
Handball (EH) 
LA Sports Services; SE Relationship manager 
on the NGB relationship manager team (four 
years) looking after investment into NGBs for 
2009-13 funding cycle; CEO of EH since 2013. 
 
CEOVE 14/08/2018 CEO SMNGB – 
Volleyball 
England (VE) 
PE teacher (over 25 years); Chair of Lincoln 
Volleyball (over 21 years); CEO of CSP 
Lincolnshire Sport (seven years); CEO of VE 
since 2016. 
  
CEOTTE 24/09/2018 CEO SMNGB – Table 
Tennis England 
(TTE) 
In-house lawyer for BOA and Director of HR 
and Legal, involved in London 2012 Olympic 
bid (12 Years); CEO of TTE since 2013. 
SMTTE 05/10/2018 Senior Management SMNGB - Table 
Tennis England 
(TTE) 
Regional Officer for ETTA (three years); CSP 
Northamptonshire Sport, involved in 
volunteering, schools and clubs (five years); 
Literacy-based charity, Beanstalk, focused on 
schools and volunteers (two years); Head of 
workforce at TTE and member of Senior 
Management Team since 2016. 
 
SEC 04/09/2018 Chair Sport England 
(SE) 
Sports Lawyer, clients including Wimbledon, 
UEFA, and the RFU, the ECB, the Ryder Cup, 
and the PGA; CEO of London Marathon since 
1995 (ongoing); UKS Independent Board 
member (six years from 2003); SE 
Independent Board member since 2010 – 
Chair since 2013. 
 
SESLR 17/08/2018 Strategic Lead NGBs Sport England 
(SE) 
Sport England (14 years), initially as regional 
development manager, then Relationship 
manager on the NGB relationship manager 
team (2009-13) funding cycle, Strategic Lead 
for NGB relations since 2013.  
  
DCMSa 11/10/2018 Senior Management DCMS Sport Participation Team focused on 
grassroots sport and relationships with Sport 
England. 
 
DCMSb 11/10/2018 Policy Advisor DCMS Sport Participation Team focused on 
grassroots sport and relationships with Sport 
England. 
 
SRADP 26/09/2018 Director of Policy Sport and 
Recreation 
Alliance (SRA) 
Labour Party and private sector as public 
affairs officer; Trade Union policy role; NCVO 
as head of policy initially and then public 
services, involved in government contracting of 
the charity sector; Sport & Recreation Alliance 
as Head of Policy since 2013, and Director of 
Policy since 2016. 
 
Source: Transcribed interviews. 
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Appendix VII: Interview Guide and Questions 
Initial Discussion: interviewees background, role, involvement with handball 
 
Understanding the historical context of contemporary sport policy within which NGBs 
operate  
Primary Question (same question to non-NGB interviewees but specific to them) 
1. What have been the key changes in the sporting landscape over the past 10-15 years 
a) What has influenced change? Why? 
b) Who have been the key influencers of change? Who are the main policy actors? 
c) Do you consider sport to sit in one policy domain or to cross multiple policy domains (e.g. health 
and education)? Why? 
 
Evaluating the impact of changing policy on operational activities of NGBs 
Primary Question 
2. What has been impact of sport policy on NGBs? 
a) How has policy impacted on the operational activities of England Handball, in particular on: 
i. Governance 
ii. Funding/Financial Resources 
iii. Capacity Building – workforce development, facilities 
iv. Participation – community/recreation/grassroots 
v. Elite performance – talent development and player pathway 
vi. Partnership-working 
vii. Any others? 
b) To what extent have UKS and SE shaped or modernised England Handball (organisationally, 
operationally, financially and strategically)?  
c) What have been the key challenges and or benefits - e.g. Performance regimes, finances, 
WSPs? Why? 
d) How has this affected the relationship with members? 
 
Ascertaining the strategies utilised to adapt to a changing operational environment 
Primary Question 
3. What strategies have been used to adapt to changeability within UK sport policy? 
a) How has England Handball strategically developed to adapt to changes in sport policy (themes)?  
What strategies have been put in place as coping mechanisms? – in relation to  
i. Governance 
ii. Funding/Financial Resources 
iii. Capacity Building – workforce development, facilities 
iv. Participation – community/recreation/grassroots 
v. Elite performance – talent development and player pathway 
vi. Partnership-working 
vii. Any others? 
 
b) How has this affected the relationship members? 
c) What is the England Handball’s view of the current government strategy for sport?  
d) How is England Handball meeting the challenges posed by SE’s mixed-investment approach - 
what are the key factors that determine NGB partnership-working? 
e) What room to manoeuvre do you have? – autonomy vs government 
 
Exploring the interplay between NGBs, the government and governmental agencies (SE and 
UKS) 
Primary Question (same questions to non-NGB interviewees but specific to them in relation to 
NGBs) - ALSO UTILISE AS PROMPTS FOR Q.3 
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4. How has the relationship between government, UKS and SE, and NGBs changed? 
a) How and why has England Handball’s relationship with government, UKS and SE changed?  
b) How important are these relationships to England Handball? Why? 
c) How do you see the current relationship with government and its agencies? 
d) What are the key factors that bind the relationships together, e.g. shared values/beliefs, shared- 
interests, interdependencies or a combination of all? And Why? 
 
Determining the strength or weakness of the NGB to influence the direction of sport policy 
Primary Question (same questions to non-NGB interviewees) 
5. Do you consider the NGB to be a 'policymaker' or 'policy taker' 
a) To what extent do you consider England Handball to have the capacity to influence sport policy, 
and in what areas e.g. elite, grassroots, and societal value?  
b) What evidence is there of England Handball previously influencing sports policy? 
c) What means are available for NGBs to influence sport policy?  
d) What sort of organisation do you consider England Handball to be - membership/social/non-
government contractual agency/an extension of government/ or something else? 
 
6. Where do you see the future of sport policy over the next 5-10 years?  
7. Do you have any documents that would be useful for this research? 
8. Who else within the organisation would be able to provide additional information? Could 
you provide an introduction? 
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Appendix VIII: Example Interview Transcript  
Interview #2 
Interviewee Code: CEOEH 
Date: 13/08/2018 
Time: 10.00am 
Location: Sheffield – Premier Inn 
 
Interview Transcript: 
TH:  If we could have an initial discussion on your background, your role, and your involvement 
with handball. 
DM: I’ve been chief executive for handball now for just over five and a half years, having joined 
them from Sport England, where I’d been relationship manager, on the national governing 
body relationship manager team for four years looking after investment into governing bodies. 
So that obviously gave me a wide perspective over 46 governing bodies through that 09-13 
period. Day job here, chief cook and bottle washer is the obvious phrase to use. In a 
governing body our size, 15 staff, my role is everything from dealing with strategy, day to day 
operations, finance, governance liaison with the Board, liaison with members and key 
partners. Some of the commercial development side, but obviously then looking after the staff 
that we have in terms of each of the key areas which really sort of cover delivery, 
development, performance, competitions, events, coaching and workforce development, as 
well as administration and office department. So, as I say, small governing body, we’ve 
evolved over the five and a half years I’ve been there. Handball’s been around for a long 
period of time in this country, but not particularly on the radar of a lot of people up until 
probably 2012 and the London Olympics. The first round of funding that England Handball got 
was in 2009. Previous to that it was pretty much a voluntary organisation, not really any staff 
to talk of, but a sport that had a lot of potential. My involvement with the sport starting when I 
was at Sport England. It was one of the sports that I managed over that four year period 
between 2009 and 2013. The sport itself is massive in Europe, probably the third or fourth 
international federation worldwide in terms of member nations. But the likes of the near 
continent in terms of Europe, Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, it’s a huge sport, and we’re right 
down below with the small fish. Even Europe, ranked 36
th
 in Europe, men and women, but as 
a sport we’ve seen tremendous growth over this five, six year period since 2012. Our focus as 
an organisation has been really on the education sector, growing it in schools, getting young 
kids playing it, is a far more important area for us than trying to get more adults to play. But I 
think given its background we’re a very diverse organisation, 60 different nationalities within 
our membership, which has its plus points, has its challenges because a lot of those come 
from bigger handball playing nations, and therefore have higher expectations or previous 
322 
 
experience of the sport, and sometimes can’t quite reconcile with the fact that it is so amateur. 
And by that, I mean voluntary in its level here, and perhaps they come with an expectation 
that its going to be a professional league, played in every part of the country, and that’s 
simply not the case. So, our work has really been to capture the swell of interest from 2012 
and maintain it, which is a challenge for a small organisation with limited funding routes to 
keep capturing the opportunities and delivering on them.       
TH: Thanks for that David. The questions then are split into five different sections. The first 
questions we’re just going to about getting an understanding of the historical context of 
contemporary sport policy in which NGBs have operated, and obviously you’re experience 
there is going to be really important. Working for Sport England, as you said last time, having 
worn both hats you can see both sides. Then I want to talk about how changing sport policy 
over the last 10 to 15 years, again because that’s sort of within your remit, how that has 
impacted on the operational activities of NGBs, but obviously with the focus being on England 
Handball. I them want to get some insight into what strategies you’ve used to adapt to this 
changing operational environment. Then I want to look at the relationship you have with 
government, Sport England and UK Sport, which obviously you don’t get any funding from at 
the moment, but it would be good to get some feedback there. And then, because what we’re 
trying to do is also build on the level of contribution, because bearing in mind of what we 
spoke about in the car about the extra funding that you’ve got, whereas other governing 
bodies have perhaps received less funding, so we talked about there being a contribution 
there. So, it’s looking at where perhaps you might have influenced those decisions and 
whether or not you are looking towards influencing sport policy in some way. Is that alright. 
  DM: Yes, that’s alright. I’ll just put that in the context of the different sides of the equation, so I will 
talk England when its Sport England and funding, and British when its UK Sport funding. 
TH:  That’s fine. So, first of all, what do you think have been the key changes in the sporting 
landscape over the last 10 to 15 years?  
DM: I think obviously key for governing bodies, quite predominantly, has been the impact of 
Lottery funding. Twofold really, the increase and then the start of a bit of a decrease. Lottery 
funding first starting in the mid-late 90s, but more so over the last 10 to 15 years at a Sport 
England level through 2005 onwards, the focus on Lottery funding into governing bodies 
centric strategy from Sport England, to grow participation. Certainly from 2009-2013 that 
funding cycle, and 13-17, eight years of governing bodies really being at the heart of Sport 
England’s participation strategy. £450-460m for each of those two four-year cycles, so nearly 
a billion pounds of funding. I think in some respects perhaps inflated governing bodies, 
certainly bloated a few of them resource-wise. Getting an awful lot of funding in, maybe not in 
the right way to deliver what the outcomes were meant to be, because I think that’s where the 
change in this current cycle with a move away from participation to inactivity, governing 
bodies are suddenly saying, hold on we’re on the periphery now, the funding has suddenly 
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almost halved, but we still want to be the same size we were, as we weren’t really set up 
correctly. So, I think that reliance on public funding was just exposed in that respect. So, 
certainly the Lottery funding impact has been one. Another area I think has probably been the 
growing changes to local authority leisure funding, both in terms of provision and delivery, at a 
development level, but also in terms of facilities that so many governing bodies are reliant on. 
Whether its playing fields, whether its sports centres, whatever it might be, a majority of those 
have either been shut down, moved into private sector hands, so the vast changes in 
contracts of local LA services again has had positive and negative impacts. Negative, cost 
increase, perhaps more of a challenge to get hold of facilities, get access to facilities, and as 
an indoor sport, for us we’re fighting with several other sports all for the same space in the 
sports hall. But, also, I think the changes in the structure of the contracts mean that it’s just 
not all about profit, a lot of those organisations are now looking at development and are 
looking to work with governing bodies, so they do provide an alternative delivery arm if you 
like. I think the third area has also probably been, not so much 10 to 15 years, but the 
spotlight’s been on it for a while, but certainly in the last three or four years has been the 
increase in changing governance, and the increased focus on more appropriate governance, 
especially for governing bodies. The focus on reducing the impact of the ‘Blazer Brigade’, for 
want of a better phrase. People who feel they’ve been in the sport 50 years and therefore 
know how to run it. Organisations now, even an organisation our size, you know 15 staff, 
turnover of £800-900k per year, we’re a small business, and therefore we should be run and 
operated as a small business, not an old boys club. So, I think certainly the changes within 
the new governance code that governing bodies have to adhere to, again has highlighted that 
as a key part for governing bodies to address, a challenge for many, not just the small ones 
but the bigger ones as well. Again, has its positives and negatives, but I think roll that all 
together we’ve seen some tremendous changes over the last 10 to 15 years. A lot of them 
positive, I think figures can be spun any which way you want. There was certainly an increase 
in participation since 2012, which was the goal of that 2009 starting point, after the award of 
the 2012 Games. There certainly have been more people playing. Is it all down to governing 
bodies? Probably not, but I think the key bit now is to get governing bodies to work more in 
partnership with organisations. So, I think those areas, funding, facilities in local authority 
leisure operations and governance have probably been the three biggest impacts that we’ve 
seen.  
TH: What about health? 
DM: Well that’s probably been the biggest change now. I think there’s always been that in the 
background, but governing bodies have been so focused on developing their sports and 
growing their sports that looking at the health context side of thing has been a bit of a side 
issue. Don’t get me wrong, some governing bodies have been focused on that, but its just not 
been on their radar, then all of a sudden 2016 when we started the process for the 2017-21 
cycle, the government through Sport England has said, actually the focus is now on inactivity. 
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Getting people who are doing nothing to do something, rather than those who are doing a bit 
or quite a bit to do even more, and therefore that took a lot of governing bodies by surprise! A 
little bit. But certainly, out of their comfort zone in terms of their ability to target inactive 
people, and I think they have to take a look at themselves and be realistic and honest enough 
to go, and we did that from a handball point of view. People aren’t going get up off their sofa 
and suddenly start playing handball. The first thing they’re likely to do is go outside the front 
door and go for a walk, or get on a bike maybe, or go for a swim at a push. So there are only 
probably half a dozen governing bodies that can have a real good focus and impact on health 
at its very basic level of redeeming inactive people. I think there’s a lot of stuff governing 
bodies can do as you start to move through the health stuff. We’ve also tried to find ways we 
can focus on the fitness side of our sport, not just sports for sports sake. But it is a big change 
for governing bodies to have to deal with and recognise that they may not be best placed to 
deal with that.  
TH: What do you think, over the last 10 to 15 years, you have mentioned it, but just to elaborate a 
little bit more, has influenced the change? And who do you think have been the key 
influencers of change within the sporting landscape – the main policy actors in change?  
DM: First and foremost, go back 13-14 years to the award of the Games. That was a big public 
announcement not just for people in sport suddenly opened their eyes to. And that at an elite 
level opened the door to sports like handball that hadn’t previously been in the Olympics that 
knew all of a sudden that seven years down the line they’re guaranteed a place in an Olympic 
Games. At a grassroots level, Sport England quickly jumped on that band wagon through the 
government’s Department of Culture, Media and Sport. So, sports ministers at the time, 
Richard Caborn, people like that, were big influencers in getting more funding into sport to 
grasp the expected increase in interest, demand, focus on sport as a whole. Not just the 
Olympic sports, but all sport was going to benefit from that. So that was such a significant 
moment in time and with it government and influence at that level, and I think from the likes of 
Sport England, from some of the bigger governing bodies who had already been benefiting 
from Lottery funding, there was suddenly a move to see that budget exponentially grow, and it 
quickly became apparent that governing bodies were going to be a group of the major 
recipients of that. And that led to a lot of scrambling and jockeying for position to who could 
get a big slice of the pie. In the right way, it wasn’t necessarily a bun fight. Organisations like 
Sport England, like UK Sport, suddenly saw their coffers swell, but they were simply the 
funders, the distributors of the Lottery money. I think what we found was it was a bit 
haphazard in the first cycle, just get in out there and see what happens. 
TH: 2005 to 2009? 
DM: Yeah, and then I think the development of a more contracting basis, governing bodies being 
held to account for their funding. 
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TH: What influenced the decision to go for a NGB-centric strategy? 
DM: I think the feeling probably that governing bodies were an established group, established in 
the since of being around for a long time. They were already doing development stuff, should 
already have the links in place, oversaw the club structure, they oversaw the competition 
structure, they dealt with all the elite side of things, so it was a natural fit. It was a bit like 
where else could they have gone. Local authorities weren’t going to do it directly themselves, 
clubs as individual elements, some could some couldn’t, county sports partnerships was an 
evolving beast at that particular point in time, governing bodies I wouldn’t say were the only 
horse in the race, but were certainly at the forefront of saying we can do this, we’ve already 
been doing it, we can simply expand on what we are currently delivering. So, it was a natural 
fit. 
TH:  And do you think the link is also following winning the bid for London 2012?  
DM:  Yeah, because I think a big part of winning that bid, its word that obviously brings a variety of 
different thoughts to bear when people talk of legacy. The whole promise of the London 2012 
bid wasn’t necessarily just on those two sets of Games over a couple of months period, with a 
bit in between. It would be the lasting legacy, increases in people playing more sport, access 
for juniors and youngsters to more sport, and I think they had to deliver on that. So, they 
wanted something that was not going to take an age to set up and test and run, but could hit 
the ground at a very quick place. And governing bodies just fit that bill, certainly at a 
development level. They were going to be the obvious recipients of the elite level funding. I 
think the challenge perhaps was that people hadn’t realised was that the increase for some of 
them was so great, some of just weren’t ready for it. You know, and suddenly you had all this 
money and didn’t really know what to do with it, apart from spend it. And that doesn’t always 
work if you’re not understanding where you need to spend and why you need to spend it, and 
its not about the short-term but about the long-term, and I think handball was guilty of that and 
one of those thrown a big bundle of cash, told to get on with it, and had a great time for two 
and a bit years, and then it all fell down like a house of cards. And I think that’s one of the 
downsides of it. So, I think there’s a whole host of people that played an important part in 
influencing that policy, but it was certainly at a government level, and that’s very helpful 
because when its coming from that level you’ve not got to persuade people to open up the 
purse strings, they’re just looking for someone to give it to. 
TH: When you say a host of people, could you give me some examples who were perhaps more 
influential than others? 
DM: Jennie Price is just coming to the end of 11 years at Sport England. She came in at the back 
end of 2007 and has been extremely influential, and has had a huge impact on that policy. Liz 
Nicholl as well, and her predecessors at UK Sport. 
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TH: Did NGBs have any influence at that time, in terms of this NGB-centric focus or strategy, or 
was it just a case of Sport England, UK Sport saying we’ve got NGBs in place we’re going to 
go with them? Or at the time were NGBs saying we can help you out here? 
DM: I don’t know. Personally, I don’t think governing bodies were organised in that way. Knowing 
back then they were still very insular, inasmuch as they just focused on their sport. And I 
won’t necessarily say it was a dog fight with other governing bodies … 
TH:  So, were they still working in artificial silos? 
DM: To an extent, because it’s like we’ll keep hold of our members, and things like the Active 
People Survey perhaps almost encourage that, you know you’re responsible for your 
numbers, so I don’t want to share that. So, I don’t think they were organised enough to be 
influencing policy. I think they were the natural recipients once government decided we’ve got 
this pot of money, we’re going to utilise our nominated outlets, which for them was UK Sport 
and Sport England, over to you guys to decide how you’re going to best distribute that, so I 
think that’s when governing bodies thought ok there’s an opportunity but were still very much, 
I’m just on my sport. There wasn’t a lot of cross-fertilisation, so I wouldn’t necessarily say 
there was any one governing body that was championing the opportunity at that point in time. 
But very quickly, once they saw the money was there, they were all knocking down Sport 
England’s door. Sport England already had those partnerships and relationships in place, 
bearing in mind they obviously increased that with the award because there were a number of 
governing bodies, and handball was one of them, that they’d never worked with before. But 
they obviously wanted to focus on all the sports that were going to be covered by the 
Olympics, as well as non-Olympic sports. Let’s not forget that Sport England funded 46 
governing bodies, through 2009-13 cycle over that 2012 period, and more than half of those 
aren’t Olympic sports. 
TH: So, the move then away from the NGB focus to a more intense mixed economy – what 
influenced that decision? Was it to do with, as you mentioned loosely, has legacy been 
achieved or is it because it wasn’t happening quick enough, or have government just 
completely changed tact, and if so for what reason? 
DM: Probably all of the above. I think there does come a point where, and this is always perhaps, I 
personally and I know others don’t like the word legacy, because there are two ways of 
looking at it. If you took a definition from a dictionary, it’s sort of what’s left behind, you know 
we could be accused of being left behind. And from a practical point of view we had it as a 
strapline, delivering on the Olympic legacy. When I arrived it 2013, there was still the hum and 
the buzz, but as time went on, I always thought that someone’s going to tap me the should 
soon and go haven’t you done that yet. How long does it last? So, I think that there’s probably 
that natural move on from 2012. And we still talk about it, it’s still such an important point in 
time, but its six years ago and times change, and once you then got past Rio in 2016, you 
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could be talking about it as the last Olympic Games and we’re not far off Tokyo now, and so 
it’ll be two Olympic Games ago. So, I think there was a point when people went enough, 
enough about looking back, and basking in that glow and let’s move on. I think there was a 
perception that perhaps it hadn’t been as big a growth as they were expecting, and therefore 
they were flogging a horse that simply isn’t going to run that much further. But I think also, the 
changing face of public life, and the increased focus on obesity, health of the nation, whether 
that’s childhood obesity, adult obesity, diabetes or all those other health-related issues that 
started to gather a bit of pace. I think a certain amount of apathy, but quizzical looks from the 
public about governing bodies, you know I never benefitted from them, and you see all this 
culture issue etc. So again, I just think it was that natural point again that you’ve had eight 
years doing it, we need to go somewhere else, we need to address another issue that is 
affecting us as a nation, and that’s the whole country, not just perhaps the smaller but 
relatively important size of the population that are doing sport. So, I think those things coupled 
together, as soon as government decided that we need to be doing something about the 
inactive area of work, there was going to be a natural flow through to Sport England. And 
that’s where I think, unfortunately now, my words would be that Sport England is a misnomer. 
It’s no longer Sport England, its Physical Activity England.  
TH: That’s really interesting, and why it’s interesting is when we come to the next point. So, in all 
are you suggesting really that sport policy from day one has been government-driven.  
DM: I think at the onset, yes. I think what’s interesting is that as we went through that first cycle 
governing bodies started to get themselves a bit more organised, they were having to deal 
with contracts, they were having to deal with meeting targets, they were having to deal with 
the potential loss of funding if they didn’t hit those targets. It became more like okay I’m not 
just moving along the trough to the next hand-out, and someone puts a load of money in my 
hand and says right we’ll see you in four years. They were being monitored, they were being 
checked and challenged, they were being asked to show what return they were providing for 
that investment, and I think that changed the way in which governing bodies felt they needed 
to be perceived. That, it was less about look at all our competitions, look at all out leagues, 
look at all of our members, there was a wider view as to look at all the stuff we can deliver, 
and more and more the governing bodies started to get themselves organised. Certainly, at 
senior level, I think again one of the changes that was relatively recently, Sport England 
delivered a programme for participation development directors, people in that sphere who 
were doing that, UK Sport did it for performance directors, Sport and Recreation Alliance did 
one for Chairs of governing bodies. No-one did anything for the chief execs, the people who 
were actually running the organisation. No-one was really providing a forum where the senior 
executives dealing with the day to day operations of each of these governing bodies, could 
come together. So, we actually ended up setting it up for ourselves, the NGB CEO forum. So 
that, when you’re talking about influencing sports policy came about in terms of the Election in 
2015. Again, the feeling at that time was the comprehensive spending review was coming 
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along, a change in government policy and stuff like that, we needed to have a voice, we 
needed to show that we were more than just about development, more than just about 
participation. There was so much more that we did, you know, volunteering, and the vast 
number of people involved in volunteering in sport, which we know a lot of sport wouldn’t exist 
without volunteers. We actually had a bigger workforce in terms of man hours than the NHS. 
We had a bigger workforce in terms of people than the NHS. The membership of governing 
bodies was bigger than most or pretty much all of the political parties put together. So, we 
were quite a big entity, and the changes that we’d made in governance and operations and 
things like that, so we created the state of the nation, and developed that as a bit of a flag to 
wave, but also a document we could out in front of government and say look we do know 
what we’re doing. 
TH: Has that had any impact do you think? 
DM: I’d to think that it raised – it kept the profile of sport and therefore the profile of governing 
bodies high, at a time when it was potentially on the wane.  Has it influenced it to the point 
where we were before, arguably not. We’re not front and centre anymore. Has it ensured that 
we’ve at least maintained a seat at the table, yes, I think it probably has. We got Tracy 
Crouch to come to several of those meetings, we got Liz Nicholl to come those meetings. We 
got Jennie price to come to those meetings. Because they knew they could talk to two thirds 
of the governing bodies CEOs that they were funding in one room at one time. They’d never 
done that before, we did it ourselves.  
TH: The binding affect of the NGB CEO forum, what would you say that is? Do you have a 
particular shared-belief, shared values on what sport can do? 
DM: I think it provided a forum for us as chief execs to come together and work with our peers, 
share best practice, identify potential partnerships. So out of that came things like netball, 
cricket, and hockey working together. I wouldn’t say purely out of that, but I think it helped 
suddenly to get away from that previous we’re all working in silos to go, actually, we’re all 
trying to do the same thing so let’s pull together. 
TH: So, a sort of collective action then? 
 DM: Yeah, collective action, pooling resources, and recognising that when governance changes or 
anything comes around, someone somewhere has done some really good work, can we all 
benefit from it rather than all trying to do the same thing to reinvent the wheel, because there 
is only so many times you can do that. But I also think it provided a collective voice. Its held 
on since then, we’ve probably dropped back to around about 20-23 governing bodies. 
TH: There were 39? 
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DM: There were, yeah. There are still a lot that involved. You get a call to come to meetings. Some 
of the big ones we know were in it for that short period of time around the Election. But I think 
it was always going to fall back to a smaller group. 
TH: So, most of the larger NGBs are the ones that have pulled out? 
DM: Yeah, I mean football, rugby, cricket, tennis. 
TH: Did they provide any reason? 
DM: I think they’re just big enough to have their own voice. They’re big enough to influence 
government. You know, people talk about the big five, and they would meet the government 
on their own. 
TH: I suppose those 20 that are left, you have this collective voice. Does that have the potential to 
go to government and say, look as a collective with all these different sports, we can make a 
huge contribution? 
DM: And we have, and we continue to do that, because when government was looking at its own 
strategy, came and presented that in its draft format to the CEO forum, to allow us to 
feedback back on it. It’s always a challenge to try a provide a collective response across 20-
25-28 governing bodies, but we were very clear to focus on stuff we could do as a united 
force and that was our place in the structure, if you like. 
TH:  So, thinking about that contribution, thinking about sport policy, my question is that you have 
sport policy, you have education policy, you have health policy, you have crime policy and so 
on and so forth. Do you think sport purely sits within sport policy, or do you think that it is 
involved within a number of different policy domains? 
DM: I think it has the potential to sit across a  variety of areas. I think the challenge is sometimes 
the public’s perception that sport is about competing. Sport means being part of a club, 
playing in a league or competition, you know that’s what sport is, because it’s what they see 
on the TV. Once you start putting it into how could it help health, then that’s physical activity. 
Somebody still may be doing a sport, but do they recognise themselves as doing sport or just 
actually getting out of breath? But there’s no doubt that it feeds into that, and I think a lot of 
some of those other agencies, when you talk about things like crime policy. Police recognise 
that if they want to engage with a load of disenfranchised youths, one of the best ways to do it 
is through sport. You know, that might be what they’re doing in an anti-social environment in 
an anti-social way, but put it into a more sociable context and actually you might be able to 
engage with them. In a similar, but slightly unconnected way in terms of social policy and 
dealing with certainly the increase in minority ethnic groups. Again, what might float their boat 
might could well be sport. Again, in our context, as a sport its huge in Europe. We know if 
you’ve got a Polish community, for example, and you want to try and engage with them, or get 
them doing something active, handball might be up there, because they would’ve come from 
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a nation that plays a lot of handball. They won’t play cricket. They won’t play rugby league. 
They’ll play football, of course. They’ll play netball. But actually, both the men and women will 
play handball.  So, it’s got a chance to impact there within local communities. Education, it’s a 
key driver. At the end of the day you’ve got premium funding into primary schools, and the 
fact that its ring-fenced money now to deliver sport. It never has been in the past. An increase 
in the sugar tax. Again, what role can governing bodies play in that and link with schools, 
colleges, universities? So, I think there’s very few policy areas that sport, and you’ve got to 
put that in its widest possible context, physical activity, doesn’t potentially have the 
opportunity to have an impact on. But I think the key is recognising, and this is the key thing 
for governing bodies, and it’s certainly the way that we’ve operated and worked. That doesn’t 
always necessarily mean it’s going to be the governing body that does it. I’ve always stated 
that, undoubtedly, in our own sport and in many other sports, there will be people who are 
better placed to deliver our sport than us. We shouldn’t try and do it all. We don’t need to do it 
all, and that’s the whole point of trying to utilise funding that we have, at whatever level, and 
as it decreases, even more importantly, not to try and double up. A classic example would be 
a sport that’s got some big clubs. Let’s take a sport like basketball, they’ve got some big clubs 
across the country, certainly in terms of the BBL, who have fantastic community programmes. 
I would always say to the governing body, and did say to the governing body, why would you 
put a county officer with more money into an area where a club is already doing a huge 
programme. Why not take a smaller investment, and invest it in the club? They could them be 
part of your delivery network and do it for you. You’ll get a bigger return and you won’t 
confuse the market place, and that’s sometimes a challenge and has been a challenge in the 
past for governing bodies not to necessarily recognise but to feel like I’m almost ready to let 
go. So, I think that’s where we can be the drivers of the bus, we don’t have to provide all the 
passengers as well. We can help to work with all these different people, and say right well 
look here’s some training for your staff or here’s a product that you can use, or actually you’re 
already going into that environment for us and would you like to take handball, from our point 
of view, with you. Because I’d rather somebody at the end receives the opportunity to play 
handball, than worry about it having to be delivered by us. If one of our partners is delivering it 
then somebody somewhere is playing handball, then I’m happy.   
TH: With that thought, that sport, so let’s take handball. Handball has the potential to cross the 
boundaries of different policy domains. Also, with regard to the compliance nature, contractual 
nature of working with Sport England and government. What sort of institution do you think 
England Handball is, as an example, is the perception now maybe among those small to mid-
sized NGBs, to consider themselves as a membership organisation, a social institution, a 
contractor to government. Where do you see yourself now? 
DM: Governing bodies will always be a membership organisation, and that’s one of the challenges 
in the new world, in that those members are often always die hards of that sport, and 
therefore their only view, their only thought, their only concern is for the success of that sport, 
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and the fact that the governing body is there to work for them. So, they get slightly peeved 
when they see the governing body going off and dealing with health or dealing in other areas, 
or all this governance stuff that they have to do. What’s that got to do with my sport? Because 
rightly or wrongly, they don’t see that as the point of a governing body. We on the other hand 
have to be adaptable, we have to recognise that if we’re going to take Sport England’s 
money, we’re going to have to dance to whatever tune they want us to or whatever tune they 
are playing, and it that means we have to meet certain governance criteria to get the money, 
then we’re going to do that. The key bit for governing bodies is explaining that to them. So, we 
will always be membership, we’ll always be there to govern the sport, and that’s what we see 
in the CEO forum. We are the ombudsman of our sports individually, but also collectively. So, 
we govern the rules and regulations, we provide the competition frameworks, we always see 
that as being the central role of governing bodies. But actually, if we want to develop and we 
want to grow, and therefore we need other sources of revenue, in a world where the 
commercial side of things is locked up by maybe half a dozen of the big governing bodies, 
certainly at that top end, then if there are opportunities to get other sources of funding from 
health routes, through social enterprise routes, wherever else it might be. Education, then 
we’ve got to try and see how we can make use of those to ensure that we can maintain the 
overall service to our members. So, I think that’s also changed the nature of the personnel 
that work within governing bodies, and the personnel that work in organisations like Sport 
England and UK Sport. It’s become a bit more of a broader, okay we need to look for people 
not just from a sports background, but from a commercial background, from a finance 
background, from a governance background that can bring skills from other sectors, so that 
we can continue to develop. 
TH: How has this affected relationships with members, as you’ve moved the governing body 
forward? 
DM: I think for us, it’s been a lot easier for us than some of our other counterpart governing bodies, 
because I always describe us as a bit of a snotty nosed teenager, compared to a grandfather 
time that is the FA or the ECB, you know organisations that have been around for a long time. 
Very, very strong structures, well-established structures. Structures that arguably have 
struggled in the governance world, because they’ve been so embedded. We don’t and didn’t 
have county structures, or regional structures. Our board wasn’t bloated, we had a mix 
already of independent and elected members. So, all be it as a small organisation, our world 
was much smaller and so allowed voices in membership to be perhaps sometimes closer to 
the centre, than they would be in a football or a rugby, where the dissenting voices and 
agitations as in all sports, some of those would be sept up my county organisations. Actually, 
when it comes to the decision-making side of things, and that’s my things always been on the 
governance side, governing bodies have paid, it’s the wrong word to use but I’ll use it anyway, 
have paid for the sins of two. The focus back in the late-90s, early-2000s certainly gathered 
pace in the FA and the way that was governed, and the RFU and the way that was governed. 
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Big high profile reviews of both sports led, undoubtedly, to the sport governance policy that 
was brought in, and then suddenly everybody had to meet it. And the thing there I think, and 
the biggest thing that we’ve had to demonstrate to our members, is just because we bring four 
or five people onto the board who it might be perceived don’t have a handball background, 
doesn’t mean they haven’t got something to offer. The fact that you’ve got this diverse mix of 
skills, knowledge and experience, and you’ve got the handball knowledge, and we can call on 
the handball knowledge from our members. But if we’ve got people on there that have got a 
legal background, finance background, performance sports background, again not just in 
handball, commercial background, marketing. It means we’ve got a mix of people around the 
table that can add to what we do. So, I think it’s just trying to get over that hurdle with 
members where they feel that the sport is being taken away from them. They’re losing control, 
because the people governing the sport don’t bleed handball. If you cut them open, they won’t 
bleed handball, that sort of feeling. 
TH: Do you think that Sport England, UK Sport, have shaped the NGB to a larger extent? 
DM: There’s no doubt that the work that they’ve done over this last 8-10 year period, and the 
governance stuff and the latter stages of that, has undoubtedly changed the way that 
governing bodies operate. The use of data and insight, for governing bodies you sign up as a 
member, you sign up as a member! They didn’t need to know your background, your 
interests, what you wanted. You were a member, because you loved the sport and that’s all 
we needed to know. Now we want to know how do you want the sport, where do you want it, 
your preferences for competitive sport or informal sport. So even in areas like data and 
insight, which were alien words to governing bodies. If like eight years ago you said to a 
governing body, in six or seven years’ time you’ll have a head of insight or a data analyst, 
they would look at you and laugh. But more and more governing bodies have got that, 
certainly the bigger governing bodies, because they recognise that they’re in a competitive 
market vying for people’s time and social money if you like. After paying all the bills, do I go to 
the cinema, do I go out for me, or do I play a sport. Which is going to give me the best value 
on my investment? So now all of a sudden governing bodies have to recognise that, so 
there’s no doubt that the policies and the programmes and the approach and strategy, more 
Sport England and less so UK Sport, they have done to a degree, has brought about the 
changing shape of governing bodies.   
TH: In that respect though, in terms of, as you mentioned insight and data analysis, what 
membership structure do you have? 
DM: We don’t have individual members, clubs join and then they will register their players. So, 
players don’t register as individuals, they register through the club, but the club does it so that 
our focus is on each of the individual clubs, but they might have a number of teams, a number 
of members. Some clubs might have 150-160 members, all of which are registered with us, 
but the club registers them through our portal. 
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TH: So, the club registers them individually, so you still have an idea of individual details? 
DM:   Yep, and we have the growing focus on that, again a policy that’s just come in the last four 
months with GDPR, the management and holding of that data and what we use it for. We’re 
also very careful now about what we ask for within privacy policies. We can give you a list of 
all of our members, but most of those members haven’t paid us direct, it would be the clubs 
that have made a payment. With the last count have about just over 3,500 members. We 
know that’s not the entire number that play handball. There are a whole host of people that 
play handball that don’t register. Recreationally, whether that’s within the clubs, we have 
emerging clubs that aren’t playing in our leagues and competitions, but you know, the biggest 
growth area we’ve seen has been in our schools competition. Schools don’t rush to deal with 
us yet, that’s an area we’re looking at, but our national schools competition that we run every 
year for year 8 and year 10, so under 13 and under 15 had 25 teams in it two years before the 
Olympics in 2012. This year, just gone, we had over 1500, so tremendous growth over that 
period of time, but we don’t know the names of all those kids playing at that level. 
TH: Has there been any discussion with YST about getting into the UK School Games?  
DM: Yep, yep, and there’s two different levels, there’s the school games and then there’s the 
national school games. So, up till about four years ago, we ran the whole competition from 
start to finish, at local level right through. We got to the point where we had about 250 teams 
in it, but it was killing us. We didn’t have the structure to organise a local level competition or 
local rounds like that, have all the contacts from a central, national point of view. So, I looked 
around at the time and thought, again, what structure exists that we could link in with, school 
games organisers. So, they went through the whole change when Gove took the money out 
from under their feet, but essentially that infrastructure and those relationships were already 
there, we simply gave them the model we wanted them to deliver, and overnight, and 
overnight for us being one year, we went from 250 teams to over 900, just by giving it to the 
School games organisers. It actually took less resource out of us as an organisation than it 
did had done previously, so we’ve benefited from that and that’s really helped that growth. We 
pick it up now at a regional level, so we have eight regions, so once we get to the county 
winners, then we want to know who they are, and we run it at that point. We’ve made 
submissions to get into the national schools games, but funnily enough, the decisions then 
are, you have the likes of Sport England and UK Sport in that decision-making, suddenly the 
no compromise perspective of UK Sport rears its head, and we didn’t get in because we’re 
not a medal potential sport. What the heck as that got to do with school games? That’s my 
question. Why should that stop a sport like handball that has seen such a growth in schools 
be prevented from having a seat at the national school games finals. Lovely presentation, 
lovely ideas you’ve got, but you’re not a medal sport. 
TH: I know you’ve already spoken about this a little, but I want to look at how sport policy has 
impacted on England Handball and the strategies that you’ve used to adapt to those changes. 
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Does that make sense? Within the research having gone through all the policies, I’ve come 
through with six themes that I’m focusing on. One is governance, one is funding, capacity 
building, participation, so community/grassroots level, elite performance but at the talent 
development and pathway level, and partnership-working. I know it might be a little repetitive, 
but if just start with governance. So, as we’ve gone through policy, we know that governance 
has had an impact on NGBs. So, what has the impact been and what strategies have you 
used adapt to those changes? 
DM: I think governance is, I want to say a relatively simple one. The fact that we’ve got a code of 
governance that you can look at and read, and perfectly understand, at least gives you the 
framework, the context, and expectations of what you will have to put in place. It helps when it 
comes to deciding, well identify what we need to do and then what you have to do about it. As 
a governing body, we didn’t struggle to much with that, because we didn’t have to make too 
many changes to structure, as it were. We needed to change our articles in certain ways, but 
not massively. We had to put together discussion papers with members to explain to them 
why we were having to do it, and why the changes were being put in place. We didn’t have to 
suddenly kick out a load of elected directors to make way for independently appointed 
directors. All we did need to do was to find a way of encouraging people to come forward. So, 
broadening our horizons in terms of where we sought those people from, and where we 
advertised, highlighting the benefits of being part of a smaller governing body, perhaps being 
able to make more of an impact than you could in a bigger governing body. But there we were 
very much led by, unless you’ve got things in place by this date, you risked your funding being 
turned off. So that allowed us to put an action plan in place, every governing body had to put 
an action plan in place, that allowed us to put an operational plan, so okay how are we going 
to deliver that, some of that was the practical, so right we need to change our articles in these 
areas, it’s got to be done by this date, which would mean an AGM, because it’s got to be 
voted on by members. Easy, let’s work that out within that timeline. Right, we’ve now got to 
look at ways of increasing our skills, knowledge and experience of our directors. Okay, where 
do we go for that, we don’t just advertise through our membership, we’ve got to go further 
afield. I’m broadly comfortable with a lot of the stuff that governance code for sport has 
brought. There’s just a couple of areas that have always struck me as being slightly in conflict 
with each other. One is they want us to be skills and knowledge based, experienced based, 
so they want directors to have, you know, what skills, knowledge and experience are you 
bringing to the table, whether that’s sport or other. Married against you’ve got to have this 
diversity in terms of gender and minority ethnic representation, which I get don’t get me 
wrong. The struggle comes when you’re at a point where you don’t quite meet the gender bit, 
but you want to find the most skills, knowledge and experience that you can, and if they all 
come along and don’t fit into the minority ethnic or gender that you require, how do you 
reconcile the two. If I’ve got a Board that’s got 10 people on it, and I need to get three of those 
to be female, and there’s only two, and a space becomes available and I put it out there, and 
the most skilled, knowledgeable and experienced are all male, what do I do? We’re very 
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fortunate that we go to women on boards, we go to sporting equals, and opportunities that 
allow us to reach into those areas, and have been very vocal in doing that, to the extent that I 
think we are one of the first mixed gender sports where our board has more female directors 
than male. 10 members on our board and six of them are female, and we’ve not done that 
through anything else other than trying to find the best people for the job. Governing bodies 
have still got to maintain that broader outlook, and our strategy to governance has been in 
finding ways and ensuring that we are reaching the widest possible audience, and recruiting 
in a smart way. 
TH:  So, in terms of funding and your financial resources? 
DM: Undoubtedly, the biggest challenge that governing bodies have faced, but all governing 
bodies, even the big ones. But, certainly more so medium size and downwards. And this is 
one of the things I struggled with from a Sport England perspective, not when I was there, but 
when it sort of came to the 2017-21 bit. They sort of put all 46 governing bodies in the same 
box, and said right, you lot will all become more commercial, more commercially sensitive, 
more cost effective, more efficiently in the way you run the business, look for other sources of 
revenue. Almost finger wagging, and you’ve everybody in that box from the football 
association to boccia, and it doesn’t work like that. The FA, arguably, doesn’t need Sport 
England’s money. If it came down to it and Sport England took their money away, yeah, 
they’d look a little bit different, but they wouldn’t fall over at the first hurdle, and their ability to 
generate other sources of revenue is huge. Boccia, but the let’s say ourselves, that ability is 
minimal. Minimal to the extent that we don’t have the media profile, we don’t have the 
numbers, the volume, that would be attractive to a bigger investor, and also the fact that the 
sports sponsorship landscape has changed. Suddenly, there aren’t all these people saying 
I’ve got all this money to give away, here you are here’s £100k, do what you like with it. So, 
our ability to generate other sources of income, is minimal. So, we have to be very careful 
about how we utilise the funding that we’ve got, and Sport England’s been very clear that it 
wants to be investing less in back office. We need to make representations to say that’s fine, 
but if you still want us to be the governors of the sport, the overseers of the rules and 
regulation, the deliverers of a certain element of the core market stuff, which is where we see 
ourselves, we need to have an office structure to do that. We all have our membership fees 
that we can generate, we have our coaching course income we can generate, but again when 
someone just comes along and says why don’t you just increase your membership fees, put 
an extra £15-20 on membership fees, and generate loads. No, it might just bring me less 
members. We’re already an expensive sport. If I suddenly say to people, you know your 
membership fees were £20 per year, there now £40 per year, not only might they go stuff 
that, they’re also more likely to start going what do I get for that, and there’s only so many 
times you can say to them well you get insurance. So, I think again, that’s where we’ve had to 
look for what other funding can we bring in, what other areas, it might still be public-related 
funding, we’ll come onto this on the elite side things, but what other sources of revenue are 
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there. We get grants from the European Federation, we get grants from the International 
Federation, but also how, if we got some of our Sport England money, how could we invest 
that with a partner that’s prepared to invest some as well, and double that investment. So, if 
we put £2-3k into a programme, and somebody else put the same in, then suddenly you’ve 
got a £4-6K programme. How can we make that work harder? I made a conscious decision 
that as we came into this funding cycle, and again we haven’t shouted overly loudly about it, 
even if we got more money, I would make us a smaller organisation. Because most governing 
bodies will have a level of development staff, the big ones will have county offices in every 
single county. I knew we weren’t going to get the funding for that, that was fairly obvious. 
Sport England was pulling away from that, so I needed people who were going to deliver 
partnerships, they were going to help us to work with other people. Find those who were 
already delivering on the ground and saying right can you take handball around for us. So, I 
had the unenviable decision, even as small as we were, of getting our award announced on a 
Friday, February last year, and four days later putting 10 out of 19 staff at risk of redundancy. 
They already knew about it, they knew the change was coming, we’d been very clear upfront, 
regardless of what we got. Less was obviously going to be an interesting conversation, but 
even if we got more, because I wanted more full time staff. So, our head count went down 
and that then meant we had to work in partnership with other people. We had to work more 
with our clubs and stuff like that. How can we help them, the clubs, to identify more local pots 
of funding that they can get hold of better than we can, we simply provide the kudos, the 
recommendation if you like, the validation of what they’re doing. So, Sport England come to 
us and say how can you run more efficiently as a business – I said well you tell me, because 
at the moment my back office costs me £7k per year. I outsource IT, I outsource HR, I 
outsource finance, I outsource payroll, I’ve got one printer in the office, so bulk procuring 
paper is not going to bring me a huge saving every year. Where I think they were looking for 
people to be able to say, you know, we’ve saved tens of thousands in their back office 
function, which meant they didn’t have to ask for it from Sport England. If I saved £1k in that 
regard, I’m doing well. Its not going to be earth shattering, so I don’t think I can be any leaner. 
So, the whole sort of shared services bit, I’m yet to see the benefit of that, not because I don’t 
think there will be benefits, simply because there’s not a lot it can give me at the moment. 
TH: So, are you saying then that, irrespective of the amount of funding that you get from Sport 
England, as you said there is a lot of reliance on Sport England funding at the moment. 
What’s that ratio at the moment? 
DM: Ours is just, just over 50%, which is not bad. 
TH: What sort of level are you hoping to get down to? 
DM: I think if we can get down to between 40 and 50. I think for governing bodies our size and 
structure, there’s always going to be a need for a certain level of funding to deliver a certain 
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level of operation, So, if that funding isn’t there, we’re going to have to cut accordingly, but 
recognise we’ll go back to where we were pre-2005.  
TH: Even if it was 30% of your funding, you’re still being shaped by Sport England; in terms of you 
need to make more efficiencies, even just to get 30%.  
 DM: Without a doubt. Some of us had to do financial sustainability plans, initially they were all 
predicated on how much sponsorship you get, but you can’t build a financial sustainability 
plan on sponsorship. It’s just an unknown quantity that could go at any point in time. 
TH: So, they still have a huge influence over you then. 
DM: Without a doubt.  
TH: Its really interesting that in table tennis, as an example, just from their annual accounts, Sport 
England as a significant party who influence not only their financial but operational activities. 
So, in effect their sort of like an extension to Sport England. Is that how you see yourself at 
all. 
DM: Yes, to a degree. They are a partner. I guess it’s how you view them – do you view them as a 
silent partner, do you view them as an aggressive partner, do you view them as a partner who 
provides investment into your business, and therefore you’ve got to satisfy their particular 
needs and wishes.  
TH: Which one of those do you view them as? 
DM: I’ll probably choose the latter. At the end of the day if they didn’t invest in our organisation, we 
would look different as an organisation, but I wouldn’t have to satisfy their needs. I’ve chosen, 
we’ve chosen to take their money, so they don’t figuratively or literally have a seat at the 
table, but they have an interest and therefore, the fact that they are putting that money in they 
want to know what they are getting back. And if they don’t feel they’re getting back what they 
think they should be, then like any investor, whether its public sector or private sector, it would 
happen in the private sector certainly, they would withdraw that investment. So, I have to 
meet their requirements, I have to answer their questions, I have to provide the information 
that enables me to show them that, yes, we are doing what we said we would do, and we’ve 
put our plan together and our bid to you for that funding, then we’re actually doing it. That 
takes a bit of time, and arguably time that’s taken away from the day to day stuff on the sport. 
That’s the world we live in. 
TH: OK, so capacity building, particularly workforce development and facilities. 
DM: I mean workforce, again key for us has not been growing our own workforce, our own directly 
employed workforce, its been about how can we facilitate the development of others, who can 
they feel comfortable and competent to then deliver the sport on our behalf. Certainly, where 
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you are talking about grassroots development. So, are there agencies out there that are 
already delivering sport in schools, for example, that by training their workforce we can give 
them the tools to be able to go and deliver handball, as part of that offer. It’s not the only thing 
that as part of that offer. Creating a small-sized version of the game, this crosses over into the 
facilities bit, a small-sided version that you could play on a netball court, with pop-up goals, 
because it fits into the environment of schools, who have very small facilities, at primary level 
most of it will be outdoors, but a lot of those primary schools will have a netball court marked 
out on their playground. So, our focus very much has been on the two strategies I produced 
over my time with bidding and handball, partnerships … the second …Within that how can we 
train the workforce in those partners to understand, be competent, confident and deliver the 
sport the way we’re asking them to do.     
 Facilities is a huge challenge, issue for us, because we need the biggest indoor court of any 
indoor sport, we’re similar to futsal and indoor hockey, but we don’t match Sport England’s off 
the shelf four badminton court sports hall. I always say I never knew when badminton courts 
became a unit of measurement. It’s a historical thing, to the extent that their own active places 
website, where you can put in your requirements in terms of metres, length and width, and it 
will throughout badminton courts. So, we need a sports hall that’s 40m long by 24 wide, as a 
minimum really, to put a 20 by 40 court in and have 2m run off. So, I put that in and out 
comes all these facilities that have 10 badminton courts, 12 badminton courts, or in the case 
of Wycombe’s badminton centre, 15 badminton courts. Fantastic, until you realise that 
Wycombe’s badminton courts are all in one long line, and you could never put a handball 
court in there. But at the same time, with all the things we’ve talked about with local 
authorities closing facilities, the rising cost of access, Sport England’s pushed to try and 
unlock more of the educational sites, because I’m pretty certain the figure we always used to 
trumpet was that 75% of sports halls in this country, are on education sites, whether that’s 
schools, colleges or universities. A lot of them will get locked at 3.00, 3.30 or 4.00. That’s it, 
won’t be open at the weekends, standing empty. Facilities that indoor sports could use. 
TH: Has there been any impact in that direction? 
DM: I’ve seen a growth of small businesses working on school sport lettings. They’ve actually 
gone to schools and said right, we’ll manage your facilities outside of school hours, not just for 
sport but for other lettings. So, you as a school can make more money from it, but you’re not 
having to deal with the operation of it. I think there is a company called school sport lettings, 
and they’ve got a number of schools on their books that if you want to place a booking, and 
go through them outside of school time and use it. 
TH: Have you had any discussions with them? 
DM     Yeah, we have, we have. Our challenge is still the size. Ours is unfortunately, where size does 
matter. So, we could have taken two routes. We could have just sat around and be moaning 
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that we’re not in France or Holland or Spain, where on most street corners there’s a full-size 
handball court. Where the structure of community sport is more through the sports club, than 
it is through the school. Or we can say that nobody’s going to build us 40 halls overnight, let’s 
try and unlock the ones that do exist and see if we can put handball lines down. Let’s cut our 
cloth accordingly and say okay we might have to bring the width or the length that we’re 
prepared to play on down. We can usually find the width, but we can’t match it with the length. 
We won’t scrimp on the width, but we can bring the length down a bit to a slightly smaller 
court, 34m in our top league. Let’s adapt, let’s do a different version, because if we were to 
say to people you’ve got to deliver this wherever you are on a 40 by 20 court, it would never 
go anywhere at all. But we can do the jumpers for goalposts like football can do, so we create 
a small-sided version, 5-a-side that you can play on a netball court. Mixed gender so you can 
take the contact out, so it’s our version of tag rugby. So, for schools, especially, a great 
version to do. We even got a partnership with a company that makes pop up goals. And what 
we’ve tried to do, through Sport England and others, is when new developments or 
refurbishments take place, can you bear us in mind. We’re not the football foundation, we 
don’t have the money to invest and influence you to build your hall bigger or to encourage you 
to put the lines down. We’ve got to ride on the coattails of others and hope that one of the 
outcomes will be that we get some access. 
TH: I’m assuming the glue is still a problem. 
DM: Always. Again, because it’s a historical thing within the sport. If it was predominantly a British 
based sport, and you said there’s no glue, we wouldn’t know anything different, but a lot of 
people that play it have grown up with using glue. Facility operators over here hate it because 
they’re forever cleaning the floors. I get it, and also when people are moaning about the cost 
of hiring halls, more often than not they’re not only having to pay for the hire cost for the 
actual game, but have to pay a little bit extra higher cost for the cleaning that has to take 
place after the game, as the facility then can’t use the hall. 
TH: You’ve spoken quite a bit there about participation anyway. But I suppose one of the 
questions would be, you’ve got your traditional sport, and having spoken to Janet the other 
day, she mentioned a similar thing to you about changing the format, different formats, but the 
impact or discussions on having 6 people on a court playing a game, handball 7 people on a 
court playing the game, and your changing that sport. 
DM: It’s not handball anymore.  
TH: So, it’s not handball anymore. Has that created tensions with members? 
DM: Oh, without a doubt, and I think again how focused is the core market, that’s what we are 
funded for now in Sport England speak, and by that core market is the people that play the 
sport regularly, and maintaining their involvement. So, as I said, where a very cosmopolitan 
sport, 60 different nationalities, more than 60 different nationalities play our sport in this 
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country and are members of our organisation. So, when you say to them, we’ve got this 
version you can play on a smaller court, they say that’s not handball. No, but it’s a way in 
which we can introduce people to the sport that we couldn’t otherwise do. The clubs are our 
key focus, so we’re trying to work with them, to make them more sustainable. And I present 
this picture. We have clubs and we have teams. A team can be just a group of guys or girls 
that happen to be very good at handball, but are not in the least bit worried about having a 
committee, having a development programme, having juniors, having a male team if they’re 
female or a female if they male. They just want to play their sport, and when it comes to 
delivery or development - no, as long as I can play my game on Saturday or Sunday, that’s it. 
And if half a dozen of those leave the team folds. So that’s a team. Then you have a club, that 
club might still only be one team, but its perhaps got a bigger outlook, or more often than not 
you are getting those that are starting to become … if you spoke to a British national and 
asked what a club looks like, he’ll say it’s got male and female teams, juniors, age ranges, it 
might even have a disability team, or you’ll have recreational members as well real ones, it’ll 
have a committee. We’re starting to see more of those come. And again, there is that push 
and pull as we’re trying to encourage our clubs to become more sustainable, because if they 
become more sustainable, then they can deliver more on our behalf. They can be the ones 
that going into schools, they can be the ones that provide the outlet for people that might be 
playing in those environments to come and play more formally. But you having to put on them 
things like safeguarding, governance, financial standing, and the governance code goes down 
to that level as well, and they don’t get it. If you want to access Sport England funding, you’ve 
got to be set up in a certain way. Safeguarding, it’s a terrible thing to say, but there are 
obviously still some countries where safeguarding and the welfare of kids in sport is not as 
high on the agenda as it is over here. So, when we saying people have got to go and do a 
safeguarding qualification, … [not clear] …, they say I know how to coach kids. Even if the ir 
way of coaching kids is not the way we expect kids to be coached. So, encouraging them to 
do so is a challenge, and the only way is to say you do what you do but you can’t do it with 
us. You won’t be able to access any funding. We’ve had some people walk away … There 
are some people within our membership who feel purely that the governing body should just 
be giving them money to function, literally to the extent of giving them money so that they can 
put petrol in the van, so they can take the team to the game. That’s the governing body’s role, 
and we just have to say no that’s not what we’re there for, and if you think that it is then you’re 
in the wrong sport and you’re in the wrong environment, because they may have been used 
to state handouts in the past.     
TH: Talent development and the player pathway then? 
DM: We’ve seen, and again I think this is a result of the work that we’ve done on the development 
side enticing schools and encouraging clubs to develop junior sections. In our Premier league 
they have to have junior teams competing in our junior league. Consequently, there are more 
youngsters playing. Therefore, we are identifying more talent, or potentially talented 
341 
 
youngsters. Our regional academy structure has grown over the five years I’ve been here. We 
started with two regional academies, we now have five. We have 16 boys and 16 girls in each 
of those, so 160 players. Very early on in our life, and I mean that in the short lifespan that 
we’ve been here and got involved in the AASE programme, the Advanced Apprenticeship for 
Sporting of Excellence, to give us and AASE more funding, would be another level, because 
its above the regional academies to keep that group together, and we have 80 young players 
on that programme. So, 40 new ones coming in each year out of the regional academy 
structure. So, we’ve been able to see that talent pathway grow, and we have squads going 
away not as England teams, we call them futures, but in competitions, they’re not sanctioned, 
they’re not EHF competitions. They might be the generations cup, so a handball event in 
Denmark. Another group went to the Paris world games, so they get an opportunity to play at 
a higher level in their age groups. So, we’ve seen that grow and what we’ve also maintained, 
and had to maintain even though we’ve seen an increase in our talent pathway funding from 
Sport England in this funding cycle. We’ve maintained and are looking to grow the AASE 
programme, which is changing now and looking to become a diploma in sporting excellence 
from September. We have still maintained a high level of self-funding, so even within our 
regional academy structures, the parents are paying an amount of money each year for their 
children to be part of that programme. We have to, there’s no other way of doing it, because 
they’re going to have to get use to that when they go into the British pathway, where it’s all 
self-funded because there is no funding from an outside agency. As a challenge there then 
when we talk about maintaining that talent pathway development, is the fact that because we 
are now running at a British level, 5 squads, men’s and women’s seniors and three aged 
squads, under 18, under 20 and under 21. But fairly recently there was nothing happening, 
and when you’re in primary schools talking to the kids and saying you have a chance to play 
in the England set-up, to them that’s fantastic because to them under 16 is ancient, but for 16 
year olds they go so where’s the outlet, why am I bothering doing this if I don’t get the chance 
to play for Great Britain or I might not the chance to go to an Olympics. So, very very difficult 
to maintain that pathway development solution, because some of them can’t see an outlet, 
can’t see a route through to possibly representing their country.  
TH:  Ok, so partnership-working. Again, the impact that policy, the emphasis on partnership- 
working, and those strategies?   
 DM: I think it’s a natural evolution. I’ve always been a partnership person. There is no government 
policy promoting partnerships directly, there’s an encouragement on it, but you know actually 
it’s just a natural way of working.  
TH: But most of the, if not all of the policy documents have strongly emphasised the need for 
working in partnerships.  
DM: But there’s nothing in there that says that you must ,and different to a governance policy, 
where the governance policy says you’ve got to meet, but I’m saying that on the basis that if a 
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governing body wants to survive long-term, it has to be prepared to open its doors, open its 
eyes, and open its arms to working with other people, because you can’t do it all. We’ve 
always said, we can’t do it all because of the size that we are, we don’t need to do it all, we 
actually don’t want to do it all. Ours has not been forced by government policy, it’s actually 
been supported by government policy. We’ve welcomed it. The strategies documents that I’ve 
produced have always been written on the basis of being able to give to other people a way in 
which they can very quickly understand what it is we do, and then identify how that might be 
able to work with us. I’m not saying this is everything that we do, but this is what we would like 
to do, how can you help us. Again, we’re not saying to you as a partner you have to do it all. 
That are certain elements you can do, whether its delivering help to our talent pathway, or 
delivering the schools competition, or work in a certain area for us for the development stuff, 
we want to hear from you, and we want to work with you.  
TH: I understand exactly what you’re saying, but in terms of the partners that you work with, is that 
purely based on what you can do for each other, or is there a higher element to that, for 
example, I know you do a lot of work with StreetGames. Do you work with StreetGames 
within a symbiotic relationship? 
DM: Yeah, yeah, yeah, without a doubt. 
TH:  But also do you work with them because you also believe in what they are doing? What 
makes that good fit?  
DM: I don’t think we would work with anybody that we didn’t feel represented what  would want to 
see within sport at various different levels. Yes, we have a long-term relationship with 
StreetGames. With the fantastic work they do, what do we add, another string to their bow, 
another sport they can offer that might be attracted to a particular demographic of youngsters 
they’re working with, within their areas of focus. What do they offer to us, and outlet, they offer 
the reach that we can’t, because they’re already out there delivering it. Why would we want to 
try and replicate that, there’s no point. So, they offer us an extension to our delivery arm. But 
fundamentally, sitting above that we believe in the power of sport. We talked a while ago 
about sports ability to do more than just be about sport, and that element of engaging with 
hard to reach groups, disenfranchised youths, people that maybe don’t get access to sport 
because they can’t afford to travel, they get it on their doorstep. Why would we not want to be 
part of that.  
TH: Do you think that’s what binds everything together, Sport England, government, NGBs, 
StreetGames? 
DM: People would love to think that’s in there. Am I naïve or old-school enough to think its in there 
somewhere. There are always those bits where they say I’m going to work with you because 
you’ll make me more money, I want to work with you because you can raise my profile. But I’ll 
still like to think there are enough principles within it that people would feel, right I’m going to 
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work with you because you represent how we want to be represented. I want to work with you 
because I agree with your objectives, I agree with your aims. But also the audience that you 
are working with are the audience that we want to work with. So, if you’ve already got traction 
there and are getting support and getting recognition, and are obviously doing something 
right, and therefore should be an organisation that we would want to partner with.  
TH: But are you seeing that in terms of partnerships that you’re working with? 
 DM: Yes, I am, because I think that people still, fundamentally, people still want to work with 
people like them, want to work with people that represent how they want to be represented. 
There is that, as you say, symbiotic relationship. Just that fact that we’re similar entities that 
each can offer the other a real benefit from being in partnership. 
TH: So, there are a number of synergies between each other.                          
DM: Yeah, but also, I think its recognising, let’s take StreetGames for instance, they have a wish to 
deliver more sport to young people in disadvantaged areas, fundamentally, with little access 
to sport. That’s what they want to do. So, they need a variety of offers, and therefore a variety 
of sports, to make that offer attractive. We want to see more people playing handball, 
fundamentally, and as a next bit if we’re seeing more people being active, great. More people 
active in handball, superb. They’ve already got the delivery arms, they’ve already got the 
people on the ground in those areas, delivering their sport offer. I don’t have that. Won’t they 
don’t have is the training, the knowledge and the experience of handball. We have. If we can 
give them that, they can give us the access. They get more strings to they’re bow, they can 
attract more people into their programmes, makes them more attractive to funding pots, 
keeps them going. We benefit because they’ve got a bigger delivery capacity. Fantastic. But 
also, the fact that central to their core is this more young people playing sport, sits with our 
focus, with our strategy of more young people playing handball.  
TH: The interesting thing there is that StreetGames consider themselves a social institution, but 
also consider NGBs to be a social institution. 
DM: As I said before, the fact is that they may well be and are more likely going to be engaging 
with youngsters, for who sport is a means to an end, it’s a means to meet with his mates. But 
also, there are a lot of kids who through StreetGames programmes, get into elite pathways. 
So, yes, we’re a social institution, and so are they, because sport is a naturally sociable 
activity, and so has a variety of strings. 
TH: So, you could argue that as England Handball wear many hats, in terms of working with the 
educational sector, working within the health sector, working in the sport policy sector, or the 
sports sector, equally it could be considered a membership organisation, a social organisation    
DM: Yep, educational organisation. 
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TH: Educational organisation, and so on and so forth. I wonder if that’s where all the challenges 
are? 
DM: We are so many things 
TH: You are so many things, and no-one quite knows where you should be?  
DM: What I would say is that’s where the partnership bit comes the fore,  
TH: Because you have that flexibility? 
DM: Yeah, because I could say, yes, we are a social institution, but actually partners like 
StreetGames, provide our social institution, on our behalf. We’re an education institution, but 
actually it’s our working partnerships with schools, colleges and universities that makes us an 
educational institution. Not solely us, but the partners that we work with provide that element. 
TH: That’s really interesting, but it certainly makes it very complex.  
 DM: Without a doubt, and that’s why for most if not all governing bodies, no is a dirty word. They 
don’t like saying no. Especially when it comes to having people coming to play your sport or 
wanting to play your sport. You don’t like turning them down. But sometimes you’ve got to say 
no, we don’t have the capacity to deal with that, we don’t the ability to deliver that. But that’s 
where a lot of self-organising is, table tennis for example, and the whole Ping thing, and also 
the pop-up nets. When I worked with table tennis, when I was at Sport England, I said that’s 
your soft way of saying no. He looked at me sideways and said what do you mean that’s the 
soft way of saying no, I said you can go to someone and say no we can’t help you out at the 
moment, but actually, look here’s a product – stretch a net across a table and play table 
tennis now. There’s an opportunity for you that’s not going to take any resource out of me, but 
you can still play. And if you get set up and start to run, we can plug you into the local council. 
So that self-organising environment, great thing for us. Again, companies organising 
corporate sport, going mammoth down in London organising corporate leagues, in different 
sports – great. Why not deliver handball, why not deliver volleyball. 
TH: Have you spoken to them?  
DM: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Handball’s in one of the big corporate games down in Essex. 
TH: So, its finding those niche markets, those crevasses where you can … 
DM: Shoehorn yourself in. 
TH: … shoehorn yourself in, and move yourself forward. 
DM: The key to that is giving somebody something simple to deliver. If you get in there and you 
go, you’ve got to do all of this, they’ll go forget it, it’s too much effort. So, we developed Try 
Handball, and even we’re starting to think now that could be the model that people just use to 
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play the sport, they don’t want to play full contact, they want to play mixed, they want to throw 
a ball around, they want to do a touch and tag version, and they want to do it on a smaller 
court. So that’s no longer trying it, its playing it. So, we might have to think of a different name 
for it.  
TH: So, what’s your view of the current government strategy?   
DM: It now sits within a wider context, and Sport England should probably be named Physical 
Activity England, because its dealing with stuff wider than sport. I think sport is now but a 
small part of a broader look at health, wellbeing, and stuff like that. Arguably, there isn’t a 
government strategy for sport. There is a strategy in which sport sits, but is there a strategy 
for sport? Other people might say otherwise, but I think Sport England has extracted their 
element from the broader government policy on sport and physical activity.  
  TH: Is that suggesting that government still doesn’t know what to do with sport? 
 DM: I used to say when I worked in local authority leisure services, and I think it’s still true today. 
Because leisure services is not a statutory requirement of local government, like education, 
health, roads, it’s always struggled because, its struggled in the sense that, it often presents 
the best opportunity to engage with people, but when it comes to Election time, you often see 
the politicians out on the sports pitches or in the sports schemes, and stuff like that, having 
their photos taken. You don’t often see them sat behind council tax desks, and stuff like that, 
but it’s the easiest thing to cut, when it comes to, we’re struggling for funding, what are we 
going to cut, it’s the only area, and we’ve seen with the likes of Northampton in their £70m 
deficit in their budget, there are a lot of things that are going to suffer. But it’s a very easy 
thing to pull, and say we don’t have to provide it. If they pulled all that funding from education, 
there would be uproar. Well they couldn’t do it. So, I think in that respect, does government 
know what to do with it, I wouldn’t necessarily say that, I think it’s more a question of its still a 
poorer relation to other areas of delivery. And the same, whilst we’ve seen the benefit of the 
primary premium funding for PE in primary schools, and the sugar tax, arguably, you’re losing 
an outlet in secondary schools, less people doing PE, less time on the curriculum, because 
again it’s not deemed as a core activity. Yet, you see all these studies that say that kids who 
are being physically active, so again you’re looking at that wider context, because you use the 
word sport to some kids and it will turn them off, but being physically active, that helps them in 
their study. I always think there’s more that could be done, but then I’m bias because its what 
I’ve always worked in, so I know the benefit of it for me as an individual, my family, other 
people that I work with, other people that I played with, and people that I played against, all 
that sort of stuff, so I always argue more can be done. 
TH: How do you see you your current relationship with Sport England, government, and I suppose 
more importantly for you, UK Sport?  
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DM: With Sport England, we are a funded partner, I think that’s about it. We will meet their 
requirements, we will tick the boxes that they want ticked from us, we will deliver want they 
want us to deliver, and that’s about it, that’s about it. The fact that they have taken away, 
they’ve had to I think through their own changes in structure, there is no longer the 
relationship management team, so I don’t have a dedicated relationship manager with Sport 
England. So, there are people that look after governing bodies, but it’s not style and structure, 
certainly when I worked there. There is no function for an NGB relationship manager at Sport 
England. 
TH: Has that happened since … 
DM: 2017. The change in focus, it’s gone. 
TH: What does that tell you?  
DM: I think its recognising that we’re not front and centre anymore. However, they’ve always said 
we want to go off and work with other organisations, work with other agencies, there’s going 
to come a point when, they might not be able to work with other agencies because they’re not 
set up in the right way. Because the thing we’ve always said is all the hoops that we’ve had to 
jump through as governing bodies, especially things like governance, in order to be able to 
access funding. So, you go off and work with an organisation that’s not set up in the same 
way, then you’re really casting us out. Then you’re really saying we can work with those and 
we can give them up, and I’m not sure how many of those around to be able to work in the 
same way. 
TH: Is that suggesting Sport England might be creating their own demise, in that respect? 
DM: It’s going to be a very interesting time for them, over the next four to six years, arguably with 
Jennie stepping down in November, and a new CEO coming in, comprehensive spending 
review coming up, reducing Lottery ticket sales. 
TH: Thinking about England handball influencing the direction of sports policy, to what extent do 
you think you have the capacity to influence sport policy, and in particular what areas? 
DM: Its very tricky as an individual organisation, and the size that we are. Can I go and demand a 
meeting with the Minister of Sport, and talk to her about sport policy on my own, probably not. 
Can I do it as a collective with other governing bodies, yes. What can we do then, I think we 
can continue to do what we do and showcase what we do, and continue to deliver our stuff to 
show to Sport England that we are a viable option for delivering to our core market, our key 
audience. The opportunity for us to, as an individual organisation, to directly influence 
government policy, is very limited. Not at our level, and not on our own. As I said before, with 
the CEO forum, and creating the state of the nation, as a collective, yes. That’s about leaving 
your governing body hat, that’s my England Handball hat, at the door, and going in as a 
representative of governing bodies as a whole, so I think it has the ability to do that.  
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TH: Do you think that’s the only means available to NGBs? Or medium size NGBs? 
DM: It’s one of them, I think if you take the UK Sport consultation coming up. There’s a public 
consultation that we can try to help, working with British Handball, to try and promote and 
encourage people to complete the survey. Again, at British Handball level, we’ve worked with 
ten other sports on the Every Sport Matters programme. We knew we wouldn’t be able to do 
that on our own, but to work with a group, and that group has stayed together, which is good, 
the outcome would be an actual change. It’s very difficult on the one hand to argue with the 
No compromise approach, but there’s also a point at which you go, look how well we did at 
our Home Games, the first nation ever in the Games following hosting to exceed what they 
did as a host nation. There are many that would say, quit while you’re ahead, because the 
only way is down, and therefore if you maintain that that is your focus, and the results don’t 
keep coming, then people will view you as a failure. Whether that’s UK Sport, whether that’s 
the governing bodies, people will view you as a failure. However, you could argue if you say, 
right guys we’ve done that where we’ve come from since 1996, after Atlanta, to where we are 
now, we’ve shown what we can do, but we’re going to change that tact slightly. We’re not 
going all out to be 2
nd
, 3
rd
 in the medals table, we still want to win medals. Nobody in the 
forum has said we don’t want to win medals anymore, what we’re saying is spread the load, 
spread it out a bit more. Recognise that actually, this is where team sports have suffered, 
what is you want, do you talk medals, or do you talk medallists. Because hockey won a gold, 
won a gold medal, or did they win 20 medals, or are there 20 medallists going around 
encouraging others. Charlotte du Jardin, who could argue about the medals she’s won, one 
lady on one horse in a relatively elite sport, and all those arguments have been had, and 
you’ve got the whole basketball scenario. But because front and centre the focus is on, if 
you’re not going to qualify for the Olympics and win medals, you’re getting nothing, what do 
we do. As handball, what do we do? I’ve always maintained if that is your or was you primary 
focus and premise, why did you change that tact purely because you had the opportunity in 
the Home Games to have host nation status. If that was merely your principle, then you 
should have said, but you wouldn’t have qualified for these Games had we not been hosting 
it, and you won’t qualify for the next one, because you won’t be getting any money, so were 
not giving you any money. But they let the genie out of the bottle, the gave basketball £11.5m, 
they gave us £3.5m, knowing full well, knowing full well, as we did, and I wasn’t even there 
then, knowing full well that once London had finished, there would be no more money, 
because they would instantly go but Rio, you’re not qualify so you don’t get any money. Yeah, 
but hold on, you’ve asked us to go from nowhere to somewhere, and just sent us back to 
nowhere again, even to the extent of saying, you need to go now and look at what gymnastics 
or hockey did, when they weren’t getting so much funding, and now they’re qualifying for 
medals. Go away, and when you’re in a position to qualify for the Olympics come back to talk 
to us about funding. You go, how the hell are we going to qualify for the Olympics with 
nothing, nothing. We’re not saying we want millions, but we’re saying in order to allow our 
teams, and players therefore, to compete, we need a small amount of funding. But if you say, 
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actually, the focus is not now the Olympics, is at a slightly lower level, arguably, in a sport like 
handball, it’s harder to win the European Championships, than it is to win the Olympics. 
That’s where the power base is.  
TH: Thank you very much David for your time. 
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Appendix IX: ‘Deep-Core’ Beliefs of government and Sport England 
Policy Document Government SE 
Raising the Game 
(1995) 
 
Conservative 
 
National heritage-pride, enriches life quality, 
teaches valuable lifelong lessons. 
 
‘Arm’s length’ ideology. 
 
Elite athletes as role models (linked to 
participation). 
 
‘The benefits of sport are well rehearsed – 
national identity and prestige, community 
development, personal challenge, as well as 
economic and health benefits. Sport is a 
central element in the English way of life.’ 
(SE, 1997, p.3) -  a vital national asset. 
 
Evidence of elite athletes as role models 
(linked to participation) 
 
A Sport Future for All 
(2000-2012) 
incorporating Game 
Plan (2002) and Playing 
to Win (2008)  
New Labour  
 
Sport matters to all, national identity, 
feelgood factor, inspirational, health benefits. 
 
Best Value ethos. 
 
Sport - essential part of the social, economic 
and environmental fabric of England. 
 
 
Creating a Sporting 
habit for Life (2012) 
 
Conservative-led Coalition 
 
‘Arm’s length’ ideology. 
 
Value for money ethos. 
 
Strong scientific evidence – regular 
physically activity leads to healthier lives, 
reduces the risk of many chronic health 
conditions. 
 
Sporting Future (2015) Conservative 
 
Social, economic, health benefits.  
 
Government duty to ensure everyone 
benefits from power of sport. 
 
Arm’s length principle across government 
agencies, especially sport, where specialist 
expertise is needed. 
 
Sport - people business, can have an impact 
on almost every aspect of everyone’s life; a 
force for social good. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
350 
 
Appendix X: ‘Policy-Core’ Beliefs of government and Sport England  
Policy Document Government SE 
Raising the Game 
(1995) 
 
Re-establish sport as one of the great pillars 
of education. 
 
Grassroots/Community/Elite sport not 
separate themes – represent a sporting 
continuum (school sport the most important 
element).  
 
Playground to Podium: (supporting sport 
from primary schools to elite level). 
 
NGBs: Important in forging strong links 
with schools – a ‘gap-bridging’ role   
 
 
Sporting continuum is dynamic and flexible – 
not clear cut – requires the right sporting 
structures and opportunities. 
 
Sport does not exist in a vacuum - affected 
by wider social, economic and political 
context; impact is wide-ranging. 
 
Foster a healthier, more successful nation 
through increased investment in sport and 
active recreation.  
 
Playground to the Podium: MORE people, 
MORE places and MORE medals 
 
Synergy exists between government and SE 
sports policy - prioritising social exclusion, 
increasing participation, and achieving 
excellence, particularly in young people. 
 
SE - Advocacy role to place sport at the 
heart of government’s agenda and foster 
relations with key players in the sector.  
 
NGBs: Well-managed, are the right 
organisations to deliver many of the 
initiatives. 
 
A Sport Future for All 
(2000-2012) 
incorporating Game 
Plan (2002) and Playing 
to Win (2008)  
Re-establish the UK as a world leading 
sporting nation. 
 
Mass participation/elite performance part of 
the same package. 
 
Playground to Podium. 
 
Clearer delineation of responsibilities -
separation between the development of 
sport and physical activity: 
 
PE and school sport (YST); 
 
Community sport (SE); 
  
Elite sport (UKS)  
 
NGBs: ‘Modernising Partnership’ – 
central role as delivers of sport to 
achieve shared government objectives - 
to increase participation, and improve co-
ordination and professionalism of sports’ 
management. 
 
Increased government funding for sport 
recognises the value of sport at the highest 
levels. 
 
SE - the only national agency with a clear 
government mandate to champion of 
community sport. 
 
Aligned and joined-up delivery, nationally 
agreed shared priorities to meet government 
social, economic and health objectives. 
 
Establish England as the best sporting 
nation in the world. 
 
Playground to the Podium: Start, Stay, 
Succeed (2002); Excel, Sustain, Grow 
(2008) 
 
Reform and modernisation to achieve 
government’s ambitious goals. 
 
Clarity of roles for the key bodies within the 
sporting landscape. SE, UKS – investors in 
sport rather than developers of sport. 
 
NGBs: New working relationship focused 
on WSP ‘outcomes’ and delivering on 
objectives for their sports effectively and 
efficiently. 
 
Creating a Sporting 
habit for Life (2012) 
 
Inspire a generation of young people to take 
up sport as a habit for life - Olympic Legacy 
from the Home Games. 
 
Sharper sense of direction and purpose 
across the entire sporting family. 
 
Active ‘mixed economy’ approach to funding 
and achieving objectives. 
 
Taking sport out of its traditional structures 
and environments and into young people’s 
lives. 
 
Active ‘mixed economy’ approach to funding 
and achieving objectives. 
 
Home Olympic Games - unique opportunity 
to convert inspiration into participation to 
create a tangible and transformative mass 
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A new youth sport strategy - focused on 
reaching out to young people more 
effectively. 
 
Collective discipline of building on what 
works, and discarding what doesn’t - 
successful organisations rewarded - financial 
sanctions for non-delivery of objectives. 
 
UKS/SE/YST - unchanged   
 
NGBs: significant shift in focus - tasked 
with delivery of increased participation 
for young people under-16.  
 
participation legacy.   
 
New Youth & Community Strategy – 
focused on helping more people acquire a 
sporting habit for life; create more 
opportunities for young people to play sport; 
nurture and develop talent, particularly the 
14-25 age group. 
 
UKS/SE/YST/NGBs - unchanged   
 
Sporting Future (2015) Redefinition of sporting success - reflective 
of the broader value of engagement in sport 
and physical activity. 
 
Sustainable mixed funding model. 
 
Unity towards achieving clear, widely shared 
outcomes and a common set of goals. 
 
Largest gains and best value for public 
investment is a focus on the least active. 
 
A new strategy for an active nation - 
Cross-Whitehall shared commitment to 
delivery;  
 
Multiple roles within and across subsystems; 
 
SE - changed remit: measuring and 
supporting both sport and certain kinds of 
physical activity - responsible for young 
people from aged five to enable a greater 
impact across the whole sporting life. 
 
NGBs: role reversion back to ‘core 
market’ and retention rather than 
increase in numbers. 
 
Alignment with government policy - focused 
on tackling inactivity where the gains for the 
individual and for society are greatest. 
 
An organisationally-neutral approach - not 
who you are but what you can do mind-set.  
 
Wider partnership-working and collaboration 
where there is genuine common purpose to 
deliver on desired outcomes. Tackling 
inactivity requires a coalition of partners. 
 
Strategy for an Active Nation – focused on 
more people from every background 
regularly and meaningfully engaging in sport 
and physical activity (from the age of 5) 
 
SE – an active role in brokering 
arrangements to help the sector become 
more productive and sustainable. 
 
NGBs:  change in emphasis for NGBs 
focused on their ‘core-market’ – those 
who regularly play sport. 
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Appendix XI: ‘Secondary-Aspects’ of government and Sport England’s belief 
system 
Policy Document Government SE 
Raising the Game 
(1995) 
 
Lottery/Exchequer grant funding conditional. 
 
Self-generated, time specific performance 
measurements/targets. 
 
 
Funding directed towards two key objectives, 
fundamentally interrelated: more champions 
and more participation; 
 
Effective and realistic target setting on a 
sport by sport basis – NGB-led. 
 
‘Fit for purpose’ assessments to receive 
public funds. 
 
A Sport Future for All 
(2000-2012) 
Closer focus on target setting - funding 
decisions/distribution linked to progress of 
sports/NGBs against delivery of government 
aims. 
 
Adoption of inclusive policies (social 
inclusion-deprivation). 
 
Monitoring and evaluation on the basis of 
earned autonomy - determined by 
compliance and contribution to contracted 
objectives. 
 
Setting of targets based on hard evidence 
and rigorous measurement of progress 
against targets. 
 
‘Fit for purpose’ assessments to receive 
public funds. 
 
NGBs monitored and evaluated via a mixture 
of self-assessment and independent 
analysis.  
 
 
Creating a Sporting 
habit for Life (2012) 
 
High standards of governance and financial 
control. 
 
Tougher performance management regime - 
strict payment-by-results system. 
 
Funding awarded on a competitive basis. 
 
Non-compliance with contracted objectives - 
funding made accessible to those offering 
strong business cases for increasing 
participation. 
 
 
Strong leadership and good governance are 
the foundations of success for NGBs. 
 
Important principle in relationship with NGBs 
- investment of public money is a privilege 
not an entitlement. 
 
Funding awarded on a competitive basis to 
NGBs with strongest WSPs and a good 
record on delivery. 
 
Strong performance management through a 
payment-by-results system approach - 
rewarding success and penalising failure. 
 
Use of alternative open market options for 
fund re-distribution/allocation. 
 
Sporting Future (2015) More productive, sustainable and 
responsible sport sector - to reduce the over-
reliance/resource-dependency on public 
subsidies. 
 
Government funding for sport and physical 
activity to go to organisations demonstrating 
ability to deliver on strategic outcomes - 
collaborative organisations best placed to 
access funding. 
 
Mandatory governance Code for all sports 
bodies seeking public funds – non-
compliance resulting in financial sanctions. 
Strongly agreed principle that funding 
decisions should be customer demand-led – 
evidence on customer need to be rigorously 
tested in all of investments. 
 
SE Board shared-belief for promoting the 
positive impact of sport and activity, and a 
commitment to overcome barriers to physical 
activity.  
 
Greater diversity at board level essential to 
represent society as a whole. 
 
Compliance with new Governance Code for 
Sport in the UK required for all funding 
agreements from 2017. 
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Appendix XII: Examples of coalition partner beliefs, alignment and advocacy 
 
StreetGames Beliefs, Alignment and Advocacy 
Context StreetGames promotes Doorstep Sport in disadvantaged communities - helps over 900 
community organisations across the UK to take sport to the doorstep in disadvantaged 
communities. 
 
Vision To make doorstep sport the accepted way to change lives, sport and communities. 
 
Mission To deliver Doorstep Sport initiatives throughout the country, working together to change sport, 
change lives, and change communities; to see more disadvantaged young people taking part in 
sport and strengthen the sporting infrastructure of the UK. 
 
Advocacy  Sport as an instrument of social change in disadvantaged communities; advocates doorstep 
sport: helping national and local policymakers to see the potential doorstep sport has to change 
lives and change communities. 
 
Source: StreetGames available online from: http://www.streetgames.org/ 
 
Greenhouse Sport Beliefs, Alignment and Advocacy 
Context A London-based charity that uses sport to engage young people and improve their life chances. 
 
Vision Every child has a fair chance to succeed. 
 
Mission To deliver intensive sports coaching and mentoring to help develop the Social, Thinking, 
Emotional and Physical (STEP) abilities of young people from disadvantaged communities. 
   
Advocacy  Belief in the power of sport to: 
 Inspire young people to fulfil their true potential 
 Develop the Social, Thinking, Emotional and Physical (STEP) skills they will need to 
thrive in later life 
 Break down the barriers that are often associated with growing up in disadvantaged or 
vulnerable communities; 
 
Evidenced-based: 
 Reduces the risk of many chronic physical conditions (such as coronary heart disease, 
type 2 diabetes, cancer, and obesity); 
 Combats mental health problems, such as depression and anxiety, and improves self-
esteem; 
 A growing body of evidence to suggest a connection between being physically active 
and being more attentive in the classroom, leading to improved Developed Social, 
academic attainment. 
 
Source: Greenhouse Sports, available online from:  https://www.greenhousesports.org/ 
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Youth Sports Trust Beliefs, Alignment and Advocacy 
Context An independent UK charity devoted to changing young people’s lives through sport. 
 
Vision To provide every young person with the opportunity to transform their lives through high 
quality PE and sport, and have a positive impact on their wellbeing, leadership and 
achievement. 
 
Mission To create a brighter future for all children and young people through the power of sport. 
  
Advocacy Every child has a right to access high quality physical education (PE), school sport and 
physical activity; 
 
Overwhelming evidence to demonstrate the power that PE and school sport has to 
change young people’s lives; unlocking their potential, helping them to be healthy and 
happy, ultimately going on to lead successful lives and positively contribute to society. 
 
Source: YST, available from: https://www.youthsporttrust.org/ 
 
County Sports 
Partnerships 
 
Beliefs, Alignment and Advocacy 
Context A nationwide network of 44 CSPs - committed to improving Lives by Growing Grassroots Sport and 
Physical Activity. 
 
Vision An active lifestyle is the social norm for everyone. 
 
Mission Transforming lives through sport and physical activity. 
 
Advocacy  Using the power of sport & physical activity for social good; Raising the profile of sport & physical 
activity through innovative local and national promotional campaigns. 
 
Source: CSP Network, available online from: http://www.cspnetwork.org/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
